“The Painful Task of Thinking Belongs To Me:” Rethinking Royal Navy Signal Reform during the American War of Independence Benjamin F. Olex Thesis submitted to the faculty of the Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts In History Arthur R. Ekirch Gertrude Harrington Becker Richard F. Hirsh May 5, 2021 Blacksburg, Virginia Keywords: British History, Royal Navy, Naval History, Signals, Fighting Instructions, American War of Independence, Eighteenth Century © 2021 by Benjamin Frederick Olex “The Painful Task of Thinking Belongs To Me:” Rethinking Royal Navy Signal Reform during the American War of Independence Benjamin F. Olex ABSTRACT This thesis examines the context and causes of signal reform in the British Royal Navy during the American War of Independence. It argues that changes in the ethos of the officer corps before and during the American War of Independence led to a complex period of signal reform. The original system was tied to the General Printed Sailing and Fighting Instructions, more often referred to as the Fighting Instructions. For around a century (ca. 1690 to ca. 1790), the Royal Navy utilized the Fighting Instructions as its main system of communication. During the American War for Independence, however, some sea officers began to question the system and devise new methods of signaling. This change was brought on by changes within the officer corps. Among the changes were trends of centralization and the influence of Enlightenment ideals. Both of these shifts helped to inspire the signal reformers, while also creating the environment to sustain signal reforms. This thesis examines the signal reforms of the three principal signal reformers of the war: Richard Howe, Richard Kempenfelt, and George Rodney. “The Painful Task of Thinking Belongs To Me:” Rethinking Royal Navy Signal Reform during the American War of Independence Benjamin F. Olex GENERAL AUDIENCE ABSTRACT This thesis examines the context and causes of signal reform in the British Royal Navy during the American War of Independence. It argues that changes in the ethos of the officer corps before and during the American War of Independence led to a complex period of signal reform. For nearly one hundred years, the navy utilized the same system of signaling to communicate between ships: the General Printed Sailing and Fighting Instructions, more commonly known as the Fighting Instructions. During the American War of Independence, some British sea officers began to question that system and propose alternate systems of their own design. Influenced by their lengthy naval experience, shifts in trends of centralization, and the influence of Enlightenment ideals, officers like Richard Howe, Richard Kempenfelt, and George Rodney experimented with new methods of signaling. Acknowledgements Olex - iv All scholarly works are a work of collaboration. This work would have been simply impossible without the support of my friends and family. Foremost, I must thank Sam. Your help has been absolutely invaluable and I am not sure my gratitude can quite be expressed in words. You moved everything to come here and support me. There are few things more selfless than that. You read my drafts, listened to my presentations, and imbued me with a very clear understanding of Joan Scott. We often asked each other what this pandemic experience would have been like if we had been apart. I think we both know it would have been completely unmanageable. Next, I have to thank my parents and my brother Nick. You have always supported everything I have done, and this was no different. Mom and Dad endured many slightly manic phone calls from me very bravely. All of you very warmly welcomed me home on my breaks when I needed it most. Nick, you also took a very deep interest in my thesis before I defended, which did not go unnoticed. Thank you all. To my friends Mike and Phoenix, you have both been a great help – usually by distracting me from my work. Mike’s work on lightning strikes in the Hudson Valley was hugely instructive to me, and the rest of the historical community. Both of you have also proven the old statement to be true: there is nothing quite like a good meme to rejuvenate the spirits. So thank you for being excellent colleagues and friends. Now I have to thank my friends from the Jerseys: Tom, Chris, Bridget, Ann, and Amy. Our conversations – both online as well as the rare in-person conversation – have helped me to stay sane. While it makes me sad that we cannot be together more often, it has been amazing to watch each of you embark on your own cool new thing, and I hope once this is all over we can see each other again. Olex - v I also have to thank Ellie, for being the best dog in the world. Now, of course, dogs cannot read, so someone will simply have to read this to her. Originally, I opposed getting a dog while in a Master’s program, but Sam’s lengthy and active campaign to change my mind finally worked, and I am so pleased it did. Ellie’s advice on naval matters has been indispensable. Last, and certainly not least, I would also like to thank my committee. This year was a challenge to everyone. Despite that, you eagerly returned your helpful comments, notes, and emails laced with excellent advice, observations, and encouragement. I cannot thank you enough. Olex - vi Table of Contents Preface ........................................................................................................................................................................... 1 Historiography........................................................................................................................................................... 4 Chapter One: The History of the Fighting Instructions ............................................................................................... 13 I. .............................................................................................................................................................................. 13 II. ............................................................................................................................................................................. 18 Chapter Two: “Our Sailing and Fighting Instructions Might Be Amended:” Reexamining Fighting Instructions .... 21 I. ................................................................................................................................................................................... 22 II. ................................................................................................................................................................................. 32 III. ................................................................................................................................................................................ 40 Chapter Three: The Factors Influencing Signal Reform ............................................................................................. 45 I ............................................................................................................................................................................... 48 II. ............................................................................................................................................................................. 55 III. ............................................................................................................................................................................ 66 Chapter Four: “The Unnatural Rebellion:” Signal Reform during the American War of Independence ................... 75 I. .............................................................................................................................................................................. 76 II. ............................................................................................................................................................................. 88 III. ............................................................................................................................................................................ 98 Conclusion ................................................................................................................................................................. 105 Bibliography .............................................................................................................................................................. 109 Olex - 1 Preface On the fifth of September, 1781, the “British fleet had,” in the words of Rear Admiral Samuel Hood, “a rich and most plentiful harvest of glory in view.”1 After several days, the fleet had finally found its French adversaries at the mouth of the Chesapeake Bay. Both fleets believed themselves to have numerical superiority and proceeded to engage the other. What followed was a tactical and strategic debacle for the British Royal Navy. As the fleets came together, the British commander, Rear Admiral Thomas Graves, hoisted two signals at once: one for the ships to arrange themselves in a line ahead and another to engage the enemy. Admiral Hood viewed these signals from his ship, which was positioned in the rear of the British line. Hood reasoned that both signals could not be simultaneously executed and that the signal for a line ahead trumped the other. Thus, he and his division of six ships of the line