A SHIP DEFENSE ANALYSIS PROCESS A Ship Defense Analysis Process Ronald S. Farris and Catherine B. Stuckey Over the past 6 years an adaptable, efficient, and cost-effective process to analyze ship defense against hostile air threats has been developed in support of the Program Executive Office (PEO) Theater Surface Combatants and PEO Expeditionary Warfare to evaluate planned and proposed improvements to their ship defense combat systems. The Requirements and Analysis Working Group, which comprises personnel from the Naval Surface Warfare Center/Dahlgren Division, Naval Research Laboratory, and APL, developed the process and conducted these analyses. This process is also used to evaluate current combat system performance to support tactics development. (Key- words: Analysis, Anti-air warfare, Ship self-defense.) INTRODUCTION An adaptable, efficient, and cost-effective process on and, in turn, expands an extensive database of Navy has been developed over the past 6 years to analyze ship weapon systems and threats. This article discusses the defense systems in support of Program Executive Office need for ship self-defense combat system analysis, Theater Surface Combatants (PEO TSC) and PEO describes the analysis process, and presents three ex- Expeditionary Warfare (PEO EXW). The process has amples of it. been developed under PEO sponsorship through the Requirements and Analysis Working Group (RAWG) THE NEED FOR COMBAT SYSTEM with representation from the Naval Surface Warfare Center (NSWC)/Dahlgren Division (DD), Naval Re- ANALYSIS search Laboratory (NRL), and APL’s Joint Warfare The analysis of combat system effectiveness is used Analysis Department and Air Defense Department. A by Navy leadership for system development and by the broad range of ship defense anti-air weapon systems Fleet to develop system employment guidelines and and threats that require expertise in many fields has tactics. The different user needs affect the analysis. been modeled and evaluated. For the analysis process, Program managers and resource sponsors are interested the analyst must have a basic knowledge of all weapon in future threats, especially those that stress defensive systems being studied, access to experts on each key capabilities. They also need a consistent representative system component, and a modeling tool to automate environment. Fleet users are interested in near-term effectiveness calculations. The analysis process relies threats in their operating area. JOHNS HOPKINS APL TECHNICAL DIGEST, VOLUME 21, NUMBER 3 (2000) 393 R. S. FARRIS AND C. B. STUCKEY Comparative Analysis ANALYSIS PROCESS TO SUPPORT Typically, a program manager or resource sponsor RAWG may have several systems from which to choose. A A six-step analysis process provides a flexible frame- comparative analysis is performed to evaluate one or work for resolving ship defense problems. Central to more systems against a common threat set and various this process is an engagement model to automate effec- conditions. When this analysis is combined with esti- tiveness calculations. Two major goals of the analysis mated system cost, it is a cost-effectiveness analysis. process (Fig. 1) are to develop data inputs needed The decision maker then selects the most cost-effective to support the model, such as the Surface Anti-Air system. The analysis is not always a simple comparison Warfare (AAW) Multi-Ship Simulation (SAMS) of numerical results because other factors such as de- model used for effectiveness calculations, and to pro- velopment risk may also be considered. vide sufficient data for the analyst to interpret results The Program Objectives Memorandum (POM) properly. process analysis, conducted biennially to determine The steps in the analysis are as follows: future weapon system procurement investment, is a comparative analysis. An example of it is discussed 1. Define the systems to be analyzed, the expected threat, later in this article. Several configurations are ana- and the operating environments lyzed against a common set of threats for 5 to 15 years 2. Modify the engagement model if necessary to ensure in the future. The effectiveness of alternatives and proper representation of the systems to be analyzed their estimated procurement and total lifetime costs 3. Establish the MOEs to use are compared. Specified measures of effectiveness 4. Collect data needed to model all components of the (MOEs) are used to compare systems. Another exam- problem, potentially using results from high-fidelity ple of comparative analysis is an analysis of alterna- simulations tives, previously called a cost and operational effec- 5. Use the engagement model to obtain the MOEs tiveness analysis. 6. Analyze and present the results Utility analysis, a type of comparative analysis, eval- Each step is further described in the following uates new systems in the same context as current or subsections. planned systems. It may not hold to strict government guidelines or have a set requirement that must be met as in other applications of comparative analysis. The Defining the Problem High Energy Laser Weapon System (HELWS) Study, Problem definition consists of identifying three com- described in the Analysis Examples section, is represen- ponents: (1) the ship defense systems to be analyzed, tative of a utility analysis. (2) the threat, and (3) the operating environment. Ship defense systems are determined jointly by the sponsor and the analyst. The sponsor will identify Operational Analysis configurations based on existing or planned system Operational analysis is conducted to evaluate ship developments. Inputs from industry may be used to self-defense systems against current threats in support identify potential system improvements or possible new of the Fleet. The Fleet uses these analyses to develop systems. Several configurations of weapons, sensors, operational and experimental tactics and system em- and control systems may be considered. Fleet users will ployment guidelines, which may be evaluated during specify the current systems on their ships. Fleet exercises. For example, the analysis results may The Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) is respon- aid a commander in allocating ships to various missions sible for defining likely near- to far-term threats to such as escorting other ships or in conducting offensive naval forces. The program sponsor is interested in fu- operations such as amphibious assault or shore bom- ture threats that stress defensive systems. ONI selects bardment. The operating area of the Fleet under eval- appropriate threats based on the program manager’s uation dictates threat and environmental conditions needs, with input from the analyst about threat char- considered, and can include the time phase of hostil- acteristics that stress the systems. Attack densities are ities (e.g., prehostilities or hot war situation) as well as chosen to reflect intended ship missions. Environmen- rules of engagement. Operational analyses can also aid tal conditions are chosen to stress the systems. These a ship’s crew in determining best defensive doctrines for threat selections are made to avoid designing a system different warfighting situations. In some cases, a Fleet around a single criterion. commander wishes to understand his ship’s capabilities Such problem definition is sufficient for comparative in a potentially hostile situation. The Fifth Fleet Study, analysis. Operational analysis, however, may require which is described in the Analysis Examples section, development of an operational situation, which in- typifies this type of operational analysis. cludes the political evolution leading to an attack, daily 394 JOHNS HOPKINS APL TECHNICAL DIGEST, VOLUME 21, NUMBER 3 (2000) A SHIP DEFENSE ANALYSIS PROCESS RF/IR environment Surface-to-air missile RF environmental model Threat missile model seeker and 6-DoF (clutter, propagation, Radar simulations model(s) (RF/IR signature, multipath) trajectory, kinematics) (NAWC/WD RAM, APL Seasparrow, APL Standard Missile) IR environmental model Intercept IRST geometry (propagation, clutter) model(s) Modtran miss distance Threat launch/turn on Kinematic EW model(s), radar/IR perturbations Ship signature model Surface-to-air missile (acquisition, decoys, end-game model (RF, IR) DECM, jamming) NRL (NSWC warhead NRL cruise missiles evaluation) Combat system models Precision ESM data ESM model (SAMS, FACTS) to radar systems Threat launch/turn on SWYSIM model Gun model(s) (NSWC/DD track and fire) PRA, kills, penetrators, firepower (MOEs) Cumulative fluence (irradiance, radome angle) Kill fluence Figure 1. The RAWG analysis process involves the use of high-fidelity simulations to develop detailed weapon and threat data for the combat system models. The flexibility of the process allows the data inputs to be tailored to the type of analysis (operational or comparative) and to the needs of the end user. Not all analyses use each of the simulations or processes indicated in this figure. (DECM = deceptive electronic countermeasures, DoF = degrees of freedom, ESM = electronic support measures, EW = electronic warfare, FACTS = Fleet Anti-Air Warfare (AAW) Model for Comparison of Tactical Systems, FLIR = forward-looking infrared, IRST = infrared search and track, NAWC/WD = Naval Air Warfare Center/Weapons Div., NSWC/DD = Naval Surface Warfare Center/Dahlgren Div., PRA = probability of raid annihilation, RAM = Rolling Airframe Missile, SAMS = Surface AAW Multi-Ship Simulation, SWYSIM = SWY Simulation.) description of scenario events, and environmental