Notes Chapter 1 Introduction 1 Armed conflict of all types increased by a factor of three during the period 1960–1992 (Human Security Centre, 2010). 2 See, among others, Pearson (1973), Small and Singer (1982), Levy (1983), Tillema (1991), Pearson and Baumann (1993–1994), Bercovitch and Jackson (1997), Huth (1998), Regan (2002), Hegre (2004), Lacina (2004), and SIPRI (2010) for a sampling of such empirical research. 3 Not inconsequential here is the article of faith at the heart of liberal thought that human rationality can be directed toward the mutually reinforcing ends of personal and social progress, a belief that resonates to varying degree within all liberal societies. On the question of war, this faith in rationality is especially crucial, in that it underpins the allegedly transformative effects of Kant’s ‘asocial sociability’ upon the domestic and eventually international arena—as well as the associated supposition that the rule of law and the devel- opment of non-violent mechanisms for dispute resolution can supplant the ‘war of all against all’ that typifies an anarchical international system (Doyle, 1986; Dixon, 1994; Russett and Oneal, 2001). 4 Indeed, since the end of World War II the United States has inarguably occu- pied a unique geopolitical position as the sole enduring military superpower as well as the leader and guarantor of liberalism and self-appointed champion of the ‘free world’, in essence rendering US foreign policy during this period an effort to consummate what Wittkopf et al. (2003), Jentleson (2010), and others have famously referred to as a marriage of ‘power and principle’. 5 From this perspective, resorting to war is understood to constitute a breakdown in the implicit code of conduct presumed to govern relations between nations, and as such an undesirable outcome that violates common and shared stan- dards of humanity. One can discern strains of this view and the universalism that underpins it in such disparate sources as Hammurabi’s Code, Kant’s three Definitive Articles, or Rawls’ ‘Law of Peoples’. 6 Narrowly, the resort to war may obviate or liquidate the war’s objectives before they can be secured. From a wider vantage point, the resort to war may create additional enemies, weaken material capacity and capabilities, or undermine the ideals and values of the society in question (or some combination of the three). On the merits of constraining war on account of the material benefits associated with doing so, the contribution of classical utilitarians like Bentham (1798) and Mill (1859) are especially noteworthy. Chapter 2 Entering the Just War Conversation 1 Just war theory and the ‘tradition’ it has spawned each have much to offer relative to consideration of the parameters of acceptable and unacceptable conduct during war (the jus in bello criteria) as well as the conditions denot- 228 Notes 229 ing a just order after the war’s conclusion (the jus post bellum precept). How- ever, as neither speaks directly to the war-decision and the ex ante rational- ization of that decision, these components of the theory and tradition largely fall outside the bounds of this research and are not systematically examined or discussed. 2 Roman proscriptions on war, advanced in accordance with fetial law (jus fetiale), were important early sources of just war thinking. In this respect, the efforts of Cicero to harness war solely to the purpose of defense of empire should not be overlooked. Cicero was especially instrumental in sustaining the earliest antecedents of the just war tradition, particularly as concerns the feas- ibility and merits of a universal standard of conduct in war (see Bellamy, 2006). At the same time, relative to social practice, Roman contributions to the just war ‘conversation’ had significantly less impact on the war-decision than did those of Hebrew and Greek civilizations. Furthermore, the contributions of imperial Roman society to this ‘conversation’ have not translated to modern liberal societies to a similar degree (no doubt due to liberal sensibilities con- cerning overt imperial dominion and conquest); hence, the diminished empha- sis here. 3 Other pretexts, such as to take vengeance, to gain advantages for the polis, or to maintain authority over those unfit to rule themselves, stemmed from the Platonic conception of a natural social order and the duties of the philosopher-king to preserve or restore them (see Hamburger, 1951). 4 Even such a critical empiricist and utilitarian as Hume—while certainly at odds with, say, Locke with regard to the presumed primacy of natural law and associated notions of justice over human relations—asserted that the central importance of justice to society is so unquestioned that undertaking to prove it would be an utterly superfluous activity (Aiken, 1970). 5 This is reflected thematically in the intellectual labors of the neo-scholastics (especially Vitoria) to define and extend standards concerning the treat- ment of the indigenous peoples in the conquest of the ‘New World’, as well as those within the African diaspora swept up in the brutal and inhumane practice of slavery, and to hold sovereigns as well as conquistadors to account for their conduct relative to those standards (Ballis, 1937; Vitoria, 1991). 6 It is important here to acknowledge the role of the Crusades relative to the just war tradition and ‘conversation’. Clearly the Christian holy wars launched in order to reunify the Western and Eastern Christians and ‘liberate’ Jerusalem (and, earlier, Moorish Spain) reflect the fundamental just war precept of ‘legit- imate authority’ to the extent that they were defined (and perceived by their protagonists) as directly commanded by God, through the papacy. At the same time, other ad bellum precepts (such as just cause) received relatively less emphasis, while the brutal atrocities committed exposed the lack of any con- cern with just conduct in relations with non-Christians, bearing little resem- blance to any form of in bello restraint associated with the just war theory or the larger just war tradition surrounding it. Whereas Walters (1973) is correct in identifying that, by virtue of reflecting the potential for the abuse of just war precepts, the holy war doctrine underpinning the Crusades was part of (rather than antithetical to) the just war tradition, it is also clear that the era of the Crusades themselves contributed little to the ‘conversation’ of what 230 Notes constitutes a ‘just’ war, beyond papal authority. As such, while the nexus of just war theory and the Crusades is a hugely significant and important one, it falls largely outside the particular bounds of this research. 7 As Johnson (1975) suggests, these attempts at clarification were certainly influ- enced by the unsatisfactory results of the Crusades and by prompting of the neo-scholastics’ religious benefactors who wished to consolidate the authority of Church after those disastrous campaigns. 8 In light of this objective, the medieval theorists confronted a difficult chal- lenge; namely, that of seeking to harmonize religious authority with the rise of a class of professional statesmen with little interest in adhering to the will of the church or doing its bidding. As direct appeals to divine sanction or for- mative theological teaching were no longer effective, medieval just war theo- rists instead appealed to a common moral standard rooted in the essence of humanity (Boyle, 1992). For example, Vitoria repeatedly and explicitly exhorted political authorities to abide by a jus gentium, while Suárez took a similar tack, insisting that ‘…a ruler’s right to make war must have at least some relation to natural law’ (Vitoria, 1991; Suárez, quoted in Taylor, 1979: 248). 9 With the decision to wage war left to the devices of statesmen, to the extent that the just war tradition retained any credence within the ‘second’ law of nations, it was due to its incorporation of the jus in bello criteria in the effort to regulate war’s conduct. The amenability of particular interpretations of the in bello precepts of proportionality (of means) and discrimination to the pro- motion of a state-based system in the 18th and 19th centuries, and to the pos- itive law doctrine which supported that system, is evident in the codification of in bello principles into formal laws of war such as the 1868 Declaration of St. Petersburg (Reichberg, 2002). 10 Internally, such a monopoly underwrote the very authority of the state, as violence could be (and was) used to thwart potential internal challenges to ruling elites, while simultaneously allowing for any such challenges to be framed by agents of the state as inherently illegitimate—allowing for the con- solidation of state power. At the same time, the ‘Weberian monopoly’ also allowed, and indeed encouraged, ‘the state’ to employ violence to defend national interests and advance national objectives relative to other states, or even to divert attention from domestic problems by initiating armed conflict with ‘enemies’. 11 The durability of the ancien regime in French political life, continuing national- ist and revolutionary sentiment in France, rapid industrial transformation, and the specter of eclipse by a unified Germany after defeat in the France-Prussian War all combined to make social cohesion the Third Republic’s primary con- cern (Shirer, 1969). It was in this context that Adolphe Thiers, the first presi- dent of the Third Republic, called republicanism the form of government that divides France the least. France had, of course, played a pivotal role as pro- genitor of the idea of popular revolution, an idea culminating in the Revo- lutions of 1848 that had engulfed the Continent. Yet France also had been the object of revolutionary scorn after backsliding into the Second Empire (1851–1870). France differed from Britain or the United States in that liberal- ism faced more entrenched internal challenges and did not enjoy the relative unbroken upward trajectory it did in British or American society (Bernard and Dubief, 1985).