Quebec Confronts Canada: Two Competing Societal Projects Searching for Legitimacy Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/publius/article/26/3/177/1824369 by guest on 24 September 2021 Alain-G. Gagnon McGill University Guy Lachapelle Concordia University Forced centralist policies, made possible by the utilization of Ottawa's spending, taxation powers, and frequent of>position to Quebec's policy preferences led a large number of Quebecers to favor greater sovereignty. The federal government's attempts to reduce provinces to junior governments in the federation have backfired in Quebec's case, and led to the construction of a modern, liberal, pluralistic, and territorial nationalist project. Meanwhile, Quebecers continue to shape a vision of themselves lhal is marked by sharp differences with the Canadian political project of undifferentiated citizens and that erects instead a communitarian model inspired by social democratic values. Un 30 October 1995, Quebecers came within a whisker of forcing a reform of the Canadian federation and taking Canada closer to a Maas- tricht type political and economic arrangement. An impressive turnout of 93.48 percent confirmed the deep concern of Quebecers from all linguistic groups, political allegiances, and regions with this decision.1 In the end, only 52,448 votes in favor of the status quo demarcated the two options. Opposition to the sovereignty-partnership project was registered within most nonfrancophone communities, with the exception of the Latino-Quebecers who were more inclined to support the nationalist project.2 Youth, low and middle income earners, unemployed, people on welfare, francophones, and intellectuals gave their overwhelming support to the nationalist cause.3 Changes advanced by the Quebec government, under the leadership of the Parti Quebecois 'Jacques Parizeau, the Bloc Quebecois Official Opposition 'See Guy Lachapelle, "Les raisons du vote massif des Quebecois au referendum," Bulletin d'histoire polUiqueA (Spring 1996): 23-26. 2See Clement Trudel, "Des centaines de Latino-Americains bataillent pour le OUI," Le Devoir, 21-22 October 1995, A7; Daniel Turp, "Post-referendum Reflections," Canada Watch 4 (November-December 1995): 42, states that 44 percent of Latin-American voters backed the sovereignty-partnership project. The dominant traits of Quebec's nationalist project are clearly liberal as it stresses the protection of individual rights through the entrenchment of the Quebec Charter of Human Rights and through the recognition of Quebec as a multinational state formed of Francophone Quebecers, eleven Aboriginal nations and a historic Anglophone minority. Charles Taylor made this point particularly clear when he argued that Quebecers are strong supporters of both individual and collective rights. See Charles Taylor, Reconciling the Solitudes: Essays on Canadian Federalism and Nationalism (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1993). © Publius: The Journal of Federalism 26:3 (Summer 1996) 177 178 Publius/Summer 1996 in Ottawa, led by Lucien Bouchard, and by the Action democratique du Quebec, an offshoot of Quebec Liberal Party, led by Mario Dumont, had a firm liberal orientation. These changes, for example, stressed the entrenchment of a Quebec Charter of Human Rights (more encompassing than the Canadian Charter), a clear decentralization of powers to the regions of Quebec, the Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/publius/article/26/3/177/1824369 by guest on 24 September 2021 elaboration of a societal project more sensitive to the needs of the people and, among other aspects, the maintenance and consolidation of free trade within North America. Pro-Canada political forces would have had difficulty challenging such proposals, because Quebecers tend to favor left-oriented policies, entrenched rights in the provincial order of government, free trade, and decentralization of powers to regions. For most of the referendum campaign, there were no forward-looking propositions initiated by the NO side, sure as it was that Quebecers would not endorse the nationalist cause. Federalist forces, led by Jean Chretien and Daniel Johnson, waited until the very end of the campaign as polls started to confirm that the YES side could win the referendum before pointing to the possibility of administrative change to existing institutions (e.g., decentralization of powers to Quebec, increasing number of Canada-Quebec agreements in the area of immigration, and work force training) and suggesting that Quebecers are better protected in a larger country. The push for independence of the last thirty years, after a brief relapse in the mid-1980s due to an expressed federal will to recognize Quebec specificity, known as the Meech Lake proposals, had never been as high as it was in late 1995. Polls following the referendum of October 1995, suggested that the federal strategy (i.e., partition, legal battles, and ethnic and linguistic divisions) led to an increase in sovereignty support bringing it to 56 percent, a seven-point gain.4 Figures from May 1980 and October 1995 reveal a significant increase in favor of sovereignty (Table 1). When compared with the referendum results of 20 May 1980, the 30 October 1995 results showed a significant increase of YES support in most ridings. In 1980, only 22 ridings out of 110 ridings supported the sovereignty-association option. This was an alternative that only granted a mandate to negotiate a new political arrange- ment between the federal government (Ottawa) and Quebec. In 1995, the mood in Quebec was different. No less than 80 ridings out of 125 ridings backed the stronger option of a declaration of sovereignty, accompanied by a proposition of economic partnership with the rest of Canada. Most regions of Quebec were more favorable to the sovereignist option than to the federalist one, with the exception of the Outaouais region, ridings of Western Montreal containing a high concentration of nonfrancophones, and ridings along the American, Ontario, or New Brunswick borders (Table 2). ^Centre de Recherche sur l'opinion publique (CROP), "Partition: les Quebecois disent NON," VAclualitt.1\ (May 1996): 37-42. Quebec Confronts Canada 179 Table 1 Quebec Referendum Results, 1980 and 1995 Referendum 20 May 1980 30 October 1995 Registered voters 4,367,584 5,087,009 Participation rate (%) 85.61 93.48 Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/publius/article/26/3/177/1824369 by guest on 24 September 2021 YES (% of valid votes) 40.44 49.42 NO (% of valid votes) 59.56 50.58 Spoiled ballots (% of valid votes) 1.74 1.82 Majority NO vote 19.12 (702,230 votes) 1.16 (52,448 votes) Source: Quebec, Chief Electoral Officer, Rapport preliminaire des resullats du depouiUement des votes le soir du scrutin: Referendum du 30 Octobre 1995 (Quebec: Bibliotheque Nationale du Quebec, 1995). The breakdown, in the Montreal region, reveals a deep division between the western end of the metropole, which is 41.9 percent francophone, and the city's eastern side, which is 83.0 percent francophone. It was confirmed, through an ecological analysis, that only 22.1 percent of voters in western Montreal and 55.3 percent in eastern Montreal backed the Quebec government's option. When aggregated along the French-English cleavage, the data suggest that francophones favored the sovereignty option at a level of 52.6 percent in the western part of Montreal and 66.7 percent in eastern Montreal. The latter represents the second largest regional support of the sovereignist option by the francophone population after Saguenay/Lac Saint Jean.5 RECOGNITION OF QUEBECERS AS A SOVEREIGN PEOPLE How can one account for the rapid progress experienced by the nationalist cause in Quebec? For the most part, the political conflict between Quebec and the rest of Canada can be reduced to a quest for recognition. During die last forty years, the Quebec government has been demanding that cultural dualism be formally recognized as the key founding principle of the Canadian state.6 Since the tabling in 1956 of the Report of the Royal Com- mission of Inquiry on Constitutional Problems, known as the Tremblay Commission, most Quebec political leaders have pursued the goal of obtaining the recognition of Quebec as a "nation," while others have demanded that it be granted a "special status" within the Canadian federation, or that Quebec be recognized as a "distinct society" (the Gerin- Lajoie Report in 1967). The claim that Quebecers form a nation has been voiced several times by Quebec's provincial political parties, and has been 5Pierre Drouilly, "An Exemplar)'Referendum," Canada Watch A (November/December 1995): 26; Pierre Drouilly, "Un referendum exemplaire," La Presse, 7 November 1995, B3. 6DanieI Latouche, "Problem of Constitutional Design in Canada: Quebec and the Issue of Bicommunalism," Publius: The Journal of Federalism 18 (Spring 1988): 131-146. 180 Publius/Summer 1996 reaffirmed several times by the Bloc Quebecois since becoming the Official Opposition in the House of Commons in October 1993. Table 2 Quebec's Referendum Results, by Regions, 30 October 1995 Downloaded from https://academic.oup.com/publius/article/26/3/177/1824369 by guest on 24 September 2021 No. of Partici- Franco- YES electoral1 No. of pation YES phone franco Region districts voters % % % phone % Lower-St-Lawrence/Gaspe/ 10 303,242 90.2 60.3 94.0 64.2 North Shore Saguenay/Lac-Saint-Jean 5 206,300 92.7 69.6 98.8 70.4 Quebec 11 480,958 93.5 54.4 96.6 56.3 Chaudiere-Appalachians 8 287,487 92.2 50.7 98.8 51.3 Mauricie/Bois-Francs 8 316,526 93.0 57.2 98.0 58.3 Eastern Townships 8 315,120 93.4 49.6 89.4 55.5 Monteregie/Montreal South Shore 18 797,679 94.7 53.7 86.5 62.2 Lauren tians/Lanaudiere 13 567,581 93.8 61.6 93.6 65.8 Outaouais 5 214,362 93.8 27.5 81.1 33.8 Northwest 4 129,834 89.8 55.8 87.4 63.9 Laval 5 236,117 95.3 46.7 78.4 59.6 Montreal Island 30 1,231,774 93.9 34.5 56.3 61.3 Total 125 5,086,980 93.5 49.4 82.4 60.0 Source: Pierre Drouilly, "Un referendum exemplaire," La Presse, 7 November 1995, B3.