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CANADIAN FORCES COLLEGE / COLLÈGE DES FORCES CANADIENNES CSC 30 / CCEM 30 EXERCISE/EXERCICE NEW HORIZONS THE BATTLE OF KURSK JULY & AUGUST 1943 By /par Maj I J Phillips REME This paper was written by a student attending La présente étude a été rédigée par un the Canadian Forces College in fulfilment of stagiaire du Collège des Forces canadiennes one of the requirements of the Course of pour satisfaire à l'une des exigences du cours. Studies. The paper is a scholastic document, L'étude est un document qui se rapporte au and thus contains facts and opinions which the cours et contient donc des faits et des opinions author alone considered appropriate and que seul l'auteur considère appropriés et correct for the subject. It does not necessarily convenables au sujet. Elle ne reflète pas reflect the policy or the opinion of any agency, nécessairement la politique ou l'opinion d'un including the Government of Canada and the organisme quelconque, y compris le Canadian Department of National Defence. gouvernement du Canada et le ministère de la This paper may not be released, quoted or Défense nationale du Canada. Il est défendu copied except with the express permission of de diffuser, de citer ou de reproduire cette the Canadian Department of National étude sans la permission expresse du ministère Defence. de la Défense nationale. 1 ABSTRACT The Soviet victory at the battle of Kursk inevitably led to German defeat throughout Europe. It was the most decisive event of World War 2. An examination of Soviet and German Fighting Power before, during and after Kursk demonstrates the newly acquired Soviet ascendancy on the Eastern Front and therefore the ultimate importance of this battle. At Kursk, the lack of operational surprise and the time to prepare enabled the Soviets to destroy key German equipments, capture important transportation centres and gain crucial offensive experience on the way to this victory. Continued qualitative improvement of the Red Army thereafter, combined with sustainable and unparalleled mobilisation and military production, ensured that this success marked the beginning of the end for Hitler and the Third Reich. Events including Stalingrad, Pearl Harbour and Operation Overlord are presented for comparison. All prove to be strategically important but only Kursk can be described as decisive in the defeat of Germany in Europe. 2 There has been no instance yet in the history of wars of the enemy jumping into the abyss of himself. To win a war one must lead the enemy to the abyss and push him in to it. Joseph Stalin, Order of the Day, 23 February 1944 Just five years after Germany’s astoundin yea iltration Ardennes and through the their brea y34.76074com Tm(th-)Tj 12 0 0 12 146.43346 634.76074 Tm(t)Tj 12 0 0 12 149.55585 634.76074 Tm(a)Tj 12 0 0 12 154.71823 634.76074 Tm(k)Tj 12 0 0 12 160.47823 634.76074 Tm(i)Tj 12 0 0 12 163.66063 634.76074 Tm(n)Tj 12 0 0 12 169.48062 634.76074 Tm(g de)Tj12 0 0 12 189.01662 634.76074 Tm(mons)Tj 12 0 0 12 214.18059 634.76074 Tm(tra)Tj 12 0 0 12 226.22858 634.76074 Tm(t)Tj -0.0159 Tc 0.0009 Tw 12 0 0 12 229.31992 634.76074 Tm(ion of)Tj12 0 0 12 256.43274 634.76074 Tm( ‘B)Tj12 0 0 12 270.79796 634.76074 Tm(litzkrieg’, H)Tj12 0 0 12 326.90881 634.76074 Tm(itler )Tj-0.0145 Tc -0.0038 F interpreted at least two ways” largely because the German and Soviet perspectives span different planning timelines.4 For the purposes of this paper, the battle will be defined in its broadest sense and therefore in accordance with official Soviet history.5 That is to say, it began on 5 July 1943 when Germany launched Operation Citadel to capture the Kursk salient and concluded on 23 August 1943 after Soviet forces had completed two counter offensives, Operations Kutuzov and Rumyantsev, which re-established Soviet control in Orel and Kharkov respectively.6 British and Australian military doctrine uses the term ‘Fighting Power’ to define and thereby estimate a state’s “ability to fight.”7 This measure provides the ideal framework for a detailed analysis of Kursk. “Fighting Power is the result of the integration of three interdependent components: the intellectual [conceptual] component provides the knowledge to fight; the moral component provides the will to fight; and the physical component provides the means to fight.”8 In short, a states total Fighting Power is derived from the summation of the moral, physical and conceptual components. To demonstrate that Germany lost the advantage during Kursk, this paper will begin by defining each component of Fighting Power before describing how events dramatically changed their balance during July and August 1943. Having thereby 4 Niklas Zetterling and Anders Frankson, Kursk 1943, A Statistical Analysis, (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2000), 115. 5 Ibid, xiii. 6 United Kingdom, Department of War Studies, Conventional Operations, … 9-7 and Niklas Zetterling and Anders Frankson, Kursk 1943, …xiii. 7 United Kingdom, Ministry of Defence, Design for Military Operations, The British Military Doctrine, AC 71451, (1996), 4-3. 8 Commonwealth of Australia (Australian Army), Land Warfare Doctrine 1: The Fundamentals of Land Warfare, (1998), 5-1. 4 established that the Soviets held the advantage in all respects after Kursk, the paper will then show that the situation was irretrievable. Contrasting the strategic implications of this event with Stalingrad, Pearl Harbour and the D Day landings will reiterate that the battle of Kursk alone made German defeat in Europe inevitable. As already outlined, the moral component of Fighting Power concerns the ability to get people to fight. “[It] has three fundamental elements: the motivation to achieve the task in hand; effective leadership from those placed in authority; and sound management of all personnel and resources. Together they produce the will to fight.”9 Analysing these elements, it is apparent that the Soviets shifted the moral balance during Kursk by leadership and management only. Motivation was not a factor in this regard since the intensity of emotion inherent within both sides changed little during the war. “[The relationship] between Germany and the Soviet Union had always been one of undisguised hatred and fear…. No war had ever been as brutal as this.”10 This was Nazism versus Communism in what Hitler described as a “war of annihilation.”11 The capability gap between the German and Soviet leaders had narrowed markedly during the two years of fighting prior to Kursk. For Germany, regular operational success achieved through well understood, tried and tested methods had made them intellectually stale and arrogant.12 As a result there was no tangible impetus to improve. “The German commanders who prepared for Kursk thought of their opponents 9 United Kingdom, Ministry of Defence, Army Field Manual, ADP-5 Soldiering, The Military Covenant, AC 71642, (February 2000), 1-3. 10 Phil Grabsky, The Great Commanders, (London: Boxtree Limited, 1993), 165- 166. 11 Len Deighton, Blood, Tears and Folly, (London: Jonathan Cape, 1993), 473. 12 David Glantz and Jonathan House, The Battle of Kursk, (Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1999), 269. 5 as tenacious but inept fighters who had difficulty coordinating the many ingredients for modern warfare.”13 In contrast, by 1943 the Soviet leadership had overcome many of the effects of ‘Stalin’s purges’. Walter Dunn Jr, a military historian, describes this recovery as a product of both battle experience and defeat. Improved [Soviet] leadership resulted for the most part from the experience of two years in combat. Inept generals were weeded out, talented junior commanders were promoted to higher commands, and officer schools turned out thousands of junior grade officers to command the new companies and battalions.14 However, in order to continue its development and thereby gain leadership superiority, the Red Army still needed self-belief. “[Soviet] commanders … were haunted by the terrible realization that never before had the Red Army halted a determined German offensive short of the strategic depths. At Kursk this was the unprecedented mission assigned to them.”15 In his book ‘On War’, Clausewitz highlights the importance of self-belief particularly in situations with great uncertainty. “With uncertainty in one scale, courage and self-confidence must be thrown into the other to correct the balance.”16 In hindsight then, the Soviets’ best chance of victory and therefore gaining self-belief, was to fight in a ‘set-piece’ campaign. The unique circumstances at Kursk, in particular a lack of operational surprise, provided precisely that situation.