THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO THE DIVIDED SKEPTIC: SAMUEL BECKETT’S PARODY AND STANLEY CAVELL’S INTERPRETATION OF PHILOSOPHICAL SKEPTICISM A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF THE DIVISION OF THE HUMANITIES IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY DEPARTMENT OF COMPARATIVE LITERATURE BY BRIAN JOHN DOMINGUEZ BERRY CHICAGO, ILLINOIS MARCH 2017 Copyright © 2017 by Brian Berry All rights reserved To the memory of Kaila Brown. CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ……………………………………………………………………………….v INTRODUCTION………………………………………………………………………………………….1 CHAPTER 1: THE UNAVOIDABILITY OF MEANING IN ENDGAME: THE IMPASSE BETWEEN SKEPTICISM AND ORDINARY LANGUAGE…………………………………………………………16 CHAPTER 2: THE UNNAMABLE’S PARODY OF THE SKEPTICAL RECITAL: CONFOUNDING THE CATEGORIES OF SKEPTICISM ………………………………………………………………….54 CHAPTER 3: THE FLIGHT FROM HUMANITY AND THE FAILED FANTASY OF A NEW FORM OF LIFE IN HOW IT IS………………………………………………………………………………..….94 REFERENCES…………………………………………………………………………………………..133 !iv ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS This project would not have been possible without the continued help and support of my committee. My chair, Loren Kruger, has not only provided invaluable feedback on my ideas, but has also augmented my drive to finish this task. I would also like to thank my committee members, John Muse and Alison James, whose specializations supplement a lack in my own. I am grateful that they were willing to help in a project such as this that borrows freely from different disciplines. A special thanks to my colleagues in the Department of Comparative Literature, particularly Monica Felix, Stephen Parkin, Mollie McFee, Chloe Blackshear, and Nana Holtsnider for their intellectual and emotional support. I would also like to thank the Mellon Foundation for their financial support through a dissertation completion fellowship. !v INTRODUCTION Samuel Beckett famously claims, in a 1961 interview with Tom Driver, that he is “not a philosopher,” and when asked about similarities between his texts and those of contemporary philosophers, he adds that “their language is too philosophical for me” (23). This response can seem surprising, since Beckett’s texts clearly invoke philosophy, particularly philosophical skepticism, a tradition in the west that denies the possibility of our knowledge of the world and of other people. His plays and novels paint a picture of human debility wherein the characters are radically uncertain of the things and people they encounter. Beckett’s attempt to distance himself from philosophy might be a humble admission of a lack of philosophical competence, or a red herring to throw off critics—these are both viable options. But I would suggest that Beckett’s attitude toward philosophical skepticism is fundamentally ambivalent: the problem of skepticism fascinates him, but he ultimately designates skeptical thought and speech as “too philosophical,” something to be abandoned. Beckett’s texts present us with a divided skeptic, a figure I am deriving from Stanley Cavell’s analysis of the skeptical tradition. Cavell notices how skeptical texts invite the reader to imagine the philosopher’s context, wherein they confront an object and deliver a skeptical recital, providing an argument for doubt in this particular context. The skeptic is divided because their context and the doubt it inspires seem both unavoidable and unnatural, since they ultimately return to ordinary life and language. Beckett’s texts parody skepticism, providing us with characters who take it perhaps too seriously, and end up seeming ridiculous, but not entirely the object of scorn. !1 The object of Beckett’s parody is specifically the tradition of philosophical skepticism that originates with Descartes’s radical doubt of the existence of the material world. Here we must distinguish two senses of ‘skepticism.’ The more general sense of ‘skepticism’ is synonymous with ‘doubt,’ say, skepticism of climate change. Cartesian skepticism is more specifically philosophical skepticism, where reality or existence are in question, requiring a different path of argument than ordinary doubt. Beginning in a state of philosophical skepticism, Descartes invokes his famous cogito and his ontological argument for the existence of God in order to re-assert his belief in the existence of the material world. His method of universal doubt should ideally lead to universal conviction of the form: ‘if I know anything, I know this.’ The resulting conviction is stronger and purer than any ordinary belief, and is thus qualitatively different (a philosophical conviction in response to philosophical skepticism). Descartes’s conclusion, even though it is markedly anti-skeptical, remains within the purview of the skeptical tradition because it begins with a strange universal doubt. Although Beckett’s texts demonstrably engage with Descartes, they do not produce a straightforward argument to either prove or disprove him—we cannot label him as either a skeptic or an anti-skeptic. Edouard Morot-Sir claims that “if there is recurrent in [Beckett’s] writings use of Cartesian behavior, objects and semantics, it is not for Cartesian purposes” (Morot-Sir 38). Beckett parodies philosophy in the sense that the philosophical material he incorporates is not meant to assuage philosophical doubts. Morot-Sir furthermore attempts to motivate the parody: !2 Beckett condemns any form of literature which even implicitly accepts the possibility of a truth-language…. Scepticism is no solution, for it fails to transcend the duality true- untrue…. And so comes Beckett’s decision to put things at their worst: to continue to use philosophical language (vocabulary and patterns), since this is inevitable, but at the same time to deny its claim of conferring any truth-value upon its affirmations or negations. (Morot-Sir 93, 95, and 96) While I agree that Beckett’s literary texts challenge truth-language, I find that skepticism challenges truth-language more than Morot-Sir gives it credit, which is why Beckett is not simply a skeptic or anti-skeptic. If we often think of ordinary language as the medium of truth,1 the premises of skepticism contradict ordinary beliefs without definitively showing them to be false, thus complicating the true/false distinction. Or rather, we might say that philosophical claims are true or false in a qualitatively different sense than non-philosophical (ordinary) claims. Skeptical language is already a parody of ordinary language, and Beckett’s texts are a parody of a parody. Beckett’s literary texts engage with philosophical skepticism at a further remove and play with philosophical language in ways that philosophical texts could not. Descartes speaks in his texts in the first person, and we would ascribe the claims made to the author himself, assuming that he would stand by them as true. However, he also makes himself a kind of character, the protagonist of his meditations, and as he invites us to imagine ourselves in his position, in a 1 I qualify this phrase because J.L. Austin’s version of ordinary language philosophy also wants to go beyond the true-false model of language, what he calls the “descriptive fallacy” (cf. How To Do Things with Words 3 and 100). However, as contemporary French philosopher Sandra Laugier notes, the destruction of the true-false fetish “does not mean abandoning the concept or criterion of truth; it means enlarging it, extending it outside of the domain of ‘description’” (Why We Need Ordinary Language Philosophy 100). !3 nightgown by the fire, he also questions the status of the speaking ‘I’.2 We cannot safely ascribe the claims that Beckett’s characters make to the author himself, and yet we are sometimes invited to do so, or at least question the status of the Beckettian ‘I.’ In an early short story, “First Love,” the narrator claims, “I have always spoken, no doubt always shall, of things that never existed, or that existed if you insist, no doubt always will, but not with the existence I ascribe to them” (35). This line makes sense attributed to the narrator, in the context of his other skeptical remarks. But it also makes sense attributed to Beckett, as either his own skeptical remark, or as a reflection on his writing as a literary author. The humor of the line depends upon a literary sense of ‘exist’ wherein we think of Beckett as an author whose vocation is to speak of things that do not exist as if they did. We might take the narrator of the story to be speaking either as a literary author himself, or as an amateurish philosopher, since philosophers also use ‘exist’ in strange ways. As its main contribution to the tradition, ordinary language philosophy (OLP) brings out the strangeness of skeptical language, particularly the use of ‘real’ or ‘exists.’ OLP invites us to imagine a context in which a claim might be made, and it turns out that we need very special reasons for asking if something is real or if something exists. For instance, I might ask, ‘Is this table real?’ if I were visiting a friend who programs convincing holograms, or who makes tables that are designed to collapse. The ordinary use of inquiring about existence or reality occurs only in a context in which there is a very specific reason for suspicion. Since the skeptic’s doubt and Beckett’s narrator’s doubt do not emerge in this kind of context, it is clear that they depart from ordinary usage. Stanley Cavell enters the OLP/skepticism debate as something of an arbiter: he 2 In the Second Meditation he admits, “I do not yet have a sufficient understanding of what this ‘I’ is” (Descartes 17). !4 concedes that the skeptic’s language is extraordinary (departs from the ordinary) but adds that they cannot help it—extraordinary doubt and language seem unavoidable to the skeptic however much they might wish to avoid them. Cavell’s OLP-inspired insight helps us understand both why Beckett would deny being a philosopher, and why his texts seem philosophical anyway. On the one hand, neither Beckett nor his characters share the skeptic’s exact context.