Precise Warriors: The Evolution of Special Operations Forces in U.S. Security Strategy Author: Jason Albino Mangone Persistent link: http://hdl.handle.net/2345/367 This work is posted on eScholarship@BC, Boston College University Libraries. Boston College Electronic Thesis or Dissertation, 2006 Copyright is held by the author, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise noted. Precise Warriors: The Evolution of Special Operations Forces in U.S. Security Strategy An Honors Thesis in Political Science, Submitted to the College of Arts and Sciences Honors Program at Boston College By: Jason Albino Mangone Under the Advisement of Professor Timothy Crawford, PhD. 2 To Nonna, Pop, Mom-mom, Pop-pop, and all the other great people of their generation, who, in foregoing their own educations, came to the United States to give the people of my generation the opportunity to receive the finest education in the world. Their courage is my greatest motivation. To my Dad, for being a tireless yet always constructive critic and a constant source of inspiration; and to my Mom, the kindest, gentlest Army Major I have ever known, for serving our country for twenty -one years and for sparking my interest in the military. Finally, to Kara, for spending countless hours with me in all of Boston College’s libraries and most of its classrooms, and for letting me compla in but forcing me to write. 3 Introduction “The Washington Post reported that US Special Operations forces are actually in various parts of Iraq, with some already hunting for weapons sites.”1 Ambiguous lines like this are oftentimes see n in newspapers and magazines, or read on the news, especially in the post -9-11 world. Images of burly men painted in green, outfitted in camouflage and a Rambo-esque bandana, donning night-vision goggles, and armed with the newest weaponry are drawn for th when thinking of the phrase “Special Operations.” There is a certain myth surrounding the community: Special Operators are the greatest warriors in the world. The use of these warriors is usually only thought of in a tactical context. This thesis, in looking beyond the battlefield adventures of Special Operators, asks the question: “How do these warriors do this job, and what ends do they serve in greater US security strategy?” That question can be answered in different ways at varying points in histo ry. Special operations forces (SOF) were brought into the military in support of World War II, then the capability was destroyed; then SOF were re -activated for conflicts in Southeast Asia in the 1960s and 1970s, but were again largely deactivated followi ng the Vietnam Conflict. Events in the early 1980s would finally make a standing SOF capability essential to U.S. security strategy; from then to the present, SOF have undergone a vast growth. This thesis analyzes the evolution of the SOF capability vis -à-vis U.S. security strategy in six chapters. Chapter one establishes a framework for this analysis by 1 Tom Gjelten, reporting for National Public Radio, February 13, 2003. 4 offering a modern definition for special operations in contrasting them with conventional forces and answering the question: “What makes special operati ons so special?” The next three chapters are quite historical in focus. Chapter two leaps back in time, asking why SOF were originally brought into the U.S. military pantheon in the early 1940s. Chapter three looks at the role of SOF in supporting a total war via a study of their use in World War II. Chapter four describes the role of SOF in the late -1950s through the end of the Vietnam Conflict. The final two chapters leave much more room for an analysis of SOF in U.S. security strategy. Chapter five describes the events that led to the final indoctrination of the SOF capability. Building on this discussion, chapter six analyzes the role of SOF in U.S. security strategy from the early 1990s through the present. The closing chapter also includes a conclusion to the entire thesis that offers suggestions for the proper use of SOF in U.S. strategy. 5 Table of Contents 1. What Makes them so “Special” and “Limited” Strategic Implications …………………………………………….….6 2. The Evolution Begins ………………… ………………………………..2 8 3. World War II: SOF in Support of Total War …………………………. 34 4. An Organization Without Organization ………………………………. 47 5. SOF in the Carter and Reagan Administrations: Establishing the Modern Context…………………………… .. ……79 6. Utilizing then Co alescing the Capability: The Strategic Roles of SOF from Multifarious to Unified……….1 11 Bibliography……………………………………………………………...1 61 6 -1- What Makes them so “Special” and “Limited” Strategic Implications To answer the question: What role do special operations play in U.S. security strategy?, the first chapter of this thesis will give a basic definition of special operations as they are understood today and will move on to provide an explanation of the classic theories, and more specifically the shortcomings and problems, surrounding conventional forces in the areas of military doctrine, general organization (as it deals with organization, professionalism, and education), innovation, and limited war; then, the heart of the chapter will further def ine special operations forces (SOF) by analyzing what is so “special” about them: what do doctrine, general organization, innovation, and limited war mean in the context of special operations? Furthermore, how do SOF answer the problems that conventional forces have in these four areas and what are the shortcomings of SOF? By answering these questions, SOF will be contrasted with conventional forces, and a framework will be set up through which it will eventually be possible to analyze when, why, and how special operations should be used as a tool of U.S. policy as opposed to conventional forces. It must be recognized that chapters 2-6 of this thesis will serve to show the growth of SOF to the understanding explained here. Special Operations Defined SOF is an all -encompassing acronym that can be substituted for two terms: special forces (SF) and other forces that conduct special operations. Special forces mean only Green Beret units of the U.S. Army. Other forces included in U.S. SOF are Navy 7 SEALs, Air Force Combat Control and Pararescue teams, Army Rangers, and Marine Corps Reconnaissance commandos, as well as other classified teams, some affiliated with the military, others associated with the CIA. Special Operations are conducted by specially tr ain ed, equipped, and organized DOD forces against strategic or tactical targets in pursuit of national military, political, economic, or psychological object ives. These operations may be conducted during periods of peace or hostilities. The may support con ventional operations, or they may be prosecuted independently. 2 SOF, then, are any forces, such as those mentioned above, that conduct such missions. Covert Action (CA) and Covert Operations (CO) are terms often mistaken to mean Special Operations. CA or CO are defined as “Activities conducted in support of national foreign policy objectives abroad which are planned and executed so that the role of the United States Government is not apparent or acknowledged publicly.” These types of activities are not necessarily military; they may include secret diplomacy, propaganda, and misinformation.3 To dispel any myths: special operations do not always deal with war and they may be covert or overt action. It is easier to define SOF in the terms that they cont rast the tool of classical military analysis: conventional forces. Tables 1 and 2 show a basic divide between the two types of forces. Table 1 shows the difference in general characteristics, while table 2 shows the difference in how the two types of forces are typically utilized. The following divisions will be analyzed in greater depth whenever it is appropriate throughout. 2 David Isenber g, “Special Forces: Shock Troops for the New Order,” Middle East Report , No. 177 (July - August 1992), p. 24. 3 Lori Fisler Damrosch, “Covert Operations,” The American Journal of International Law , Vol. 83., No. 4 (October 1989), p. 796 from Executive Orde r No. 12,333, §3.4h, 1981. 8 TABLE 1-CHARACTERISTICS 4 SOF Conventional Personnel Exceptional motivation and National average ability Equipment Highly modified, uniquely Standardized procured Training Joint; often with foreign Service; usually with forces national forces Size Smaller: groups, regiments, Larger: armies, numbered wings air forces, fleets TABLE 2-UTILIZATION 5 SOF Conventional Maneuver Break contact with friendly Maintain contact with forces friendly forces Combat Plan for brief, selective Plan for protracted, combat inclusive combat Risk Accept high risk of failure, Hedge, circumvent, loss to force reinforce Intent Exert leverage, use Attain decisive success indirection, attack opponent’s key capabilities To summarize, then, SOF, in comparison to conventional forces, are smaller units with better equipment, having more motivated and better trained soldiers, that work with other forc es, and use the best technology available. When at war, as opposed to conventional forces, SOF may act independently, quickly, and at a high risk in order to destroy an opponent’s key capabilities. This is a general statement, and a better understanding of it will be had after the Doctrine portion of the chapter, where the missions that SOF are capable of are discussed. 4 Bruce Pirnie, Analysis of Special Operations Forces in Decision Aids (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1994), p.10, Figure 2.2. 5 Ibid , p. 7, Figure 2.1. 9 Doctrine Conventional Conventional military doctrine is a topic that can be analyzed on almost innumerable levels. To start, there is air, land, sea, and space doctrine. Within each area of operation, there is different doctrine for each situation. In other words, the doctrine the Marine Corps would use in attacking a well -defended island in the Pacific is different from the doctrine it would prescribe to in attacking a building in Baghdad.