1 OBJECTIVE AESTHETIC VALUES IN ART Ben McGorrigan, BSc, MA Thesis submitted to the University of Nottingham for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy JULY 2015 2 Abstract This dissertation defends an answer to the question: to what extent, if any, are aesthetic values in art objective? I defend what I call Moderate Aesthetic Objectivism, which can be summarised as follows. A work of art has a certain aesthetic value if and only if a human critic, in the circumstances ideal for the aesthetic experience of that work, would experience the work as having that aesthetic value. ‘Experience’ here is meant in a broad sense, encompassing imagination and understanding as well as perception. We should regard such a critic as someone who would detect the aesthetic value rather than make it the case that the work had that value. Experiencing a work as being aesthetically valuable in a certain way involves having an aesthetic experience which is itself valuable. Such an experience will be pleasurable, often in complex ways. Although critics in ideal circumstances for the aesthetic experience of a work detect aesthetic values rather than making it the case that the work has certain aesthetic values, the work only has those values because the resultant aesthetic experiences had by such critics are themselves valuable. The aesthetic values of a work are, however, realised by properties of the work which dispose it to cause such valuable aesthetic experiences for humans in the circumstances ideal for the aesthetic experience of the work. Those properties are what is aesthetically valuable in the work, and they are objective in the sense that their existence and character is independent of whether they are detected or responded to. This account therefore retains elements of both subjectivist and objectivist 3 approaches to aesthetic value. It can, I argue, make sense of our conflicting intuitions about the objectivity or subjectivity of aesthetic values in art. 4 Acknowledgments I am grateful to everyone who has helped me with this work directly or indirectly. Thanks are especially due to my parents for being as supportive as anyone could wish, my supervisor Greg Currie for being generous with his time and insight, and my partner Rachel for making me happy. I am also extremely grateful to fellow postgraduate students and staff (past and present) at the University of Nottingham Philosophy department; especially those who have provided me with written or verbal feedback or with whom I have enjoyed many debates and discussions. I have also learned much from visitors to the department, my undergraduate students, and my family and friends, all of whom have helped me develop this thesis in some way or another. I am also indebted to many of my former teachers and other role models. 5 Contents Preface ............................................................................................................... 8 1. Objectivity .................................................................................................... 12 1.1 Epistemic and Ontological Objectivity ........................................... 12 1.2 Art Works and their Properties ...................................................... 17 1.3 Aesthetic Objectivism .................................................................... 22 1.4 Cognitive Command ....................................................................... 35 2. Aesthetic Values in Art ................................................................................. 44 2.1 Art................................................................................................... 44 2.2 Aesthetic Values in Art ................................................................... 48 2.3 The Paradox of Taste ..................................................................... 53 2.4 Aesthetic Judgments ...................................................................... 62 2.5 Aesthetic Experience...................................................................... 68 3. Humean Response-Dependence .................................................................. 78 3.1 The Standard of Taste .................................................................... 78 3.2 Equally Valid Aesthetic Experiences .............................................. 84 3.3 The Real Problem ........................................................................... 93 3.4 Response-Dependence .................................................................. 98 3.5 Dispositionalism ........................................................................... 114 3.6 Anti-Dispositionalism ................................................................... 117 6 4. Aesthetic Value Empiricism ........................................................... 129 4.1 Aesthetic Value Empiricism ............................................. 130 4.2 The Heresy of the Separable Value .................................. 140 4.3 Aesthetic Experience........................................................ 149 4.4 The Non-Aesthetic Values of Aesthetic Experiences ....... 160 5. Relativism and Faultless Disagreements........................................ 175 5.1 Aesthetic Relativism ......................................................... 176 5.2 Aesthetic Sensibilities ...................................................... 178 5.3 Faultless Disagreements .................................................. 182 5.4 Cultural Variation ............................................................. 191 6. Aesthetic Scepticism ...................................................................... 201 6.1 Aesthetic Error Theory ..................................................... 201 6.2 Non-Cognitivism ............................................................... 205 7. Aesthetic Testimony ....................................................................... 219 7.1 Aesthetic Objectivism and Testimony ............................. 220 7.2 Transmission Testimony and Evidential Testimony ......... 221 7.3 Pessimism about Aesthetic Testimony ............................ 224 7.4 The Acquaintance Principle ............................................. 236 7.5 Optimism about Aesthetic Testimony ............................. 241 8. Conclusions .................................................................................... 255 7 8.1 The Paradox of Taste Revisited ........................................ 255 8.2 Aesthetic Values in Art ..................................................... 257 8.3 Humean Response-Dependence ..................................... 265 8.4 Anti-Objectivism............................................................... 269 8.5 Moderate Aesthetic Objectivism ..................................... 273 Bibliography ....................................................................................... 278 8 Preface This is a dissertation in Aesthetics, the branch of philosophy concerned with beauty, ugliness and related values such as elegance and garishness. This dissertation can be classed as primarily a work of Meta-Aesthetics: a division of Aesthetics which can be understood by analogy with Ethics. In Ethics, we have the following divisions: Applied Ethics is the philosophy of which actions are morally good, bad, better or worse in particular situations, for example in the ethics of abortion. Normative Ethics is the philosophy of what makes an action morally good, bad, better or worse, for example Consequentialism states that the consequences of actions are what determine their moral value. Meta-Ethics is the philosophy of Ethics, covering issues such as whether moral values exist, whether they are objective, and whether moral judgments are cognitive. Similarly, in Aesthetics we can identify the following three divisions: Applied Aesthetics is the philosophy of whether and to what extent particular objects are beautiful or ugly (or otherwise aesthetically valuable or disvaluable). Normative Aesthetics can be identified as the philosophy of what makes objects beautiful or ugly. Meta-aesthetics can be seen as the philosophy of Aesthetics, covering issues such as whether aesthetic values exist, whether they are objective, and whether aesthetic judgments are cognitive. 9 In this dissertation I am interested in what aesthetic values are and to what extent they are objective, and these are issues in Meta-Aesthetics but the answers I defend involve normative aesthetical claims about broadly what makes works of art aesthetically valuable. The dissertation is structured as follows: there are two introductory chapters; followed by two chapters in which I develop what I am calling Moderate Aesthetic Objectivism; followed by three chapters dealing with some of the main objections and challenges to the view; followed finally by a concluding chapter in which I summarise the claims I have made and the arguments for them. Chapter 1 introduces concepts of objectivity and Objectivism and the notion of cognitive command as an indication of objectivity and an explanation of convergence in judgment. Chapter 2 introduces concepts of art, aesthetic value, taste, and aesthetic value judgment. I present an apparent paradox involving conflicting intuitions about the objectivity or subjectivity of aesthetic values in art, and I introduce two major historical attempts to address this problem: David Hume’s ‘standard of taste’ and Immanuel Kant’s critique of ‘judgments of taste’. My own account is a development of certain aspects of each of these theories.1 Chapter