Howard Kreisel Between Philosophic Optimism and Fideistic Scepticism: An Overview of Medieval Jewish Philosophy In the introduction to his magnum opus, The Wars of the Lord, the early fourteenth century Jewish Provencal philosopher, scientist, and biblical exegete Gersonides writes as follows in regard to the difficult questions he addresses in his treatise: “We recognize that there are many reasons why it might seem proper to refrain from exam- ining these questions.”1 He then lists these reasons. The third reason he brings is particularly poignant for our discussion: Third, I think that because of envy, which shall never disappear, some will attribute to me arro- gance and rashness in investigating the question of the eternity or creation of the world. For perhaps they think that the intellect of a sage cannot reach the truth on this topic, except if he is a prophet; all the more so when they have seen that earlier scholars of stature from our nation have not investigated this question in the way [that we propose]. From this they have concluded the impossibility of arriving at the truth on this question by means of philosophy. For if this were possible [they say], it would not have escaped the earlier sages.2 Gersonides responds with a lengthy rebuttal of this argument: Now this argument is very weak. It does not follow that what was not known by the former sages will also not be known by their successors. For in time the truth will be forthcoming, as Aristotle says in book two of the Physics. Were this not so, a man would not investigate any science, but only accept what others have taught him. But if this were the case, there wouldn’t be any science at all – which is utterly absurd.3 Gersonides is a strong believer in the possibility of progress in solving weighty philo- sophical questions. Furthermore, he erases the line between prophet and sage, that is to say knowledge based on revelation and knowledge based on reason, when it comes to these questions, since the prophet attains his knowledge of speculative matters 1 Levi ben Gershom, The Wars of the Lord, vol. 1, trans. Seymour Feldman (Philadelphia: The Jewish Publication Society, 1984), 93 [with some emendations on my part of the translation]. For a recent study of Gersonides’ thought see Seymour Feldman, Gersonides: Judaism Within the Limits of Reason (Oxford: The Littman Library of Jewish Civilization, 2010). 2 The Wars of the Lord, 94. 3 The Wars of the Lord, 94. Note: I would like to thank the anonymous reviewers of this article for their criticisms and suggestions. Open Access. © 2018 Howard Kreisel, published by De Gruyter. This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 License. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110553321-002 8 Howard Kreisel in his capacity as sage.4 Gersonides concludes this argument with the following observation: If someone objects that perhaps this doctrine [namely, creation] is one that cannot be philoso- phically demonstrated, we reply that until a proof is forthcoming that shows the impossibility of such a philosophical demonstration, this is not a valid objection against us. Nor is that which Maimonides pronounced concerning the impossibility of [demonstrated] knowledge on this topic a valid criticism, unless the absurdity of what we shall affirm with respect to one of the possible alternatives on this question will have been demonstrated, as has been mentioned. Indeed it can be shown in several ways that the philosophical verification of this doctrine is possible. For we find among the community of philosophers throughout the ages a natural desire to attain the truth on this question, as Aristotle and Maimonides have both related. [Indeed], we ourselves have perceived [this desire] in the accounts of all the inqui- rers [on this topic] that have reached us. Now a natural desire cannot be for something that is unattainable, all the more so if it is unattainable by any investigation. In conclusion, the aforementioned arguments do not preclude completing our investigation of this topic as best we can. For human perfection is completed when one knows reality as much as one can, and it is greater in knowing the more superior things than in knowing the things of inferior rank and value.5 Gersonides essentially completes here the thought Aristotle voices in the opening of his Metaphysics: “All men by nature desire to know,”6 by arguing that nature, meaning God, does nothing in vain,7 and hence all natural desires are in principle for something that can be attained.8 There is a tremendous optimism in Gersonides’ approach to human intellection, a belief in scientific and philosophic progress. It is an optimism that is subtly anchored in the theological belief in God’s wisdom and goodness. Gersonides is convinced that the perfection of the intellect is the true per- fection of the human being, hence God must have also provided the human being 4 For an analysis of Gersonides’ approach to prophecy see Howard Kreisel, Prophecy: The History of an Idea in Medieval Jewish Philosophy (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001), 316–424. 5 Wars of the Lord, 96. 6 Aristotle, Metaphysics, Book 1.1, 980a22. 7 The notion that nature does nothing in vain is inherent in Aristotle’s philosophy and is voiced by him in On the Heavens, Book 1.4, 271a33, and in Parts of Animals, Book 4.13, 695b19. Maimonides brings this notion in the name of Aristotle in Guide of the Perplexed 2, 14, and Gersonides mentions it in Wars of the Lord 1, 4; 5, 3, 6. 8 Maimonides had voiced the other side of this idea when he argued in Guide of the Perplexed 1, 31 that for what is impossible for the human being to apprehend, “he will not find that his soul longs for knowledge of them.” (trans. Pines [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963], 65). His position in the same chapter on whether all things that the human being longs to know are within his grasp to attain, however, is not without ambiguity. He is explicit on the point that on many of these matters it is impossible for human beings to arrive at conclusions that can be proven demonstratively. This still leaves open the question on the epistemological status of non-demonstrative proofs, a point to which I will return later on. Between Philosophic Optimism and Fideistic Scepticism 9 with the capacity to attain this perfection.9 Moreover, Gersonides does not believe that revelation provides privileged information in the domain of speculative knowl- edge that in principle is closed to rational discourse. When it comes to weighty philosophical- theological issues, he does not regard himself as a dwarf sitting on the shoulders of previous giants, a metaphor which was often used as a justification for the belief in scientific progress despite the traditional belief in the superior stature of the ancients10; Gersonides clearly sees himself as a giant in his own right. While the explicitness and extent of Gersonides’ optimism in philosophic and scientific progress is perhaps atypical of his Jewish philosophic contemporaries – most of them were prone to pay at least the customary lip service to the special nature of prophetic knowledge or to the intellectual superiority of the forefathers – his basic stance is in fact characteristic of Provencal Jewish philosophy.11 Nor is he the only one who accords the prophet no essential superiority over the philosopher in specu- lative matters. His contemporary, Nissim of Marseilles is even more outspoken in this matter. He argues that the public leadership role that the prophet assumes detracts from his ability to continue to rise on the ladder of knowledge, an impediment that the philosophic sage does not have to overcome in his quest for knowledge.12 It should be pointed out, however, that there are limits to Gersonides’ philosophic optimism. He rejects the possibility of reaching a level of knowledge whereby one experiences ontological conjunction with the Active Intellect,13 a possibility that most of his philosophic contemporaries continued to accept. It also should be noted that he does not feel that he has solved the issue of creation with demonstrative argumentsc, only with dialectical ones, as is true of the other issues with which he deals in his trea- tise. Yet this fact in itself does not in any manner mitigate his philosophic optimism 9 This is certainly not to argue that there are no limits to the human capacity to know in Gersonides’ thought, or that all human beings share the same capacity: see below, n. 13. 10 On the attitude of medieval Jewish thinkers to the wisdom of the ancients see Abraham Melamed, On the Shoulders of Giants: The Debate between Moderns and Ancients in Medieval and Renaissance Jewish Thought [Hebrew] (Ramat-Gat: Bar-Ilan University Press, 2003), esp. 140–153. 11 For a study of the relationship between prophet and sage in the philosophy of Maimonides and his followers in Provence see Howard Kreisel, Judaism as Philosophy: Studies in Maimonides and the Medieval Jewish Philosophers of Provence (Boston: Academic Studies Press, 2015), 270–314. 12 Kreisel, 307–310. This argument was previously already made by Samuel Ibn Tibbon in his Com- mentary on Ecclesiastes, where he criticizes Maimonides’ view on this issue; see Aviezer Ravitzky, “The Political Role of the Philosopher: Samuel Ibn Tibbon Versus Maimonides,” Maimonides Studies 5 (2008): 345–374. Levi ben Avraham in his Livyat Hen also presents this position; see Kreisel, Judaism as Philosophy, 300. 13 See Seymour Feldman, “Gersonides on Possibility of Conjunction with the Agent Intellect,” AJS Review 3 (1978): 99–120.