Table of Contents Acknowledgments...........................................................................................................................i Introduction.........................................................................................................................................1 A. Legal Standards.........................................................................................................8 B. Other Factors Contributing to the Killings..............................................16 C. Summary of Conclusions.................................................................................22 D. Recommendations...............................................................................................25 Chapter One The Rules of Engagement.........................................................................................................29 A. General Operation of the Rules.....................................................................30 B. In Life-Threatening Situations ......................................................................32 C. The Procedures for Apprehending Suspects.......................................34 1. Shooting Persons Wearing Masks............................................36 2. Examples of Killings While Apprehending Suspects...................................................39 D. Plastic Bullets.........................................................................................................44 Chapter Two Official Investigations.................................................................................................................57 A. Introduction...............................................................................................................57 B. The IDF's Mechanisms for Investigating Killings...........................................................................................................64 1. Debriefings and Operational Reports.....................................65 2. Investigators Specially Appointed by Senior Commanders ..................................................... 71 3. Criminal Investigation Division (CID)......................................72 4. After the CID Investigation: Action by the Prosecutor...................................................75 5. Appealing Decisions Not to Prosecute...................................76 6. Courts-Martial and Disciplinary Trials................................................................. 77 C. The CID Investigations: Seven Major Deficiencies...................................................................78 1. Inadequate Efforts to Obtain Palestinian Testimony........................................................79 a. Procedures for Accepting Civilian Complaints ..........................................88 b. The Perception of Palestinians as Liars.........................................91 2. Inadequate Cooperation with Nongovernmental Organizations and Other Intermediaries............................ 93 a. UNRWA and Investigations..........................................97 3. Slow Pace of Investigation .........................................................100 4. Understaffing at the Criminal Investigation Division......................................................108 5. Inadequate Response to Requests for Information About Investigations............................. 111 a. Autopsies.............................................................................117 6. Failure to Seek Medical Evidence When Autopsies Are Not Possible.............................129 7. The Appearance of Partiality...................................................... 137 a. Soldiers Reporting on Other Soldiers....................................................143 b. Greater Independence for the Investigative Process....................................145 D. The Givati Trial.......................................................................................................149 1. The Court-Martial................................................................................151 2. The Verdict............................................................................................152 Chapter Three Independent Human Rights Monitoring ....................................................................... 161 A. Access to Events...................................................................................................164 1. Israelis and Foreigners .................................................................164 2. Palestinians..........................................................................................171 B. Extrajudicial Sanctions against Palestinian Monitors........................................................................... 173 C. Censorship.............................................................................................................. 176 1. Israeli and Foreign Press.............................................................. 176 2. Palestinian Press.............................................................................. 178 D. Members of Knesset ......................................................................................... 179 E. Soldiers as Monitors..........................................................................................180 F. The Yehuda Meir Case.......................................................................................180 Appendix I: Cases........................................................................................................................ 187 Appendix II: IDF Response, Middle East Watch Rebuttal, and Further IDF Response ..........................................213 INTRODUCTION This report examines three aspects of Israeli policy that have contributed to the excessive number of Palestinians killed during the intifada. These policies are reflected in the rules issued to Israeli troops operating in the occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip on when they can open fire, which Middle East Watch finds to be unduly permissive; the procedures followed by the Israel Defense Force (IDF) to investigate and punish troop misconduct against Palestinians, which Middle East Watch finds to be ineffective; and the restrictions imposed by the IDF on independent bodies attempting to monitor its conduct in the occupied territories, which Middle East Watch finds to be unjustified. Middle East Watch urges immediate modification of these policies to reduce the number of Palestinians killed unjustifiably at the hands of Israeli troops and to ensure that Israeli use of lethal force in the occupied territories is made consistent with internationally recognized standards of necessity and proportionality. During the first 31 months of the intifada, Israeli security forces1 killed over 670 Palestinians and injured many thousands more.2 Israeli 1 We use the term "security forces" to include all Israeli state agents: IDF troops; the Border Police, which is institutionally part of Israel's Police Ministry but operates in the occupied territories under the direction of the IDF; and the General Security Service (Shin Bet). Although a statistical breakdown is not available, the vast majority of killings by security forces in the territories have been inflicted by the IDF. 2 Unless otherwise noted, the statistics used in this report are those reported by the human rights organization B'Tselem, the Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories. 1 authorities lay the blame for these casualties on the Palestinians, arguing that their violent resistance to Israeli troops has necessitated a forceful response to restore and maintain order. Officials claim that, with few exceptions, soldiers have responded to constant dangers and provocations with great restraint and with no more force than appropriate. Our investigation found that, to the contrary, Israeli policies all too often encouraged a lack of restraint by IDF troops. This conclusion was reached after extensive interviews with witnesses to the use of lethal force by Israeli troops; Palestinian and Israeli lawyers who have represented the families of those killed by the IDF; representatives of Palestinian, Israeli and other human rights organizations; five IDF reserve soldiers and officers; and several senior IDF representatives.3 With regard to the number of Palestinians killed by the gunfire of security forces during the intifada, there is not much disparity between official and independent figures. There are wider discrepancies between official and independent tallies of casualties due to causes other than bullets, such as beatings and tear gas. The IDF acknowledges responsibility for very few non- shooting deaths, while B'Tselem counts 34 inflicted by security forces through June 30, 1990. In addition, B'Tselem has counted more than 80 Palestinians who died shortly after exposure to tear gas, although it acknowledges that, from a medical standpoint, it is difficult to determine whether tear gas was the direct cause of death. (B'Tselem press release, July 1, 1990.) The IDF claims that no causal link has been demonstrated between the use of tear gas and a single Palestinian death. (Paul Adams, "Children in the Front Line," Middle East International, May 25, 1990.) 3 The IDF representatives interviewed by Middle East Watch included the Chief Military Prosecutor, the Deputy Judge Advocate-General, the commander of the Criminal Investigation Division (CID), the head of the IDF's International