First Battle of Kernstown The First Battle of Kernstown was fought on March 23, 1862, in Frederick County and Winchester, Virginia, the opening battle of Confederate Maj. Gen. Thomas J. “Stonewall” Jackson's campaign through the Shenandoah Valley during the American Civil War. Attempting to tie down the Union forces in the Valley, under the overall command of Maj. Gen. Nathaniel P. Banks, Jackson received incorrect intelligence that a small detachment under Col. Nathan Kimball was vul- nerable, but it was in fact a full infantry division more than twice the size of Jackson’s force. His initial cavalry attack was forced back and he immediately reinforced it with a small infantry brigade. With his other two brigades, Jack- son sought to envelop the Union right by way of Sandy Ridge. But Col. Erastus B. Tyler's brigade countered this movement, and, when Kimball’s brigade moved to his Valley Campaign: Kernstown to McDowell. assistance, the Confederates were driven from the field. Confederate There was no effective Union pursuit. Union Although the battle was a Confederate tactical defeat, it represented a strategic victory for the South by prevent- ing the Union from transferring forces from the Shenan- doah Valley to reinforce the Peninsula Campaign against maining division, under Brig. Gen. James Shields, was the Confederate capital, Richmond. Following the earlier stationed at Strasburg to guard the lower (northeastern) Battle of Hoke’s Run, the First Battle of Kernstown may Valley, and intelligence indicated that it was withdrawing be considered the second among Jackson’s rare defeats. toward Winchester. Banks made preparations to leave the Valley personally on March 23.[4] Jackson’s orders from Johnston were to prevent Banks’s 1 Background force from leaving the Valley, which it appeared they were now doing. Jackson turned his men around and, in one of the more grueling forced marches of the war, Further information: Confederate order of battle, Union moved northeast 25 miles on March 22 and another 15 order of battle to Kernstown on the morning of March 23. His cavalry, under Col. Turner Ashby, skirmished with the Feder- Jackson’s division had been withdrawing “up” the Val- als on March 22, during which engagement Shields was ley (to the higher elevations at the southwest end of the wounded with a broken arm from an artillery shell frag- Valley) to cover the flank of Gen. Joseph E. Johnston's ment. Despite his injury, Shields sent part of his divi- army, withdrawing from the Centreville–Manassas area sion south of Winchester and one brigade marching to the to protect Richmond. Without this protective movement, north, seemingly abandoning the area, but in fact halting the Federal army under Banks might strike at Johnston nearby to remain in reserve. He then turned over tac- through passes in the Blue Ridge Mountains. By March tical command of his division to Col. Nathan Kimball, 12, 1862, Banks occupied Winchester just after Jack- although throughout the battle to come, he sent numer- son had withdrawn from the town, marching at a leisurely ous messages and orders to Kimball. Confederate loy- pace 42 miles up the Valley Pike to Mount Jackson. On alists in Winchester mistakenly informed Turner Ashby March 21, Jackson received word that Banks was split- that Shields had left only four regiments and a few guns ting his force, with two divisions (under Brig. Gens. John (about 3,000 men) and that these remaining troops had Sedgwick and Alpheus S. Williams) returning to the im- orders to march for Harpers Ferry in the morning. Ashby, mediate vicinity of Washington, D.C., freeing up other who normally had a reputation as a reliable cavalry scout, Union troops to participate in Maj. Gen. George B. Mc- inexplicably did not verify the civilian reports and passed Clellan's Peninsula Campaign against Richmond. The re- them on to Jackson. Jackson marched aggressively north 1 2 2 BATTLE with his 3,000-man division, reduced from its peak as right flank, about 2 miles west on Sandy Ridge, which stragglers fell out of the column, unaware that he was soon appeared to be unoccupied. If this were successful, his to be attacking almost 9,000 men.[5] men could move down the spine of the ridge and get into the Union rear, blocking their escape route to Winchester. Kimball countered the maneuver by moving his brigade 2 Battle under Col. Erastus B. Tyler to the west, but Fulkerson’s men reached a stone wall facing a clearing on the ridge be- fore the Union men could. Jackson’s aide, Sandie Pendle- ton, obtained a clear view from the ridge of the Union forces arrayed against them and he estimated that there were 10,000. He reported this to Jackson, who replied, “Say nothing about it. We are in for it.”[8] Actions at the First Battle of Kernstown, 11 a.m. to 4:45 p.m. Jackson moved north from Woodstock and arrived before Pritchard Hill, July 2009 the Union position at Kernstown around 11 a.m., Sunday, March 23. The devoutly religious Jackson preferred to avoid battles on the Sabbath, but throughout his Civil War Around 4 p.m, Tyler attacked Fulkerson and Garnett by career he did not hesitate when military advantage could using an unorthodox approach with his brigade in “close be gained.[6] He later wrote to his wife: column of divisions”—a brigade front of two companies with 48 companies lined up behind them in 24 lines, in all I felt it my duty to [attack], in consideration about 75 yards wide, and 400 yards long, a formation dif- of the ruinous effects that might result from ficult to control and lacking offensive power at the front. postponing the battle until the morning. So far The Confederates were temporarily able to counter this as I can see, my course was a wise one; the best attack with their inferior numbers by firing fierce volleys that I could do under the circumstances, though from behind the stone wall. Jackson, finally realizing the very distasteful to my feelings; I hope and pray strength of the force opposing him, sent out Col. Jesse to our Heavenly Father that I may never again Burks’s brigade, which had been held in reserve, but by be circumstanced as on that day. I believe that the time they arrived around 6 p.m., Garnett’s Stonewall so far as our troops were concerned, necessity Brigade had run out of ammunition and he pulled them and mercy both called for the battle. Arms is back, leaving Fulkerson’s right flank exposed. Panic set a profession that, if its principles are adhered in among the Confederates, and as Burks’s brigade ar- to for success, requires an officer to do what rived, it was caught in the fleeing mob and forced to re- he fears may be wrong ... if success is to be treat. Jackson tried in vain to rally his troops. He called obtained.[7] out to a soldier “Where are you going, man?" The soldier replied that he was out of ammunition. “Then go back Jackson performed no personal reconnaissance before and give them the bayonet!" Jackson said. However, the he sent Turner Ashby on a feint against Kimball’s po- soldier ignored him and kept running. Kimball organized sition on the Valley Turnpike while his main force— no effective pursuit. That night, a cavalryman sat with the brigades of Col. Samuel Fulkerson and Brig. Gen. Jackson by a campfire alongside the Valley Pike and jok- Richard B. Garnett (the Stonewall Brigade, Jackson’s own ingly said “It was reported that they were retreating, Gen- first command)—attacked the Union artillery position on eral, but I guess they were retreating after us.” Jackson, Pritchard Hill. The lead brigade under Fulkerson was re- not known for his sense of humor, replied, “I think I am pulsed, so Jackson decided to move around the Union satisfied, sir.”[9] 3 3 Aftermath A Second Battle of Kernstown occurred in the Valley Campaigns of 1864. Union casualties were 590 (118 killed, 450 wounded, 22 captured or missing),[2] Confederate 718 (80 killed, 375 4 Notes wounded, 263 captured or missing).[3] Despite the Union victory, President Abraham Lincoln [1] Salmon, p. 33, cites 8,500 Union, 3,000 Confederate; was disturbed by Jackson’s audacity and his potential Eicher, p. 209, cites 9,000 Union, 4,200 Confederate; threat to Washington. He sent Banks back to the Val- Cozzens, p. 215, cites 6,352 Union engaged, 3,500 Con- ley along with Alpheus Williams’s division. He also was federate; Robertson, p. 340, cites Confederate strength concerned that Jackson might move into western Virginia of 2,700 infantry, 290 cavalry, and 24 guns; Clark, p. 65, against Maj. Gen. John C. Frémont, so he ordered that cites 9,000 Union, and Confederate forces of 3,600 in- the division of Brig. Gen. Louis Blenker be detached fantry, 600 cavalry, and 27 guns; NPS and CWSAC Re- port update cite 8,500 Union, 3,800 Confederate. from McClellan’s Army of the Potomac and sent to re- inforce Frémont. Lincoln also took this opportunity to [2] Cozzens, p. 215, Eicher, p. 211; Salmon, p. 35, Kennedy, re-examine Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan's plans for p. 78, and Clark, p. 71, cite 590 total Union casualties. the defenses of Washington while the Peninsula Cam- paign was underway and decided that the forces were in- [3] Robertson, p. 346; Cozzens, p. 215, cites 737 (139 killed, sufficient. He eventually ordered that the corps of Maj.