Philosophers’ volume8,no.6 july2008 Imprint 1. Introduction SincethepublicationofG.E.Moore’sPrincipia Ethicaithasbecome commonplace for philosophers to distinguish between questions in metaethics and those in normative ethics.1 A sympathetic character- Metaethics izationofthecenturyofself-consciouslymetaethicalresearchthatfol- lowedwouldemphasizetheextraordinarydevelopmentbothinour understandingofthecentralmetaethicalproblemsandinthesophis- ticationofthetheorieselaboratedtomeetthem.However,someare & notsosympathetic.Inthispaper,Iexamineonesourceofdistrustin metaethicalresearch:itsapparenttensionwiththenotionthatmoral- ityisautonomous. Tobegin,IbrieflysketchhowIamthinkingofmetaethics,ofthe the Autonomy of autonomyofmorality,andofthetensionthatcanappeartoexistbe- tweenthem.Onetraditionalconceptionofmetaethicstakesittocon- cern only the analysis of moral language.2 However, contemporary philosophers typically use the term more expansively.3 Here, I use Morality the term to pick out elements common to these contemporary dis- cussions.Thiscommoncoreencompassesmoralontologyandmoral psychologyaswellasmoralsemantics.Bycontrast,normativeethics (sometimesalsocalled‘substantiveethics’)concernsthestructureand contentofthecorrectmoralevaluationofagents,statesofaffairs,and actions.Normativeethicaltheoriestypicallyofferaccountsofmoral valueandmoralreasons,ofvirtuouscharactertraits,ofrightness,and Tristram McPherson oftherelationshipsbetweenthese. 1. The word ‘metaethics’ came into regular philosophical usage much later. University of Minnesota Duluth Moore’sdiscussionemphasizedthedistinctionbetweentwokindsofques- tionsaboutmorality,whichinturnencouragedthedevelopmentofindepen- dentresearchprogramsinwhatwouldlaterbecalled“metaethics”and“nor- mativeethics”. 2. ObviousworriesaboutthisconceptionarisefromQuineanconcernsabout analyticity.SuchworriesledZimmermantoargueforan“ontologicalturn”in metaethics(1980,653). © 2008 TristramMcPherson 3. VariousbroaderconceptionsofmetaethicsaresuggestedinDarwall,Gibbard, <www.philosophersimprint.org/008006/> andRailton(1997,7),Miller(2003,2),andSinnott-Armstrong(2006,6). tristrammcpherson Metaethics and the Autonomy of Morality AdomainofinquiryisautonomousinthesenseIintendifresultsin The apparent tension between metaethics and the autonomy of otherdomainsdonotcontributetothejustificationoftheoriesinthat morality derives from the plausibility of taking metaethical theoriz- domain.4Theautonomy of moralityisthustheclaimthat: ingtohavetwofeatures.First,metaethicscanseeminglybearonthe justificationofnormativeethicaltheories.ShellyKaganmakesanes- autonomy: Non-moral theses are irrelevant to the justifica- peciallystrongversionofthisclaimthatmetaethicsisrelevanttothe tionofnormativeethicaltheories. justificationofnormativetheory:“[I]nthecourseofdefendingagiven Iwillsometimesrefertothisastheautonomy thesis.5Theideathatnor- theoryaboutthefoundationsofnormativeethics,whenwetrytoex- mativeethicaltheorizingisautonomousmayappearintuitivelyattrac- plainwhyitisthatthevariousfeaturesofthattheoryshouldseemat- tive.Thus,itmayseemonreflectionthattheonlylegitimategrounds tractiveandplausible,inevitablytheclaimswemakewillthemselves for abandoning a basic moral principle will involve tension with simplybemetaethicalclaims”(1998,6).Kagan’sclaimiscontroversial. othermoralcommitments.6Further,theautonomythesispromisesto However,evenifitdoesnotseeminevitablethatmetaethicsplaysthis explaintheplausibilityofHume’sdictumthatonecannotderivean sortoffoundationalroleinnormativetheorizing,theideathatourbest ‘ought’froman‘is’:ifmoralityisautonomous,itwillalwaysbeanerror accountsofmoralpropertiesormoralconceptscouldn’tcountforor toderiveamoralconclusionfromstrictlynon-moralpremises. againstthejustifiabilityofanormativetheorymightseempuzzling. Becausemetaethicalclaimsarethemselvesclaimsaboutmorality, 4. My use of the term ‘autonomous’ here is inspired by Harman’s distinction this point does not by itself conflict with the autonomy thesis. The between“naturalism”and“autonomousethics”inmoraltheory(2000,79). apparentproblemarisesfromconjoiningthispointwithreflectionon However,Iuseittomakeaslightlydifferentdistinction.Harmansuggests thatanyapproachtoethicsnotdominatedbyaconcerntoplacevaluesin thetaskofmetaethicaltheory.Onaplausiblegloss,thecentraltaskof thenaturalworlddiscoveredbyscienceisautonomous(2000,79).Onmy metaethicsistoexplainhowmoralityfitswiththeotherelementsof gloss,scienceisonlyonedomainwithrespecttowhichmoralitymightbe autonomous.Forexample,Ialsotakedivinecommandtheorytobeincom- ourbroaderconceptionoftheworld.(Notethatthisdescriptionofthe patiblewiththeautonomyofmorality,asitwouldrenderevidenceofGod’s taskofmetaethicsisconsistentbothwithconceivingoftheseother willprobativefornormativeethicaltheory. elementsinexclusivelynaturalisticterms,andwiththinkingthatour 5. Therestrictionofthescopeoftheautonomythesistotheories,understood bestoverallconceptionoftheworldmustaugmentortranscendthe asconsistingoffundamentalprinciples,iscrucialtotheplausibilityofthe autonomythesis,becauseitisimplausiblethatevidencefromotherdomains scientificworldview.)Thissuggeststhatcoherencewithwell-justified isnotrelevanttothejustificationofderivativeprinciplesorofparticularmor- generalaccountsofontologyandsemanticscountsinfavorofame- aljudgments.Forexample,considerthemoralprinciple“Itiswrongtofire loadedgunsatinnocentpeople”andtheparticularmoralclaim“Lee’sfiring taethicaltheory.Hence,itseemsnaturalformetaethicaltheorizingto hisgunatJohniswrong.”Anaturalwaytojustifysuchclaimswouldappeal involveappealtonon-moralpremises. inparttomorebasicnormativeprinciples,andinparttothetypicalorpre- dictablecausalconsequencesoffiringloadedgunsatpeople.Theautonomy Together, these two apparent features of metaethical theorizing thesisshouldthusbeunderstoodascompatiblewitharolefornon-moral appeartoconflictwiththeautonomyofmorality.Thus,ifnon-moral thesesinexplainingwhyanormativemoralprincipleappliestoaparticular premisesarerelevanttothejustificationofaccountsofmoralseman- case,orsupportsaderivativeprinciple. ticsorontology,andtheseaccountsinturnplayaroleinjustifying 6. CompareHarman’sdescriptionoftheautonomousethicist’sreasoningabout acase:“[W]eshouldcontinuetobelieve[thatacriminalhassufficientreason foundationalnormative theories, then non-moral premises can play nottoharmhisorhervictims]unlesssuchcontinuedbeliefconflictswith anindirectroleinjustifyingnormativeethicaltheories.Thisconclu- generalizationsorothertheoreticalprinciplesinternaltoethicsthatwefind attractivebecausetheydoabetterjobatmakingsenseofmostofthethings sionappearstobeinconsistentwiththeautonomythesis. weoriginallybelieve”(2000,87). Ifoneissympathetictotheautonomythesis,thisapparenttension philosophers’imprint – 2 – vol.8,no.6(july2008) tristrammcpherson Metaethics and the Autonomy of Morality mightsuggestthatthereissomeerrorimplicitinmetaethicaltheoriz- implications. Thus, if metaethics was necessarily neutral between ing.Somephilosophershaverecentlyoffereddiagnosesofthisalleged normativetheories,thesensitivityofmetaethicaltheorytonon-moral error. Thus Christine Korsgaard suggests that the dialectic between considerations(thesecondapparentfeatureofmetaethicaltheories) metaethical realists and antirealists rests on a mistaken conception couldnotimpugntheautonomyofnormativeethicaltheorizing. ofthefunctionofmoralconcepts.Sheclaimsthatwhenourthinking Onecouldthinkoftheneutralitythesisineitheroftwoways.First, aboutthesubjectiscorrected,“wewillnotbeinclinedtothinkthat one could think of it as a hypothesis about metaethical theories, to there is a difference between doing ‘meta-ethics’ and doing ‘norma- beevaluatedbyexaminingsuchtheories.However,itiseasytofind tive’orpracticalethics”(2003,121n.44).RonaldDworkinalsofinds counterexamplestothisneutralityhypothesis,intheformofmetaethi- errorinmuchapparentlymetaethicaltheorizing,arguingthatitrests caltheorieswithdirectnormativeimplications.Considerasimpleex- onmistakingsubstantiveethicalclaimstobemetaphysicalor“philo- ample:theanalyticutilitarianismthatMoore(1903,17–18)attributes sophical”(1996,100). toJeremyBentham.Thissemantictheorystatesthattheword‘right’ Thispaperexaminesthreewaystoaddresstheapparenttension means“conducivetogeneralhappiness”.Analyticalutilitarianismisan betweenmetaethicsandtheautonomyofmorality.Insection2,Iex- accountofthesemanticsofacentralpieceofmoralvocabulary,and aminetheattempttoaddressthistensionbyrejectingtheclaimthat hence a paradigmatic metaethical theory. However, it also transpar- metaethics can be relevant to the justification of normative ethical entlyhasimplicationsforthecontentofthecorrectnormativetheory. theories.Ievaluatethisstrategyinpartbyexaminingthereasoning Theneutralitythesisthusseemsimplausibleifreadasahypothesis thatleadsDworkintothediagnosismentionedabove.Insection3,I concerningthepossiblecontentoftheoriesthatweintuitivelycount examinevariantsontheproposaltovindicatetheautonomyofmoral- asmetaethical. itybyappealingtoadeepcontrastbetweenpracticalandtheoretical Onecouldinsteadthinkoftheneutralitythesisasaconstrainton reason. Korsgaard’s diagnosis is best understood as following from atheory’scountingasmetaethical.Thinkingoftheneutralitythesis suchacommitment.Finally,insection4IsuggestwhatItaketobe asahypothesisrunsintotroublewhereseeminglyparadigmaticme- themostpromisingwaytoresolvetheapparenttensionbetweenme- taethicaltheorieshavenormativeimplications.Bycontrast,aneutral- taethicsandtheautonomyofmorality. ityconstraintwouldentailthatthesamedatashowedsuchtheories notreallytobemetaethical.Thus,acceptingsuchaconstraintmight 2.