Parliaments in Times of Crisis: COVID-19, Populism and Executive Dominance Nicole Bolleyer, Geschwister-Scholl-Institute, Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich, Germany Orsolya Salát, Institute for International and Political Studies, ELTE University, Budapest, Hungary Online Appendix Note on Court Rulings in Response to COVID-Measures While by now a range of cases is pending and first rulings have been issued, even strong, unquestionably independent courts with high standing appear cautious to challenge executives as could be expected on the basis of literature. For instance, the German Federal Constitutional Court rejected several requests for preliminary injunctions as ungrounded,1 and even when it recognized the severity of rights limitations, it emphasized that in light of the importance of the state’s duty to protect life and limb, stakes are too high for a decision to be taken in accelerated procedure.2 On the other hand, of course, a decision which comes in a year or two’s time, will likely not be able to reverse processes which led to significant harm, like bankruptcy and so on. When courts do intervene, they object to blanket bans (like the German court on the blanket ban on assemblies)3 or limit the range of possible interpretations of executive action (like the French Constitutional Council, largely finding the emergency laws constitutional, just putting relatively small reservations to their interpretation).4 Thus, to date, judicial activity seems to have remained in the outer and formal spheres of constitutionalism.5 Primary Documents and Online Sources BBC. MPs agree to extend COVID powers until September, 25.03.2021. https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-56521358, accessed 05.04.2021. Bundeskanzlei Schweiz. Bericht des Bundesrates über die Ausübung seiner Notrechtskompetenzen und die Umsetzung überwiesener Kommissionsmotionen seit Beginn der Coronakrise, 28.05.2020. https://www.bk.admin.ch/bk/de/home/dokumentation/gesetzgebung/berichtnotverordnu ngen.html, accessed 10.08.2020. 1 BVerfG, 1 BvR 762/20, 1 BvR 2038/20 , 1 BvR 2039/20, 1 BvQ 93/20. 2 BVerfG, 1 BvR 755/20, especially paras. 10-11. 3 BVerfG, 1 BvR 828/20. 4 Décision du Conseil constitutionnel n° 2020-800 DC du 11 mai 2020, décision du Conseil constitutionnel n° 2020-808 DC du 13 novembre 2020. 5 See also, on a very recent decision of the BVerfG on complaints regarding measures of the April 2021 reform, https://www.zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2021-05/bundesverfassungsgericht-lehnt-eilantraege-gegen- ausgangssperre-ab?utm_referrer=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.google.com%2F, acccessed 01.05. 2021. 1 Cowie, Graeme. Coronavirus Bill: Amended time limits and post-legislative review, Library of the House of Commons, 25.03.2020. https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/coronavirus- bill-amended-time-limits-and-post-legislative-review/, accessed 20.07.2020. Department for Health and Social Care (UK). Suppementary Delegated Powers Memorandum on the Coronavirus Bill, 23.03.2020. https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/bills/lbill/58-01/110/5801110-DPMsupp.pdf, accessed 20.07.2020. Filippov, Gabór. Hungary: Executive Summay, n.d.. https://freedomhouse.org/country/hungary/nations-transit/2020, accessed 10.02.2021. Gaillet, Aurore and Maximilian Gerhold. Etat d’urgence sanitaire: Wie Frankreich den Coronavirus bekämpft, Verfassungsblog, 27.03.2020. https://verfassungsblog.de/etat- durgence-sanitaire/, accessed 10.08.2020. Haguenau-Moizard, Catherine. Governing Through Fear in France: The Pandemic, Parliament and Citizens’ Rights in France, Verfassungsblog, 01.04.2020. https://verfassungsblog.de/governing-through-fear-in-france/, accessed 10.08.2020. Jacobsen, Lenz. Infektionsschutzgesetz im Bundestag: Von Angst getrieben, Die Zeit Online, 18.11.2020. https://www.zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2020- 11/infektionsschutzgesetz-bundestag-reform-coronavirus-pandemie-befugnisse- grundrechte, accessed 05.04.2021. Keul, Katja, Manuela Rottmann, Canan Bayram, Christian Kühn, Irene Mihalic, Konstantin von Notz, Renate Künast, Luise Amtsberg, Katja Dörner, Kai Gehring, Britta Haßelmann, Monika Lazar, Filiz Polat, Tabea Rößner, Charlotte Schneidewind-Hartnagel, Margit Stumpp und der Fraktion BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN. Antrag ‘Recht und Justiz krisenfest gestalten’, Drucksache 19/18712, 21.04.2020. https://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/19/187/1918712.pdf, accessed 10.08.2020. Klafki, Anika. Coronavirus und Reformbedarf des „Pandemierechts“, 05.03.2020. https://verfassungsblog.de/coronavirus-und-reformbedarf-des-pandemierechts/, accessed 05.08.2020. Letteron, Rosalind. L’état d’urgence sanitaire, un objet juridique non identifié, Libertés Cheries Blog , 21.03.2020. http://libertescheries.blogspot.com/2020/03/letat-durgence- sanitaire-objet.html, accessed 10.08.2020. 2 Mudde, Cas. Will the Coronavirus kill populism? Don’t count on it, The Guardian, 27.03.2020. https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/mar/27/coronavirus- populism-trump-politics-response, accessed 14.07.2020. Müller, Jan-Werner. How Populitsts will leverage the pandemic, World Politics Review, 07.04.2020. https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/28663/how-populists-will- leverage-the-coronavirus-pandemic, accessed 08.08.2020. Richter, Dagmar. Das Corona-Ermächtigungsgesetz – ein schlechtes Beispiel für Europa? Machtfülle des Bundesgesundheitsministers und Entmachtung des Gesetzgebers durch das neue deutsche Infektionsschutzgesetz, 24.04.2020, http://jean-monnet- saar.eu/?page_id=2498, accessed 25.07.2020. Schäfer, Fabian. Das Covid-19 Gesetz auf einen Blick, NZZ, 07.05.2021. https://www.nzz.ch/schweiz/das-covid-19-gesetz-auf-einen-blick-ld.1623528, accessed 10.05.2021. Schmitz, Holger and Carl-Wendelin Neubert. Parlament beschliesst Änderung des Infektionsschutzgesetzes, 19.11.2020. https://www.noerr.com/de/newsroom/news/parlament-beschliesst-anderungen-des- infektionsschutzgesetzes, accessed 10.02.2021. Sierakowski, Slawomir. Why populists love the pandemic, Balkan Insight, 02.04.2020. https://balkaninsight.com/2020/04/02/why-populists-love-the-pandemic/, accessed 08.08.2020. Wissenschaftliche Dienste Deutscher Bundestag. Staatsorganisation und § 5 Infektionsschutzgesetz. Ausarbeitung WD 3 - 3000 - 080/20, 2020. https://www.bundestag.de/resource/blob/690262/cb718005e6d37ecce82c99191efbec49/ WD-3-080-20-pdf-data.pdf, accessed 05.08.2020. 3 Table A1: Parliamentary Policy-making Power during the COVID-19 Crisis Hungary UK France Germany Italy Switzerland Main Legal Foundations for (National) Rights-Restrictive 1.Fundamental Law of Hungary 1. Public Health 1. Public Health Federal Act to Prevent and 1. Italian 1. Swiss constitution 6 9 Measures (pre-existing and newly created) 2.Catastrophe Act (2011, and (Control of Disease) Code Fight Human Infectious constitution (law 2. Swiss Epidemic Act 2012 8 as modified by the Transition Act 1984 2. Coronavirus Act Diseases (4. revisions up decrees) 3. Government and Act 2020) 2. Coronavirus Act (2020), amending to spring 2021) 2. Civil Protection Administration Organization Act 3. Coronavirus Act (2020) 2020 the Public Health Code 4. COVID-19 Act (since Sept. 4. Transition Act 20207 Code 2020) Legal Environment as Chosen/Created during Crisis (Evolution of Parliamentary Policy-making Power within cases) Choice in favour of (available) legal No (for the initial 15 days)11 Yes Yes n/a12 Successively No13 n/a foundation for executive action (Health Act 1997) (Civil Contingencies (1955 Act on the that reduced parliamentary-policy Act 2004) State of Emergency) making power (if yes, available act(s) not used) Reform of foundation for executive Yes Yes Yes Yes No No14 Reduction of action (overall) reducing (Coronavirus Act 2020, (Coronavirus Act 2020) (Coronavirus Act Federal Act to Prevent and Parliamentary parliamentary constraints (if yes, Transition Act 2020) 2020) Fight Human Infectious Policy-Making new or amended act) Diseases) Power through Legislative Choice Reform of foundation for executive Yes Yes Yes Yes No No15 6 Fighting the COVID-19 pandemics executives have used different types of legal measures simultaneously. The focus in this analysis is the main legal foundation used by the national government to put in place the main rights-restrictive measures that curtailed and still curtail fundamental democratic rights whose implementation through executive decrees is particularly problematic and where normative pressure to assure parliamentary involvement is particularly prounounced. 7 The Health Act was relied on for four days between the expiry of the initial state of danger on 26 March and the entry into force of the Coronavirus Defense Act on 30 March. Then the June 2020 modification to the Health Act by the Transition Act granted the possibility for the government to declare and renew every 6 months the so- called “medical crisis situation”. 8 This act provided basis for the lockdown measures in England under the Health Protection (Coronavirus, Restrictions) (England) Regulations 2020 (the other regions adopted similar but separate regulations). The Coronavirus Act 2020 expanded the already extensive executive powers further. 9 Art. 77(2) of the Italian constitution allows the government in cases of ‘urgency and necessity’ to issue so-called law-decrees – “provisional measures with the force of law”. Law decrees as an instrument are unrelated to the state of emergency declared based on the Civil Protection Code authorizing the issuing of civil protection orders. 11 A constitutional state of exception (state of danger) was declared, which allows for broader executive action