NEPAL: ELECTING CHAOS Asia Report N°111 – 31 January 2006 TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS................................................. i I. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................... 1 II. THE ROYAL OFFENSIVE........................................................................................... 2 A. THE ROYAL CEO DOES WHAT HE HAS TO DO.....................................................................2 B. A BELLIGERENT PALACE ......................................................................................................3 C. SHADES OF 1990...................................................................................................................5 D. THE MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS .................................................................................................6 III. THE OPPOSITION........................................................................................................ 8 A. THE MAOISTS MOBILISE .......................................................................................................8 B. “STRIKING THE HEAD”..........................................................................................................8 C. THE PARTIES PROTEST........................................................................................................10 IV. LOCAL POLLS: MEANINGFUL DEMOCRACY?................................................ 11 A. WHAT’S WRONG WITH ELECTIONS? ...................................................................................11 B. BASIC BENCHMARKS ..........................................................................................................12 C. LESSONS FROM OTHER CONFLICTS .....................................................................................13 D. DON’T JUMP THE GUN ........................................................................................................14 V. THE INTERNATIONAL ROLE ................................................................................ 15 VI. CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................. 17 APPENDICES A. MAP OF NEPAL ...................................................................................................................18 B. MAP OF MUNICIPAL POLL LOCATIONS................................................................................19 C. MAP OF JANUARY 2006 SECURITY INCIDENTS ....................................................................20 D. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP .......................................................................21 E. CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON ASIA...............................................................22 F. CRISIS GROUP BOARD OF TRUSTEES ...................................................................................24 Asia Report N°111 31 January 2006 NEPAL: ELECTING CHAOS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS Nepal’s royal government is inviting confrontation by planned. They have demonstrated that they remain a force forcing through, amidst a new crackdown on civil liberties, to be reckoned with, and their attacks on major cities municipal elections on 8 February 2006 which will not undermine the government’s claim that it has broken their be free, fair or credible. Filling local posts with palace back and rendered them incapable of serious trouble. Most placemen will neither restart the national democratic importantly, they are still the only political player with a process, nor bring a peace process closer. The conflict coherent strategy. remains soluble: although the palace has refused to reciprocate a four-month Maoist ceasefire and the rebels Despite the promise held out by the November 2005 seven have resumed their armed campaign, mainstream parties parties-Maoist agreement, there is a fundamental dispute and the Maoists have agreed a roadmap which permits over how to progress towards peace. The traditional view compromise with the monarchy. But after one year of royal that the palace and parties must first unite and then deal rule and ten years of insurgency, the priority should be with the Maoists is still supported in certain quarters, most that peace process, not polls for offices with little power vocally the U.S. Others, not least the mainstream parties that all mainstream parties are boycotting. themselves, have given up hope of a stable alliance with the palace and are looking to move more directly to a new Holding elections in any conflict situation is a risky constitutional settlement that can bring the Maoists into undertaking. In Nepal’s case, the polls are only the latest in non-violent competitive politics. a series of moves which have inflamed political tensions and increased the polarisation between the palace and other The combination of peaceful party protests and armed political forces. The mainstream parties retain considerable Maoist action has shaken the royal government and may support and, with the Maoists agreeing not to impede their yet derail its proposed elections. But only a serious activities, are bringing increasing numbers onto the streets. change of course by the palace can dissipate the mood of But Maoist support for the boycott has given the king confrontation. The role of the outside world in forcing a an excuse for a security clampdown and hundreds of non- rethink is crucial. If King Gyanendra is to take it seriously, violent political protestors are still under arrest. The use of international concern, with targeted sanctions against his the army to suppress dissent has brought back memories of family and officials and a review of aid, must be both royal opposition to the 1990 democracy movement. more explicit and more coordinated. From February 2005 onwards, his calculation that he can essentially ignore With the first anniversary of the 1 February 2005 royal external pressure has yet to be proved wrong. coup approaching, the elections are a matter of pride for the king. He is unwilling to compromise, even though far RECOMMENDATIONS fewer candidates have put themselves forward than there are seats available. The local elections are meant to pave To the Royal Government: the way for general elections, which the royal government insists will reinvigorate democracy. But they have been 1. Call off the municipal elections and initiate a planned by a coterie of hardline royalist advisers who were broad-based peace process. active in trying to suppress the 1990 democracy movement and who are set on excluding the parties from power. 2. Take up the UN Secretary-General’s offer to help broker and monitor a durable bilateral ceasefire to The confrontation between an increasingly isolated palace create an environment for serious talks in which and increasingly militant mainstream activists has benefited to test Maoist willingness to compromise, and the Maoists. Since they ended their unilateral ceasefire on seriously consider international offers to assist in 2 January, they have sustained an intense and effective a process of reconciliation, including working military campaign. Their new concentration on small towards viable post-conflict elections. urban attacks has been carefully calibrated and well Nepal: Electing Chaos Crisis Group Asia Report N°111, 31 January 2006 Page ii To the Political Parties: has limited interests in Nepal and is viewed as more objective than India or the U.S., can play an 3. Go beyond the legitimate election boycott to important role in setting benchmarks, which the develop a clear peace agenda that contains a UN is best placed to monitor. positive message for steps to resolve the conflict. 9. Form a loose contact group of key states and the 4. Resolve internal differences over a peace process UN to coordinate policy, leave no room for doubt before conducting further negotiations with the it is united in seeking a peace settlement and return Maoists, agreeing most critically whether to continue to democracy, and make clear to the king that calls for restoration of parliament or move directly support for continuation of the constitutional to an interim government empowered to hold monarchy is neither unconditional nor guaranteed: elections for a constituent assembly. he does not have a blank cheque to veto peace 5. Embrace internal reforms in order to boost initiatives and pursue his project of dismantling organisational capacity and regain public democracy. confidence. 10. Impose targeted sanctions, including travel bans and asset freezes, on the royal family, senior To the Maoists: officials and military officers, and review the army’s lucrative involvement in UN peacekeeping 6. Respect fully stated commitments to observe missions. international humanitarian law and to abide by international development agencies’ Basic 11. Review all development assistance channelled Operating Guidelines. through the government. 7. Offer a concrete plan for disarmament as part of a 12. Give appropriate help to the parties and Maoists if peace process and a renewed ceasefire to create they are prepared to negotiate further towards a the environment for talks. peace process on the basis of their twelve-point agreement; do not stand in the way of third-party To the International Community: facilitation of their dialogue if they want it; and be prepared to help in a tripartite process should 8. Develop a united message that sets benchmarks for the king decide to enter talks. elections