THE STRUCTURE OF A METAPHYSICAL INTERPRETATION OF SCIENCE OF HISTORY Yunlong Guo School of Law and Politics Cardiff University Thesis Submitted in Fulfilment of the Requirement for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy July 2018 II DECLARATION This work has not been submitted in substance for any other degree or award at this or any other university or place of learning, nor is being submitted concurrently in candidature for any degree or other award. Signed ……………………………………(candidate) Date …………………………………… STATEMENT 1 This thesis is being submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of ………(insert MCh, MD, MPhil, PhD etc, as appropriate) Signed……………………………………(candidate) Date…………………………………… STATEMENT 2 This thesis is the result of my own independent work/investigation, except where otherwise stated, and the thesis has not been edited by a third party beyond what is permitted by Cardiff University’s Policy on the Use of Third Party Editors by Research Degree Students. Other sources are acknowledged by explicit references. The views expressed are my own. Signed……………………………………(candidate) Date………………………………… STATEMENT 3 I hereby give consent for my thesis, if accepted, to be available online in the University’s Open Access repository and for inter-library loan, and for the title and summary to be made available to outside organisations. Signed……………………………………(candidate) Date………………………………… STATEMENT 4: PREVIOUSLY APPROVED BAR ON ACCESS I hereby give consent for my thesis, if accepted, to be available online in the University’s Open Access repository and for inter-library loans after expiry of a bar on access previously approved by the Academic Standards & Quality Committee. Signed……………………………………(candidate) Date………………………………… III IV ABSTRACT The aim of this research is to reconstruct a metaphysical interpretation of the philosophy of history with regard to the spirit of historical thinking. The spirit of historical thinking is to emphasize the relation between what happened in the past and historical thinking about the past in the present. However, current philosophies of history, which are largely epistemologically oriented, have not adequately explored this relation. In order to investigate the relation between past and present, I refer to an Aristotelian philosophy of practice and politics, and adapt it to the domain of the philosophy of history, and argue the case for a metaphysical science of history. A metaphysical science of history contains two primary parts. They are the part on physis and the part on technê/phronēsis. With regard to physis that metaphysically investigates the natural generating progress of entities, I argue that the existence of historical events can be understood as a natural developing progress in which the events are ordered in a chronological sequence. Such chronological sequence is essentially the physis of history in the metaphysical sense (I characterize it as ‘Ordnungszeit’). For the part on technê/phronēsis, I demonstrate that Aristotelian knowing is for itself an action of knowing, which is located beyond a given temporal position in the past to both the past and the thinking present, and indicates the fundamental Beingness of history (I characterize it as ‘Geschehenszeit’). Finally I conclude that the historical eudaimonia, namely the pursuing of the completeness of historical knowledge, is the final presentation of actualizing Geschehenszeit, as it bridges the past and the present in accordance to the spirit of historical thinking. V VI TABLE OF CONTENTS DECLARATION AND STATEMENTS…………………………………………………………………………III ABSTRACT………………………………………………………………………………………………………………V TABEL OF CONTENTS………………………………………………………………………………………………VII CHAPTER ONE – THE SPIRIT OF HISTORICAL THINKING, AND EPISTEMOLOGICAL HISTORICIZATION 1.1 Different levels of the spirit of historical thinking…………………………………………………1 1.2 On the general method of this research…………………………………………………………………7 1.3 A short introduction to epistemological historicization………………………………………10 1.4 The first wave: an intellectual beginning established by Hegel and Dilthey……………14 1.4.1 Hegel’s epistemological tendency in his philosophy of history……………………17 1.4.2 Dilthey’s epistemological scheme of his philosophy of history……………………23 1.4.3 A short conclusion of the first wave of epistemological historicization: intellectualization……………………………………………………………………………………………25 1.5 The second wave: an individualized tendency resulting from distinguishing the ‘critical theory’ from the ‘speculative theory’ ……………………………………………………………27 1.5.1 The epistemological principles of the critical philosophy of history……………30 1.5.2 The speculative philosophy of history against individualization: in the view of the critical theorists…………………………………………………………………………………………33 1.6 The third wave: the fragmentation tendency in the destruction and re-enhancement of epistemological historicization……………………………………………………………………………35 1.6.1 Rorty’s critiques on epistemological philosophy in general…………………………36 1.6.2 Ankersmit’s epistemological historical experience in a non-traditional philosophical sense……………………………………………………………………………………………40 1.7 Conclusion and reason for metaphysics in general…………………………………………………44 CHAPTER TWO – THE GENERAL STRUCTURE OF A METAPYSICAL SCIENCE OF HISTORY: AN ARISTOTELIAN SCHEME OF ‘PRACTICAL SCIENCE’ VII 2.1 Limitation of epistemological historicization, and introduction of a metaphysical alternative………………………………………………………………………………………………………………53 2.2 Preparing discussion: meanings and translations of ‘metaphysics’ and other terms 58 2.2.1 A descriptive metaphysics, not a revisionary metaphysics…………………………58 2.2.2 An Aristotelian descriptive metaphysics, not a Platonic one………………………61 2.2.3 Translations and a basic explanation of the term οὐσία/ousia/entity: primary and secondary instances……………………………………………………………………………………65 2.3 Science of history as a practical science but also concerning the theoretical science/metaphysics: the primary structure……………………………………………………………69 2.3.1 Characteristics of practical science as differing from theoretical science………69 2.3.2 Fundamental relevance between the theoretical science and practical sciences……………………………………………………………………………………………………………75 2.3.3 General conclusion of the characteristics of practical science: science of polis as an example………………………………………………………………………………………………………79 2.4 On the physis of the science of history: one of the two secondary structures…………81 2.4.1 Developmental interpretation: from the material cause to the formal end cause…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………81 2.4.2 Understanding the formal end cause: not the only result of the development 90 2.4.3 Relation between the developmental and the essential interpretations, and their historical applications (Ordnungszeit and Geschehenszeit) in general…………92 2.5 On the technê/phronēsis of the science of history: the other of the two secondary structures………………………………………………………………………………………………………………94 2.5.1 The relative position of technê/phronēsis in terms of physis…………………………96 2.5.2 Am I a producer applying technê, or a practiser applying phronēsis? …………101 2.6 Conclusion: actualizing historical eudaimonia……………………………………………………105 CHAPTER THREE – ON THE PHYSIS OR ORDNUNGSZEIT OF HISTORY: THE FIRST SECONDARY INSTANCES 3.1 Introduction……………………………………………………………………………………………………109 3.2 On modern theories of the temporal feature of history: Ricoeur and Koselleck……111 VIII 3.2.1 Ricoeur’s temporal seriality of history………………………………………………………112 3.2.2 Koselleck’s temporal modes of historical events………………………………………115 3.2.3 From featured principles to the study of the nature of historical thinking…120 3.3 The logical position of historical events: the material cause as the logical beginning………………………………………………………………………………………………………………121 3.3.1 A re-emphasizing of the meaning of the term ‘physis’ ………………………………122 3.3.2 A logical rather than a particular concept of the term ‘beginning’ ……………123 3.3.3 A logical clarification of the argument ‘historical events as the material cause of history’………………………………………………………………………………………………………124 3.3.4 The material cause as the necessary condition of the telos…………………………126 3.3.5 Further meanings of the position of historical events for historical thinking…………………………………………………………………………………………………………127 3.4 The logical reason, or the nature, of historical event: being differentiated from historical fact, and being theoreticized to history……………………………………………………129 3.4.1 Necessary condition may or may not be the material cause: an example of polis ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………129 3.4.2 Epistemological historicization’s clarifications on historical fact………………131 3.4.3 The logical nature of historical fact – non-meaningful, and of historical event – meaningful………………………………………………………………………………………………………133 3.4.4 Theoreticizing historical events in the past into systematic history in the present, or not…………………………………………………………………………………………………137 3.5 Understanding the fundamental Beingness, or ‘ousia’, of the generated historical knowledge in the present as a complex entity: the transformation from Ordnungszeit to Geschehenszeit………………………………………………………………………………………………………141 3.5.1 The logical position of the ousia of history: by analogy with the example of the ousia of polis……………………………………………………………………………………………………144 3.5.2 Descriptive function of the ousia of history: bridging the past and the present……………………………………………………………………………………………………………151 3.6 Conclusion………………………………………………………………………………………………………156 IX CHAPTER FOUR – ON TECHNE AND PHRONESIS OF HISTORY: THE SECOND SECONDARY