Social Emergence: Distinguishing Reflexive and Non-reflexive Modes Christopher Goldspink Robert Kay Centre for Research in Social Simulation Head of Strategic Innovation, Department of Sociology Westpac Banking Corporation, University of Surrey. Guildford, GU1 7XH, UK Level 8, Westpac Place, 275 Kent Street, Sydney NSW 2000 [email protected] [email protected] Abstract within the context of human social systems by focusing on Emergence has a long and controversial history. In this paper processes of ‘normative’ self-organization. The aim is to we briefly review the primary strands of the debate, paying contribute both to the conceptualization of emergence as attention to its use in the fields of philosophy of science and well as to how social emergence may be meaningfully mind, social science and systems theory including the theory modeled. of complex systems. We argue that it is important to recognize We argue that the ambiguity, opaqueness and lack of why emergence in social systems is fundamentally different specification of the concept of emergence currently present a from other natural systems. The key characteristics of significant barrier to its application to the study of social reflexivity are discussed and a distinction between two systems. Furthermore we argue that social systems classes of emergence proposed. Non-reflexive emergence: represent a specific class of system, distinct from other where the agents in the system under study are not self-aware, and Reflexive emergence: where the agents in the system under natural systems where emergence may be studied. This is study are self-aware and linguistically capable. We specify the due to the capability of human agents to distinguish ‘self’ generative processes we believe are associated with each of from ‘other’ and in doing so reflexively distinguish and these categories and argue for the adoption of this distinction interact with their environment, greatly increasing the in both theoretical and practical modeling of human social scope and complexity of the emergent structures which are systems. possible. As a consequence we argue that both the form and mechanisms through which emergence occurs are not entirely analogous between natural and social systems. Introduction In this paper we review the historical and contemporary definitions of emergence, paying particular attention to its The concept of emergence has become widely used within use in the fields of philosophy of science and mind, social the social simulation community. The concept continues to be vaguely defined and to stand in for different science, general systems theory and complexity theory. This is followed by a discussion of the distinct propositions about social generative mechanisms. Within characteristics of social systems and the implications of the social simulation community, the concept has focused this difference for social simulation. The key primarily on upward causation (consistent with its usage characteristics of reflexivity will then be discussed and a within complex systems theory and associated research tentative framework will be proposed for two classes of programs such as those into artificial life) (Sawyer, 2003). Few attempts have been made to reconcile this use of the emergence, specifically: concept with its wider philosophical use and with the ∞ Non-reflexive emergence: where the agents in the parallel debates about the micro-macro link and the system under study are not self-aware, and relationship between structure and agency within the social sciences. Relatively little attempt has been made to ∞ Reflexive emergence: where the agents in the system identify the defining characteristics of human social under study are self-aware and linguistically capable. systems and to critically re-examine the concept within this context. Similarly derivative concepts such as We then specify the generative processes associated with downward causation and ‘immergence’ (Castelfranchi, each of these classes. 1998b) have only recently begun to be explored in the In proposing these two classes we do not preclude the simulation of human social systems. One current attempt distinction of other specific forms of emergence, but seek to to advance our understanding of upward and downward highlight the need for differing approaches to the study of causation in social systems is the EU funded project different system types, with a view to enhancing the Emergence in the Loop (EMIL). EMIL is concerned to explanatory power and applicability of the emergence explicate the mechanisms of emergence and immergence concept to various system classes. Copyright © 2007, Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence (www.aaai.org). All rights reserved. 48 A Brief History of the Concept of Emergence 5. May be capable of top-down causation. 6. Are characterized by multiple realization or wild The notion of emergence has a long history, having been disjunction (Fodor, 1974) (alternative micro-states invoked in a number of disciplines with varying degrees of may generate the same macro states). centrality to the theoretical and methodological development of associated fields. The concept remains A key concept is supervenience: a specification of the ambiguous and contentious, covering: ‘loose’ determinisms held to apply between levels such that ‘…an entity cannot change at a higher level without …a wide spectrum of ontological commitments. also changing at a lower level’ (Sawyer, 2001: 556). According to some the emergents are no more than patterns, with no causal powers of their own; for Within this stream prominence of place is given to both downward and upward causation. Clayton and Davies others they are substances in their own right… (2006) specify downward causation as involving macro (Clayton, 2006: 14). structures placing constraint on lower level processes hence ‘Emergent entities provide the context in which The first explicit use of the concept has been attributed to local, bottom up causation takes place and is made George Henry Lewes, in 1875 (Ablowitz, 1939). Following Lewes the concept rose to prominence primarily possible’ (Peterson, 2006: 697). This concept appears similar to that of ‘immergence’ within the social within the philosophy of science but more recently can be simulation literature and is worth exploring a little more seen to have been advanced within three distinct streams: fully as it is otherwise absent within the approach to philosophy, particularly philosophy of mind; systems emergence typical of complex systems inspired approaches theory, in particular complex systems; and social science (Sawyer, 2003, 2005). where it has largely been referred to under the heading of the micro-macro link and/or the problem of structure and Davies (2006) argues that the mechanism of downward causation can usefully be considered in terms of agency. Interestingly there has been relatively little cross boundaries. Novelty, he argues, may have its origin in a influence between these streams. While it is beyond the system being ‘open’. If novel order emerges it must do so scope of this paper to present a full comparison or to within the constraints of physics. He concludes: attempt a synthesis of the different streams, some brief comments are offered on the alternative perspectives and … top-down talk refers not to vitalistic augmentation contribution of each to the wider debate. of known forces, but rather to the system harnessing existing forces for its own ends. The problem is to The Contribution from Philosophy of science understand how this harnessing happens, not at the level of individual intermolecular interactions, but The philosophy of science and philosophy of mind stream overall – as a coherent project. It appears that once a is arguably the oldest – some date it back to Plato system is sufficiently complex, then new top down (Peterson, 2006) but the debate is widely seen as having come to focus with the British Emergentists (Eronen, rules of causation emerge (Davies 2006: 48). 2004; Shrader, 2005; Stanford Encyclopaedia of For Davies then, top-down causation is associated with Philosophy, 2006). This school sought to deal with the self-organization. For Davies it is the ‘openness’ of some apparent qualitatively distinct properties associated with systems that ‘provides room’ for self-organizing process to different phenomena (physical, chemical, biological, arise, but he concludes, ‘openness to the environment mental) in the context of the debate between mechanism and vitalism: the former being committed to Laplacian merely explains why there may be room for top-down causation; it tells us nothing about how that causation causal determinism and hence reductionism and the latter works.’ The devil then, is in the detail of the mechanisms invoking ‘non-physical’ elements in order to explain the specific to particular processes in particular contexts and qualitative difference between organic and in-organic particular phenomenal domains. matter. This stream remains focused on explaining different properties of classes of natural phenomena and with the relationship between brains and minds (See Clayton & The contribution from Social Science Davies, 2006 for a recent summary of the positions). The micro-macro problem – the relationship between the Peterson (2006: 695) summarizes the widely agreed actions of individuals and resulting social structures and characteristics of emergent phenomena within this stream the reciprocal constraint those structures place on as follows.