1 “Errors of judgement, not of intent”: The Southern Policy of Ulysses S. Grant Richard Dotor Cespedes UCL DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY In the subject of History 2 Declaration I, Richard Dotor Cespedes, confirm that the work presented in this thesis is my own. Where information has been derived from other sources, I confirm that this has been indicated in the thesis. 3 Abstract The Reconstruction era has been subject to countless studies seeking to vilify or celebrate citizens and politicians of the time. From an initial consensus on its immorality and opportunism, to a revisionism where its achievements were celebrated, and a post-revisionism where the cause of its downfall became the focus, the racial, social and political aspects of Reconstruction have been subject to over a century of debate. Within this historiography, though, the significance of Ulysses S. Grant has been predominantly ignored. Challenging the view that Grant lacked political and racial ideals, the aim of this thesis, and my original contribution to knowledge, is to define his Southern Policy in the context of a personal political and racial philosophy, rather than a record of achievement. An examination of the development of his viewpoint on Reconstruction, the rights of the freedmen, and the power of the President and Federal Government, reveals a struggle at the heart of Grant’s Southern policy as he sought to protect the results of the Civil War whilst hastening a close to the work or Reconstruction. Furthermore, careful study of his correspondence reveal him to be an egalitarian who, if permitted, would have been willing to manage the South with greater force and in far more absolute terms. The tension of his ideals and the dichotomy between thought and action resulted in an inconsistent approach to Southern state crises, counter-productive policy choices and ill-timed changes of course. The outcome was a Southern policy that was not only a political failure for Southern Republicans but, as revealed by a study of Grant’s 4 philosophy on the political and racial issues of the day, a personal one for the President. 5 Table of Contents Abbreviations ............................................................................................................... 6 Acknowledgments ........................................................................................................ 7 Introduction .................................................................................................................. 9 Chapter 1: Ulysses S. Grant in History ...................................................................... 22 Chapter 2: Slavery, Race and War ............................................................................. 72 Chapter 3: “In the face of the enemy”: Southern Policy 1867-1869........................ 110 Chapter 4: Closing the work of Reconstruction: Grant’s First Years in Office ....... 151 Chapter 5: Amnesty, Enforcement and the Grant Administration’s Attempts to Occupy the Middle Ground ...................................................................................... 196 Chapter 6: Ballots and Banditti ................................................................................ 233 Chapter 7: Republicanism by any Means ................................................................ 259 Conclusion ............................................................................................................... 289 Bibliography ............................................................................................................. 313 6 Abbreviations DGW Morse, John T. ed., The Diary of Gideon Welles: Secretary of the Navy under Lincoln and Johnson (Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1911) 3 Volumes DHF Diary of Hamilton Fish, Fish Papers, Library of Congress LOC Library of Congress PMUSG Grant, Ulysses S., Personal Memoirs of U.S. Grant (New York: Charles L. Webster, 1885) 2 Volumes PUSG Simon, John Y. et al, eds., The Papers of Ulysses S. Grant (Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1967-2009) 31 Volumes USG Ulysses S. Grant 7 Acknowledgments For supporting me academically, financially and emotionally, I would like to thank those individuals who have been instrumental in the completion of this thesis, over nine long - and as my supervisor warned me - tortuous years. To my family, I would like to thank them for their encouragement and financial support throughout my undergraduate and post graduate studies. Without their help, none of this would have been possible. To my wife, I would like to express gratitude for the emotional support, encouragement and understanding she has displayed over the years. I would also like to thank her for appreciating that holiday time meant study time. Shortly after starting this thesis, I began working full-time in further education. The demands of teaching, marking, preparing lessons and managing programmes frustratingly made the study of Ulysses S. Grant very much a part-time activity. The struggle of balancing this workload, particularly in the last few years where my career has progressed, has always been appreciated by all that have supported me and again, I would like to express my gratitude. To my supervisor, Professor Iwan Morgan, I would like to express sincere gratitude for the guidance, wisdom, patience and honesty he has shown to me over the years. As time has passed, and the thesis had progressed slowly towards completion, Professor Morgan has always been there to provide academic guidance above and beyond what was required, and to take a sincere interest in my personal and professional life. 8 I would like to thank the School of Advanced Study and University College London for facilitating a smooth transition between institutions. I would also like to thank the Institute for the Study of the Americas (SOAS) for funding my fieldwork in Washington D.C. Lastly, I would like to thank Dr Andrew Moran at London Metropolitan University and Professor Nathan Abrams at Bangor University for encouraging me to embark on this journey. 9 Introduction Throughout Reconstruction historiography and presidential studies in general, the significance of Ulysses S. Grant on the post-Civil War American South has been inadequately explored. Whilst celebrated as a general in countless volumes about his military career, those studies that touch upon his presidency often fall short of comprehensiveness, tending to perpetuate an image of political ineptitude, unintelligence and insignificance. In reference to this historiography, the late John Y. Simon, Executive Director of the Ulysses S. Grant Association, wrote that “military historians analyzed a far different Grant than did political historians, and the two portraits hardly seemed to show the same person”.1 The majority of academics are comfortable with the assumption that Grant was ill- suited for the role of president and once in office, was insignificant in his impact. Thomas A. Bailey in Presidential Greatness (1966) concluded that his “eight long years in blunderland are generally regarded as a national disgrace” and that even if one was to “[e]liminate those crooks for whom Grant was not directly responsible… he is entitled to a Below Average [sic] rating, a few notches better than complete failure”.2 This opinion is illustrated by Grant’s positioning in presidential rankings where he typically occupies the lower end of the table. A recent survey conducted by 1 John Y. Simon, “Ulysses S. Grant One Hundred Years Later”, Illinois State Historical Society, LXXIX (Winter 1986), p.256 2 Thomas A. Bailey, Presidential Greatness (New York: Appleton-Century, 1966) pp.295-296 10 the Institute for the Study of the America’s United States Presidency Centre placed Grant at number twenty eight of the forty presidents assessed, a rare high point.3 Whilst not vilified to the same extent as James Buchanan, Grant consistently occupies the bottom end of the presidential spectrum of achievement, dismissed as the “simple soldier, inexperienced in statecraft, impervious to sound advice, and oblivious to his own blundering”.4 Grant certainly acknowledged his shortcomings as President. In his final annual message, he wrote of his “fortune, or misfortune, to be called to the office of Chief Executive without any previous political training.”5 Reflecting on his time in the White House, he admitted to mistakes and failures, but believed them to have been “errors of judgment, not of intent”.6 This statement is fundamental to this thesis as the counter-productive outcomes of Grant’s Southern policy (in the context of protecting the results of war) were predominantly the result of mismanagement or insurmountable obstacles, rather than an intention to strip away the achievements of the Civil War and Reconstruction era. The tendency to define the presidency of Ulysses S. Grant by failure or the corruption that surrounded him has perpetuated ignorance as to the more complex and arguably positive aspects of his political career. Particularly in reference to Southern affairs, a closer study of Grant during the Reconstruction era reveal him to be far more committed to the cause of civil rights in the South than many have given him credit 3 Institute for the Study of the Americas, United States Presidency Centre. UK Survey of US Presidents Results [Internet] [Accessed 29 July 2014]; Available from: http://www.community- languages.org.uk/US-presidency-survey/overall.htm 4 Eugene H. Roseboom and Alfred E. Eckles jr, A History of Presidential