Notes Introduction: The significance of the antibureaucratic revolution 1. For the most sophisticated and nuanced exposition of the former view see Cohen (2001: 62–78) and Popov (1993: 20–3); for the latter see Silber and Little (1995: 34–8, 58–63) and Banac (1992: 176–8), as well as the statements of high officials targeted by protest groups of Kosovo Serbs and participants in the anti- bureaucratic revolution or, alternatively, the views of Serbia’s and the other republics’ high officials who condemned the protests of Kosovo Albanians. 2. Cohen (2001: 57–88), Popov (1993: 16–23), Pavlowitch (2002: 184–98), Pavkovi´c(2000: 89–90, 103–7) and Ðilas (1993). 3. There are dozens of books and articles on the conflicts surrounding national- ist mobilization and Yugoslavia’s disintegration. For reviews of the literature see Ramet (2005) and Jovi´c(2001). For elite-centred research see, for example, Gagnon (2004), Jovi´c(2003) and Cohen (1995), and for focus on the person- alities of political leaders see Sell (2002) and Silber and Little (1995). For the attitudinal approach, that looks principally into the attitudes of main actors, ideologies, culture and religion, see Wachtel (1998), Pavkovi´c(2000), Perica (2002), Dragovi´c-Soso(2002), D¯ oki´c(2003) and Miller (1999). For focus on the role of the institutions of multi-national federalism in the rise of national- ism and nationalist conflict see Ramet (1992), Hayden (1999), Vujaˇci´c(1996), Bunce (1999) and Woodward (1995a). 4. I am grateful to a member of the Presidency of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia, whom I interviewed for the book, for the permission to read his personal copy of the document. 5. Dnevnik (Novi Sad), Duga (Belgrade), Intervju (Belgrade), Jedinstvo (Pristina), Književne novine (Belgrade), Pobjeda (Titograd – Podgorica), Politika Ekspres (Belgrade), Politika (Belgrade), Start (Zagreb), Veˇcernje novosti (Belgrade), Vjesnik (Zagreb). 1 Yugoslavia’s peculiar authoritarianism 1. For an overview of the history of Yugoslavia, see Lampe (2000). Yugoslavia’s highly decentralized multi-national federalism and the national question are explained in detail in Burg (1983), Ramet (1992), Rusinow (1988), Stanovˇci´c (1992), Ðilas (1991), Shoup (1968) and Banac (1984). For details on self- management, see Sekelj (1990), Allcock (2000) and Lydall (1989), and for liberalization in the 1960s, see Carter (1982). 2. The report was published in Intervju, special edition no. 11, ‘Dokumenti vremena: Šuvarova Bela knjiga’, 10 May 1989. 212 Notes 213 2 The rise of Miloševi´c 1. An earlier version of this chapter was published in Vladisavljevi´c(2004a). 2. For the most sophisticated exposition of the former view see Cohen (2001: 43–74); for a most detailed and informed attempt to substantiate the latter view see Silber and Little (1995: 37–47). 3. I am grateful to Jasna Dragovi´c-Sosofor directing my attention to this poll. 4. D¯ uki´c(1994): 13–17. Slavoljub D¯ uki´c,a prominent Belgrade journalist, is by far the most prolific and cited author on Miloševi´c.His books provide ample detail about Miloševi´c’sfamily background, childhood and schooling, business career, rise to power and his rule in Serbia in the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s, with a focus on personalities and not on the historical and political context. Many accounts of the ascent of Miloševi´cand his rule in the late 1980s that appear in scholarly and other literature on Yugoslav controversies, in both English and Serbo-Croatian, draw heavily on D¯ uki´c (1994, 2001). 5. For balanced and highly informative portraits of leading members of the older generation in Serbia see the account of Ckrebi´c,theirˇ younger long-term associate (1995: 271–340). 6. Draža Markovi´c,Špiro Galovi´c,Vaso Milinˇcevi´cand two anonymous mem- bers of Serbia’s party Presidency, interviews with the author. 7. Among my interviewees, Draža Markovi´carticulated this, at the time widely shared view in the leadership of Serbia, most passionately. 8. The report was published in Intervju, special edition no. 11, ‘Dokumenti vremena: Šuvarova Bela knjiga’, 10 May 1989. 9. Draža Markovi´c,Boško Kruni´c,Špiro Galovi´cand two anonymous high party officials, all present at the meeting, interviews with the author. 10. Several of my interviewees from different political generations and factions put emphasis on this point. 11. Špiro Galovi´c,Vaso Milinˇcevi´c,Milenko Markovi´cand another member of Serbia’s party Presidency, interviews with the author. 12. Draža Markovi´c,Špiro Galovi´cand two influential members of Serbia’s party Presidency, who wanted to remain anonymous, interviews with the author. 13. Špiro Galovi´c,Vaso Milinˇcevi´c,Milenko Markovi´cand two anonymous high party officials, interviews with the author. 14. Špiro Galovi´c and an anonymous member of Serbia’s party Presidency, interviews with the author. 15. Another episode, probably the most gruesome removal of a political oppon- ent by state officials in Serbia in recent times, fully reveals the extent to which many from the Miloševi´cgroup feared Ivan Stamboli´c,even many years after he had retired from political life. In August 2000, a month before the presidential election that set in motion the demise of Miloševi´c,there were rumors that Ivan Stamboli´cmight enter presidential race. This should not have been a reason for concern for either Miloševi´cor a democratic opposition candidate since Stamboli´chad been outside political life since the end of 1987 and did not enjoy popular support. Realistically, he could not expect to win but a small fraction of the vote. Nonetheless, key regime officials apparently believed that he had become a serious threat again. Stam- boli´cwas promptly abducted and murdered. His body was found two and a 214 Notes half years later, during the police investigation following the assassination of Zoran D¯ ind¯i´c, the Prime Minister of Serbia, in 2003. Two years later, Belgrade’s Dictrict Court found that Miloševi´chad issued the order for the murder of Stamboli´cand Serbia’s Supreme Court confimed the verdict in March 2007. For details see Popov (2007). 3 The grass-roots protest of Kosovo Serbs 1. In statistical yearbooks of socialist Yugoslavia this part of Kosovo’s popula- tion was listed under the categories of Serbs and Montenegrins. However, Serb and Montenegrin identities were not considered as mutually exclus- ive in Kosovo, unlike in parts of Montenegro. The considerable majority of Kosovo Montenegrins, who comprised less than 15 percent of this section of Kosovo’s population, embraced both identities, especially when the issues at stake were Serb–Albanian relations and the status of Kosovo. There was little difference in attitudes and political behavior between Serbs and Montenegrins in Kosovo throughout the twentieth century and in its aftermath. 2. An earlier, short version of this chapter was published in Vladisavljevi´c (2004b). 3. See, for example, Silber and Little (1995: 34–47, 58–9), Judah (2000: 47–55) and Malcolm (1998: 339–43). 4. The term Kosovo (Kosova in Albanian) is widely accepted in the West and I use it throughout the book. Serbs normally use the term Kosovo-Metohia. I also use the anglicized version of geographical names in the autonomous province, while personal names appear in their Serbo-Croatian and Albanian spellings. 5. See, for example, the report on the emigration of Serbs from Kosovo jointly drafted by Yugoslavia’s and Serbia’s governments in Politika, 30 and 31 September, and 1, 2, 3 and 4 October 1982, and excerpts from the report of the working group of the Federal Assembly, created to investigate com- plaints of Kosovo Serbs from the meeting with federal and Serbia’s leaders in Belgrade on 26 February 1986, in Intervju, 11 April 1986: 38–45 and its conclusions in NIN, 13 April 1986. 6. I calculated the share of the two groups in Kosovo’s population from the figures from post-war censuses. See Miljkovi´c(1989: 48). 7. For more information see Bogosavljevi´c(1994: 20–2), Blagojevi´c(1996: 235– 42), Islami (1994: 31–2) and Popovi´c et al. (1990: 12–14). 8. See the report on emigration of Serbs from Kosovo jointly drafted by Yugoslavia’s and Serbia’s governments in Politika, 30, 31 September, 1, 2, 3 and 4 October 1982 and excerpts from the Archive of the Holy Bishop’s Council of the Serbian Orthodox Church (1945–86) in Jevti´c(1987: 793–838). 9. For a detailed chronology of the events see Vjesnik, 16 May and 6 June 1981. 10. For more details about the protests see Kola (2003: 157–8) and Ðakovi´c(1984: 293–9). Although the protests obviously originated from local sources, several informed observers hinted that the Sigurimi, Albania’s intelligence service, had probably played some role initially. See, for example, Marmullaku (2003: 304–5) and Kola (2003: 159). Notes 215 11. The expression ‘ethnically clean’ comes from the petition. 12. See a transcript of the speeches of Kosovo Serbs at the meeting in NIN,23 and 30 March, and 6 and 13 April 1986. 13. For eyewitness accounts of the events see Borba, 5–6 April 1986: 6; 7 April 1986: 1, 4; 12 April 1986: 3; Intervju, 11 April 1986: 35–7; Tijani´c(1988: 174); and Vojo Vuˇcini´c,a Kosovo Serb activist, in Kerˇcov et al. (1990: 253). 14. For more information on the petitions see NIN, 26 April 1987: 12, and the transcript of the meeting of representatives of Kosovo Serbs with Slobodan Miloševi´cin Kosovo Polje on 24–25 April 1987, published in Borba, 8, 9–10 and 11 May 1987: 17. 15. Budimirovi´c,Šolevi´cand Kecman, interviews with the author.