THE AFFIRMATION OF BLINDNESS: A NIETZSCHEAN CRITIQUE OF INTERPRETATIONS OF SUFFERING FROM DISABILITY A dissertation submitted to Kent State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy by Caleb A. Berkemeier August 2021 © Copyright All rights reserved Except for previously published materials Dissertation written by Caleb A. Berkemeier B.A., Mount Vernon Nazarene University, 2009 M.A., Kent State University, 2012 Ph.D., Kent State University, 2021 Approved by Sara Newman_____________, Co-chair, Doctoral Dissertation Committee Tammy Clewell_____________, Members, Doctoral Dissertation Committee Wesley Raabe______________, Deborah Barnbaum_________, Anthony Fernandez_________, Accepted by Babacar M’Baye___________, Chair, Department of English Mandy Munro-Stasiuk_______, Interim Dean, College of Arts and Sciences TABLE OF CONTENTS----------------------------------------------------------------------------------- iii ABBREVIATIONS OF NIETZSCHE’S WORKS----------------------------------------------------- vi EPIGRAPH---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------vii CHAPTERS I. Introduction 1. The Problem of Suffering from Disability--------------------------------------------1 2. The Affirmation of Blindness----------------------------------------------------------7 3. A Note on Terminology----------------------------------------------------------------14 Part I. Disability and the Meaning of Suffering II. Disability Studies and the Meaning of Suffering 1. Introduction------------------------------------------------------------------------------19 2. Michael Oliver and Suffering from Oppression------------------------------------20 3. Tobin Siebers and Suffering from Ideology-----------------------------------------26 4. Susan Wendell and Suffering for Difference---------------------------------------34 5. Conclusion-------------------------------------------------------------------------------40 III. Disability and the Problem of Suffering 1. Introduction------------------------------------------------------------------------------42 2. Suffering Defined-----------------------------------------------------------------------44 3. Suffering and Value--------------------------------------------------------------------50 4. A Nietzschean Interpretation of Suffering-------------------------------------------60 5. Suffering and Power--------------------------------------------------------------------68 6. Conclusion-------------------------------------------------------------------------------76 IV. The Ideological Interpretation of Suffering iii 1. Introduction------------------------------------------------------------------------------80 2. Theories of Ideology as Theodicies--------------------------------------------------81 3. Is the Ideology-of-Ability Theory “True?” -----------------------------------------86 4. The Ideology-of-Cure Theory---------------------------------------------------------96 5. Conclusion-----------------------------------------------------------------------------108 Part II. Blindness and Suffering V. Three Interpretations of Blindness 1. Introduction----------------------------------------------------------------------------112 2. Kenneth Jernigan and the National Federation of the Blind---------------------115 3. A Deflationary Interpretation of Blindness----------------------------------------122 4. A Religious Interpretation of Blindness--------------------------------------------129 5. An Affirmative Interpretation of Blindness----------------------------------------139 6. Conclusion-----------------------------------------------------------------------------147 VI. Ressentiment, Bad Conscience, and the Oppression Narrative 1. Introduction----------------------------------------------------------------------------151 2. Ressentiment---------------------------------------------------------------------------153 3. Imaginary Compensation for Powerlessness--------------------------------------161 4. Ressentiment and Imaginary Compensation in Georgina Kleege’s Blind Rage- ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------167 5. Internalized Ableism and Bad Conscience-----------------------------------------175 6. Conclusion-----------------------------------------------------------------------------182 VII. The Affirmation of Blindness in Literature 1. Introduction----------------------------------------------------------------------------185 iv 2. Blindness and Power in Sophocles’ Oedipus Cycle------------------------------193 3. Blindness and Power in Milton’s Samson Agonistes-----------------------------207 4. Conclusion-----------------------------------------------------------------------------217 VIII. Conclusion-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------219 WORKS CITED--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------224 v Abbreviations of Nietzsche’s Works A – The Anti-Christ BGE – Beyond Good and Evil D - Daybreak: Thoughts on the Prejudices of Morality EH – Ecce Homo GM – On the Genealogy of Morality GS – The Gay Science HAH – Human, All Too Human NCW – Nietzsche Contra Wagner NUL – Nietzsche Unpublished Letters TI – Twilight of the Idols Z – Thus Spoke Zarathustra WP – The Will to Power vi I have often asked myself whether I am not more heavily obligated to the hardest years of my life than to any others. As my inmost nature teaches me, whatever is necessary—as seen from the heights and in the sense of a great economy—is also the useful par excellence: one should not only bear it, one should love it. Amor fati: that is my inmost nature. And as for my long sickness, do I not owe it indescribably more than I owe to my health? I owe it a higher health—one which is made stronger by whatever does not kill it. I also owe my philosophy to it. Only great pain is the ultimate liberator of the spirit, as the teacher of great suspicion which turns every U into an X, a real, genuine X, that is, the letter before the penultimate one. Only great pain, that long, slow pain in which we are burned with green wood, as it were—pain which takes its time—only this forces us philosophers to descend into our ultimate depths and to put away all trust, all good- naturedness, all that would veil, all mildness, all that is medium— things in which formerly we may have found our humanity. I doubt that such a pain makes us “better,” but I know that it makes us more profound. —Friedrich Nietzsche, NCW “Epilogue” vii Chapter I. Introduction 1. The Problem of Suffering from Disability In their chapter in the Disability and Social Theory reader, Tanya Titchkosky and Rod Michalko challenge “the hegemonic taken-for-granted character of the disability-as-a-problem frame” (127). What they mean is that the disabled body is automatically and unreflectively interpreted as a problem because it deviates from a presupposed “natural” or “normal” body. Thus, in every domain of social life—e.g., science, education, medicine, employment, rehabilitation, politics, etc.—disability is approached as something to be normalized. Scientists, doctors, and rehabilitation specialists attempt to mitigate or eliminate the problem of disability through treatments and cures. Educators and human resources professionals attempt to normalize disability through accommodation strategies and technologies. Politicians and political activists seek to integrate disability into mainstream socioeconomic life through civil rights legislation. All of these efforts certainly have practical value, and we would not want to live in a world in which people did not pursue these goals. However, for Titchkosky and Michalko, automatically interpreting disability as a problem in need of a solution precludes the possibility that disability may have its own value. As they put it, from the disability-as-problem perspective, “[disability] may participate in normalcy, but it can never be normal, let alone be valuable, enjoyable or necessary” (128). 1 The notion that disability could be valuable, enjoyable, or necessary strikes at the heart of the common-sense perspective about disability that we find in mainstream social and cultural life. But it resonates well with perspectives that come out of the disability rights movement (DRM), and out of Disability Studies (DS)—the academic and theory-driven wing of the DRM. From these quarters, we are told that the real disability problem is how people with impairments are discriminated against, marginalized, excluded from participation in social life, and rendered disabled by structural and attitudinal barriers. Such people are not primarily disabled by their bodies; they are disabled within social contexts and physical environments that have been constructed, intentionally and unintentionally, to exclude them. Thus, disability is imposed on impaired people by an oppressive social structure that is maintained by the non-disabled. Disability is an identity to be reclaimed from non-disabled oppressors, a weapon to be used for critiquing ableism and other harmful ideologies, a form of life that is valuable specifically because it is different, and/or an identity of which to be proud. Most DS theorists share the view that “common sense” ideas about suffering from disability are misleading and harmful stereotypes. In Part 1 of this dissertation, I focus on four such theorists—Tobin Siebers, Michael Oliver, Susan Wendell,