Civilizar. Ciencias Sociales y Humanas ISSN: 1657-8953 [email protected] Universidad Sergio Arboleda Colombia López-Astorga, Miguel Some arguments that the mental logic theory needs to clarify to continue being an alternative to the mental models theory Civilizar. Ciencias Sociales y Humanas, vol. 16, núm. 31, julio-diciembre, 2016, pp. 235- 247 Universidad Sergio Arboleda Bogotá, Colombia Available in: http://www.redalyc.org/articulo.oa?id=100250983013 How to cite Complete issue Scientific Information System More information about this article Network of Scientific Journals from Latin America, the Caribbean, Spain and Portugal Journal's homepage in redalyc.org Non-profit academic project, developed under the open access initiative Civilizar Ciencias Sociales y Humanas 16 (31): 235-248, Julio-Diciembre de 2016 Some arguments that the mental logic theory needs to clarify to continue being an alternative to the mental models theory 1 Algunos argumentos que la teoría de la lógica mental necesita aclarar para continuar siendo una alternativa a la teoría de los modelos mentales Recibido: 04 de agosto de 2015 – Revisado: 31 de marzo de 2016 - Aprobado: 11 de mayo de 2016. Miguel López-Astorga 2 Abstract Undoubtedly, the mental models theory has become an important theory in cognitive science. This theory can predict and explain most of the experimental results that the literature of that eld shows. This fact can lead one to think that human mental processes are essentially semantic and that the syntactic approaches can no longer be held. In this way, in this paper, I try to analyze a framework based on formal rules, the mental logic theory, which also seems consistent with the experimental results, and review some of the reasons that its proponents often give in order to prove that it is worth continuing to consider it as an explicative alternative to the mental models theory. However, I show that such reasons can be questioned from the mental models theory and that, therefore, they need to be explained in a clearer way. Keywords Semantics, syntax, formal rules, mental logic, mental models. 1 Este artículo es resultado del Proyecto N. I003011, "Algoritmos adaptativos e inferencias lógicas con Resumen enunciados condicionales", apoyado Indudablemente, la teoría de los modelos mentales se ha convertido en una teoría por la Dirección de Investigación de importante en el ámbito de la ciencia cognitiva. Esta teoría puede predecir y explicar la la Universidad de Talca, Chile) El mayoría de los resultados experimentales que se hallan en la literatura. Tal hecho puede autor, que es el investigador principal del pr oyecto, agradece a las insti- llevar a pensar que los procesos mentales humanos son esencialmente semánticos y que tuciones mencionadas por su ayuda en el presente ya no es posible defender enfoques sintácticos. En este sentido, en este en la nanciación de este documen - trabajo, trato de analizar un marco basado en reglas formales, la teoría de la lógica mental, to y a los expertos anónimos que lo que también parece consistente con los resultados experimentales, y de revisar algunas de revisaron por sus comentarios, lo que sin duda mejoró la versión nal. las razones que sus defensores ofrecen a menudo para probar que puede ser productivo 2 Doctor en Lógica y Filosofía de la continuar considerándolo como una alternativa explicativa a la teoría de los modelos Ciencia por la Universidad de Cádiz, mentales. No obstante, muestro que esas razones pueden ser cuestionadas desde la teoría España. Licenciado en Filosofía de los modelos mentales y que, por tanto, necesitan ser explicadas de un modo más claro. y Ciencias de la Educación por la Universidad de Sevilla, España. Docente del Instituto de Estudios Palabras clave Humanísticos “Juan Ignacio Molina”, Semántica, sintaxis, reglas formales, lógica mental, modelos mentales. Universidad de Talca, Chile. Correo electrónico: [email protected] Para citar este artículo use: López- Astorga, M. (2016). Some arguments that t he mental logic theory needs to clarify to continue being an alter- native to the mental models theory. Civilizar Ciencias Sociales y Humanas, 16 (31), 235-248. 236 Miguel lópez -A storg A Introduction the discussion between the two approaches is more explicit (e.g., López-Astorga, 2014a, It is obvious that the mental models 2014b, 2015a, 2015b, 2015c, 2016a; O’Brien, theory (from now on, MM), which is explained, Braine, & Yang, 1994; Schroyens, Schaeken, & described, and commented on in papers such D’Ydewalle, 2001). In this way, I think that what as, for example, Byrne and Johnson-Laird is appropriate is to start by describing the general (2009), Johnson-Laird (1983, 2001, 2006, theses both of MM and ML. 2010, 2012, 2015), Johnson-Laird, Byrne, and Girotto (2009), Khemlani and Johnson-Laird The semantic approach of MM (2009), Oakhill and Garnham (1996), or Orenes and Johnson-Laird (2012), is a very relevant As said, MM is fundamentally a semantic theory at present. In addition to the fact that it theory. It states that syntax is not important in has wide acceptance in the eld of psychology human reasoning and that individuals, when they of reasoning and cognitive science, MM has reason, pay attention to the semantic possibilities proved to be consistent with almost all the or models of propositions. In this way, what experimental results that can be found in the people do is to look for the models in which, if literature on cognition. For these reasons, it the premises are true, the conclusion is true too. can be thought that this theory is the theory that best accounts for human inferential activity, One interesting point of MM is that that it is right to claim that mental processes are individuals do not always identify all the basically semantic, and that neither syntax nor models to which the propositions refer. Thus, logical forms play any role in such processes. it distinguishes between ‘mental models’ and ‘fully explicit models’. People immediately Thus, it seems that MM is revealing that and easily detect the mental models. However, formal approaches such as that of Rips (1994) the fully explicit models can only be noted if a or that of the mental logic theory (e.g., Braine & greater effort is made. Each logical connective, O’Brien, 1998a; O’Brien, 2009, 2014; O’Brien conjunction, disjunction, conditional, and & Li, 2013) must be overcome. However, this biconditional, has its models, but I will only last theory, the mental logic theory (from now consider here, as an example, the conditional. on, ML), is also coherent with many of the According to MM, a proposition such as ‘if A experimental ndings reported by the literature then B’ has a mental model: on cognitive science, and, for this reason, its proponents state that there is no conclusive A and B evidence that leads to its absolute rejection, and that the literature fails to demonstrate that it is a Nonetheless, its fully explicit models are mistaken or incorrect theory. the following: My aim in this paper is to show that, while A and B it is true that ML can offer arguments in its favor, ¬A and B it is also true that MM can easily respond to those arguments and that, if the proponents of ML ¬A and ¬B want their theory to continue to be an alternative Where ‘¬’ denotes negation. to be considered, they must necessarily clarify certain aspects of it. I will expose and explain In this way, it is not hard for MM to explain in details all of this in the next pages. To do phenomena such as the fact that the modus ponens that, I will base on not only works such as those rule is often less difcult than the modus tollens cited above, but also other papers in which rule for individuals (see, for example, Byrne & Civilizar Ciencias Sociales y Humanas 16 (31): 235-248, Julio-Diciembre de 2016 Some argument S that the mental logic theory need S to clarify to continue being 237 an alternative to the mental model S theory Johnson-Laird, 2009). As it is well known, the that human reasoning works following formal modus ponens schema is this one: rules and its adherents have proposed a number of such rules, which have not been selected ran - If A then B domly, but in accordance with empirical results. In other words, ML only accepts the formal rules A that, according to experiments reported in the li- ------------- terature on reasoning, people really use. Ergo B In this way, ML distinguishes different types of rules (see, e.g., Braine & O’Brien, Given that, as mentioned, the mental 1998b): ‘Core Schemas’, which are used as model of the conditional is ‘A and B’, it is often as possible, ‘Feeder Schemas’, which are evident, following MM, that, in a scenario in used as often as necessary, ‘Incompatibility which it is known that ‘if A then B’ and ‘A’ are Schemas’, which refer to contradictions, and true, most people will tend to draw that ‘B’ is ‘Other Schemas’, which play a limited role in true too. Nevertheless, the case of the modus the ‘Direct Reasoning Routine’ and are more tollens rule is different. As is also well known, linked to learned abilities. its schema is as follows: Core Schemas are a set of basic and If A then B simple rules. Some of them are, for example, a ¬B version of the modus tollendo ponens rule: ------------- A1 or… or An, ¬Ai; ergo A1 or… or Ai- Ergo ¬A 1or Ai+1 or… or An (schema 3 in Braine & O’Brien, 1998b, p. 80. ‘A1 or… or An’ and As can be noted, ‘¬A’ can only be derived ‘¬Ai’ are premises; on the other hand, what is from ‘if A then B’ and ‘¬B’ if the fully explicit after the word ‘ergo’, i.e., ‘A1 or… or Ai-1or Ai+1 or… or An’ is the conclusion).