Executive summary THIS REPORT is concerned with the problems caused by the proliferation of small arms and light weapons (SALW) in the South Caucasus. Levels of SALW possession remain very high, reflecting the continued atmosphere of insecurity: conflicts remain unresolved, crime is widespread and people do not always feel they can trust the state to protect them. In such circumstances, SALW are seen as protection against these unpredictable forces.Yet SALW proliferation is also a cause of insecurity in itself, heightening fears of further violence both between and within societies. Although SALW proliferation in the Caucasus is recognised as a serious security concern, there has been little detailed analysis of its dimensions: How many weapons are in circulation? How were these weapons acquired, and which types of guns are widespread? What role do guns play in society? This report seeks to find some answers to these questions by exploring the dynamics of SALW proliferation in the region and rooting it in the context of the local security environment. It is comprised of seven case studies written by local researchers in the Caucasus, complemented by a chapter on the view from Moscow. It is difficult to get even approximate figures of the number of SALW in circulation in the South Caucasus. The major source of SALW proliferation was the stores of the Soviet Army as the Soviet Union collapsed, and the arms of the Transcaucasian Military District were divided amongst the newly independent republics, breakaway regions, paramilitary organisations and individuals by a combination of legal and illegal means. This period was so chaotic that it is not always possible to establish how many weapons ended up where. Although the states of the region have had some success in establishing control, disbanding paramilitary organisations and collecting or registering weapons held by the civilian population, concrete information about the SALW situation remains scarce, and legislation to regulate the possession and use of SALW is weak. Information on weapons under state control is usually secret, and estimates of the amount in illegal circulation vary considerably. The authors demonstrate that there is no single ‘problem’ with SALW in the Caucasus – each area has its own specific ‘problems’.Though in some regions of the Caucasus there was a traditional ‘gun culture’,it was not until the late 1980s that civilians began to acquire arms on a large scale, because political conflicts over ethnic identity, territory and survival created a sense that weapons were needed and catalysed the formation of armed groups. This was facilitated by poor stockpile security. Moscow had little idea how vulnerable its military stores were. In the instability of the period, it was quite easy to acquire arms by bribing those responsible for their storage or by violent seizure of the weapons. 2 THE CAUCASUS: ARMED AND DIVIDED · EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Case studies There were few SALW in circulation in Armenia during the Soviet period. SALW proliferation began as a response to rising tension in the largely Armenian-populated Nagorno Karabakh region of Azerbaijan from 1988 onwards. Weapons were acquired from various internal sources, including the army and the Ministry of the Interior. This was not possible in Nagorno Karabakh, where all state sources were under Azerbaijani control. Compared to other states in this post-conflict region, Armenia began early with efforts to disband paramilitary organisations and create a unified military and security structure. This has largely been successful, though it is thought that some political organisations might have dormant paramilitary units.Various arms control and disarmament measures have been put into action. Although crime rates in Armenia are low, the underlying potential for violence is still high, as the shootings in the Armenian Parliament in October 1999 and the December 2002 assassination of television chief Tigran Naghdalian have demonstrated. Traditionally, Azerbaijan was not a nation with a strong ‘gun culture.’When conflict flared up in 1988 over Nagorno Karabakh, local paramilitary groups tried to obtain weapons from wherever they could, in particular from Soviet military stores. In 1992, Azerbaijan acquired a large quantity of arms through the division of Soviet military property in the South Caucasus, and further weapons were obtained through illicit purchases and seizures of Soviet weapons. It is estimated that of the 160,000 units of SALW in Azerbaijan in Soviet times, up to 90,000 may have come into Azerbaijani hands.Yet because of internal political disputes, Azerbaijan remained militarily weak and deeply unstable until Heydar Aliev came to power in 1993. With a ceasefire agreed in Nagorno Karabakh in 1994, the situation began to stabilise from 1995, and the state has had some success in disbanding paramilitary groups, collecting weapons and stemming SALW proliferation. However it is likely that significant amounts of SALW are still in circulation. In the early 1990s, Georgia was host to a number of ethnic and political conflicts, and the state lost control over its law-enforcement and security agencies. This led to a sharp increase in SALW proliferation. The most active period of SALW proliferation occurred when the Soviet military withdrew from the South Caucasus. Most Soviet weapons were transferred to the Georgian MOD, but significant numbers also ended up in the hands of paramilitary organisations. Today, the state remains weak, organised crime is widespread, ethnic conflicts remain unresolved, and the public has little trust in the government security agencies. State bodies are woefully under- funded, and this encourages corruption, as officers supplement their income through bribery and coercion. The ministries themselves have various economic interests which provide extra-budgetary revenue. The Georgian security sector also suffers from weakly co-ordinated and overlapping roles and remits, and is not really subject to civilian control. Even within some areas that Tbilisi supposedly has control over (ie excluding Abkhazia and South Ossetia), there are paramilitary groups and security actors who are beyond the rule of the central government. Some attempts have been made at weapons collection, but have so far had limited success, and there are thought to be up to 40,000 units of SALW still in illegal circulation. When conflict with Georgian forces broke out in August 1992,many Abkhaz were armed only with hunting rifles, though more advanced weapons were soon acquired from Russian troops, either by negotiation or unilateral seizure. The SALW used were mostly of Soviet/Russian origin. Since the conflict ended in 1993, SALW have remained widespread. The local population still feels insecure, and in such circumstances, people are reluctant to hand in their weapons. Tension is particularly high in the Gal(i) region, which lies on the de facto Abkhaz border that forms a ceasefire line with Georgia proper. The government of the unrecognised Republic of Abkhazia has had some success in regulating SALW proliferation. Legal arms sales are better controlled than before, and the MOI keeps a register of all individuals who possess arms. SAFERWORLD ARMS & SECURITY PROGRAMME 3 Legislation has been passed on the possession and trafficking of firearms. However, whenever tension escalates at the border, guns again become more visible in society. The main source of weapons in South Ossetia during the conflict with Georgian forces in the early 1990s was Chechnya, but towards the end of the conflict arms were also obtained from Russian troops in North Ossetia. Following the end of the conflict in 1992, the unrecognised Republic of South Ossetia began to construct its own security structures. The government has made some attempts to control SALW proliferation and collect weapons from the population, as has the OSCE, though these programmes have had limited success. In North Ossetia it was much easier to acquire weapons from Russian military sources than in the South. North Ossetia fought a short war against the Ingush in 1992, and though relations between the two are now stable, North Ossetia is still very sensitive to events elsewhere in the North Caucasus. Recently, however, the increase in Russian military activity in the region has acted as a stabilising factor. Unofficial estimates of the amount of SALW in North Ossetia range between 20,000 and 50,000. In Dagestan, an autonomous republic of the Russian Federation, there is a strong ‘gun culture’, and many people kept arms even in Soviet times. Arms are now very widespread. The main source of weapons currently appears to be Chechnya. In the early 1990s, Dagestan developed unique political institutions to suit its ethnic diversity. These institutions, combined with the influence of traditional clan communities known as jama’ats, were successful in preventing tensions in the region escalating into war. Recently, Moscow’s influence in the area has increased, prompting fears that inter- ference from the centre could undermine this stability. There are four federal brigades on Dagestani territory, and also Border Guard troops.Yet there are also a number of informal paramilitary groups who are loyal to individual politicians and leaders and a number of Chechen militants in the republic. The Dagestani government has at times undertaken attempts to collect weapons and disarm informal groups, but these are generally perceived as attempts by one political faction to disarm another faction, rather than initiatives that will benefit the whole society. As the Soviet Union collapsed, Moscow’s initial policy was to keep as many SALW under its control as possible, but significant quantities of weapons were stolen from Soviet/Russian military bases and arms stores. In 1992, a large amount of weapons was transferred legally according to agreements between Moscow and the newly independ- ent states on the division of Soviet military property. It is estimated that overall the states and unrecognised entities of the South Caucasus acquired more than 260,000 units of SALW.The Russian government has no definite policy concerning SALW proliferation in the South Caucasus.