Character and Causation ‘In Character and Causation,Sandis’s project is to show how Hume’sradical empiricism implies a revision of traditional philosophical concepts such as causation, character, motivation, and normativity. The arguments here both advance the discussion of Hume’s motivational psychology and recommend to action theorists an important new way of conceiving of its categories.’ Elizabeth S. Radcliffe, College of William and Mary, USA In the first ever book-length treatment of David Hume’s philosophy of action, Constantine Sandis brings together seemingly disparate aspects of Hume’s work to present an understanding of human action that is much richer than previously assumed. Sandis showcases Hume’s interconnected views on action and its causes by situating them within a wider vision of our human understanding of personal identity, causation, freedom, historical explanation, and morality. In so doing, he also relates key aspects of the emerging picture to contemporary concerns within the philosophy of action and moral psychology, including debates between Humeans and anti- Humeans about both ‘motivating’ and ‘normative’ reasons. Character and Causation takes the form of a series of essays which collec- tively argue that Hume’s overall project proceeds by way of a soft conceptual revisionism that emerges from his Copy Principle. This involves re-calibrating our philosophical ideas of all that agency involves to fit a scheme that more readily matches the range of impressions that human beings actually have. On such a reading, once we rid ourselves of a certain kind of metaphysical ambi- tion we are left with a perfectly adequate account of how it is that people can act in character, freely, and for good reasons. The resulting picture is one that both unifies Hume’s practical and theoretical philosophy and radically trans- forms contemporary philosophy of action for the better. Constantine Sandis is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Hertford- shire and Fellow of the Royal Society of Arts. He is author of The Things We Do and Why We Do Them (2012), as well as editor and co-editor of numerous books including Philosophy of Action from Suarez to Anscombe (2019), Philo- sophy of Action: An Anthology (2015), Human Nature (2012), Hegel on Action (2010), and A Companion to the Philosophy of Action (2010). This page intentionally left blank Character and Causation Hume’s Philosophy of Action Constantine Sandis First published 2019 by Routledge 52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017 and by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2019 Taylor & Francis The right of the editor to be identified as the author of the editorial material, and of the authors for their individual chapters, has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Sandis, Constantine, 1976- author. Title: Character and causation : Hume’s philosophy of action / by Constantine Sandis. Description: 1 [edition]. | New York : Taylor amp; Francis, 2019. | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2018039562 | ISBN 9781138283787 (hardback) Subjects: LCSH: Hume, David, 1711-1776. | Act (Philosophy) | Agent (Philosophy) Classification: LCC B1498 .S236 2019 | DDC 128/.4092–dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2018039562 ISBN: 978-1-138-28378-7 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-315-27002-9 (ebk) Typeset in Sabon by Taylor & Francis Books For Lou, who is for Kant. In short, as nothing more nearly interests us than our own actions and those of others, the greatest part of our reasonings is employ’d in judgments con- cerning them. David Hume, A Treatise on Human Nature, 2.3.1.15/405 Contents List of tables ix Preface and Acknowledgements x Hume Texts xiii Prologue: People and Their Actions 1 1 The Soft Science 9 1.1 Action and Its Causes 9 1.2 Motive and Necessity 11 1.3 Reason Enslaved 14 1.4 Ruling Passions and the Will 25 2 Causation: The Very Idea 29 2.1 The New in the Old 29 2.2 Necessity and Projection 32 2.3 Our Concept of Causation 34 2.4 Missing Shades and Impressions 36 2.5 Meaning and Intelligibility 38 3 Necessity, Power, and Freedom 44 3.1 One Final Method 44 3.2 Secret Powers 47 3.3 Singular Causation and Induction 50 3.4 Freedom and Necessity 54 4 People Across Time 58 4.1 The Self as Bundle 58 4.2 Fictions 61 viii Contents 4.3 Paradox and Appendix 64 4.4 Between Vulgarity and Metaphysics 70 5 The Self as Agent 77 5.1 Characteristic Selves 77 5.2 Mistaken Identity 81 5.3 Characteristically Responsible 85 5.4 The Will 87 6 Hume’s Actual Theory of Motivation 94 6.1 Humeanism About Motivation 94 6.2 Reason and Influence 96 6.3 Reasons and Error 102 6.4 Hume’s Anti-Humeanisms 104 7 Past Actions 107 7.1 Sentiment and Detachment 107 7.2 Understanding Sympathy 110 7.3 The History of Thought 113 7.4 A Just Medium 116 Epilogue: Hume and Contemporary Philosophy of Action 120 Bibliography 124 Index 138 Tables 6.1 Psychologism v. Anti-Psychologism 105 6.2 Humeanism v. Anti-Humeanism 105 Preface and Acknowledgements This book takes the form of a series of essays that support one another in collectively sketching a picture of Hume’s philosophy of action. While the book is intended to be read as a whole, across which a certain picture of Hume’s philosophy unfolds, I have done my best to ensure that individual chapters are as self-standing as possible, so that the scholar burdened by all things academia may dive straight into any given topic of interest. To facil- itate this, I have allowed myself a little repetition and plenty of cross- referencing. I tend to focus more on Hume’s Treatise, but my readings are often backed by appeal to his two Enquiries, a number of the shorter Essays, and The History of England. If anything, the later writings fit the overall view I am defending better than the Treatise; I appeal to the earlier work more simply owing to the wealth and depth of its treasures. Some of the ideas explored within these pages were first rehearsed in a handful of previously published articles, which may be found in the biblio- graphy. My views on Hume have developed considerably since then and this book has, for the most part, been written anew and structured within a general narrative framework that was largely absent from the original pieces. For comments, conversations, and encouragement at one point or another I would like to register my indebtedness to Keith Allen, Annette Baier, Helen Beebee, Mark Bevir, Stephen Boulter, Gary Browning, Alix Cohen, Jonathan Dancy, Karim Dharamsi, Giuseppina D’Oro, Stephen Finlay, Philip Goff, Lorenzo Greco (who sent me comments on several draft chapters), David Henderson, Jeppe Høj, Rosalind Hursthouse, Richard Joyce, Peter Kail, Dan O’Brien, Danièle Moyal-Sharrock, Peter Millican, Marta Moreno, Luke Mulhall, Charles Pigden, Stathis Psillos, Sabine Roeser, Paul Russell, Michael Smith, Tom Stoneham, Stephen Turner, Galen Strawson, Axel Seemann, Karsten Stueber, and Chon Tejedor (whose idea it was that I write this book), as well as two anonymous referees for the press. I have particularly learned from those above whose views are radically different from mine. While our arguments and conclusions may differ radically, we remain a tribe united in that exhilarating practice of trying to make sense of the same texts, with all the highs and lows that such Preface and Acknowledgements xi investigative work entails. We are all engaged in solving related mysteries in which we know who did it but are trying to figure out what was done, and precisely why. All Hume scholarship is, effectively, the philosophy of Hume’s actions; we share the textual impressions that gave rise to our interpretational ideas. Earlier versions of parts of the book were first presented at Hume Studies in Britain II (University of Edinburgh), Hume: Motivation, ‘Is’ and ‘Ought’ (University of Otago), the British Society for the History of Philosophy conference, Causation: 1500–2000 (University of York), the University of Birmingham’s Royal Institute of Philosophy lecture series, the University of Athens’ Research Seminar in History and Philosophy of Science, the Philo- sophy of History symposium on ‘Empathy, Rationality, and Explanation’ at the 84th Pacific Division Meeting of the APA, the British Society for Ethical Theory, and the universities of Reading and Stirling. Many thanks to the organisers and participants of these events. I am also grateful for funding from Aspectos Modales del Realismo Materialista, HUM 2007–61108 (MCYT – Spanish Government), without which I could not have been pre- sent at many of the above. Some of the material in this book has been re-worked from the following articles, whose publishers I would like to acknowledge: ‘Hume and the Debate on “Motivating Reasons”’, in (ed.) C. Pigden, Hume on Motivation and Virtue (Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 142–154 (Ch. 6); ‘Pouring New Wine into Old Skin: The Meaning of Hume’s Necessary Connexions’ in (eds.) K. Allen & T. Stoneham, Causation in Modern Philosophy (Routle- dge, 2011), 166–187 (Chs.