Distant crisis, persistent culture: Reflections on recent UMNO and Malaysian politics Khoo Boo Teik1 Science University of Malaysia At the outset, let me briefly outline the connections between ‘distant crisis’ and ‘persistent culture’, that are explored here. By ‘distant crisis’ I refer to the so-called ‘East Asian financial crisis of 1997’. Up to mid-1997, Malaysia had had high economic growth and shared in an Asian triumphalism that was variously expressed in the ‘East Asian miracle’, ‘Asian values’ or expectations of an ‘Asian century’. The 1997 crisis had two powerful impacts on Malaysian political economy. Economically, the crisis disrupted hopes of continued rapid growth that would fulfill Prime Minister Dr Mahathir Mohamad’s ‘vision’ of Malaysia’s becoming a ‘developed country’ by the year 2020. Politically, Mahathir’s widening differences with his deputy, Anwar Ibrahim, over the course of crisis management culminated in Anwar’s dismissal, prosecution and imprisonment on charges of immoral conduct unrelated to economic or financial matters. The ‘Anwar affair’ itself galvanized dissent into a Reformasi movement that challenged the ruling Barisan Nasional (BN, or National Front) government. In the general election of November 1999, the opposition Barisan Alternatif (BA, or Alternative Front), born of Reformasi, failed to dislodge the BN from power. Yet, BA significantly eroded the position of UMNO (United Malays National Organization), the BN’s leading party. 1 Associate Professor, School of Social Sciences, Universiti Sains Malaysia, 11800 Penang, Malaysia. Distant crisis, persistent culture: Reflections on recent UMNO and Malaysian politics By ‘persistent culture’ I have in mind UMNO’s political culture, shaped by Malay traditions but embedded in 60-year old party structures and procedures, and a 50-year record of state rule. Since the 1970s, UMNO has been captive to factionalism and periodic infighting, and never more divisively so than when its leaders’ policy differences coincided with their prospects for succession at the apex of UMNO’s hierarchy, and an intensifying competition for state patronage and political largesse. 2 From the 1980s onwards, UMNO built a corporate empire, justified by the ethnically determined economic restructuring objective of the New Economic Policy (NEP). But UMNO’s intrusions into the economy only enmeshed it within an increasingly discordant Malay axis of the state, ruling party and an emerging capitalist class. In short, the crisis of 1997 threw the Malay capitalist class into disarray, but the 1999 election kept UMNO in power. The former development paved the way for a new generation of ‘wannabe’ Malay capitalists, while the latter left the party’s culture unreformed. Hence, the new generation hoped to rise, but largely via the NEP-justified 2 On the subject and different episodes of intra-UMNO fighting, see Harold Crouch, ‘The UMNO Crisis: 1975–1977’, in Harold Crouch, Lee Kam Hing and Michael Ong (eds), Malaysian Politics and the 1978 Election, Kuala Lumpur, Oxford University Press, 1980, pp. 11–36; John Funston, ‘Malaysia: A Fateful September’, in Southeast Asian Affairs 1999, edited by Daljit Singh and John Funston, Singapore, ISEAS, 1999, pp. 165–84; Ghani Ismail (1983). Razaleigh Lawan Musa, Pusingan Kedua, Taiping, Perak, IJS Communications; Jae Hyon Lee, UMNO Factionalism and the Politics of Malaysian National Identity, PhD Thesis, School of Politics and International Studies, Murdoch University, Australia, February 2005; Roger Kershaw, ‘Within the Family: The Limits of Doctrinal Differentiation in the Malaysian Ruling Party Election of 1987’, Review of Indonesian and Malaysian Affairs, 23 (1989): 125–93; Khoo Boo Teik, Beyond Mahathir: Malaysian Politics and its Discontents, London and New York: Zed Books, 2003; Khoo Khay Jin, ‘The Grand Vision: Mahathir and Modernisation’, in Joel S. Kahn and Francis Loh Kok Wah (eds) (1992) Fragmented Vision: Culture And Politics In Contemporary Malaysia, Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1992, pp. 44–76. 129 2007 KPSA International Conference [The Rise of Asia and Its Future] state-sponsored routes despite their discredited modes of governance. At the same time, certain difficulties in leadership transition emerged, rendering UMNO vulnerable to another bout of infighting. Ironically, then, UMNO’s hegemonic position meant that its own convulsions could once more destabilize the political system. Looking at these connections between a ‘distant crisis’ and a ‘persistent culture’ – via a review of some aspects of Malaysian politics in 2006 – may offer an understanding of the implications that different stances towards a ‘rising Asia’ may have held for social transformation in Malaysia within the last decade. I. A big spat3 On 22 June 2002, Mahathir Mohamad announced his intention to resign as Prime Minister and UMNO President. On 1 November 2003, he was succeeded by Abdullah Ahmad Badawi. That sixteen-month transition in premiership, carefully managed to keep UMNO intact, was presented to soothe a post-Reformasi public that did not quite know what UMNO offered or what Mahathir wanted for him to remain in office until 30 October 2003. Whatever their unwritten terms, Mahathir’s agreement with UMNO or perhaps his later ‘gentlemen’s agreement’ with Abdullah had become worthless by 1 May 2006 when Mahathir called this a ‘half-past six country which has no guts’.4 At one point Mahathir said that Abdullah was not UMNO’s ‘first choice’ to be his successor. By implication – a critical one since Mahathir hinted at ingratitude and broken promises – Abdullah was Mahathir’s choice. Alluding to being ‘backstabbed’ and ‘demonized’, Mahathir posed more and more demanding questions and stronger and stronger criticisms of Abdullah’s 3 A longer treatment of the issues raised in this section is available in Khoo Boo Teik, ‘Wake me up at half-past 6’, Aliran Monthly, 26, 5 (2006): 2–6. 4 ‘Dr Mahathir: Malaysia a “half-past six country with no guts” if …’, New Straits Times, May 2, 2006 130 Distant crisis, persistent culture: Reflections on recent UMNO and Malaysian politics administration. The Abdullah side – some Cabinet ministers, UMNO leaders and senior media figures – responded with harsher and harsher tones. Mahathir himself was reminded he had given his word not to interfere with the ‘new’ government. Soon salvoes of mutual criticism converged into a barrage of accusation. Into the fray was drawn Musa Hitam, Mahathir’s Deputy Prime Minister from 1981 to 1986. Musa spoke painfully of this round of UMNO infighting as only he could speak of UMNO’s pains of the past 25 years. Being no Reformasi diehard, Musa did not say Mahathir was nyanyuk (senile) but the former diagnosed the latter’s condition as a ‘post-PM syndrome’.5 Into the fight leapt an unlikely combatant – Matthias Chang, Mahathir’s former political secretary. On 18 April, Chang called Minister of Foreign Affairs Syed Hamid Albar an ‘incompetent’ ‘big Napoleon’ over the government’s decision to stop building the ‘scenic’ or ‘crooked’ – but definitely half – bridge to Singapore. On 13 June, Chang called Abdullah’s son-in-law, Khairy Jamaluddin, and New Straits Times Deputy Chairman Kalimullah Hassan ‘corrupt’ and ‘cowardly’ and accused them of campaigning to ‘demonize’ Mahathir.6 Suddenly half-forgotten figures with an axe or two to grind emerged, almost casually so. Following a police assault on demonstrators protesting electricity rate increases, Ani Arope a former chairman of the state power company, Tenaga, spoke of Tenaga’s ‘unequal treaties’ with the Independent Power Producers (IPP) privileged to supply power to Tenaga under Mahathir’s privatization schemes. Ani revealed that the Economic Planning Unit of the Prime Minister’s Department had compelled Tenaga to accept a higher price for IPP-supplied power than the IPP had asked.7 Then appeared the author of a surat layang (poison pen letter) whose identity had been a poorly kept ‘official secret’ 5 ‘Musa on Mahathir’s outspoken style’, New Straits Times, June 10, 2006 6 Leslie Lau, ‘Mahathir loyalist blasts Abdullah’s supporters’, Straits Times, June 14, 2006 7 ‘Ani: TNB got raw deal’, thestar online, June 6, 2006, http://biz.thestar.com.my/news/story.asp?file=/2006/6/6/business/14432852&sec=businessAni: sighted 6 June, 2006 131 2007 KPSA International Conference [The Rise of Asia and Its Future] since 1996. 8 There was an unpublicized investigation of Syed Ahmad Idid Syed Abdullah’s accusations of judicial corruption. It did not result in any action being taken against any judge but led to Syed Ahmad Idid’s ignoble departure as High Court judge. Now the media gave him a chance to revisit his old allegations. Two judicial developments were not irrelevant to what was happening. First, the Court of Appeal granted Sukma Darmawan Sasmitaat Madja’s appeal for a new trial on old charges.9 In 1998, Sukma had been jailed after he pleaded guilty to letting Anwar Ibrahim sodomize him. Later, Sukma maintained his innocence, claiming he ‘confessed’ only because he couldn’t withstand the torture by his interrogators. Second, Anwar’s RM100 million ‘defamation and conspiracy’ suit against Mahathir wound its way through the judicial process, with Anwar’s registering a long reply to Mahathir’s statement of defence.10 Resourceful as ever, Mahathir discovered the utility of civil society’s limited instruments of expression. His statements and his allies’ commentaries were posted on websites and blogs. He gave a characteristically long and candid interview to Malaysiakini.11