BACKBENCH DEBATE WITHIN THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY AND ITS INFLUENCE UPON BRITISH FOREIGN POLICY 1948-1956 SANDRA D ONSLOW PHD THESIS LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS 1994 UMI Number: U074333 All rights reserved INFORMATION TO ALL USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted. In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. Dissertation Publishing UMI U074333 Published by ProQuest LLC 2014. Copyright in the Dissertation held by the Author. Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC. All rights reserved. This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code. ProQuest LLC 789 East Eisenhower Parkway P.O. Box 1346 Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 ABSTRACT This study examines Conservative backbench debate on European integration and British relations in the Middle East. It concentrates upon the Europeanists and the Suez Group and considers their attempts to influence British foreign policy from the formation of the Council of Europe in 1948 until the resignation of Sir Anthony Eden as Prime Minister in January 1957. Interviews with former parliamentarians and contemporary sources, published and unpublished, are used to assess their influence. The position of these groups within the spectrum of the Conservative party is considered, and the extent to which a common philosophy and motivation can be attributed to each faction. It analyses the role of the Europeanists in supporting Continental moves towards European integration, as well as broader Conservative attitudes to European integration and its emerging institutions: the Council of Europe, the European Coal and Steel Community, the European Defence Community, and the Messina process. The study looks at the reasons for the Churchill government's failure to build upon the successes of the Europeanists whilst the Conservatives were in opposition. The thesis seeks to show that the Suez Group occupied a more important position within the party than has been appreciated hitherto. Attention is paid to the views and role of this nascent group in the Palestine and Abadan crises, and in the negotiations over self-government for the Sudan, together with the role of the Suez Group in the party struggle over the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement on the Suez Canal Zone Base in 1954. The part played by the Suez Group and the Anti-Suez Group in the Suez crisis of 1956 is discussed. - 2 - TABLE OF CONTENTS Abstract .................................. 2 P r e f a c e .......................................................11 Abbreviations ............................................... 12 CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION...................................... 13 Published Comment on the Europeanists, the Suez Group and the Anti-Suez Group ......................... 15 The Political Significance of the Europeanists, the Suez and the Anti-Suez Groups ................... 17 Other Conservative Groups ............................ 19 (a) The Progress Trust (b) Conservative Ginger Groups on Home Affairs (c) Informal Groups Conservative Backbench Influence and Government Policy ............................................... 22 (a) The Mechanics of the Conservative Party (b) The Nature of the Conservative Party Political Debate 1948-56 ............................. 27 (a) The House of Commons in the 1940s and 1950s (b) The MP outside Parliament The True Extent of Backbench Influence ............... 31 (a) Criteria for influencing policy (b) Criteria for influencing foreign policy (i) Public Methods (ii) Private Methods CHAPTER 2: CONSERVATIVE ATTITUDES TO EUROPEAN INTEGRATION ■ - - 36 Categories of Conservative Opinion .................... 36 (a) The Europeanists (b) The Sceptics (c) The Anti-Europeanists The Europeanists ....................................... 37 (a) Churchill's Decision to Adopt the Cause of Europe (i) Robert Boothby (ii) Leo Amery (iii) Duncan Sandys (b) Other Prominent Supporters of European Integration (i) Macmillan (ii) David Maxwell Fyfe (iii) David Eccles (iv) Peter Thorneycroft (v) Walter Elliot (c) Second-tier backbenchers (i) Sir Peter MacDonald (ii) Peter Roberts (d) Analysis of pro-European Thought The Sceptics ........................................... 63 (a) Eden (b) The Majority of the Party (c) The Reasons for Conservative Ambivalence The Anti-Europeans ..................................... 70 The Motivation of the Sceptics Summary................................................. 76 CHAPTER 3; THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY AMD EUROPE; IN OPPOSITION 1948-50 ........................................ 77 The Move towards Europe: Labour vs Conservative ..... 77 (a) Conservative Enthusiasm for Europe (b) Conservative Doubts Surface The Congress at the Hague ............................. 89 (a) The Reaction within the Conservative Party (b) The Reaction within the Government The Europeanists and the Conservative Sceptics: The Beginning of 1949 ............................... 98 The Moderation of Conservative Opinion The Assembly of the Council of Europe ............... 104 (a) The Conservative Europeanists and the Council of Europe (b) The Reaction of the Labour Government The Conservative Europeanists and The Party Conference of 1949 ................................. 108 The Conservative Europeanists and Their Opponents: The End of 1949 ..................................... Ill Summary ............. 115 CHAPTER 4: THE WAITING ROOM OF POWER: 1950-51 117 The Effect of the February Election ... 118 (a) Europeanists: Departures Arrivals (b) Anti-Europeanists: Departures Arrivals Conservative Attitudes to Europe .................... 120 (a) Conservative Divisions Persist A(b) The Economic Debate Conservatives and the Schuman Plan .................. 123 (a) The Conservative Dilemma (b) The Conservative Europeanists' Response to the Schuman Plan (c) The Schuman Plan Debate: Conservative Doubts Persist (d) The Outcome The Macmillan-Eccles Plan ........................... 141 (a) The Impact of the Macmillan-Eccles Plan (b) The Reaction of the Labour Government The European Army .................................... 146 (a) The Conservative Europeanists and The European Army (b) The Reaction of the Labour Government (c) Conservative Opinion of the Pleven Plan Europe and the Commonwealth ......................... 150 Summary .............................................. 151 CHAPTER 5: THE TRIUMPH OF EDEN 1951-55 ................... 153 The Effect of the October Election ................. 154 (a) Europeanists: Departures (1951 election) Departures (1951-55) Arrivals (b) Anti-Europeanists: Departures (1951-55) The 'Crunch': Strasbourg, November 1951 ............. 155 The Conservative Europeanists and Europe: 1951-55 ... 157 (a) Conservative Europeanists and Military Integration (b) Conservative Europeanists and Political Integration: British Leadership in the Council of Europe (c) Conservative Europeanists and Economic Integration: (i) Europe and 'Europe Overseas' (ii) Atlantic Union - 5 - The Influence of the Conservative Europeanists: 1951-55 ....................................... 173 (i) the loss of Churchill's interest and support (ii) the decisive influence of Eden (iii) Whitehall (iv) lack of ministerial support (v) the attitude of the Conservative backbenches The Problems of Big Europe: Conservative attitudes to the Council of E u r o p e ...................... 182 The Distraction of Imperial Preference ......... 186 The Conservative Party and Europe: 1955-56 .......... 188 (a ) Europeanists: Departures (b) Anti-Europeanists: Departures (c) The Revival of Interest in Europe (d) The Conservative Europeanists and the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) The Influence of Conservative Europeanists 1955-56 Summ a r y ................................................ 199 CHAPTER 6: THE GENESIS OF THE SUEZ GROUP AND THE ANTI-SUEZ GROUP........................................201 The Irresponsibility of Opposition vs the Constraints of P o w e r ........................... 201 THE SUEZ GROUP................................................ 204 Membership.............................................. 204 a) 1954-55 b) 1955-6 c) Sympathizers ('crypto-Suez Group') 1953-56 The Suez Group M P s ...................................... 207 (a) Captain Charles Waterhouse (b) Julian Amery (c) Lord Hinchingbrooke (d) Major Harry Legge-Bourke (e) Other Members of the Suez Group The Formation and Organization of the Suez G r o u p .......217 The Continuation of the Suez G r o u p ..................... 219 The Position of the Suez Group within the Conservative Party................................................. 220 The Public Perception of the Suez Gr o u p ................ 224 The Philosophy of the Suez G r o u p ....................... 225 The Suez Group and the Middle E a s t ..................... 228 The Whips' View of the Suez G r o u p ...................... 230 THE ANTI-SUEZ GROUP...........................................231 Membership..............................................232 The Formation and Organization of the Anti-Suez Group . 234 The 'Philosophy' of the Anti-Suez G r o u p ................ 235 Summary................................................. 237 CHAPTER 7: THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY AND THE MIDDLE EAST: 1948-1951 .............................. 238 Britain's Position in the Middle East after the Second World Wa r ................................. 238 The Position of the Middle East in Conservative Thought..............................................