C M I have testifi ed now for two years, as we’ve been talking Y Torchbearer K about the supplemental funding required to reset the force National Security Report —it will take us at least two years to reset the force from what we are consuming in this war. General Peter J. Schoomaker Chief of Staff, United States Army in testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 30 June 2005 Resetting the Force: The Equipment Challenge Reproduction of this report, in whole or in part, is authorized with appropriate acknowledgment of the source. An AUSA Torchbearer Issue October 2005 3 October 2005 Resetting the force—preparing redeployed Soldiers and their equipment for future missions—reflects how we care for our people and prepare units for upcoming training and deployments while positioning the Army to be more responsive to emerging threats and contingencies. Amidst the constant demands of combat and stability operations, the Army’s equipment is aging far more rapidly than projected. Due to high operational tempos, a harsh environment and limited depot maintenance available in theater, ground and air vehicles in Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom are experiencing usage five to six times greater than expected. Future unit readiness is at risk. To mitigate risk, the Army is taking a series of steps to reverse the stress of combat on equipment as forces redeploy. The program, called Reset, consists not only of repairing and modernizing equipment, replacing battle losses and equipment which are uneconomical to repair, and recapitalizing (to include implementing lessons learned) but also reorganizing into and training on the new brigade-centric modular formations. In this latest edition of AUSA’s signature Torchbearer National Security Report series, we focus our examination on Equipment Reset and the resources it will take to complete it. We hope you find this report a useful resource and that you will continue to look to AUSA for thoughtful, credible analysis of contemporary national security issues. Contents Gordon R. Sullivan Executive Summary........................................... 3 General, U.S. Army Retired Introduction ....................................................... 5 President, AUSA Background........................................................ 6 Current Operations ........................................... 7 Equipment Reset—What Is It?.......................... 9 Replacement of Losses..................................... 9 Recapitalization—Preserving the Life of Current Fleets............................ 11 Repair of Equipment.........................................13 Aviation Reset ................................................. 14 Combat Vehicle Reset .....................................1 5 Additional Reset Concerns...............................1 7 What is Needed................................................1 7 What Must Be Done......................................... 17 Torchbearer Message...................................... 19 2 Executive Summary Resetting the force takes time and funds. Dr. David S. C. Chu, Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness) in testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 30 June 2005 Major combat and stability operations in Afghanistan This Torchbearer Report focuses primarily on the and Iraq are placing tremendous demands on Soldiers last aspect while outlining a future reset challenge and their equipment. Over the past three years (2003– involving prepositioned stocks. 2005), the Army has deployed more than 40 percent of Despite usage levels five to six times above its equipment to Operations Enduring Freedom (OEF) peacetime expectations and in the midst of an extremely and Iraqi Freedom (OIF). As a result, the Army needs harsh environment, equipment readiness in theater to reset those units by preparing Soldiers and their remains high, above the peacetime goals of 90 percent equipment for future missions. As Army units return for ground equipment and 75 percent for aviation. from deployments, they face significant challenges However, this high in-theater equipment readiness in rebuilding their combat power. This is not new in comes with a price—in this case both monetary and America’s history. What is significant, however, is in terms of impact on the remainder of the Army. the magnitude and length of current operations. The As Army maintainers correctly emphasize in-theater increased operating tempo combined with an already readiness, Army Materiel Command is working to ensure aging fleet and significant combat losses challenge repair parts availability for the entire force worldwide, the Army’s ability to sustain operational availability especially for units preparing to deploy who undergo for its systems. The Reset program is designed to accelerated preparatory training prior to deploying. The reverse the effects of combat stress on the Army’s mission many of these units face in fighting insurgents in Afghanistan and Iraq is different from that for which equipment. the units were initially designed, equipped and trained. The Army resets units forward to the new Reset, then, comprises a series of actions to modular formations—not back to their legacy restore units to a desired level of combat capability designs. Reset is not just equipment-focused; it is: commensurate with mission requirements and • reorganizing returning units into modular unit designs; availability of resources: • retraining essential tasks to incorporate lessons • replacing battle losses and washed out equipment learned from OEF and OIF; (damaged to the degree that repair is not economical); • providing considerable training and professional recapitalizing equipment that needs extensive development for Soldiers and leaders; • refurbishment, implementing lessons learned where • adjusting prepositioned stocks of ammunition and sensible/affordable; and equipment to support the force; and • repairing existing equipment in accordance with • bringing unit readiness back up to Army standards. applicable Army maintenance standards. 3 would be expected. The analysis shows that the effective increase in aging of vehicles deployed to the theater for one calendar year resulted in five years of wear and tear. The resulting stress decreases the remaining useful life of the vehicle.] In addition to the reset of equipment as it returns with units from OEF/OIF, the Army must address the impact of these operations on prepositioned stocks and the equipment that has remained in theater. The Army’s prepositioned stocks from Southwest Asia assets, afloat assets and European assets have been employed in the current conflict. These assets are maintained in theater and are removed from theater to higher-level maintenance only when required. The equipment will require a significant amount of reset following the current conflict; until that The express purpose of Equipment Reset is to equipment is reset, the nation will be accepting risk bring unit equipment to combat-ready condition, in its ability to deploy forces in the time required. either for the unit’s next rotation in support of When the 4th Infantry Division returned from Iraq current operations or for other, unknown future in 2004, it needed to replace, repair or refurbish 71,000 contingencies. The 1st Cavalry Division, for example, pieces of equipment. But it also had to absorb thousands having returned in 2005 from a year-long rotation in Iraq, of newly assigned Soldiers (many directly out of basic/ is resetting itself in anticipation of another deployment, advanced individual training) and to reorganize the perhaps as soon as 2006, and/or to be available for an entire division into a modular force, to include manning unexpected crisis/natural disaster. All of its tanks and and equipping a new 4th Brigade. While supplemental most of its infantry fighting vehicles are in the mainte- appropriations have been critical in fixing current nance shop after operating an average of 5,000 miles per challenges and in addressing some of the lifecycle issues vehicle through dust and heat. that have resulted, additional support is necessary. To complete the Reset program, the Army will require [In 2003, the average age of the Abrams tank fleet increased funding above the baseline budget for at was more than 14 years. These tanks have a design life least two years after hostilities have ceased. of 20 years, with expectation of operating slightly more than 800 miles a year. In OIF, in one year, these tanks Therefore, Congress must: are being driven in excess of 5,000 miles, often on • fund the Department of Defense (DoD) at an hard surfaces as opposed to cross-country, for which amount approximating 4 percent of the Gross Domestic Product; and they were designed. Building on a RAND study, the Army conducted analysis in 2004 and determined • increase the Army’s share of the DoD budget to that the equipment in Iraq was aging much faster than at least 28 percent to meet Army requirements. 4 Resetting the Force: The Equipment Challenge [If operations in Afghanistan and Iraq ended today] it [would] take us at least two years to reset the force. We’re using the equipment three to 10 times more than expected. General Peter J. Schoomaker, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army in testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, 30 June 2005 Introduction The challenge facing the U.S. Army (and other ability to meet future threats is the absolute requirement services) is daunting: to maintain the operational to rapidly return operational units to an effective readiness