.", The Charting of the Eastern (Japan) Sea and Korean coasts by the Russian Sailors in the Nineteenth Century Alexei Postnikov (Professor, Institute of the History of Science and Technology, Russia) In our previous presentation l we showed that the maJ onty of Russian maps which had been published in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries had pelagonyms Koreiskoe more (Korean Sea) or More Vostochnoe (Eastern Sea) on them. The Russian World Atlas for education published by Saints-Petersburg Academy of Sciences in 1737 have put forward such tradition for the first time. It is safe to assume that the majority of these maps reflects a tradition of sea- naming which have developed more or less spontaneous on base of perception of Korea Sea's place relative to the nearby coast and states of Eurasia. The development of sea charting during European round the world expeditions of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries led to the fanning of internationally approved (at least by the European states) understanding of the main sea's geographical limits and their names. To ignore a traditional sea name and to give an arbitrary new one was not unusual for the explorers of that time. The first Russian expedition to sail by this sea and to do its survey in passing (1805) was that of Captain Ivan F. Krusenshtern (1 nO- l846) during round the world voyage on board of Nadejzda (1803- 1806)."The Atlas of the Southern Sea" [Pacific Ocean] and "The Collection of Works to analysis and explaining of the Atlas of the Southern Sea" had been the fundamental scientific results of this expedition which influenced very much all later Russian works on the Pacific Ocean. One side of this influence is of special importance for our topic: these publications have changed the eighteenth centu ry Ru ssian tradition of sea- naming for the Pacific Ocei::1D and its western part, intrcx::lucing mainly La Perouse's views on this matter. Ivan F. Kruzenshtern's authority proved to be stronger than Russian national traditions of sea" naming in East Asia. although few maps showed that old notions were alive. The last Russian official map to show the above notion of sea- naming in the area under di scussion was the Map of the Polar sea and the Eastern Ocean. compiled on base of the - 63- up- to-date suroeys in the Hydrographical Department c! the Navy Ministry. 1844 . One might think the map's adherence to the name Korean Sea to be outdated and strange for such a sound publication, if there was not so long Russian national cartographic tradition to back it up. After this map Russian Admiralty accepted definitively the European notions of pelagonyms' distribution in the area between Korea and japan with japanese sea being its major feature. It is worthwhile to mention that Ivan F. Kruzenshtern had not been able to survey the Korean coasts in any way, which fact is confinned by the CIrlrt of Discoveries and surveys fulfilled [by Russian offices] on boord of HNadejda H under Captain Kruzenshtem in 1804 and 1805. 2 The beginning of actual charting of Korean these coasts had been postponed for some 40 years more (up to the middle of the nineteenth century), when Russia got herself , involved very much with the South Asian politics, In the 1850th Russian Empire T had made active steps to return Amur regions into the Crone Possessions and I to win for herself a strong footing on the Pacific ocean coast. The Vice-Admiral I E.V. Putyatin Embassy to japan have been one of the first actions to reach t these ends. During the voyage on board of "Pallada" under Lieutenant-Captain t l S. Unkovskii Russian Navy officers perfonned a roule survey of Korea Eastern • coast. which laid a basis for an later Russian charting of the region. We shan I not dwell on these works, because Professor Evgenii M. Pospelov paid some attention to them in his presentation. In 1855 Russian Navy officers have begun systematic meteorologic observations in the Japan Sea.3 As a result of Captain Grigorii. I. Nevel'skoy's expedition, which had proved the mouth of the ArnUT river to be navigable, Primorsk (Maritime) Region was founded in 1856. Siberian Navy Fleet (group) I has been organized based in Nikolayevsk- on -Amur to facilitate exploration and defence of new Russian possessions and neighboring regions. The Corps of • '>'.' Navy Navigators (Hydrographers) of the Fleet under Lieutenant Colonel Vladimir . ~ M. Babkin had been proclaimed on October 31, 1856, and thi s day became an official date of Russian Pacific Hydrographic Office' s formation. During first '",'il years of its development the Office had been surveying mouth of Arnur and its vicinities, but in 1859-1862 offices of the Navy vessels "Plastun" "Griden", "Vostok" , "Oprichnik" and "Naeznik" perfonned some reconnatssance hydrographic surveys of other Japan Sea coastS.4 With the Treaty of Peking, signed in November, 1860, Korea became Russian immediate neighbor because by the force of the treaty Tumen'-Ula river became Russia's boundary with the Korean Kingdom. Many Russian statesmen and Navy officers especially those ",',' . - 64 - grouped around Navy mlnister Grand Prince Kon stantin, insistered that the expansion of Russia's territorial dominion in the Far East had to go beyond the geographical limits of the Arnur river itself. So, Rear Admiral Popov speculated in 1860 that the Russian population of Alaska could be relocated to the sea-coast south of the Arnur estuary from where "it may be presumed, not satisfying ourselves with a pointless battle against the natural hindrances [in the Arnur region] we will move farther south into Korea.',5 This position was vigorously endorsed by many of those exiled Decembrists in Eastern Siberia who had a naval background, such as Baron V,l. Shteingel' and Mikhail Bestuzhev. Shteingel' had noted the need for more southern ports in 1854,6 and Bestuzhev brought the matter up rather irately with Murav' ev himself in 1857 (or so he claimed). "Is it really the case? he demanded in a conversation with the governor- general," that the Amur drew us to the ocean in order that we fold our arms and gaze admiringly from behind the ice floes and sandbars of its mouth at the corrunercial activities of other nations? If you want to take part in this activity and maintain fleets [on the Pacificl. then it is necessary to prepare suitable ports for them. and not glaciers and harbors closed [by ice], which are aU that Russia can boast of [on the Amur]. Yes! it will be a sin if we Russians. out of our customary apathy. do not now take advantage of favorable circumstances and seek out for ourselves an open JXlrt to the south.n7 Anticipating what was to become the preoccupation of Russian far-eastern policy four decades later. voices were raised already at that time calling for the extension of Russian influence into Korea An important but little-remembered incident some years after Murav' ev's conversation with Bestuzhev serves as an indication of the detennination of Konstantin Romanov and his like- minded associates to shape events in the Far East in the line with their perspective. In May 1860, Rear Admiral Ivan Likhachev, an assistant and trusted confidant of Konstantin Nikolaevich submltted a detailed memorandum to the Grand Prince setting forth his own evaluation of the overall situation confronting Russia in the Far East. Conceding that the Treaty of Peking had gained for Ru ssia the advantage of the coastline south of the Amur estuary. Likhachev pointed out that the country's overall naval position in the Far East remained highly problematic nonetheless, for this coastline provided access only into the Sea of Japan, which was itself cut off from the Pacific by the Japanese islands and was thus in its own way an "internal" sea like the Black Sea and the Baltic. This disadvantageous situation would inhibit the future development of - 65- Russia's naval power on the Pacific in the same way it had inhibited elsewhere. To overcome this obstacle, Russia had to secure free and unrestricted access In and out of the high seas of the Pacific, and the only way to do this would be to establish a Russian naval base on what called the "main gate" leading out of the Sea of Japan, namely the Japanese island of Tsu Shima. The island was located between Japan and Korea in the middle of the Straits of Korea, about 500 miles south of the southernmost point of Russia's new Pacific boundary. Likhachev's proposal had strong support of Konstantin Romanov, who was able to obtain the consent of the tsar to proceed with a provisional landing on the island. Rear Admiral Likhachev himself was sent to survey the situation in the Far East firsthand, and in April 1861, after inspecting Russia's newly acquired coastline, he wrote back to Konstantin. He now declared unequivocally that Russia's "future main military port on the Pacific should be on Tsu Shima," ordered the landing on the island for that spring, and proceeded to fortify the Russian position there. The project, however, was aborted almost ·1 immediately. The Russian build-up elicited strong objections from the Japanese I I as well as the British - the latter making a demonstrative landing of their own on the island in June - and in St. Petersburg, where the Foreign Ministry had been critical from the outset, support began to waver. By December 1861, Likhachev had been ordered to abandon the island and return to St. Pertersburg.