This is a repository copy of Consequentialism with Wrongness Depending on the Difficulty of Doing Better. White Rose Research Online URL for this paper: https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/103082/ Version: Accepted Version Article: Gustafsson, Johan orcid.org/0000-0002-9618-577X (2016) Consequentialism with Wrongness Depending on the Difficulty of Doing Better. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy. 108–118. ISSN 2161-2234 https://doi.org/10.1002/tht3.200 Reuse Items deposited in White Rose Research Online are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved unless indicated otherwise. They may be downloaded and/or printed for private study, or other acts as permitted by national copyright laws. The publisher or other rights holders may allow further reproduction and re-use of the full text version. This is indicated by the licence information on the White Rose Research Online record for the item. Takedown If you consider content in White Rose Research Online to be in breach of UK law, please notify us by emailing [email protected] including the URL of the record and the reason for the withdrawal request. [email protected] https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/ [This is the pre-peer-reviewed version of the following article ‘Consequentialism with Wrongness Depending on the Difficulty of Doing Better’ Thought ¢ (ó): Õþ–ÕÕ, óþÕä.] Consequentialism with Wrongness Depending on the Difficulty of Doing Better Johan E. Gustafsson∗ Moral wrongness comes in degrees. On a consequentialist view of ethics, the wrong- ness of an act should depend, I argue, in part on how much worse the act’s conse- quences are compared to those of its alternatives and in part on how difficult it is to perform the alternatives with better consequences. I extend act consequentialism to take this into account, and I defend three conditions on consequentialist theories. The first is consequentialist dominance, which says that, if an act has better conse- quences than some alternative act, then it is not more wrong than the alternative act. The second is consequentialist supervenience, which says that, if two acts have equally good consequences in a situation, then they have the same deontic status in the situation. And the third is consequentialist continuity, which says that, for every act and for any difference in wrongness δ greater than zero, there is an arbitrarily small improvement of the consequences of the act which would, other things being equal, not change the wrongness of that act or any alternative by more than δ.I defend a proposal that satisfies these conditions. Traditional consequentialism states that an act is right if and only if its conse- quences are at least as good as those of every alternative act and, if the act is not right, it is wrong. The wrong acts, however, might differ in ways that could be morally relevant. The consequences of one of them might be almost optimal while those of another are catastrophic in comparison. In addition to value dif- ference, a further intuitively morally relevant difference between different wrong acts is how hard it would have been to avoid them—how hard it would have ∗ I would be grateful for any comments on this paper, which can be sent to me at [email protected]. ±u oh¶±í o fu±±u§ ó been to perform a better act instead.Ö In this study, I shall defend an extended version of consequentialism that is capable of taking these kinds of differences into account for a more fine grained grading of the wrongness of acts. It is natural to assume that consequentialism can account for degrees of wrongness by taking into account how much worse the consequences of a wrong act are than those [p. ÕþÉ] of the right acts.ô Consider a choice situation where there are three available alternatives with consequences valued as follows: Situation Õ Act Value aÔ Õþþ aò ÉÉ aç þ Here, it appears reasonable to say that aç is more wrong than aò, because the loss of value compared to the optimal alternative, aÔ, is greater for aç than for aò. Moreover, it seems that, aç is not just more wrong than aò, it is much more wrong than aò because the loss of value relative to aÔ is much greater for aç than for aò.í Ö If we grant the possibility of being passive and not performing any act in a choice situation, there might be a difference between how hard it is to avoid an act and how hard it is to perform an alternative act. For the purposes of this study, however, I shall count being passive in a choice situation as an act. ô See, for example, Mackie (ÕÉßß, p. óþ¢), Eriksson (ÕÉÉß, pp. óÕ–óÕÉ), and Calder (óþþ¢, p. óóÉ). Mill’s (ÕÉäÉ, p. óÕþ) proportionality criterion of wrongness, which says that acts are wrong ‘as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness’, might be read as suggesting a similar view. í The main theoretical interest in such cardinal information about how much more wrong an act is compared to another act (rather than merely ordinal information about whether it is more wrong than the other act) is that it affords a neat solution for dealing with the following kind of case—first discussed by Regan (ÕÉþ, p. óä¢)—where two states of nature are equally likely: Act State Õ (ý. ) State ó (ý. ) aÔ Very minor wrong Very minor wrong aò Major wrong Right aç Right Major wrong In this case, it seems that a morally conscientious person would choose aÔ, which is known to be slightly wrong, rather than one of aò and aç, each of which might be right but they both have a ý. chance of being very wrong. However, if aÔ were instead known to be almost as wrong as aò and aç are in states Õ and ó respectively, it appears that a morally conscientious person would instead choose one of aò and aç. Hence it appears that morally conscientious people are not just concerned with avoiding wrong acts; their concern with avoiding wrong acts is proportional to the acts’ degrees of wrongness; see Graham (óþÕþ, p. ÉÉ) and Bykvist (óþÕÕ, p. ìß). A natural way of spelling this out is that morally conscientious people act as to minimize expected moral wrongness, and that requires cardinal rather than merely ordinal degrees of wrongness. ±u oh¶±í o fu±±u§ ì We introduce the following notation: W(x) is the degree of wrongness of x. V(x) is the value of the consequences of x. Ω is the set of available alternatives. Given that each alternative might be performed without difficulty, the following appears plausible: (Õ) W(x) = max V(y) − V(x) T y ∈ Ω. In other words, one calculates the degree of wrongness of an alternative x by, for each alternative y, calculating the result of subtracting V(x) from V(y). According to equation (Õ), the greatest of these results is equal to the degree of wrongness of x. Given that all acts in situation Õ can be performed without difficulty, this yields that W(aç) = Ôýý and W(aò) = Ô. These results are, I think, in line with what one would expect from a consequentialist theory capable of han- dling degrees of wrongness. Another welcome feature is that the acts with optimal consequences—that is, the right acts according to traditional consequentialism— always get a zero degree of wrongness: In situation Õ, for instance, equation (Õ) yields that W(aÔ) = ý. In addition to value difference, the wrongness of an act might depend on the difficulty of the acts with better consequences. In the literature, there are various accounts of degrees of easiness and difficulty of acts.Ø I shall try to remain neutral between these accounts. I shall assume, however, that each act among your alternatives is securable in the sense that you cannot fail to perform the act you have chosen to perform. Hence the easiness of an act should not be thought Note that this is not the only formula that could account for the intuitions we have appealed to so far. Taking an act’s degree of wrongness to be proportional to the value difference between the act’s consequences and those of the right act (or acts) appears, however, to be the simplest, most straightforward way to do so. The aim of this paper is mainly to find one plausible account of degrees of wrongness depending on the difficulty of doing something better and not to show that it is the only plausible account of this kind. Compare Parfit (Õɦ, p. ìì), who suggest that if it is very hard to not act in a certain way, acting that way is only morally bad in a very weak sense. Moreover, compare Berlin (ÕÉ¢, p. Õ¢n) who suggests that the morally relevant sense of freedom depends not just on which possibilities are open to the agent but also on how easy or hard they are to achieve. Ø For an early account of degrees of ability, see Benson (ÕÉß, p. ìóÉ). Moreover, see Portmore (óþþß, p. Õþ) for a distinction between degree of difficulty and degree of effort, and Cohen (ÕÉß, pp. óì–óìÉ) for a distinction between difficulty and cost. ±u oh¶±í o fu±±u§ ¦ of as the probability of successfully performing the act given that you have chosen to perform it. Non-securable acts—such as, buying a winning lottery ticket—are better modelled as securable acts with an uncertain outcome—such as, buying a lottery ticket when one does not know whether the ticket is a winner.