University of Massachusetts Amherst ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014 1-1-1996 Causal v. positivist theories of scientific explanation : a defense of the causal theory. Douglas H. Rice University of Massachusetts Amherst Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1 Recommended Citation Rice, Douglas H., "Causal v. positivist theories of scientific explanation : a defense of the causal theory." (1996). Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014. 2291. https://scholarworks.umass.edu/dissertations_1/2291 This Open Access Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It has been accepted for inclusion in Doctoral Dissertations 1896 - February 2014 by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more information, please contact [email protected]. CAUSAL V. POSITIVIST THEORIES OF SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION: A DEFENSE OF THE CAUSAL THEORY A Dissertation Presented by DOUGLAS H. RICE Submitted to the Graduate School of the University of Massachusetts Amherst in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY September 1996 DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY © Copyright by Douglas Hans Rice 1996 All Rights Reserved. CAUSAL V. POSITIVIST THEORIES OF SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION: A DEFENSE OF THE CAUSAL THEORY A Dissertation Presented by DOUGLAS H. RICE Approved as to style and content by: /u_ y Robert J. Ackermann, Chair ruce Aune, Member 0 If) * 1 Gareth Matthews, Member Stan Rachootin, Member John Robison, Department Head Philosophy Department ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This dissertation could not have been written without the support of many people and institutions. Above all, I am thankful for the love of my family and friends—especially Geraldine, Wiley, Phil, Steve, Cindy, Sioux, Regine, George, and Dan —who encouraged me when they could, and tolerated me when my dissertational struggles were seemingly endless and insufferable. I would also like to express my gratitude to Professors Martha Nussbaum, Cynthia Freeland, Bruce Aune, Vere Chappell, Leonard Ehrlich, Gareth Matthews, Fred Feldman, Bob Wolff, and Bob Ackermann. I learned much from these excellent teachers, and each of them provided me, in different ways and at different times in my career as a philosophy student, with inspiration and encouragement that I appreciate greatly. The Philosophy Department at the University of Massachusetts Amherst supported me generously with teaching assistantships during my tenure as a doctoral candidate. In addition, the Freiburg/Baden-Wuerttemberg Exchange Program at the University of Massachusetts and the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) granted me two years of study in Germany unencumbered by teaching duties or financial obligations. It is safe to opportunity, this dissertation would not be finished. say that if I had not been granted this Beyond that, living in Germany was a wonderful experience, and I am grateful to these to institutions for facilitating the journey. Finally, Professor Guenther Patzig was generous hospitality. me during my year at the University of Goettingen, and I thank him for his IV n ABSTRACT CAUSAL V. POSITIVIST THEORIES OF SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION: A DEFENSE OF THE CAUSAL THEORY SEPTEMBER 1996 DOUGLAS H. RICE, A.B., HARVARD UNIVERSITY M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST Directed by: Professor Robert J. Ackerman Three fundamental claims are defended in this dissertation. First, the influence of Hume's epistemological program and his skepticism with respect to causal knowledge have hindered the development of an adequate theory of scientific explanation. Second, Hume's conception of causal knowledge is outdated, and knowledge of causation should be relieved of the special epistemological burden placed on it by Hume's followers. Finally, once relieved of this Humean epistemological burden, the causal theory of scientific explanation is superior to alternatives lying in the tradition of Humean positivism. Humean positivism places severe constraints on theories of scientific explanation, and its influence on extant theories is reviewed. Recent positivist theories of scientific explanation are discussed critically, and are shown to suffer serious difficulties. Particular to attention is paid to recent pragmatic theories (van Fraassen's and Sintonen's) and Kitcher's unificationist theory. examination of The causal theory of scientific explanation is developed through an theories, theories of causation. Traditional views (e.g., the regularity view), recent statistical that and Salmon's (1984) theory of causation are rejected in favor of Cartwright's thesis essential features of scientific causal laws are best understood as capacity ascriptions. The causal capacities and explanations are then outlined: most prominent are the ascription of v the description of causal interactions. The philosophical benefits of the causal theory are also summarized. Common objections to causal theories of explanation are treated. Of central importance is Hume's skeptical argument. Once Hume's conception of causal knowledge is modernized, however, his arguments yield no skepticism particular to the knowledge of causation: causal knowledge is as defensible as are more respectable types of empirical knowledge. Other important objections are also reviewed. Finally, historical studies of two well-known explanatory controversies—the Jensen- Lewontin debate concerning the heritability of IQ, and a dispute about the nature of cosmic radiation—are presented. Positivist theories of scientific explanation can account for neither the origin nor the manner of resolution of these controversies. In contrast, the causal theory of explanation is shown to illuminate the controversies successfully. This success offers additional evidence in favor of the causal theory of scientific explanation. * VI TABLE OF CONTENTS ACKNOWLEDGMENTS iv ABSTRACT CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION ! 1.1 Explanation and Understanding 1 1.2 Some Philosophical Problems of Explanation 2 1 .3 The Forefathers of Modern Theories of Explanation: Aristotle and Hume 4 1 .4 Two Approaches to the Theory of Explanation 5 1.5 Summary of Chapters 10 2. THE HUMEAN POSITIVIST TRADITION 12 2.1 Hume's Influence and the Positivist Tradition 12 2.2 Hume's Critical Philosophy: The Analysis of Causal Knowledge 13 2.3 Humean Positivism and the Philosophy of Scientific Explanation 13 2.4 Logical Positivism 17 2.5 The Impact of Logical Positivism's Demise on the Philosophy of Science 20 3. POSITIVIST APPROACHES TO SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION 23 3.1 Neo-Positivist Theories of Scientific Explanation 23 3.1.1 The Covering-Law Model of Explanation 23 3.1.2 Kitcher's Unification Theory of Explanation 35 3. 1.2.1 Explanatory Patterns 38 3. 1.2. 2 Unifying Power 42 3. 1.2. 3 Evaluation of Kitcher's Theory 46 3.2 Paleo-Positivist Theories of Scientific Explanation 55 3.2.1 The Pragmatics of Explanation: Scriven's Contributions 55 3.2.2 The Pragmatics of Explanation: Van Fraassen's Theory of Why-Questions 60 Pragmatics of 3.2.2. 1 Bengt Hannson: The Necessity of a Explanation 6"! 63 3. 2. 2. 2 Van Fraassen's Theory of Why-Questions of Why-Questions 65 3. 2. 2. 3 Evaluation of Van Fraassen's Theory vii 3.2.3 Further Developments in the Pragmatics of Explanation: Explanation and Epistemic Context (Gardentors, Sintonen) 69 3.2.3. 1 Gardenfors: The Dynamic Epistemic Context of Explanation 71 3. 2. 3. 2 Sintonen's Theory of Explanatory Commitment 75 3. 2. 3. 3 Evaluation of Sintonen's Account 80 4. THE CAUSAL THEORY OF SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION 82 4.1 What is a Cause? 83 4.1.1 Traditional Views of Causation 84 4. 1.1.1 Causation As Regularity 84 4. 1.1. 2 Probabilistic Theories of Causation 90 4. 1.1. 3 The Counterfactual View 99 4.1.2 Salmon's Theory of Causation (1 984) 101 4.1.3 Dowe's (1 992) and Salmon's (1 994) Theory of Causation 107 4.2 Causal Knowledge: Causal Capacities and Interactions 110 4.2.1 The Nature of Causal Capacities and Their Ascription 113 4.2.2 Causes As the Operation of Capacities v. Causes As Regularities 117 4.3 The Causal Theory of Explanation 121 4.4 Theory, Explanation, and Causal Knowledge 125 4.5 A Summary of the Benefits of the Causal Theory of Scientific Explanation 127 5. OBJECTIONS TO THE CAUSAL THEORY OF SCIENTIFIC EXPLANATION 131 5.1 The Importance of Causes in Science 132 5.2 Dispositions 134 5.3 Knowledge of Causal Capacities and Interactions 140 5.4 The Grounds of Hume's Skepticism 140 5.5 The Perception of Causation 147 5.6 Michotte's Experiments 13° 5.7 Hume's Argument Again 154 5.8 More Epistemological Worries 156 5.9 Epistemology and Science 157 5.10 Testing (Bootstrapping) Causal Claims 158 I 66 5.11 Non-Causal Explanations 5.11.1 Laws of Coexistence ^7 167 5.11.2 Brody's Essential-Property Explanations 170 5.11.3 Kim's Non-Causal Connections viii 5.11.4 Other Non-Causal Laws 173 5.11.5 Identity Explanations -| 75 6. EXPLANATORY CONTROVERSIES AND THEIR RESOLUTION 177 6.1 Explanatory Controversy in Science 1 77 6.2 First Case Study: Controversies over the Explanation of Differential IQ-Test Performance 181 6.2.1 Jensen's Argument 183 6.2.2 Heritabi I ity 185 6.2.3 Lewontin's Criticism 187 6.2.4 Jensen's Reply 190 6.2.5 Lewontin Again 192 6.3 Second Case Study: Controversies over the Nature of Cosmic Radiation 1 93 6.3.1 Cosmic Radiation: Photons or Particles? 195 6.3.2 Crisis and Resolution of the Explanatory Controversy 199 6.4 A Comparison of the Two Case Studies 203 6.5 The Covering-Law Model and Explanatory Controversy in the History of Science 203 6.6 Pragmatic Theories of Explanation and Explanatory Controversy in the History of Science 207 6.7 Kitcher's Unification Theory and Explanatory Controversy in the History of Science 209 6.8 Explanatory Controversy and the Causal Theory of Explanation 217 NOTES 220 BIBLIOGRAPHY 248 IX CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 1.1 Explanation and Understanding Science begins with the desire to understand.