May 2020 Moscow’s War in Syria Edited by A Report of the Seth G. Jones CSIS Transnational Threats Project May 2020 Moscow's War in Syria Edited by Seth G. Jones A Report of the CSIS Transnational Threats Project Lanham • Boulder • New York • London About CSIS The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) is a bipartisan, nonprofit policy research organization dedicated to advancing practical ideas to address the world’s greatest challenges. Thomas J. Pritzker was named chairman of the CSIS Board of Trustees in 2015, succeeding former U.S. Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA). Founded in 1962, CSIS is led by John J. Hamre, who has served as president and chief executive officer since 2000. CSIS’s purpose is to define the future of national security. We are guided by a distinct set of values—nonpartisanship, independent thought, innovative thinking, cross- disciplinary scholarship, integrity and professionalism, and talent development. CSIS’s values work in concert toward the goal of making real-world impact. CSIS scholars bring their policy expertise, judgment, and robust networks to their research, analysis, and recommendations. We organize conferences, publish, lecture, and make media appearances that aim to increase the knowledge, awareness, and salience of policy issues with relevant stakeholders and the interested public. CSIS has impact when our research helps to inform the decisionmaking of key policymakers and the thinking of key influencers. We work toward a vision of a safer and more prosperous world. CSIS is ranked the number one think tank in the United States as well as the defense and national security center of excellence for 2016-2018 by the University of Pennsylvania’s “Global Go To Think Tank Index.” CSIS does not take specific policy positions; accordingly, all views expressed herein should be understood to be solely those of the author(s). © 2020 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved. ISBN: 978-1-5381-4015-4 (pb); 978-1-5381-4016-1 (eBook) Center for Strategic and International Studies Rowman & Littlefield 1616 Rhode Island Avenue, NW 4501 Forbes Boulevard Washington, DC 20036 Lanham, MD 20706 202-887-0200 | www.csis.org 301-459-3366 | www.rowman.com II Acknowledgments This report would not have been possible without a broad and selfless team effort. At CSIS, we thank Catrina Doxsee, James Suber, Grace Hwang, Alex Friedland, and Jacob Ware for their help at various periods of the research, writing, and editing. CSIS’s iDeas Lab was outstanding in helping design, edit, and produce the report, and a special thanks to Rebecka Shirazi, Jeeah Lee, William Taylor, and Phillip Meylan for their great work. Thanks to Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr. for his outstanding help in producing and analyzing satellite imagery of Russian activity in Syria, which we used in virtually every chapter. In addition, we thank Sam Charap and Michael Kofman for their thorough and inciteful reviews of the manuscript, which greatly improved the quality of the report by identifying holes (some big and some small) that needed to be fixed. Thanks also to Heather Conley, Jeff Mankoff, and Kathleen Hicks for their knowledge on Russian and broader gray zone activities. At RAND, thanks to Mark Cozad, Dara Massicot, Clinton Reach, and Sam Charap for their willingness to discuss lessons from the Russian campaign in Syria. Finally, we could not have done the research without aid from a range of U.S. and partner governments. We had numerous discussions with current and former officials from U.S. European Command, U.S. Central Command, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the U.S. intelligence community, and other U.S. and partner government agencies. We also had several productive trips to Israel, Jordan, and Lebanon to meet with subject matter experts on the Russian campaign in Syria. Finally, thanks to Diana Davis Spencer, Abby Spencer Moffat, and the Diana Davis Spencer Foundation for their generous support to this project. We also thank the Sarah Scaife Foundation for their unselfish support. III Contents Executive Summary 1 Chapter 01: Introduction 4 Seth G. Jones Chapter 02: Russian Goals and Strategy 7 Seth G. Jones Chapter 03: The Military Campaign 18 Brian Katz and Nicholas Harrington Chapter 04: The Punishment Campaign 41 Danika Newlee Chapter 05: The Diplomatic Campaign 52 Brian Katz Chapter 06: Implications and Takeaways 64 Jason Gresh, Seth G. Jones, and Edmund Loughran Appendix: Russian Force Composition in Syria 71 About the Authors 81 Endnotes 84 IV Moscow in the Middle East that was under threat. Executive Second, Russian leaders assessed that the United States and its partners were attempting to overthrow Bashar Summary al-Assad’s regime and were either attempting to replace it with a friendly government or would leave behind a This report examines Russia’s military and diplomatic collapsed state. But these two reasons are insufficient campaign in Syria, the largest and most significant to explain Russian intervention. Moscow’s decision was Russian out-of-area operation since the end of the also significantly influenced by its ability to establish a Cold War. Russia’s experience in Syria will significantly viable military strategy at an acceptable cost. Moscow shape its military thinking, influence promotion and took a major gamble by becoming directly involved in personnel decisions, impact research and development Syria. It adopted a strategy that combined airpower for its arms industry, and expand its influence in the and ground maneuver to overwhelm a divided enemy. Middle East and beyond for the foreseeable future. Instead of deploying large numbers of Russian army Yet despite the importance of Russia’s involvement forces to engage in ground combat in Syria—as the in Syria—especially as the United States competes Soviet Union did in Afghanistan in the 1980s—Moscow with countries such as Russia and China—there has relied on Syrian army forces, Lebanese Hezbollah, and been little systematic analysis of Russia’s campaign other militias and private military contractors as the in Syria. This research aims to help fill the gap and main ground maneuver elements. The Russian air provides some new analysis and data. It conducts a force and navy supported these forces by conducting broad assessment of the Russian campaign—including strikes from fixed-wing aircraft, helicopters, ships, political objectives, diplomatic initiatives, and civilian and submarines. targeting—which place the military campaign in a wider context. In addition, it compiles a data set of Russia’s The Military Campaign civilian targeting and analyzes satellite imagery of Russia’s military campaign in Syria was successful in Russian activity. Some of the authors of the report also achieving Moscow’s strategic objectives at a manageable served in the U.S. Department of Defense and Central cost in terms of Russian casualties and finances. Russian Intelligence Agency during portions of the campaign, efforts benefited from having limited objectives and and they provide an interesting first-hand perspective. facing rebel groups that failed to coordinate their activities and lacked key defensive assets, such as Overall, this report concludes that Russia was anti-air weaponry. Russian operations and tactics successful in achieving its main near-term political were also well aligned to its strategic goals, focusing on and military objectives in Syria, including preventing airpower and special operations forces to enable regime the collapse of the Assad regime (an important regional offensives on the ground. Over the course of the war, partner) and thwarting a possible U.S. attempt to Russia gradually improved its air-ground integration overthrow Assad. The main conclusions can be divided with pro-regime forces. into five areas: Russian goals and strategy, the military campaign, the punishment campaign, the diplomatic Russia’s military intervention in Syria can be divided into three campaign phases centered around different campaign, and broader lessons. but intertwined objectives: stabilizing the Assad regime Russian Goals and Strategy in core areas of western Syria (September 2015 to Russia directly intervened in Syria beginning in 2015 spring 2016); conducting offensive operations in for two main reasons. First, Russian leaders wanted the west to recapture Aleppo (spring 2016 to spring to stabilize Syria, a strategically-important hub for 2017); and countering the Islamic State in central 1 Executive Summary and eastern Syria (spring 2017 to spring 2018). Russia leverage at the international negotiating table. While then turned its attention to retaking Idlib Province the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs negotiated in northwestern Syria and expanding its presence in ceasefires and de-escalation agreements in Geneva northeastern Syria in the wake of the U.S. drawdown and Astana, the Ministry of Defense exploited those and Turkish invasion of the area. While Russia’s primary agreements to rest and refit pro-regime forces and then contribution throughout the phases of the campaign violate the agreements when feasible. While Russian remained airpower, battlefield needs precipitated a diplomatic and military efforts were not always perfectly steady increase in specialized ground forces—including synchronized, they were better orchestrated than the artillery units, forward air controllers, special operations United States and other Western countries, enabling forces, military police, and private military contractors. Moscow to link battlefield