THE JAMES A. BAKER III INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY RICE UNIVERSITY WHEN YOU HAVE NOT DECIDED WHERE TO GO, NO WIND CAN TAKE YOU THERE: A STRATEGY TO ACHIEVE A COMPREHENSIVE ISRAELI-ARAB PEACE By YAIR HIRSCHFELD, PHD ISAAC AND MILDRED BROCHSTEIN FELLOW IN MIDDLE EAST PEACE AND SECURITY IN HONOR OF YITZHAK RABIN JAMES A. BAKER III INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY RICE UNIVERSITY FEBRUARY 2007 A Strategy to Achieve a Comprehensive Israeli-Arab Peace THESE PAPERS WERE WRITTEN BY A RESEARCHER (OR RESEARCHERS) WHO PARTICIPATED IN A BAKER INSTITUTE RESEARCH PROJECT. WHEREVER FEASIBLE, THESE PAPERS ARE REVIEWED BY OUTSIDE EXPERTS BEFORE THEY ARE RELEASED. HOWEVER, THE RESEARCH AND VIEWS EXPRESSED IN THESE PAPERS ARE THOSE OF THE INDIVIDUAL RESEARCHER(S), AND DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT THE VIEWS OF THE JAMES A. BAKER III INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY. © 2007 BY THE JAMES A. BAKER III INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY OF RICE UNIVERSITY THIS MATERIAL MAY BE QUOTED OR REPRODUCED WITHOUT PRIOR PERMISSION, PROVIDED APPROPRIATE CREDIT IS GIVEN TO THE AUTHOR AND THE JAMES A. BAKER III INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY. A Strategy to Achieve a Comprehensive Israeli-Arab Peace ACKNOWLEDGMENTS There are many people who deserve my thanks for their support to make this study possible. First and foremost among them stands Ambassador Edward P. Djerejian, the founding director of the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy at Rice University, Houston, Texas, who has made my appointment as the Isaac and Mildred Brochstein Fellow in Middle East Peace and Security in Honor of Yitzhak Rabin possible, and who has accompanied me from the beginning to the end of this study, and given me important advice. As a matter of fact, the above, is a gross understatement, as the acquaintance and friendship of Ambassador Djerejian, and the many dialogues we have had throughout the last 13 years have had an enormous influence on my political thinking and my understanding of Middle Eastern policies, and have given me important insights into the intricacies of U.S. policy making in the Middle East. I am grateful to Isaac and Mildred Brochstein whose generosity has made this study possible. Of great support to me was the help and friendship of all the wonderful people who work in the Baker Institute in Houston and make this place so particularly special. I am deeply obliged to Professor Allen Matusow, who oversaw my work at the Baker Institute. The support and work of Hillary Harmon in improving my English and editing the study has been invaluable. The constant assistance in small and big matters that I was given by Paula Medlin, Ambassador Djerejian's executive assistant, made possible much of the communications that were necessary to carry out this work. Jason Lyons helped in all practical matters of importance, which made it possible for me to go back and forth from Israel to Houston, and made my stay very pleasant. Cathy Hamilton has helped in matters related to the effective use of the Baker Institute's computer system, and was a wonderful guide to NASA, which turned into an unforgettable experience for my wife and me. I owe much to the entire staff of the Economic Cooperation Foundation (ECF); Boaz Karni, who for years has carried out most important and effective peace-building work and possesses a very analytical and often provocative mind, has had uncounted discussions with me, which definitely have influenced my thinking; Brigadier-General Dov Sedaka and Lieutenant-Colonel Ron Shatzberg, and Brigadier General Shlomo Brom have written important papers on various security issues, which I have used and related to; on economic issues I have relied much on work carried out by David Brodet. My assistant Tony Galli has reviewed the manuscript many times, and given me important remarks. In order to assist in the writing, he prepared a first draft regarding the development of Israeli-Syrian peace negotiations during the 1990s, and he summed up major findings of ECF studies regarding Palestinian economic needs. He also reviewed related secondary literature. I am pleased to use this opportunity to express my gratitude to him. My student Ido Zelkovitz has helped me, most professionally, in dealing with all Arabic sources and has offered important advice related to the ideological positions of the el-Fatah, Hamas, and Hisbollah, movements. His insights have been most valuable to me. Last but not least I want to thank my wife Ruth, who has offered me much support. Yair Hirschfeld, Ramat Yishai, Israel, January 2006 A Strategy to Achieve a Comprehensive Israeli-Arab Peace TABLE OF CONTENTS Executive Summary……………………………………………………………………………...1 Introduction ……………………………………………………………………………………...8 Part One: Developing a Strategy to Achieve a Comprehensive Israeli-Arab Peace……………………………………………………………………..………………...........14 Ten Questions to be Asked in the Effort toward Strategy Development...……….……..15 Developing the Strategic Concept……………………………………………………….16 How to Create a “Strategic Design Framework”….……………………………………..19 Preparing to Get the Concerned Parties on Board……………………………………….23 Preparing for the First Stage of the Strategic Design Framework……………………….34 Creating a Cohesive Support Structure for the First Stage of the Strategic Design Framework…………………………………………….....50 Preparing for the Second Stage of the Strategic Design Framework…………………….52 Preparing for the Third Stage of the Strategic Design Framework……………………...70 Conclusion: Part One…...………………………………………………………………..73 Part Two: The Historical Setting................................................................................................80 Building a Commonly Accepted Conflict Resolution Framework………………………80 Narrowing the Gap…………………………………………………………………….....93 Deepening the Abyss…………………………………………………………………...112 The Wider Conflict……………………………………………………………………..130 Conclusion: Part Two….……………………………………………………………….139 Bibliography…………………………………………………………………………………...144 A Strategy to Achieve a Comprehensive Israeli-Arab Peace EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The aim of this study is to influence US strategic thinking in regard to the Middle East towards the development of a strategic framework for a comprehensive Israeli-Arab peace. In doing so, this study is divided into two parts: the first part details the suggested strategic framework to achieve an Israeli-Arab peace. The proposed strategy does not seek to present a ready-made recipe for policy-making that decision-makers are expected to accept or reject in full; the intention is rather to demonstrate that a constructive peace-making process is feasible, and provide guidelines and ideas, that should assist decision-makers in Washington, Europe and in the Middle East in discussing and developing a commonly accepted working concept. The second part discusses the historical progression of the Israeli-Arab peace process. In researching and writing this historical account, the intention was not to provide another new narrative, but rather to focus on the identification of lessons learned and draw practical policy conclusions, hoping to provide decision-makers and strategists with the necessary empirical and analytical tools, which should help to guide the discussions towards the development of a commonly accepted strategic framework. The core of this study may be summed up, in the form of seven policy recommendations, which should be viewed in their entirety. *********************************** Recommendation No. 1: Policies of the Cold War Era Have to be Adapted to New Circumstances Since the Six Day War of June 1967, consecutive US administrations pursued engagement in the ongoing Israeli-Arab peace process. In doing so, three tendencies prevailed: first, practical peace-initiatives were left by and large to the party themselves; second, each new administration would adopt a different approach; and third, the decision to engage was, as a rule, judged not by the strategic necessity, but rather by the evaluation of whether success was feasible in the short term or not. During the Cold War, this approach made sense. The global competition between Washington and Moscow both limited the possibilities of peace-making, as a US brokered peace threatened to diminish Soviet influence, and limited the possibilities of escalating violence, as both superpowers possessed the power and the determination to contain violence. In a global setting of an ongoing confrontation between the “West” and militant Islam, threatening moderate and pragmatic Arab and Islamic regimes and societies, and the international community at large, the limitations of the Cold War reality do not exist anymore. Possibilities of peace-making can be now sustained by a wide coalition of global and regional 1 A Strategy to Achieve a Comprehensive Israeli-Arab Peace powers, but the danger of an unlimited and perpetual escalation of violence, has become far more imminent. Accordingly, an effective peace-building strategy has become a vital necessity. Neither Israel, nor the pragmatic Arab regimes in the Middle East can face the challenge of militant Islam on their own. Therefore, any US decision, to condition US involvement in the Middle Eastern peace-making, upon its immediate chances of success, becomes essentially self-defeating. Without substantial and fully coordinated strategic support, any effort is doomed to failure. In order to strengthen the moderate and pro-Western forces in the Arab world, substantial headway in the Israeli-Arab peace process is necessary. This, however, will not make the threat of militant radical Islam recurrent terrorism