: : IliII ~~ "'_~'""'tr'rff@_M,,"_' "~"".~,y,~",.",.,,.","." ­? ., -� REVIEW OF MARY MIDGLEY'S ANIMALS AND WHY THEY MATTER -!!.-__-::-:T:'": 5t1eci~ [etwBet1l1eeneerltrie.sp.,gcig? tne=r_~ DONALD VANDEVEER North Carolina State University -'"--"....... _...,/....... I have never met Mary Midgley, but read­ ing her Animals and Why They Matter makes me tion of the book's focus is in order. Much think she is, indeed, a sly person. After of the book is devoted to identifying those all, innocent purchasers of her book expect doctrines, quasi-articulated reasons, atti­ to read about our treatment of animals, but tudes, and psychological shards which tend to Midgley sneaks in, for a start, essays about block us from thinking clearly about (non­ our treatment of slaves, wanen, the concept human) animals and about our lOClral!lOral relation­ of equality, the ];Ower of symbolism, the ship with them. That these obstacles are concept of errotion, and the demonstrable very great is born out by the enorrrousenormous ne­ myopia of most of the so-called great think­ glect of such matters by !lOstmost of the thinkers ers of the western tradition. She does all tI1atUlat Vle label "the greats." It is also bomborn this with verve, oonsiderableconsiderable learning, and out by name-calling, disdain, and cheap shots with refreshing turns of phrase; for example, that emanate from people who, on certain on Hobbes' identification of injustice as the topics, are anvng the best and brightest­ non-perfonnance of contract, she notes that from ordinary people down to scientists and "it is impossible to extract from this tiny fhilosofhers. Although a good deal of work hat that large rabbit, !lOrality."lOClrality." She also has occurred--analyzing the arguments con­ exhibits a nice, down-to-earth sensitivity to cerning duties toward, or rights of, animals facts. In discussing R. G. Frey's "no de­ --in the last decade or so, we still hear the sires without beliefs and no beliefs without same shoddy claims or arguments franfrom those language" thesis, and against the doubt that who do not question the status quo, e.g., we a dog oouldcould desire or choose to perform a lack contractualoontractual relations with animals, they certain act every Friday, Midgley calls at­ don't talk (as we do), they are not !lOrallOClral tention to the notable case of one guide-dog agents, not experimenting on them YIOuldwould im­ who s];Ontaneously took her owner shopping pede science, maybe they lack feelings, after each Friday without being told. Against the all they're not hurran,human, and so on. As if such skeptics and perverse behaviorists (if ~~atl1att considerationsoonsiderations are all true, or if true, as is not a redundant fhrase) who deny that if they clearly settled the displtes. Midg­ animals have moods, feelings, or "inner men­ ley, with understanding, fairness, and care tal processes," she reminds us of the mahouts dismantles a good number of these views, in (eler:hant handlers) who would likely be particular those which appeal to natural killed if they couldoould not ascertain that an competicompetition,tion, to the claim that those who eler:hant was angry. In brief, then, one believe in duties to animals are too emotion­ might complain that this book is not what one al, to rationalist considerations (which tend bargained for. Happily, however, and unlike to deny that justice is owed to the non­ a familiar result, one gets more rather than rational or those not self-conscious,self-oonscious, e.g., less. Indeed, it is rare that a philosofhy Hurne, Kant, and Rawls). InIn a later chapter book is brief, incisive, far-ranging, clear, (7), Midgley tellingly illustrates how sane and cogently argued. Sane books ought to be of "the greats" (e.g., Hume,Hurne, Kant, and Rous­ read but doing so is a chore. Animals and seau) tend to lose:,lose" or not employ, their Why They Matter is both instruinstructivective and sa­ tisfying. r-:1J ~(~J '~(~ j. l J;;~f+- 'l'ypically,Typically, after a few generous remarks, t~ reviewers go on to identify real or alleged REVIEW ~ if l flaws and, shortly, I shall try to articulatearti.culate j i " [!I~ a fewfew reservations.reservations. First, a bit of descrip­ ~'1'~ 155 BE:IWEEN THE SPECIESSPEX:IFS =.' {_r;;,'",. ,'..,. ~ ,. ,>·,·.-:X-0:t"""t/q.IT-;"C'l"'-';,~"'~",!;"tr:.",,,.,,,,,,,,,, " ;:",_",,;;:,,~,"_, rational capacities on c~~in topics, e.g., the treabnent of wanen. Thus, Rousseau claims that "wanan is specially made for man I s delight." The point of this attention to consideration of historical attitudes toward wanen, slaves, or the "Indians" in America is, of course, to illustrate our most imperfect rationality, Le., our capacity to both think clearly on some topics and have a kind of intellectualmelt-down on certain issues. Thus, our myopia (to switch meta­ phors) about animals is not unusual. There has been a problem about getting people to think more clearly by teaching them sane logic. I still believe the practice useful, but as the cases mentioned suggest, people still just do not think at all when it comes to certain issues, or else their reasoning capacities seem to be on vacation. Midgley is sensitive to ~1is and illustrates well how our prejudices and ambivalences cloud our thinking about animals. The book functions to enlighten as the Gennans would have it, an Aufklarung, a Barry Kent MacKey clearing up; it helps sweep away much of the billal Protection Inet1t:ute (API) _ Canada historical intellectual trash which prevents us from taking animals seriously. Why should we do so? Midgley's answer, in brief, is Thus, Midgley is unwilling to accept certain that we should in many cases for reasons radically egalitarian (across species) views quite similar to the reasons we take people as well as the traditional "absolute dismis­ seriously, i.e., why they matter. sal" of the view that animals matter. This What follows with respect to how we quasi-rroderate position is, I believe, the right one (as I have argued elsewhere).[l] should treat them? On this crucial point we hear little in this voltnne. Midgley speaks However, the implications of this outlook judiciously and cautiously. She is not obvi­ need to be developed and articulated further. 0usly an all-out utilitarian, and she gives So, much is left undone in this voltnne, no evidence here of believing that ani.mals but it is a wise little bcok. Too many have rights (in some sense beyond merely discussions fixate only on whether ani.mals being objects of duties). Unlike the posi­ matter and why. Midgley tries to settle tions of Peter Singer and Tan Regan, she does not beat the drt.nn for an abolition of facto­ these matters. Next, we need to focus on how ry-farming, most or all experimentation on much they matter and what follows vis-a-vis animals, or most or all hunting. Does she our dealings with them. Midgley does not in believe animals (or some) have "equal inher­ this volume try to settle these matters. [2] ent value" (as do, let us assume, normal Concerning them, we need careful argument for people) or that equal interests (animal or here perplexities and errotions run deep. On human) should be given equal moral weight? this point, I believe Midgley would agree. If I read her correctly, the answer is nega­ tive, or perhaps, that we do not know. She Notes does suggest that there are serious problems about 1. See "Interspecific Justice," in Peo­ ople, Penguins, and Plastic Trees, edited by the exchange-rate at the species­ myself and Christine Pierce (Wadsworth, barrier. • this rate can indeed 1986) • not be set, quite at par--that "speciesism" is not just an irra­ 2. This reviewer has not, however, read tional prejudice. (p. 26) Nidgley's volume, Beast an~ !"Jan. BETWEEN THE SPECIES 156 -------------­-------------- ---_.--­---_.--- ---------------------­ ...._.._--_._------------~~------_--_._------------~~--------- IX� .u .u .1 .1 '7 n a"~· L LST 3HL 3HL S3I;)3dS 157 BETWEENN:3::3M.L38: THE SPECIES .