Price 20 P Price 20 P CHIMUREWGA THE MONTHLY ZANU NEWSLETTER LET US FIGHT AND REBUILD Vol. 1, No.7 30 June,1976 Detente No. 2 There is no doubt that little good can come to Zimbabwe as a result of the recent meeting of the two arch enemies of Zimbabwean liberation, Henry Kissinger and John Vorster. Thre is no doubt that a plot was hatched there in Bavaria to embark on Southern African D t nte No. 2 now that Dgtente No. 1 has failed to achieve its main objectives, viz. to break up African unity by making some countries economic slaves and therefore allies of S. Africa (Zambia was S. Africa's main victim in this); to destroy the liberafion forces in Zimbabwe and Namibia; and to install a neo-colonialist black government in Zimbabwe as quickly as possible. The liberation forces received a temporary setback with the complete destruction of the external wing of ZANU, but when the liberation forces recouped from this blow, they eimerged stronger, more determined and more united than ever before. Kissinger and Vorater failed to install a neo-colonialist black government in Zimbabwe partly because of Smith's intransigence and partly because the guerrillas relentlessly maintained the momentum of the armed struggle despite being completely cut off from food, ammunition and medical supplies and from reinforcements from outside. Already the stage has been carefully prepared for Detente No. 2, and all efforts will be made by the imperialist powers of the United States, Britain and South Africa to ensure that Detente No. 2 succeeds. As in D~tente No. 1, these imperial'st forces mean to use 'peaceful" means such as financial pressure and ruthless diplomacy to achieve their victory. Once again the imperialists will try to us African countries neighbouring on Zimbabwe to achieve their sinister aims. It is only to be hoped that these neighbouring African countries will not allow themselves to be used again as the tools of imperialism but will stand firmly by the principles of African liberation. However, considering the painfully weair condition of the imperialist controlled economies of certain African countries, it is possible, even likely, that they will succumb once again. Possibly the same countries which played a leading role in Southern African Detente No. 1 will ploy an equally prominent role in D6terte No. 2, b~at their bEatryl of Africa w Il lead them into further dependence Qn the imperialistas, and eventually to their overthrow in time to come. Dtente No. 2 is likely to begin with the following moves: 1. Kissinger will persuade or implore Vorster to lean on Smith to renounce his U.D.I. 2. Promises will be made that property and interests will be protected in a free Zimbabwe with majority rule in one or two years, possibly the lesser. A few thousand CONTENTS Detente No. 2 P. 1 Mercenary Activity in Africa p. 2 News in Brief P. 5 Effect of ZANU Detentions and trials on Zambia P. 9 Ndabaningi Sithole Rejects ZANU p. 11 From Other Papers p. 13 STOP PRESSs ZANU Tial in Zambia on 2 Aug., 1976, p. 16 WE ARE OUR OWN LIBERATORS whites wIl be rla I" " T, of babs as a peace offei to. 4at Afria opinion, but~ a n g ,m i nre toai e nif Iiinterests (but they will claim to be helpin Zimbabwe). 3. Smith ma neno i ohcp U.EB.. and all,3w the British to come in, with aid from S. Africa, NATO and the U.S.A. Smith himself will resign. 4. A "transitional" government will be formed immediately headed by a "moderate" leader such asE Garfi.eld p-do,~unit of mdate whites and blacts. The rw "transitional, government will decla-e a comilete and general n gnesty to all exed Zt'7dJoabweans_ politicians and tneir supporters. Ceg -aD cOBunt ies. such as Britain a4 some neigobouring African countries ay cooperate by "deporting" all Zinbabweans in their territory, includiag freedom fighters. 6. Negotiations witl take place under the auspices of Britain, the U.S.A., S. Africa, Zambia and possibly the U.N. to bring about a neo-colonialist &overmrrent under the banner of "TajoritY rule". 7. A Ceasefire will be imrosed as a "corllary to an Amnesty, arn' all freedom fighters will be allowed to ,return into the country. The liberation armi will be- "integrated" into the colonial army., 8. A general "alection,' will be held,supervised by S. Africa, Britain, the U.S.A., etc. This "election" is aimed at causing confusion and uisun-ty, and bobbing Zimbabweans of their victory, &s reactionary politicians such as Nkomo, Muzrewa, aitholu ard Chikerema ill be fnanced to the hilt is their "election" campaigns. They will Sling mud at each other, and the whole campaign will be a charade oranrised and controlled by outside financial interests. Whoever wins, these "elections" wll really be irrelevant, as whatever happens,the financia! intere stS will win aod the people of Ziniabwe will lose. In the meantime, the freedom fighters will be constrained, unable t o move whether they decide to cooperate or not. Once a Ceasefire has been impesed, they may be considered as outlaws if they continue fighting and attempts will be made to per- sdt lce to deser th r figh r the ppula I t he i ical awarene a weak then Zimbabwe is i reaso it is th~e repniltyoal .... i t and -volut Ziab to participat in rais p0ic awareness of he masss. 9. An attempt will be mde teo include some ZANU leaders in the transitional government and election campaign to give the deal credibility as it i.w.ll-km... that the freedom fighters operating in,, Zimbabwe are largely ZANLA forces. tRnegade Ndabaningi Sithole will be used by the imperialists to confuse the masses: he will claim to be the "legitimate" leader of ZANU and will denounce the fr6eedom fighters as "diaobedient children and rebels." D6tente No. 2 wAllput the freedom fighters and tne masses to the test. As in Ddtente No. 1, they will find themselves without a friend in the outside world willing to auppOrt tbWei cause oj4uly. As in D~tente No. 1, the pressures for compromise will be enormous and leaders who oppose Ddtente dot as WANe Haticnal Chairman Herbert htepo so fearlessly did, will be mercilessly murdered by the enemy. The struggle will become harder as there are no easy victories in the revolution. However, ZANI , as the vanguard cf the masses, has moved so far, and the people of Zimbabwe have been so highly politinized, that it is unlikely that they will collapse under tie onslaght D -te'le No. anymore than they di under Dtnt No. 1 Tis high level of politicization and the uidaunted courage our people have shown over the years of resistance will mean that Zimbabweans will not'res-t until total liberation is won, whatever the machinations of the imperialigts and thg9r black agents. A Luta continua Pamberi ne Chimurenga' Based on the analysis of A.M. ,Chidoda, ZANU Representative in Canada. Mercenary Activity in Africa The public trial of 13 mertenaries (tan British, two American and one Irish) in Lvanda, Angola, has generated a lot of debate on mercenary activities in general and their heavy involvement in African conflicts in particular. Unfortunately far too much attention hgg been focused on whether the mercenaries were guilty or not. Bllicose noises have rung out through western capitals about the harshness o the sentences that have been passed, four of the-defendants, Georgiu, alias Callan, McKenzie, Baker and Geerhart, having been condemned to death by firing squad and the rest to prison terms ranging from 16 to 30 years. Britain and America have appealed for clemency but these appeals will remain hollow and meaningless unless they are accompanied by a firm commitment to ban mercenary recruitment, training and financing for wars in Africa and elsewhere. Algeria, Congo, Biafra and Sudan fight in Algeria under the hanner of the4_Preign Legion. Most of them were sadistic killers from former SS - soldiers who used to indulge in 'ratissages", exercises during which French officers would give the meraelharies orders to exterminate whole villages, whichvwere thought to harbo FN, cadres, inicrmlnael3y Geerpal Mass, who was in charge of the mercenaries once said, "To bring people to making a few confessions, it has been necessary to beat theme a bit. Naturally this may have '$d to some accidents". (Der Spiegel 47/1971). After Algeria the mercenary hoardes moved onto Zaire, then the Congo, where their life of looting, plundering, pillaging,,raping, mass murder, etc, reached a frightening peak in the years 1964- 65. These were the years of the notorious Congo Muller, Schramme and Major Hoare, who to this day is still active. Hoare, went to Nieria where he fought with the Biafran secessionist together with Wicks, Steiner and4 the Frenchman, General Fulgues, a former companion of Tshombe, Steiner later offe red his sevices to the Anya nya in puthgn Suan highlightened by the Luanda trial, mer enar7 WetInAicaf be aed aa long The mece naries who mught in the bove meptioned wa nsc contries sAgra h eg,(o TalreY. countrie -ee chaaceied b i rmia amb~~mt weeh~d b rnhipwllamt thkeves, sadistic murderers, safe breakers, experts on explosives, etc,, The effects of mercenaries have been arie,. In Algeria they not only delayed independence but they succeeded in eliminating most of the radical elements in the FNL hierarchy in the hope of promoting the emergence of a more moderate leadership hiich wouid be repared to make compromises .i7th the French colonisers.