1 STATE OF CALIFORNIA 2 GOVERNOR’S BLUE RIBBON FIRE COMMISSION 3 4 5 BEFORE THE GOVERNOR’S BLUE ) RIBBON FIRE COMMISSION, ) TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS 6 ) January 7, 2004 Senator William Campbell, Chair ) Ventura County, California 7 ) 8 9 CHAIR CAMPBELL: [mid-sentence] laryngitis. And for anybodyin politics, laryngitis is a 10 catastrophic illness. But we’ll try and see how long the voice holds up. We’d like to first of all welcome 11 you to Ventura County. It was the intent of the commission to hold one meeting in each county of the five 12 counties involved in the October/November fires here in Southern California. So, we’d like to ask you to 13 stand at this point and we’d ask the chairperson ofthe Ventura County Board of Supervisors, Judy Mikels, 14 to lead us in the pledge of our flag. 15 [Pledge of Allegiance is recited.] 16 CHAIR CAMPBELL: Thank you. If I might go over some details for the members of the 17 commission. The way in which you turn on your mike is you press the button, the green button, at the 18 bottom. And when you press it a second time, it will turn it off. 19 Good morning, ladies and gentlemen. Mym nae is William Campbell and I’m Chair of the 20 Governor’s Blue Ribbon Commission on the fire. The commission members and I welcome you to this 21 third hearing in a review of the state’s efforts tocombat the destructive series of wildland and wildland 22 urban interface fires that scourged Southern California last October and November. The fires burned nearly 23 three-quarters of a million acres, destroyed over 3,600 homes and took the lives of 22 people. And now we 24 are witnessing the tragic aftermath of these fires. Fifteen people lost their lives when a church camp was 25 inundated by a mudslide, resulting from the loss of protective vegetation due to the fires. As the former 26 Chairman of the California State Legislature Select Committees on Fire Services, and as Joint Committee 27 on Fire, Police and Emergency Disaster Services, I have participated in several different reviews of federal, 28 state and local firefighting efforts. We oweto itour communities and the residents and the brave firefighters to take this opportunity to ascertain what government, the private sector, our communities, and Governor’s Blue Ribbon Fire Commission Page 1 of 118 January 7, 2004 1 our families, as well as individuals can do to not only prevent such fires from occurring, but how to better 2 combat them when they do erupt. 3 As you may know, the Blue Ribbon Fire Commission has already conducted two hearings. The 4 first hearing was on Thursday, November 11, 2003, in the Los Angeles area, and the second hearing was on 5 Thursday, December 4, 2003, in the San Bernardino area. Those hearings provided the commission 6 members with an overview and a chronological history of the fires that besieged Southern California during 7 late October and early November. We also nedlear about California’s ildlandw and wildland urban 8 interface firefighting capabilities, the number and types of federal, state, local, military and private sector 9 resources available to combat wildland and wildlandurban interface fires, and how these resources were 10 dispatched and coordinated during the firefighting response. 11 Today’s hearing will address fire prevention and e-firepr management efforts. We are all well 12 aware of the fact that California has a constant and growing population with an ever-increasing demand for 13 new housing. This exploding population has forcedan ever-relentless encroachment of housing and 14 developments into the state’s wildland and rural eas,ar which geometrically increased the difficulty and 15 demand for fire prevention and fire suppression programs and services. However, we cannot simply 16 depend upon an ever-increasing number of fire suppressionresources to solve our wildland fire problems. 17 We must also consider, and encourage, the use of sound, effective fire safety and fire prevention practices. 18 Fire safe building standards and codes, realisticand coordinated fuel reduction programs, and the 19 commitment of communities, families and individuals to fire safety and fire protection practices. These are 20 vital and critical and complimentary programs that support our fire suppression capabilities. We have long 21 known California’s a fire prone state. Our Mediterranean climate, our long, dry summers and Santa Ana 22 winds, chaparral brush and rangelands, and wooded foothills, and the forested mountains, make California 23 a prime target for wildland fires. When you addto this combination California’s burgeoning population, 24 the residential development of our wildland areas,the environmental and air quality regulations that 25 severely impede fuel reduction programs, budgetaryestrictions, r and the malicious acts of cowardly 26 persons, it is no wonder why California’s periodic fire disasters occur. 27 However, such impediments must not deter us in our effort to minimize the wildland fire threat. In 28 today’s hearing, the commission will benefit from the presentation of experts on the benefits and Governor’s Blue Ribbon Fire Commission Page 2 of 118 January 7, 2004 1 roadblocks to sound pre-fire management efforts. Please note, at the conclusion of our invited 2 presentations, anyone wishing to address the commission in regard to our review, will have the opportunity 3 to speak. Those who wish to address the commission oday,t please see Mr. Springer at the end of the dais 4 down there. If you wish to submit written testimony instead, Mr. Springer can inform you on where to 5 send the information. Again, thank you for your attendance. Do any of the commission members wish to 6 comment at this time? If not, we’ll begin first of allwith Dallas Jones. Dallas, we’ve asked Dallas, who’s 7 the Director of the Office of Emergency Services, to review the report of the, I think it’s officially titled the 8 East Bay Hills Fire of 1991, but most of us kind ofcall it the Oakland Hills Fire of 1991. There was a 9 major report done as a result after that, similar to the one we’re doing now, and what we’d like to do is find 10 out what information they garnered from that, howthat information was utilized, what recommendations 11 we adopted, and those that we didn’t adopt, that might have been beneficial. So, Dallas, you’re on. Thank 12 you. 13 DIRECTOR JONES: Mr. Chairman and honored commissioners, I have to say this is the first time 14 in many, many years that I’ve seen the chairman almost speechless. [Laughter.] 15 CHAIR CAMPBELL: Some people are grateful, by the way. 16 DIRECTOR JONES: It’s not really a good thing, because his humor always enlightens our 17 meetings and I always look forward to that, so we’ll try to save his voice as much as possible. 18 I’d like to review with you the lessons learned from the Oakland Hills Fire,or as we called it 19 officially, the 1991 East Bay Hill Fire. We will review some of the recommendations, many of which since 20 the time they were put together, have been implemented in California. The speakers to follow me will 21 review some of those, what they’re doing in their different agencies, but also I believe some of the newer 22 things that we’ve learned in that period of time, also. But first I’d like to overview, a little bit, the fire 23 itself. 24 CHAIR CAMPBELL: For those of you, if you’d like, the presentation will be on the chart at the 25 rear of this room. You might want to turn your chair around a little bit to help you. Otherwise we’ll have a 26 chiropractor on duty to provide services. 27 DIRECTOR JONES: This fire started in residentiala area near the Caldecott Tunnel in the 28 Oakland Hills. Thehomes were built on steep slopes, surrounded by abundant shrubbery and trees. Governor’s Blue Ribbon Fire Commission Page 3 of 118 January 7, 2004 1 Previous fires in the area included the 1970 fire that burned 200+ acres, and 37 homes, and the 1923 fire 2 that destroyed over 600 homes in one hour. It started near a three-acre fire that had burned the previous 3 day and at 0830 the following morning a spark within the burn area was blown into a fuel-rich area outside, 4 and the fire began. Within minutes the fire was out of control. East Bay Hills was a classic -canyon 5 influenced fire with winds rapidly moving it toward residential populations. A thermal inversion layer 6 developed and worked to put a lid on the bowl that trapped the fire. Pre-heated fuels within the bowl made 7 ignition most likely. The fire swept down slope, ivendr by fierce winds, and engulfed brush, trees and 8 homes. Within 15 minutes of the first house ignition,the fire gained such intensity that it looked and 9 behaved like a tornado, much like several of the fires in the recent firestorms. 10 Resources were immediately overtaxed. Communications were inadequate. Water pressurewas 11 insufficient. Narrow streets quickly became blocked. Untreated wood roosts contributed to the rapid 12 spread, and most homes had improper brush clearance. Incoming mutual aid units were unfamiliar with the 13 area. With the first hour had ignited 790 structures, nowthat’s within the first hour of that fire. In the 10 14 hours it burned through Oakland and Berkeley, it ignited homes at a rate of one every 11 seconds.