The Porcupine and the End of History Oklukirpi ve Tarihin Sonu Baysar Taniyan Pamukkale University, Turkey Abstract Set in a fictional East European country in the aftermath of the collapse of communism, Julian Barnes’s The Porcupine (1992) is a political satire where he juxtaposes two dominant ideologies; capitalist liberal democracy and communism. Although this short novel has a conventional narrative form, postmodern discussions on history can be observed, especially the discussion which has revolved around the idea of “the end of history”. It was Francis Fukuyama’s controversial article entitled “The End of History” (1989) that has sparked this specific debate. In 1992, he elaborated his thesis in a book titled The End of History and the Last Man, the same year Barnes published his novel. Fukuyama suggests that the modern Western liberal democracy is the ultimate and the most successful form of human government, the point where the Hegelian dialectic of history comes to an end. The aim of this article is to present a critical reading of the novel in the context of Fukuyama’s thesis and the discussion generated by this thesis. While it is true that Fukuyama’s thesis has now been outdated and negated, this reading may still provide fresh insights for the current political panorama of the world shaped by surging nationalism, increasing populism and growing conservatism. Keywords: Julian Barnes, The Porcupine, history, Francis Fukuyama, end of history Öz Komünizmin çöküşü sonrası kurgusal bir doğu Avrupa ülkesinde geçen Julian Barnes’ın Oklukirpi (1992) adlı romanı, kapitalist liberalizm ve komünizm gibi iki başat ideolojiyi karşı karşıya getiren politik bir hicivdir. Geleneksel bir anlatı biçimine sahip olmasına rağmen bu kısa romanda tarih üzerine, özellikle de “tarihin sonu” düşüncesine odaklanan postmodern tartışmaları takip etmek mümkündür. Bu özgül tartışma Francis Fukuyama’nın “The End of History?” (1989) başlıklı tartışmalı makalesi ile başlamıştı. Barnes’ın da romanının yayınlandığı 1992 yılında Fukuyama bu tezini, Tarihin Sonu ve Son İnsan adlı kitabında detaylandırmıştır. Fukuyama, modern liberal Batı demokrasisinin nihai ve en başarılı yönetim şekli olduğunu, yani Hegelci diyalektik tarihin sonu olduğunu önerir. Bu makalenin amacı, Barnes’ın romanının Fukuyama’nın tezi ve bu tezin ürettiği tartışmalar bağlamında eleştirel bir okumasını yapmaktır. Fukuyama’nın tezinin güncelliğini yitirdiği doğru olsa da bu okuma, yükselen milliyetçilik, artan popülizm ve büyüyen muhafazakârlık ile şekillenen dünyanın güncel siyasi görünümü hakkında yeni fikirler verebilir. Anahtar Kelimeler: Julian Barnes, Oklukirpi, tarih, Francis Fukuyama, tarihin sonu CUJHSS, December 2020; 14/2: 240-251. DOI: 10.47777/cankujhss.848919 © Çankaya University ISSN 1309-6761 Printed in Ankara Submitted: Apr 30, 2020; Accepted: Sep 6, 2020 ORCID#: 0000-0002-2843-8835; [email protected] The Porcupine and the End of History | 241 1989 was one of the milestones in human history as the world witnessed the collapse of Socialist regimes epitomised by the “Fall of Berlin Wall”. In the same year, Fukuyama published his article entitled “The End of History?” and within this optimistic scene, he declared “an unabashed victory of economic and political liberalism” against all of its ideological competitors including “absolutism, then bolshevism and fascism, and finally an updated Marxism” (3). He starts his article by heralding that “something very fundamental has happened in world history” and then explains that fundamental thing as “the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government” (“The End of History?” 4). In other words, what Fukuyama suggests is the end of history “understood as a single, coherent, evolutionary process” (last man xii). By history, Fukuyama does not refer to crude events, wars, conflicts, but the progressive understanding of dialectical history formulated by the philosophy of history. In his bold assumptions, Fukuyama is indebted to Hegel and his idea of evolutionary history. In his Lectures on the Philosophy of History (1837), Hegel strongly asserts that “reason governs the world, and that therefore world history is a rational process” (87), which is also “the progress of the consciousness of Freedom” (88). The reason dictates that man is destined to live in a society in which he would relish complete freedom: Spirit’s consciousness of its freedom (and along with it for the first time the actuality of its freedom) has been declared to be the reason of spirit in its determinacy. The latter is the destiny of the spiritual world, and (since the substantial, physical world is subordinated to the spiritual, or in the speculative sense has no truth over against it) it is the final end of the world in general. (Hegel 89) Under the guidance of reason, human societies will eventually evolve into a form where “all” enjoy freedom, at which point the history will necessarily come to an end. Fukuyama regards Western liberal democracy as the point projected by Hegel and, therefore, he claims that history in this sense has come to an end. While Fukuyama’s article could muster up support (Bloom et al. 1989), the text is obviously open to criticism as it is Eurocentric, a criticism which is also levelled at Hegel (Buchwalter 2009). For instance, Jacques Derrida directs a negative and severe criticism in Specters of Marx (1993): For it must be cried out, at a time when some have the audacity to neo- evangelize in the name of the ideal of a liberal democracy that has finally realized itself as the ideal of human history: never have violence, inequality, exclusion, famine, and thus economic oppression affected as many human beings in the history of the earth and of humanity. Instead of singing the advent of the ideal of liberal democracy and of the capitalist market in the euphoria of the end of history, instead of celebrating the ‘end of ideologies’ and the end of the great emancipatory discourses, let us never neglect this obvious macroscopic fact, made up of innumerable singular sites of suffering: no degree of 242 | Baysar Taniyan progress allows one to ignore that never before, in absolute figures, have so many men, women and children been subjugated, starved or exterminated on the earth. (85) In 1992, Fukuyama published a book titled The End of History and the Last Man, in which he reiterates his strong belief in the inevitable triumph of liberal democracy by referring to “the revelation of enormous weaknesses of … seemingly strong dictatorships” and the spread of “the free market” (xiii) and by insisting that “the ideal of liberal democracy could not be improved on” (xi). While in the article, he identifies “religion and nationalism” (“The End of History?”14) as new challenges to liberal ideology, in the book, he posits identity politics, relatedly politics of recognition, as the weakness of the system (last man xiii-xxiii). In order to advance his argument, Fukuyama resorts to Plato and then, again, to Hegel. In the Republic, Plato divides the human soul into three parts: desire, reason, and thymos. Much of human action is organized by the first two. Thymos, which Fukuyama interprets as “self- esteem,” is related to a person’s sense of worth, or recognition by others (last man xvii). Emotions of anger, pride, and shame can be aroused depending on whether thymos is satisfied or not, and Fukuyama points out that Hegel holds these emotions responsible for historical change (last man xvii). For Fukuyama, reason and desire can explain the industrial revolution and transformations in economic life, but thymos is the ultimate fuel for liberal democracy as it provokes “a rational desire to be recognized as equal” (last man xx). This democratic society requires taming of thymos and curbing all dangerous feelings of superiority. Consequently, Fukuyama suggests that “the typical citizen of a liberal democracy was a ‘last man’” or ‘“men without chests,’ composed of desire and reason but lacking thymos, clever at finding new ways to satisfy a host of petty wants through the calculation of long-term self- interest” (last man xxii). The emerging problem here is that without thymos, man lacks aspiration or inspiration to create or to move forward and hence, he is no longer human. It is also, therefore, the point where history ends. Fukuyama also acknowledges that “thymos is the fundamental source of human evil” (last man 181). In the world, thymos will always exist, and there will always be disagreements, arguments, or competitions for domination. Fukuyama, then, introduces new categories for thymos: megalothymia as the desire to be recognized as superior and isothymia, the desire to be recognized as the equal of other people (last man 182). He is still optimistic that liberal democracy will always provide new channels for the megalothymia to discharge its energy. What is interesting is that, in 1992, Fukuyama cited Donald Trump as a megalothymic personality whose personal ambitions are safely channelled into business far from political life (last man 328). No matter how one defines it, as historical necessity or as a twist of fate, or as contingency, to the disappointment of Fukuyama, Trump has ventured forth into politics and became the president of the United States. Moreover, while Brexit in the UK and extreme nationalist and populist governments at work in different liberal countries of Europe undermine the basic foundations and The Porcupine and the End of History | 243 premises of liberal societies, contingent events, like the Covid-19 pandemic1, reveal how economically and socially vulnerable these societies are. Upon such developments, in 2018, Fukuyama published another book, Identity: The Demand for Dignity and the Politics of Resentment. The first sentence of his Preface is, “this book would not have been written had Donald Trump not been elected president in November 2016” (ix). He admits that he did not “suspect back then that Trump would not be satisfied with business success and celebrity, but would go into politics and get elected president” (Identity xiv).