NOTES TO PART ONE 1 C.D. Broad, "Hume's Theory of the Credibility of Miracles," Proceedings oj the Aristotelian Society, NS XVIII (1916-1917), p. 77. The arguments that Broad critiques are in David Hume, Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding, Section X, "Of Miracles," ed., L.A. Selby-Bigge, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Pr., 1975). All references to Hume's "Essay on Miracles" (i.e. "Of Miracles") will be to this edition of the Enquiries. I omit section and part numbers and give only page references. 2 Broad, p. 92. This criticism of Hume by Broad is probably the most often repeated criticism of Hume's position in Part I "Of Miracles." Among those that have criticized Hume along these lines are the following: F.R. Tennant, Miracle (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1925, p. 82; A.E. Taylor, David Hume and The Miraculous (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1927), pp. 34- 38; Anthony Flew, Hume's Philosophy oj BelieJ(London: RKP, 1961), p. 17l. 3 David Hume, A Treatise OJ Human Nature, ed., L.A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), p. 165. All references to the Treatise are to this edition. I omit book, section and part numbers and give only page references. 4 Even if belief is regarded, in part, as a function of custom and ideally nothing else, it is not clear that we would always say that our belief that B will follow A is, or ideally should be, stronger in cases where A's have always been observed to be followed by B's, than in cases where they have not. The psychological conviction with which a belief is held might, in some circumstances, be regarded as intrinsic to the belief itself. Firmly believing B will follow A, due to past experience, may be a different belief than less firmly believing B will follow A. The propositional content of the beliefs might vary accordingly. "B will follow A" might be an abbreviation for content that includes implicit or explicit reference to the conviction with which the belief is held and so be part of the belief itself. But far more often it is unlikely to suppose that the propositional content of our beliefs contain a self-reflective component concerning the conviction with which the belief is held. So speaking, as Hume does, of the belief "B will follow A" as ideally being stronger in proportion to the degree of one's experience of their conjunction, is not objectionable on the grounds that believing some proposition p strongly, and believing the same proposition p weakly, are two different beliefs. The content of those beliefs may well be the same no matter what the degree of conviction is with which they are held. Where Hume's account is objectionable is in the very strange idea, which rests on his analysis of the causal relation, that there is no justifiable reason for believing that B will follow A. Not even past experience provides justifiable reason. 5 Hume equates this transition with the idea of a necessary connection between cause and effect - a connection that Hume says "exists in the mind, not in 75 76 NOTES TO PART ONE the objects." The necessary connection between causes and effects is the foundation of our inference from one to the other. The foundation of our inference is the transition arising from the accustomed union. These are, therefore, the same. The idea of necessity arises from some impression. There is no impression conveyed by our senses, which can give rise to that idea. It must, therefore, be derived from some internal impression, or impression of refiexion. There is no internal impression, which has any relation to the present business, but that propensity, which custom produces, to pass from an object to the idea of its usual attendant. This, therefore, is the essence of necessity ... necessity is something that exists in the mind, not in the objects ... Either we have no idea of necessity, or necessity is nothing but that determination of the thought to pass from causes to effects and from effects to causes, according to their experienced union [Treatise, pp. 165-6]. This is a somewhat stilted way of describing the matter, but one that is is in keeping with Hume's theory of belief. If A's have been followed by B's fifty percent of the time in the past, we would not ordinarily say that our inference that A will be followed by B this time is fifty percent warranted or justified. Rather, we would say that we can justifiably infer that A will be followed by B with a fifty percent probability. (I am referring here only to those cases, if any, in which we assume, with Hume, that inferences can be justified, in some sense, on the basis of past experience and only on such a basis.) J.L. Mackie, The Cement of The Universe (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974), p.15. For Stove's argument see D.C. Stove, "Hume, Probability and Induction," in Hume, ed. V.C. Chappell (Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 1966), pp. 187-212. Also see D.C. Stove, Probability and Hume's Inductive Skepticism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973); Tom L. Beauchamp and Alexander Rosenberg, Hume and the Problem of Causation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981). For a discussion of the sense in which past experience should be understood see Dennis Ahern, "Hume on the Evidential Impossibility of Miracles," in Studies in Epistemology, ed. Nicholas Rescher (Oxford: Blackwell, 1975), pp. 1-32. See pp.4-5. Hume concludes his essay on miracles with a similar sarcastic remark. ... upon the whole, we may conclude that the Christian Religion not only was at first attended with miracles, but even at this day cannot be believed by any reasonable person without one. Mere reason is insufficient to convince us of its veracity: And whoever is moved by Faith to assent to it, is conscious ofacontinued miracle in his own person, which subverts all the principles of his understanding, and gives him a determination to believe what is most contrary to custom and experience [po 131]. But as J.L. Mackie says:" ... this is only ajoke. What the believer is conscious of in his own person, though it may be a mode of thinking that goes against 'custom and experience', and so is contrary to the ordinary rational principles of the understanding, is not, as an occurrence, a violation of natural law." J.L Mackie, The Miracle of Theism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), p. 29. Also see, R.M Burns, The Great Debate On Miracles (Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, 1981). Burns supports the view that this, and some other NOTES TO PART ONE 77 problematic passages like it in Hume's essay, should be interpreted as ironic or sarcastic (chapters 6-7). He also argues (chapter 7), contrary to Flew, that Hume's argument in Part I is intended as an a priori argument, and contrary to Gaskin, that Hume intended his argument to apply to the case of seeing a miracle for oneself as well as to belief based on testimony (p. 295, note 120). On all of these points I agree. Burn's is the only author I know of who also contends that Hume's argument against miracles is, in a sense, superfluous given his view that divine activity is impossible to know. However, he doesn't see how this position ofHume's, aside from logically preempting Hume's argument in part I, also plays a crucial role in it. If, contrary to Hume's empiricism, it were possible to know divine activity, then it would be possible to justifiably believe that a miracle occurred. Burn's discussion of the historical background to Hume's essay, and of the origin of the essay itself, is extremely useful in helping to understand Hume's essay. Chapters 7 and 8 are valuable in helping to understand both Hume's argument and criticisms of it. Although Burn's discusses the essay in the context of the publication of the Treatise and Enquiries I don't think he sees how integrally related to Hume's philosophy it is. But in his discussion (chapter 8) of various criticism's of Hume's a priori argument in part I, he does argue that Hume's argument cannot be supported apart from his theory of explanation and that this theory is connected to his empiricism. As I argue in part I, this insight is both true, important and has largely been overlooked. Burns cites a passage from one of Hume's letters to George Campbell, author of a Dissertation on Miracles, 1762 which was a reply to Hume. I quote some of it because it shows, I think, that in Hume's view the argument against miracles was integrally connected with the Treatise. Hume writes: It may perhaps amuse you to learn the first hint, which suggested to me that argument which you have so strenuously attacked. I was walking in the cloisters of the Jesuits College at La Fleche ... engaged in conversation with a Jesuit of some parts and learning who was relating to me, and urging some nonsensical miracle performed in their convent, when I was tempted to dispute against him; and as my head was full of the topics of my Treatise 'if Human Nature, which I was at that time composing, this argument immediately occurred to me ... [Burns, p.1331· Burns thinks that Hume's argument is not especially original (pp.140-1). The same argument occurred in earlier writers that Hume may have read. However, if my overall thesis that Hume's Essay must be interpreted in the context of his theory of a posteriori reasoning is correct, then Hume's position is, of course, highly original.