Heidegger’s Philosophy of Disclosedness: a Relational Interpretation of Being and Time Marco Motta BA Hons A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at The University of Queensland in 2014 School of History Philosophy Religion and Classics i Abstract Due to the lack of an established philosophical tradition in Australia, Heideggerian scholarship has relied heavily on readings coming from abroad, especially from North America. However, the same lack has granted a certain intellectual freedom, and some novel and exciting ideas have been able to emerge, a relatively large portion of which has been more or less directly influenced by Heidegger’s thought. This makes it all the more urgent for an independent interpretation of Being and Time to emerge within the Australian context. Needless to say, such a new and independent interpretation of Being and Time requires a careful engagement with those readings currently dominating Heideggerian scholarship. And since no influence has been stronger in Australia than that of commentators working in the United States, the primary aim of this dissertation will be to define and assess the major currents in the contemporary North American interpretation of Being and Time. Accordingly, I shall firstly identify four main readings of Being and Time which will be exemplified by the four scholars who I believe embody these readings most comprehensively. These are, the Pragmatic reading of Hubert Dreyfus, the Epistemological reading of Cristina Lafont, the Hermeneutical reading of Stephen Crowell and the Ethical reading of François Raffoul. Of these four interpretative trends, at least the first two, and to a lesser degree also the third, tend to pay excessive attention to Heidegger’s notion of understanding. Such readings run the risk of reducing Heidegger’s work to a search for that ground which allows for the discoveredness of entities in their ‘truth’. Once this reduction is carried out, the focus of Being and Time comes implicitly yet inevitably to shift from ontology to epistemology. As a result, the notion of Being developed in the Pragmatic and the Hermeneutic interpretation, as well as, partially, in the Phenomenological reading, is an incomplete one. For Dreyfus, Being is nothing more than the unspoken social background, a sort of preconscious knowing-how, which determines the ‘what’ of things. For Lafont, it is merely the function of a Language which determines the being of entities by conditioning the means through which entities are interpretatively understood by Dasein. In both cases, Being is reduced to the quasi-transcendental condition of the correctness of human understanding and Heidegger’s greatest ii achievement would be that of having definitively and inextricably bound human subjectivity to such a condition, lest it not be at all. Similarly, also Crowell runs the risk of reducing Being to a mere grounding space, i.e. the ‘space of meaning’, a transcendental-phenomenological clearing where entities can be discovered as what they ‘are’. It must be said, however, that the Phenomenological interpretation of Being and Time, far from Dreyfus’ and Lafont’s unsophisticated approaches, has the great merit of having released the study of Heidegger’s philosophy to the necessary confrontation with Husserl’s phenomenology, without which a satisfactory interpretation of Being and Time cannot be achieved. On the other hand, Raffoul’s Ethical reading, by paying close attention to the analysis of authentic Disclosedness, especially in relation to the call-response dynamic which characterises Dasein fundamental openness to its Being, shows Dasein’s existential subjectivity not as a static essence that Dasein ‘has’ and that can be ‘known’, but as the existential relation to that alterity which is Dasein’s own Being. Building upon some of Raffoul’s insights, this dissertation aims to demonstrate that, firstly, much of the interpretative tradition which has influenced the current Australian understanding of Being and Time has mistakenly taken the analysis of discoveredness as the principal aim of Heidegger’s book rather than his starting point, and overlooked the strategic role of the concept of Disclosedness in the economy of the book’s ontological project. Secondly, by conducting a critical study of the notion of Disclosedness and its constituents, paying special attention to Heidegger’s analysis of authentic Disclosedness, this essay attempts to bring to the fore what I believe is Heidegger’s fundamental concern, namely, that of constructing a phenomenology of the transcendent ground of phenomenology itself. As such, Disclosedness constitutes the bridging notion between the phenomenological ‘space of meaning’ and the ethical ‘call-response of alterity’, the unifying space of Heidegger’s phenomenological and mystical voice. Yet this unification can be achieved only if the notion of Disclosedness is interpreted not as the openness which results from having merely understood something, but as the existential relation with that otherness which characterises Dasein in its transcendence and, as such, manifests Dasein in its Being. This otherness is Dasein’s Being. iii In order to explore this relation more thoroughly, I shall introduce the notion of Otherness in the work of Emmanuel Levinas. This may seem an arbitrary move, but, as I shall demonstrate, the comparison between Levinas’ analysis of Alterity and Heidegger’s treatment of authentic Disclosedness proves extremely useful in justifying the grounding nature of the disclosing relation between Dasein and its Being, in respect to discoveredness of intraworldly entities, the Disclosedness of the World and, ultimately, the Disclosedness of Being itself. With the help of Levinas’ philosophy, this dissertation will show that while Heidegger begins his analysis with a study of the human understanding, initially described as grounded in a pre-emptive understanding-of-Being [Seinsverständnis], in Being and Time his final goal is the overcoming of a notion of the human existence centred exclusively on understanding in favour of a ‘relational’ interpretation of Dasein. Therefore, Dasein’s existential openness to its Being is no longer characterised as an understanding of Being but in terms of the relation of Disclosedness between Dasein itself and its Being [Seinserschlossenheit]. This is not merely a terminological shift, but constitutes an attempt to pay closer attention to what I believe is Heidegger’s original avenue for overcoming transcendental philosophy and paves the way to a true philosophy of the transcendent. Being and Time tries to achieve this quasi-mystical goal by radicalising the phenomenological notion of intentional space in terms of the disclosive relation between Dasein and its Being. As such, in this dissertation I shall, finally, propose a reading of Being and Time centred on the notion of Disclosedness, able therefore not only to acknowledge the presence of Heidegger’s two voices, but also to bring to the fore Heidegger’s effort to reconcile them. iv Declaration by author This thesis is composed of my original work, and contains no material previously published or written by another person except where due reference has been made in the text. I have clearly stated the contribution by others to jointly-authored works that I have included in my thesis. I have clearly stated the contribution of others to my thesis as a whole, including statistical assistance, survey design, data analysis, significant technical procedures, professional editorial advice, and any other original research work used or reported in my thesis. The content of my thesis is the result of work I have carried out since the commencement of my research higher degree candidature and does not include a substantial part of work that has been submitted to qualify for the award of any other degree or diploma in any university or other tertiary institution. I have clearly stated which parts of my thesis, if any, have been submitted to qualify for another award. I acknowledge that an electronic copy of my thesis must be lodged with the University Library and, subject to the General Award Rules of The University of Queensland, immediately made available for research and study in accordance with the Copyright Act 1968. I acknowledge that copyright of all material contained in my thesis resides with the copyright holders of that material. Where appropriate I have obtained copyright permission from the copyright holder to reproduce material in this thesis. v Publications during candidature Peer-Reviewed Journals Marco Motta “Clear and Distinct Perceptions and Clear and Distinct Ideas: The Cartesian Circle”, Crossroads, Forthcoming Conference Abstracts Marco Motta “Dasein and its Other”, Perspectives on Power, Brisbane: The University of Queensland, 2011 Marco Motta “Dasein and its Other”, ASCP, Brisbane: The University of Queensland, 2010 “Burri and Heidegger: Beyond the Subjective Artist”, ASCP, Melbourne: Monash University, 2009 “Heidegger’s Jewish Ancestry”, The Alternative Expression of the Numinous, Brisbane: The University of Queensland, 2008 Publications included in this thesis “No publications included”. Contributions by others to the thesis “No contributions by others.” Statement of parts of the thesis submitted to qualify for the award of another degree “None” vi Acknowledgements During the six year journey through which this dissertation has slowly taken shape, I have been supported in different ways by a great number of individual people