A philosophical reading of legal positivism Juliele Maria Sievers To cite this version: Juliele Maria Sievers. A philosophical reading of legal positivism. Philosophy. Université Charles de Gaulle - Lille III, 2015. English. NNT : 2015LIL30017. tel-01221770 HAL Id: tel-01221770 https://tel.archives-ouvertes.fr/tel-01221770 Submitted on 28 Oct 2015 HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci- destinée au dépôt et à la diffusion de documents entific research documents, whether they are pub- scientifiques de niveau recherche, publiés ou non, lished or not. The documents may come from émanant des établissements d’enseignement et de teaching and research institutions in France or recherche français ou étrangers, des laboratoires abroad, or from public or private research centers. publics ou privés. Université de Lille 3 – Sciences Humaines et Sociales UMR 8163 – Savoirs, Textes, Langage THESIS Submitted for the Degree of PhD in Philosophy at the Université de Lille 3 Advisor: Pr. Dr. Shahid Rahman A Philosophical Reading of Legal Positivism Juliele Maria SIEVERS Université de Lille 3, July 16, 2015 Members of the Jury: Pr. Dr. Patrice CANIVEZ Université de Lille 3 Pr. Dr. Sandrine CHASSAGNARD-PINET Université de Lille 2 Pr. Dr. Jan-Reinard SIECKMANN Friedrich-Alexander Universität (Erlangen-Nürnberg) Pr. Dr. Matthias ARMGARDT Konstanz Universität Pr. Dr. Shahid RAHMAN Université de Lille 3 1 2 3 4 To my brother, Joel. (Para o mano.) 5 6 Table of Contents 1. Introduction……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..1 2. The Author and his Theory……………………………………………………………………………………………….7 2.1 Three Schools of Thought, or: Why Legal Positivism? ………………………………………………….….8 2.1.1 Legal Realism……………………………………………………………………………………………………9 2.1.2 Natural Law Theory……………………………………………………………………………….……….10 2.1.3 Legal Positivism…………………………………………………………………………………………..…12 2.2 Why Kelsen? …………………………………………………………………………………………………….…….…….14 2.2.1 The Historical Context…………………………………………………………….……………………..14 2.2.2 The Pure Theory of Law (1960) ……………………………………………………………………..16 2.2.3 The General Theory of Norms (1979) …………………………………………….………………17 3. Preliminary Notions………………………………………………………………………………………………………..21 3.1 The Notion of Legal Validity………………………………………………………………………………..…………22 3.1.1 Defining “Legal Norm” …………………………………………………………………………………..22 3.1.2 Validity as Existence…………………………………………………………………………………….…24 3.2 Legal Science and its Object: Hume’s Naturalistic Fallacy………………………………………………27 3.2.1 Hume’s Naturalistic Fallacy…………………………………………………………………….……..28 3.2.2 The Relations between the Science and its Object…………………………………………30 3.3 Legal Conditions……………………………………………………………………………………………….…………..32 3.3.1 Imperatives and Norms………………………………………………………………….………………32 3.3.2 Causality and Imputation…………………………………………………………..…………………..34 3.4 Fictions………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….35 3.4.1 The Hyerarchy of Norms…………………………………………………………………………….….36 3.4.2 The Basic Norm (Grundnorm) ………………………………………………………………………..38 7 3.5 Normative Conflicts and Logical Contradictions ……………………………………………………………41 3.5.1 The Problem of Applicability …………………………………………………………….…………..41 3.5.2 Conflicts between Norms ………………………………………………………………………………42 3.5.3 Derogation ……………………………………………………………………………………………….…..43 3.5.4 Temporality and Efficacy …………………………………………………………………………….…45 3.6 Practical Reasoning and the Rule of Inference ……………………………………………………….…….46 3.6.1 Dissipating the Confusion ……………………………………………………………………………..48 3.7 Final Remarks on this Topic ………………………………………………………………………………………….49 4. Legal Positivism: A Defense of the Scientific Method ……………………………………………………51 4.1 Positivism versus Natural Law Theories ………………………………………………………………………..52 4.1.1 Legal Validity and the Positive Law Perspective …………………………………….………56 4.1.2 Statics versus Dynamics ………………………………………………………………………..………57 4.1.3 Normative Content and the Natural Law Perspective …………………………….…….60 4.2 Understanding the Tension ……………………………………………………………………..……………………62 4.3 Overcoming the Tension ……………………………………………………………………………..……………….64 4.4 Final Remarks on this Topic ………………………………………………………………………………..………..65 5. Science and Method: The Naturalistic Fallacy ……………………………………………………………… 69 5.1 David Hume as a Model ………………………………………………………………………………………………..70 5.1.1 The “Ought” …………………………………………………………………………………….……………72 5.1.2 The “Is” …………………………………………………………………………………………………….…..74 5.2 One Example of the Fallacy: Jørgensen’s Dilemma ………………………………………….…………..75 5.3 Final Remarks on this Topic ……………………………………………………………………………..…………..79 6. The Non-Existence in Legal Science ………………………………………………………..……………………..82 6.1 Legal Science: Meaning and Particularities ………………………………………….…………….…………83 6.1.1 Some Examples …………………………………………………………………….……………………...84 6.1.2 Dichotomies in Kelsen’s Theory ……………………………………………………………………86 6.2 The Basic Norm as a Scientific Fiction …………………………………………….……….…………………..87 6.2.1 The Searching for Justification ……………………………………….……………………..……..88 6.2.2 Understanding the Fiction ……………………………………………………………..…………….89 6.2.3 A Little Help from Philosophy: Vaihinger’s “As-If” approach………………………….90 8 6.3 Where is the Basic Norm? ………………………………………………………………………………….…………91 6.4 Final Remarks on this Topic ………………………………………………………………………………..………..94 7. Normative Conflicts and Temporality in Law …………………………………………………………………96 7.1 Norms versus Sentences …..………………………………………………………………………………..………..97 7.2 Derogation ………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..….99 7.2.1 The Formulation of the Derogation Norm ……………………………………………………..99 7.3 The context of the Normative Conflict ………………………………………………………………………..101 7.3.1 Some Examples …………………………………………………………………………………………..101 7.4 Retroactivity ………………………………………………………………………………………………….……………103 7.5 The Basic Norm ……………………………………………………………………………………………………..……104 7.6 Final Remarks on this Topic ………………………………………………………………………………………..105 8. The Notion of Practical Reasoning (Part I) ……………………………………………………..……….…..107 8.1 Introduction …………………………………………………………………………………………….………….……..107 8.2 Understanding Jørgensen’s Dilemma ………………………………………………………..……………….109 8.3 First Attempts: Jørgensen and Ross ………………………………………………………….………………..109 8.3.1 Jørgensen’s Answer to the Dilemma ………………………………………….….……………110 8.3.2 Ross’ Answer to the Dilemma ……………………………………………….………….…………111 8.4 Kelsen’s Battle against the Dilemma …………………………………………………………………………..116 8.4.1 Correcting Jørgensen ……………………………………………………………………….…………117 8.4.2 Correcting Ross ………………………………………………………………………………..…………118 8.4.3 Kelsen’s Final Solution ……………………………………………………………..…………………119 8.5 Any Objections? Von Wright’s Deontic Logic ………………………………………………………………121 8.6 Final Remarks on this Topic ………………………………………………………………………………………..123 9. The Notion of Practical Reasoning (Part II) …………………………………………………..……………..125 9.1 Dialogs about Kelsen’s Solution ……………………………………………………………………….…………126 9.2 The Dialogical Approach to Logic ………………………………………………………………………………..127 9.2.1 Dialog, Validity, Truth and Justification ………………………………………………...…....128 9.3 The (Dia)logical Tools ………………………………………………………………………………………….………131 9.3.1 Preliminary Notions ……………………………………………………………………..……………..131 9.3.2 Set F Facts and the Problem of Justification …………………………….………………….134 9 9.3.3 The N Normative System ……………………………………………………….………………..….137 9.4 The Dialogical System DLLC2 …………………………………………………………………………………..…..141 9.5 Jérôme C.’s Guilt and Further Discussions ……………………………………..……………………..……142 9.5.1 Jérôme C.’s Example ………………………………………………….………………………………..142 9.5.2 Further Discussions …………………………………………………..……………………….….……145 9.6 Back to Jørgensen’s Dilemma and Final Remarks …………………….…………………….….……….147 10. Conclusion …………………………………………………………………………………….………………….……….149 Appendix ……………………………………………………………………………….………………………………….…….156 Bibliography ………………………………………………………………….…………………………………………….…..215 Abstract …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..220 Résumé ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………222 Acknowledgments …………………………………………………………………………………………………………..224 10 11 12 Chapter 1 Introduction The present study represents a true effort in bringing closer two disciplines which have a long history of mutual collaborations but also of remarkable tensions. By the way, the undeniable connections between law and philosophy have already generated a hybrid discipline called “philosophy of law”. This special branch aims to studying questions concerning the fundaments of law, the justification of legal norms, the sources of law and also its fundamental notions and concepts such as that of justice, for example, as well as the relations between the legal and the moral field. But the field of legal philosophy is a very vast one, since it tries to cover different issues conforming the different aspects of the legal domain, such as constitutional law, international law, contract law, and so on. Then, it seems reasonable that an interdisciplinary study must, to begin with, find its specific place and have a specific objective and justification within this legal context. Then, for the present study, we have chosen to place our inquiry in the field of legal theory and, more specifically, the field of analytical jurisprudence. Nowadays, the multidisciplinary feature seems to be a positive quality on the academic context. But the interests in interdisciplinarity are not recent: Logic and Law are a perfect example of two disciplines that were intimate related already when the period of Roman law prevailed. Nevertheless, the results of the possible associations