Notes

Chapter 1 Introduction

1 Armed conflict of all types increased by a factor of three during the period 1960–1992 (Human Security Centre, 2010). 2 See, among others, Pearson (1973), Small and Singer (1982), Levy (1983), Tillema (1991), Pearson and Baumann (1993–1994), Bercovitch and Jackson (1997), Huth (1998), Regan (2002), Hegre (2004), Lacina (2004), and SIPRI (2010) for a sampling of such empirical research. 3 Not inconsequential here is the article of faith at the heart of liberal thought that human rationality can be directed toward the mutually reinforcing ends of personal and social progress, a belief that resonates to varying degree within all liberal societies. On the question of , this faith in rationality is especially crucial, in that it underpins the allegedly transformative effects of Kant’s ‘asocial sociability’ upon the domestic and eventually international arena—as well as the associated supposition that the rule of law and the devel- opment of non-violent mechanisms for dispute resolution can supplant the ‘war of all against all’ that typifies an anarchical international system (Doyle, 1986; Dixon, 1994; Russett and Oneal, 2001). 4 Indeed, since the end of World War II the has inarguably occu- pied a unique geopolitical position as the sole enduring military superpower as well as the leader and guarantor of liberalism and self-appointed champion of the ‘free world’, in essence rendering US foreign policy during this period an effort to consummate what Wittkopf et al. (2003), Jentleson (2010), and others have famously referred to as a marriage of ‘power and principle’. 5 From this perspective, resorting to war is understood to constitute a breakdown in the implicit code of conduct presumed to govern relations between nations, and as such an undesirable outcome that violates common and shared stan- dards of humanity. One can discern strains of this view and the universalism that underpins it in such disparate sources as Hammurabi’s Code, Kant’s three Definitive Articles, or Rawls’ ‘Law of Peoples’. 6 Narrowly, the resort to war may obviate or liquidate the war’s objectives before they can be secured. From a wider vantage point, the resort to war may create additional enemies, weaken material capacity and capabilities, or undermine the ideals and values of the society in question (or some combination of the three). On the merits of constraining war on account of the material benefits associated with doing so, the contribution of classical utilitarians like Bentham (1798) and Mill (1859) are especially noteworthy.

Chapter 2 Entering the Just War Conversation

1 Just war theory and the ‘’ it has spawned each have much to offer relative to consideration of the parameters of acceptable and unacceptable conduct during war (the jus in bello criteria) as well as the conditions denot-

228 Notes 229

ing a just order after the war’s conclusion (the precept). How- ever, as neither speaks directly to the war-decision and the ex ante rational- ization of that decision, these components of the theory and tradition largely fall outside the bounds of this research and are not systematically examined or discussed. 2 Roman proscriptions on war, advanced in accordance with fetial law (jus fetiale), were important early sources of just war thinking. In this respect, the efforts of to harness war solely to the purpose of defense of empire should not be overlooked. Cicero was especially instrumental in sustaining the earliest antecedents of the just war tradition, particularly as concerns the feas- ibility and merits of a universal standard of conduct in war (see Bellamy, 2006). At the same time, relative to social practice, Roman contributions to the just war ‘conversation’ had significantly less impact on the war-decision than did those of Hebrew and Greek civilizations. Furthermore, the contributions of imperial Roman society to this ‘conversation’ have not translated to modern liberal societies to a similar degree (no doubt due to liberal sensibilities con- cerning overt imperial dominion and conquest); hence, the diminished empha- sis here. 3 Other pretexts, such as to take vengeance, to gain advantages for the polis, or to maintain authority over those unfit to rule themselves, stemmed from the Platonic conception of a natural social order and the duties of the philosopher-king to preserve or restore them (see Hamburger, 1951). 4 Even such a critical empiricist and utilitarian as Hume—while certainly at odds with, say, Locke with regard to the presumed primacy of and associated notions of over human relations—asserted that the central importance of justice to society is so unquestioned that undertaking to prove it would be an utterly superfluous activity (Aiken, 1970). 5 This is reflected thematically in the intellectual labors of the neo-scholastics (especially Vitoria) to define and extend standards concerning the treat- ment of the indigenous peoples in the conquest of the ‘New World’, as well as those within the African diaspora swept up in the brutal and inhumane practice of slavery, and to hold sovereigns as well as to account for their conduct relative to those standards (Ballis, 1937; Vitoria, 1991). 6 It is important here to acknowledge the role of the Crusades relative to the just war tradition and ‘conversation’. Clearly the Christian holy launched in order to reunify the Western and Eastern Christians and ‘liberate’ Jerusalem (and, earlier, Moorish ) reflect the fundamental just war precept of ‘legit- imate authority’ to the extent that they were defined (and perceived by their protagonists) as directly commanded by God, through the papacy. At the same time, other ad bellum precepts (such as just cause) received relatively less emphasis, while the brutal atrocities committed exposed the lack of any con- cern with just conduct in relations with non-Christians, bearing little resem- blance to any form of in bello associated with the just war theory or the larger just war tradition surrounding it. Whereas Walters (1973) is correct in identifying that, by of reflecting the potential for the abuse of just war precepts, the holy war doctrine underpinning the Crusades was part of (rather than antithetical to) the just war tradition, it is also clear that the era of the Crusades themselves contributed little to the ‘conversation’ of what 230 Notes

constitutes a ‘just’ war, beyond papal authority. As such, while the nexus of just war theory and the Crusades is a hugely significant and important one, it falls largely outside the particular bounds of this research. 7 As Johnson (1975) suggests, these attempts at clarification were certainly influ- enced by the unsatisfactory results of the Crusades and by prompting of the neo-scholastics’ religious benefactors who wished to consolidate the authority of Church after those disastrous campaigns. 8 In light of this objective, the medieval theorists confronted a difficult chal- lenge; namely, that of seeking to harmonize religious authority with the rise of a class of professional statesmen with little interest in adhering to the will of the church or doing its bidding. As direct appeals to divine sanction or for- mative theological teaching were no longer effective, medieval just war theo- rists instead appealed to a common moral standard rooted in the essence of humanity (Boyle, 1992). For example, Vitoria repeatedly and explicitly exhorted political authorities to abide by a , while Suárez took a similar tack, insisting that ‘…a ruler’s right to make war must have at least some relation to natural law’ (Vitoria, 1991; Suárez, quoted in Taylor, 1979: 248). 9 With the decision to wage war left to the devices of statesmen, to the extent that the just war tradition retained any credence within the ‘second’ law of nations, it was due to its incorporation of the jus in bello criteria in the effort to regulate war’s conduct. The amenability of particular interpretations of the in bello precepts of (of means) and discrimination to the pro- motion of a state-based system in the 18th and 19th centuries, and to the pos- itive law doctrine which supported that system, is evident in the codification of in bello principles into formal laws of war such as the 1868 Declaration of St. Petersburg (Reichberg, 2002). 10 Internally, such a monopoly underwrote the very authority of the state, as violence could be (and was) used to thwart potential internal challenges to ruling elites, while simultaneously allowing for any such challenges to be framed by agents of the state as inherently illegitimate—allowing for the con- solidation of state power. At the same time, the ‘Weberian monopoly’ also allowed, and indeed encouraged, ‘the state’ to employ violence to defend national interests and advance national objectives relative to other states, or even to divert attention from domestic problems by initiating armed conflict with ‘enemies’. 11 The durability of the ancien regime in French political life, continuing national- ist and revolutionary sentiment in France, rapid industrial transformation, and the specter of eclipse by a unified Germany after defeat in the France-Prussian War all combined to make social cohesion the Third Republic’s primary con- cern (Shirer, 1969). It was in this context that Adolphe Thiers, the first presi- dent of the Third Republic, called republicanism the form of government that divides France the least. France had, of course, played a pivotal role as pro- genitor of the idea of popular , an idea culminating in the Revo- lutions of 1848 that had engulfed the Continent. Yet France also had been the object of revolutionary scorn after backsliding into the Second Empire (1851–1870). France differed from Britain or the United States in that liberal- ism faced more entrenched internal challenges and did not enjoy the relative unbroken upward trajectory it did in British or American society (Bernard and Dubief, 1985). This made advocating the export of liberal ideals through Notes 231

force—which the Jacobins had argued for a century earlier—a far less natural proposition for the Third Republic, a regime attempting to govern a moribund society that largely desired a return to monarchy (ibid.). Whereas France too boasted an expansionist agenda during the late 19th and early 20th century in places such as Indochina and North Africa, for these reasons and others the war-decision was chiefly legitimated through appeals to national glory and mission civilisatrice rather than liberal (Logue, 1983). 12 This radical liberal internationalism, which was frequently translated into wars of ‘national liberation’ encouraged from without rather than organically generated from within, speaks of a return to an earlier proactive strain in the just war tradition which envisioned the articulation of the prudential criteria as little more than a means to advance a foreordained social order through military force. 13 Beveridge’s ‘March of the Flag’ speech singularly captures the degree to which moral legitimization was applied to the burgeoning project of American empire, and the war-decision in general: ‘Shall the American people continue their resistless march toward the commercial supremacy of the world? Shall free institutions broaden their blessed reign as the children of wax in strength until the empire of our principles is established over the hearts of all mankind? Have we no mission to perform—no duty to discharge to our fellow man? Has the Almighty Father endowed us with gifts beyond our deserts, and marked us as the people of His peculiar favor, merely to rot in our own selfish- ness, as men and nations must who take cowardice for their companion and self for their deity…shall we be as the man who had one talent and hid it, or as he who had ten talents and used them until they grew to riches. And shall we reap the reward that waits on the discharge of our high duty as the sovereign power of earth?’ (ibid.) 14 Indeed, perhaps the ultimate incongruity of post-Enlightenment modernity is the reality that it is an age at once defined by the rational pursuit of ‘progress’ as well as by wars of striking frequency and increasing destructiveness, draw- ing upon the full resource endowments of the nation and the state and prompted and sustained by competing that countenance war in all-or-nothing terms (Kaldor, 1999). 15 The Popular Front in France, led by Leon Blum, was instrumental in this regard, arguing against non-interventionism despite significant internal challenges from the Right and external opposition by the Baldwin and Chamberlain governments in Britain. 16 At the same time, this exceedingly convincing case does not change the fact that the conduct of the war by the Allies as well as the Axis powers was morally repugnant. The explicit policy of the Royal Air Force to target civilian population centers in Germany (adopted in 1942 and persisting for the remainder of the war), the fire-bombing of Dresden, and the twin detonations of atomic weapons on Hiroshima and Nagasaki come to mind as ready exam- ples confirming the unjust nature of the prosecution of the war (relative to the just war criteria) from the Allied side. 17 Because this research is focused on the war-decision relative to the just war tradition, it is possible to limit consideration here to the consid- erations alone. However, I openly acknowledge that in the same way that such a narrowed focus impedes the ability of decision-makers and the public 232 Notes

at-large to appraise the ‘justice’ of any war, so too does it limit the ability to draw broader conclusions about the behavior of states relative to the just war theory or the standards of ‘legitimacy’ relative to the prosecution of war that it seeks to advance. 18 The allowance for self-defense is codified in Article 51 of the UN Charter, which stipulates the ‘…inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs…until the Security Council has taken measures nec- essary to maintain international and security’. The privileged moral position extended to self-defense within the just war tradition dates at least as far back as Augustine, at least in the case of response to armed attack. Attempts at more expansive articulations of the self-defense exception (i.e., where armed attack does not occur, but appeals to ‘self-defense’ are made—see the British and French justification of the use of force during the Suez crisis, various Israeli military forays into neighboring Arab states, or the US attack of Iraq in 2003) have been met with mixed reviews by just war theorists. 19 The full text of the Charter can be found at: http://www.un.org/aboutun/ charter/. 20 While the explicit attempt by the UN’s framers to confer competent authority on the Security Council diverges from the traditionally statist orientation of just war theory, the logic is the same. Since the international agreement estab- lishing the United Nations Organization had recognized legal status, and since the principles espoused by the UN Charter concerning the use of force, while imperfect, were not manifestly unjust, than in just war terms that body pos- sessed (and possesses) the right to serve as a legitimately recognized authority able to sanction acceptable uses of force and prohibit unacceptable ones as it saw fit. 21 Though in other respects, such as his contention the traditional basis of just war theory in the universality of natural law should be replaced by a robust emphasis on advancing and defining individual rights, Walzer’s take is decidedly less orthodox.

Chapter 3 Framing, Foreign Policy, and Just Wars

1 These four are loosely oriented around culture (Geertz, 1973; Skocpol, 1985; McAdam, 1994); cognition (Goffman, 1974; Snow and Benford, 1988; Gamson, 1995); dramatistic and rhetorical analysis (Edelman, 1988; Burke, 1989; Gusfield, 1989); and repertoires of contention and action (Tilly, 1993, 1995; Tarrow, 1993). 2 See, for example, Benford (1992) on the complex interactions between the vocabularies of motive associated with the nuclear freeze movement of the 1980s and the original diagnostic frame that movement leaders generated. 3 The harmony or disharmony of these frames at the elite level, and the inter- face of ‘official’ (governmental) and public frames, each represent junctures for the generation of feedback to be circulated back to the relevant decision- makers (as well as other opinion-leaders). See Entman (2004: 4–17). 4 As Druckman (2001: 1045) notes: ‘Instead of viewing framing effects as evidence of unilateral elite manipulation, I suggest that framing effects may occur because citizens delegate to ostensibly credible elites to help them sort Notes 233

through many possible frames. In this portrayal, people turn to elites for guidance and they are thus selective about which frames they believe—they only believe frames that come from sources they perceive to be credible.’ 5 Among some notable examples of frames interpreted as sufficiently represen- tative of this ‘master frame’ status in the view of those who most closely study framing are the rights frame (Williams and Williams, 1995; Valocchi, 1996), the injustice frame (Gamson et al., 1982; Carroll and Ratner, 1996), and the hegemonic frame (Blum-Kulka and Liebes, 1993). 6 The advancement of such a decidedly constructivist interpretation of what con- stitutes a ‘just war’ should not be interpreted as a rebuke of the concrete and measurable concepts and propositions at the heart of just war theory or the tradition subsuming it. Indeed, nothing could be further from the truth. With respect to the central focus of this research (the war-decision) as well as the conduct and termination of war, the just war tradition has clearly promulgated and sustained a set of enduring moral and ethical standards. From the neces- sary (but not sufficient) catalytic criterion of ‘just cause’ through concerns with proportionality and discrimination on the battlefield and the proper dispatch of the vanquished after the war’s cessation, those standards have remained con- sistent and coherent even amidst centuries of efforts to apply them in a social context; there is, in fact, a ‘there’ there. Yet it is the applied dimension of the entire just war enterprise, and the mutability that defines that application, which makes just war theory and the narrative tradition enveloping it particu- larly useful for this analysis. 7 Setting the tone for centuries of American foreign policy to come, Paine argued that the otherwise vile institution of war provided a legitimate means to advance the cause of national liberation—including, of course, the revolution against imperial Britain to which he was committed. Paine contended that the lib- eration of society from the domination of oppressive and illegitimate state power was a moral duty. Drawing upon an expanded notion of self-defense and making an explicit appeal to natural law (both prominent features of the just war narrative before and since), he argued that it was in the common interest of humanity, and in the particular interests of liberal society, to aid threatened nations in repelling invasion and throwing off the yoke of colonial rule (Keane, 1995). 8 Modelski defines the sphere of influence as ‘an area in which one great power assumes exclusive responsibility for the maintenance of peace…it denotes a situation in which one power has acquired a monopoly or near-monopoly for its services to that area’ (1972: 156).

Chapter 4 Analyzing the Just War Frame

1 Though both the Augustinian and scholastic traditions did in fact contribute to the development of the jus in bello convention, the concern with conduct in war remained a matter of secondary importance in both the classical and medieval chapters of the just war tradition since, if the criteria at the heart of the jus ad bellum convention were followed, only divinely sanctioned wars (which on the basis of their sanction required little constraint) would be prosecuted in the first place. 234 Notes

2 Reichberg (2002) contends, with appeals to Kant, that Johnson’s ‘basic’ criteria are what really differentiate the just war tradition from cosmopolitanism. I would extend this characterization of the basic category further, in contending that they also distinguish the just war tradition from the idealism of the ‘just peace’ view as well. 3 Doing so would require unfettered access to a small handful of powerful indi- viduals who are not only nearly impossible to interview, but who are highly likely (for a variety of reasons) to have difficulty accurately recalling their thought processes relative to such considerations, and (again, for a variety of reasons) may even in some cases intentionally obfuscate their logic and reasoning should they be able to recall it accurately. Distortion and/or deception concerning the decision and the event precipitating it is always possible; in few (if any cases) is one individual the only actor with significant impact on major decisions such as overseas military deployments; such events are rare and beyond the reach of most researchers, and even when they occur within the ‘fog of war’ usually leave one with as many questions as answers. Added to these logistical obstacles is the more fundamental problem that even if the interested researcher were to gain access in order to attempt to evaluate the presence, absence, and relative weight of such criteria, because these criteria turn on assessing the resonance of moral considerations within the perception and cognition of individual decision-makers contemplating war, any findings they produce are necessarily idiosyncratic to the individual concerned and the cognitive and psychological processes by which they operate. As such, any broader generalizations (such as I seek here) would be difficult if not impossible to draw. 4 Walzer, for example, contends that the ‘self-help’ principle has historically been considered the paramount example of a legitimate use of force; even Mill’s entrenched opposition to external interference in the affairs of a sover- eign nation explicitly leaves a place for self-defense and self-determination (Walzer, 1977: 87–88; Mill, 1859). 5 As Walzer (1977: 53–55) notes, the right of states to territorial integrity and political sovereignty are derived from the rights of individuals to build a common life and depend on the of their members. To the extent that a state seeks to and/or succeeds at protecting the lives and interests of its individual constituents, it should remain beyond (aggressive) challenge by any other state or states. 6 For example, just cause resulting from an act of aggression can ostensibly be responses to a physical assault (e.g., a violation of territory), but could plaus- ibly be extended to include aggressive verbal overtures (e.g., the impugning of national honor or threats to national sovereignty), trade embargoes and sanc- tions (acts of aggression against economic activity), and other less direct provocations (Regan, 1996). 7 Far less consensus exists with respect to those revisions to the strict legalist translation of ‘just cause’ introducing the prospects of a just use of military force in anticipation of probable acts of aggression, as a mechanism of counter- intervention, and as a means of assistance in the cause of national liberation. While Walzer’s attempt to chronicle such revisions proved vital to the post- effort at revising just war criteria to fit contemporary dilemmas, the extent of disagreement within the just war tradition over the specification Notes 235

of ‘just causes’ necessitates their exclusion from the operationalization of the just war frame introduced here. 8 The authority criterion by definition renders the sovereign the sole legitimate conduit for the use of organized violence, thereby reifying the prevailing struc- ture and source of political authority and depriving potential rivals to that authority of any moral basis for forcibly challenging the status quo. As such, the competent authority criterion has proven an invaluable impetus for the consolidation of a Weberian monopoly on coercion critical to the emergence and centrality of the modern state in the prevailing Westphalian arrangement (Johnson, 1981; Phillips, 1984). 9 The degree to which legal instruments such as the UN Charter (see Chapter I, Article 2 and Chapter VII, Articles 39, 42, and 51)—as well as the NATO Charter (Article 2)—betray the influence of the just war tradition is striking. These two instruments articulate a vision of collective security which, like the just war tradition, seeks to maintain the self-help focus consonant with the predominant legalist paradigm, while also affirming the possibility for extenuating circumstances in which the resort to war is permissible beyond immediate self-defense. Accordingly, both charter documents take great care to address the conditions under which such a use of force may be legit- imate, thereby not only affirming but essentially claiming competent authority by presenting a hortatory declaration relative to the use of force directed at their constituent member-states (Arend and Beck, 1993). 10 Common examples raised by contemporary just war theorists include the use of military force in response to humanitarian (Walzer, 1977) or as part of a major collective security operation such as the Persian Gulf War (Johnson, 1999). 11 This is not to say that the demonstrated commission of such acts—e.g., the extensive targeting of civilians in wartime, systematic violent discrimination on the basis of race, ethnicity, gender, age, or other demographic character- istics, forced imprisonment and torture, etc.—are ‘’ in an epistemological sense (which is a philosophical concern outside the bounds of this research), but rather that they are likely to be understood and more importantly repre- sented as such by the decision-makers of concern in this analysis. 12 This translation of competent authority refers to authority imparted by a sov- ereign state that is itself a target of ‘wrongful attack’. For the purposes of this analysis, target state authorization is sufficiently represented either in the form of a direct invitation or request for military response from the US, or through an indirect invitation or request extended through a legitimate intermediary (an IGO, RGO, or another sovereign state). 13 As Miles and Huberman (1994: 25) note, qualitative case study analysis by definition attempts to explain a ‘phenomenon of some sort occurring in a bounded context’ (emphasis added). Thus it is crucial to establish that phenomenon by denoting what falls outside that ‘bounded context’. 14 For a related rationale in a similar analytical domain, see Western (2005). 15 One can point to recent operational designations such as Operation Iraqi Free- dom (Iraq), Operation Restore (Afghanistan), Operation Just Cause (Panama) and Operation Restore Hope (Somalia) or to allegorical flourishes proclaiming the existence of an ‘axis of evil’ in the world for telling (if anecdotal) evidence to that effect. 236 Notes

16 This definition, which builds upon preceding analyses of international and foreign policy crises by Hermann (1969), Snyder and Diesing (1977), Lebow (1981), Brecher and Wilkenfeld (2000), and others provides the best and most parsimonious elaboration of the phenomenon. 17 As such it is clear that resulting analysis must be singly concerned with the framing of the affirmative war-decision for the duration of the crisis, in order to ensure both the internal and external validity as well as reliability of this inquiry and its findings (Campbell and Stanley, 1963; Mintz et al., 2006; Hudson and Butler, 2010). 18 Though these basic limitations do not limit the possibility that the findings of this study may prove applicable to other liberal societies, and/or to other historical time periods. 19 However, application of this criterion does not itself narrow the scope of the population too greatly, in that the use of military force in response to foreign policy crisis is a rather frequent practice by the US (Huth, 1998; Meernik, 1996; Regan, 1996). Indeed, in consulting the latest (v.10.0) iteration of the ICB dataset, over 20 per cent of all crises occurring since 1945 have featured some direct application of military force by the US (CICDM, 2010). 20 The start date of 9 November1989 was utilized as a proximate date for the start of the post- era; that date representing the date of record with respect to the breaching, en masse, of the Berlin Wall. It is also important to mention here that the satisfaction of the three necessary and sufficient conditions for a foreign policy crisis for the US does not exclude other states from experiencing a foreign policy crisis in relation to the same crisis event, either simultaneously or at some other juncture still within the defined temporal bounds affixed to the crisis (e.g., the first foreign policy crisis experienced by the US after 9 November 1989, over Panama, was also a crisis for Panama). 21 Since 1989, there were two cases in which the US employed an overt direct use of military force, but was not itself a direct crisis actor (hence requiring exclu- sion of these cases from the population of concern here): YUGOSLAVIA II: BOSNIA (1992), and IRAQ NO-FLY ZONE (1992). 22 Employing crisis variables such as this one as sorting devices has the addi- tional benefit of allowing for some consideration of the relationship between the just war frame and manifest features of the crises (such as the object of the gravest threat within the crisis) featured within the crises selected for analysis. 23 While to some degree this selection criterion seemingly overlaps with the main selection criteria (US direct crisis actor and US overt direct military force), applying this condition does help further delimit prominent cases of crisis while also distinguishing (at least to a degree) between crises in which the US was bound and determined to render an affirmative war-decision from the outset regardless of the gravity or severity of the crisis and those in which the affirmative war-decision was somewhat more of a response to crisis events. To that effect, two cases satisfy these two main selection criteria, but do not feature a sufficiently ‘grave’ threat as the trigger to the crisis, and are thus excluded from the analysis: US EMBASSY BOMBINGS (1998), and UNSCOM II- OPERATION DESERT FOX (1998). 24 This crisis would seem, at least anecdotally, suitable for examination in light of the just war frame, given the extensive and elaborate (and sometimes inter- nally contradictory) rationale advanced by the Bush Administration in justify- Notes 237

ing a resort to war (Butler, 2007). However, the extent to which the resort to war was a fait accompli—as reflected in the reality that the crisis itself was precipitated by the US—renders the case too idiosyncratic for inclusion in a comparative, multi-case study research design. 25 There is a clear and not insignificant ‘gap’ between the Gulf War (1990–1991) and the Kosovo (1999) cases. I attribute this inter-regnum to two factors: one, the disproportionate effect of the Somalia debacle and the subsequent issuance of Presidential Decision Directive 25 in 1994, which expressly limited US mil- itary intervention during the middle years of the Clinton presidency; and two, the limitations associated with the self-imposed requirement of variance in party in power, which require selection of a case occurring during the Clinton years which also satisfies the other primary and secondary selection criteria. 26 ‘Speech-acts’ were readily available from a variety of sources, including (but not limited to) official government websites associated with the Office of the White House, Department of State, Department of Defense, National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), and so forth, including both current and archived sites (maintained both by the agencies themselves, as in the case of the Department of State, or through use of the Internet Archive search tool). Particularly valuable were the extensive web-based collections maintained by NARA (archives.gov), DOD (DefenseLINK), and the Department of State (Office of the Historian, as well as the Foreign Relations of the United States, or FRUS, archive housed by the University of Wisconsin) and the FOIA Electronic Reading Room maintained by the Central Intelligence Agency. Several acad- emic and other non-governmental collections were invaluable as well, again including (but not limited to): the database maintained by the American Presidency Project at the University of California-Santa Barbara, and in partic- ular the ‘Papers of the Presidents’ archive; the holdings of the Miller Center of Public Affairs at the University of Virginia; the National Security Archive, maintained at George Washington University; the Cold War International History Project (CWIHP) based at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars; and the various national security-related documents and state- ments available at the Federation of American Scientists website. For less readily available ‘speech-acts’, archival research was utilized requiring multiple in- person visits to the National Archives I and II (Washington, D.C. and College Park, MD, respectively), the Library of Congress (Washington, D.C.) and the Pentagon Library (Arlington, VA). 27 Speech-acts attributed to the White House Press Secretary, as a constituent of the Executive Office of the President and a direct public outlet of the President, were also considered relevant for inclusion. 28 Secondary concerns include the need for parsimony as well as consistency in the analysis. On the former score, the already extensive array of indicators within the just war frame lend a significant degree of breadth and potential variability to the analysis; seeking to conduct that analysis for multiple foreign policy principals (such as the Vice President, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, National Security Adviser) would be unwieldy, at least within the bounds of a single inquiry. On the latter, the significant variability in the cases selected with respect to the decision-making authority and more importantly (for this analysis) public profile of these foreign policy principals has the potential to undermine the analysis; for instance, the role of Vice President Cheney in 238 Notes

framing the US military engagement in Afghanistan was extensive, whereas Vice President Quayle issued no public statements of importance concern- ing the Persian Gulf crisis. This is a degree of variability which of course does not entail with respect to the President, lending needed consistency to the empirical analysis. 29 A combination of computer-based and human coding was used in arriving at the determination of the presence/absence and relative weight of these indi- cators in the data collected for each case. In the latter instance, inter-coder reliability estimates (reached through simple correlation tests) met or exceeded a threshold parameter of 0.8 in all cases (Lombard et al., 2002).

Chapter 5 The Gulf War: Desert Shield, Desert Storm

1 Similar support was extended to these goals and the multinational coalition assembled in pursuit of it through a resolution by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) following its summit of 22 December 1990. 2 This is reflected in a statement issued by Secretary of State James A. Baker III jointly with his Soviet counterpart (Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze), ‘…today, we take the unusual step of jointly calling upon the rest of the international community to join us in an international cutoff of all arms supplies to Iraq…as for military intervention…the United States has no such plans at this time’ (Los Angeles Times, 1990). 3 Throughout this period, the President made repeated mention of the fact that he was engrossed in Martin Gilbert’s popular history of World War II, The Second World War, as well as what he considered to be ‘uncanny parallels’ between Gilbert’s chronicling of the run-up to WWII and events in the Gulf. 4 The embeddedness of Presidential rhetoric in the language of the ‘just war’—as exemplified in the statements noted here, and more systematically in the analysis that follows—is significant not only for its own sake, but in light of the President’s well-chronicled (and self-acknowledged) struggles with the ‘vision thing’. As Smith (1992) contends, the crisis was perceived by many of the President’s top advisors and to some degree by the President himself as affording an opportunity to address that problem, thereby making the use of just war language and, potentially, the ‘just war frame’ doubly significant. 5 The Munich analogy remained central as well, as is evident later in the same address: ‘…You know, if you look into history, America never went looking for a war. But in World War II, the world paid dearly for appeasing an aggressor who could have been stopped. Appeasement leads only to further aggression, and ultimately to war. And we are not going to make the mistake of appease- ment again’ (ibid.). 6 This statement was representative of several advanced during Bush’s diplo- matic foray through Europe and in particular his Thanksgiving holiday visits to troops stationed in the Gulf, all marked by extensive allusions to various aspects of just war theory, including examples both of just causes and com- petent authority. 7 The somewhat unusual decision to single out students is comprehensible in light of the looming specter of the ‘Vietnam syndrome’, and the desire by the White House to attempt to cultivate support (or at least blunt criticism) from Notes 239

populations such as college students and the press that had proven crucial sources of opposition to the war effort a generation hence. 8 For a description of how relevant ‘speech-acts’ by the President of the United States were collected for this case, see Chapter 4, note 26. 9 A combination of computer-based and human coding was used in arriving at the determination of the presence/absence and relative weight of these indicators in the data collected for each case. In the latter instance, inter- coder reliability estimates (reached through simple correlation tests) met or exceeded a threshold parameter of 0.8 in all cases (Lombard et al., 2002). 10 In total, 88 per cent (120/137) of Presidential speech-acts featured at least one just war signification, though in the interests of a conservative approach to the analysis I view the presence of two or more significations a better estimate of minimal significance for the frame. 11 Indeed, if one eliminates the 70 days in which no Presidential speech-acts concerning Iraq and the Gulf occurred, the average number of just war signi- fications per day exceeds six (6.22). 12 The mean of just war signifiers per speech-act was 3.86, with a standard deviation of 3.04. 13 This differential is robust, even if one controls for the fact that the just cause criterion had more potential observations per speech-act than the competent authority and right intention criteria (seven, versus three and five respectively). 14 The magnitude of the standard deviation across all 15 just war signifiers (23.32) can largely be accounted for by the prominent outlier of the ‘global authority’ variable, as the variance across the other 14 signifiers (independent variables) is not significant. 15 These 137 cases of Presidential speech-acts were coded for ‘primary target audi- ence’ in accordance with considerations including (but not limited to): the venue in which the speech-act was delivered, formal or intentional references or allusions to one or more audiences within the speech-act, and the delivery mechanism of the speech-act itself (e.g., press conference, speech, televised appearance, etc.). Inter-coder reliability estimates (reached through simple cor- relation tests) relative to the determinations of primary target audience met or exceeded a threshold parameter of 0.8 in all cases (Lombard et al., 2002). The audience category ‘opinion-leaders’ includes business and religious leaders, the legal community, and members of the military; the category ‘foreign’ refer to instances where the speech-act is primarily directed at a non-American audience; the category ‘multiple’ includes those speech-acts in which multiple audiences were targeted to a degree in which it was impossible to determine a primary and secondary audience(s). 16 Additional speech-acts directed at foreign (non-US) and multiple audiences were also accounted for in the data, though for the most part they reside outside the bounds of this research and provide only minimal contextual information. In this case (Gulf War) in particular they are relatively inconse- quential, accounting (combined) for approximately 10 per cent of all 270 just war significations in Presidential speech-acts. Apart from their infre- quency, it is also worth noting that the seven ‘just cause’ considerations were in rough proportion to the average across all audiences both for speech-acts directed at a foreign audience and those in which the primary audience was indeterminate. 240 Notes

17 It is also worth noting the finding that claims of ‘self defense’ occurred in a far lower than expected proportion in speech-acts directed at the press—the most commonly targeted domestic audience—thereby providing further evidence of the claim that its abstract quality rendered it of seemingly little use to the Administration, particularly relative to its most frequently targeted audience. 18 Interestingly, the degree of reduced emphasis relative to the general baseline in speech-acts directed at opinion-leaders was, in proportional terms, even greater than the enhanced emphasis evident in those directed at the press; the marginal difference was made up by a slightly greater than expected resonance in speech-acts directed primarily at a foreign audience—a difference perhaps explained by the Administration’s perception of the likely sensitivity of for- eign audiences to a perceived violation of diplomatic custom and norms of diplomatic immunity. 19 The relatively small number directed at the other two audiences (14 per cent, or 18/126, in each instance) requires conditioning any strong conclusions about an enhanced emphasis in either case. 20 With respect to the conditions defining a ‘chronological cluster’, it should be pointed out that the average daily number of just war significations contained in Presidential speech-acts concerning the Gulf crisis was 3.4; hence, the notion of the ‘cluster’ rests on the idea of a sustained level of just war significations above the daily average for the crisis. 21 In light of the focus on the temporal dimension of the crisis and its possible effects on the just war frame, days were employed as the unit of analysis. This required a slight manipulation of the data, such that days featuring more than one Presidential speech-act were aggregated along with the data pertaining to the 15 translations of the just war frame. 22 While the actual number of just war significations advanced in March 1991 fell short of the expected value of 105, the total number actually advanced that month (88) equates to about 84 per cent of the expected figure—making the shortfall in December 1990 all the more striking. 23 The third cluster, occurring from 5–7 April 1991, minimally exceeds the thresh- old both in terms of duration and significations per day. Featuring 18 total signi- fications distributed over five total speech-acts, the essence of this ‘cluster’ was a public effort by the White House to disavow any responsibility for encouraging the Shiite and Kurdish uprisings which engendered brutal by Saddam’s regime—as reflected in the emphasis on ‘response to/punishment of evil’ and various right intention significations within this cluster. 24 In proportional terms (by month), the distribution of right intention signi- fications hews closely to the larger fluctuations in speech-acts and total signi- fications, with one major exception—March 1991. That month, which featured a relatively low number of speech-acts and just war significations, at the same time accounted for the single largest percentage of right intention signi- fications (25 per cent of all right intention significations advanced during the crisis were advanced in March 1991). This outcome was undoubtedly a func- tion of the impending termination of the crisis and in particular the successful expulsion of Iraqi forces from Kuwait, events which triggered repeated signi- fications in Presidential speech-acts affirming the association between the decision to use military force and the pursuit of ‘right intentions’ such as a formal outcome and crisis abatement. Notes 241

25 This point was stated explicitly by others in the Administration as well; see, for example, NSA Brent Scowcroft’s September 1990 assertion that ‘This [the crisis] represents the first test of our ability to maintain global or regional stability in the post-Cold War era’ (Drew, 1990).

Chapter 6 Kosovo: Allied Force and the Noble Anvil

1 These two operational monikers refer to the NATO action and the US contingent attached to it (respectively). 2 This was a site to which he returned to celebrate the 500-year anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo in 1989. 3 The State Department’s dispatch of Taft, given her title and position, hardly seems incidental, especially given the credence that a report issued by a high-ranking official specifically concerned with refugees and displacement would lend to Albright’s public assertions that the situation was devolving toward genocide and therefore justified military intervention. The high-profile mission led by self-described ‘human rights hawk’ (and then Assistant Secre- tary of State for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor) John Shattuck to south- ern Serbia, following closely on the heels of Taft’s mission, can be thought of in a similar vein (Shattuck, 2003). 4 ‘…Does the United States have an immediate, selfish interest in what happens on some lonely road in Kosovo to some poor farm family driving a wagon, with horses that are underfed because they haven’t been able to get food? No. We have…I would argue we have a humanitarian interest’ (Clinton, 1999e). 5 These characterizations were greatly facilitated by the ICTY indictment for war crimes and crimes against humanity issued against Milosevic on 27 May 1999. 6 For explication of data collection methods employed in identifying relevant ‘speech-acts’ by the President of the United States employed in this analysis see Chapter 4, note 26. 7 In total, 67 per cent (112/167) of Presidential speech-acts featured at least one just war signification, though in the interests of a conservative approach to the analysis the presence of two or more significations a better estimate of frame application. 8 Even in eliminating the ten days in which no Presidential speech-acts con- cerning Kosovo occurred, the average number of just war significations per day of the crisis increases only slightly, to 2.8/day. 9 The mean value of just war signifiers per speech-act was 1.14, with a standard deviation of 1.05. 10 This differential is robust, even if one controls for the fact that the just cause criterion had more potential observations per speech-act than the com- petent authority and right intention criteria (seven, versus three and five respectively). 11 Indeed, the magnitude of the standard deviation across all 15 just war signi- fiers (22.6) can largely be accounted for by the outlier status of the ‘response to/punishment of evil’ variable, as the variance across the other 14 signifiers (independent variables) is not significant. 242 Notes

12 See ‘Statement by the European Council concerning Kosovo’, Berlin European Council, 24–25 March 1999; available at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/ACFB2.html. 13 These 167 cases of Presidential speech-acts were coded for ‘primary target audi- ence’ in accordance with considerations including (but not limited to): the venue in which the speech-act was delivered, formal or intentional references or allusions to one or more audiences within the speech-act, and the delivery mechanism of the speech-act itself (e.g., press conference, speech, televised appearance, etc.). Inter-coder reliability estimates (reached through simple cor- relation tests) relative to the determinations of primary target audience met or exceeded a threshold parameter of 0.8 in all cases (Lombard et al., 2002). The audience category ‘opinion-leaders’ includes business and religious leaders, the legal community, and members of the military; the category ‘foreign’ refers to instances where the speech-act is primarily directed at a non-American audi- ence; the category ‘multiple’ includes those speech-acts in which multiple audiences were targeted to a degree in which it was impossible to determine a primary audience. 14 Though a much smaller population of speech-acts, the appearance of ‘just causes’ in speech-acts targeting the mass public (53 per cent, or 17 of 32) was nearly identical in proportional terms to that evident in speech-acts directed at the press, thereby further underscoring the intensive emphasis on these significations relative to speech-acts targeting opinion-leaders. 15 It bears noting here that the relationship of the crisis actors to one another—and in particular the reality of Kosovo as a province within the sovereign borders of the then Federal Republic of Yugoslavia—makes ‘target state authority’ impossible to attain except by the FRY, which of course defies logic in this instance; as such, all allusions to ‘competent authority’ in the speech-acts collected and coded were either global or regional in nature. 16 This increased emphasis bears up in spite of the fact that all else being equal, as was discussed above, ‘just causes’ are more likely to be invoked in speech- acts directed at opinion-leaders. 17 Though not audiences of particular concern here—and representing less than 10 per cent of the entire population of Presidential speech-acts advanced during the Kosovo crisis—it is interesting to note that the overriding if not monolithic emphasis on the response to/punishment of evil signification, while not evident in other domestic audiences, is also reflected in speech-acts directed primarily at foreign (non-US) audiences as well as those in which a single target audience was not discernable. 18 With respect to the conditions defining a ‘chronological cluster’, it should again be noted that the average daily number of just war significations con- tained in Presidential speech-acts concerning the crisis was 2.4; hence, the notion of the ‘cluster’ rests on the idea of a sustained level of just war significations above the daily average for the crisis. 19 In light of the focus on the temporal dimension of the crisis and its possible effects on the just war frame, days were employed as the unit of analysis. This required a slight manipulation of the data, such that days featuring more than one Presidential speech-act were aggregated along with the data pertaining to the 15 translations of the just war frame. Notes 243

20 Also relevant here are the relatively high number of speech-acts (eight) featuring one or more frame significations during this three day period. 21 One key qualifier here is the muted overall response to the crisis by the President, irrespective of the frame. It is worth recalling here that the total number of Presidential speech-acts concerning the crisis (167) translates to an average of slightly more than 2 speech-acts per day; further, ten of the 78 days during the crisis featured no Presidential speech-act concerning the crisis at all. 22 Impeachment hearings in the House of Representatives concluded 19 December 1998, while those in the Senate drew to a close on 12 February 1999.

Chapter 7 Afghanistan: Enduring Freedom and Infinite Justice

1 It should be noted that the ICB dataset also considers the AFGHANISTAN–USA crisis to satisfy the conditions for a foreign policy crisis for the UK (which immediately pledged support in finding the perpetrators of the 9/11 attacks), Afghanistan (where the ruling Taliban regime, playing host to al-Qaeda leader- ship, was immediately identified as a facilitator of the attacks) and Pakistan (for whom the stakes of any direct action in Afghanistan had direct rami- fications, given the country’s geographic and political proximity to Afghanistan and the Taliban, respectively). 2 Jackson’s Writing the War on remains the most complete treatment of the dominant discourse advancing the GWOT. Thus the author’s con- tention that ‘in examination of over 300 pages of speeches by dozens of different speakers, from the president to ambassadors, and covering more than two years, I found virtually no instances of deviation from the primary narratives…’ (2005: 154) is especially telling in this regard. 3 The use of such moralistic appeals to define 9/11 as a pivotal event in a larger struggle of versus evil (e.g., the first volley in a ‘just’ if metaphorical war) was hardly limited to the President. In addressing those assembled at a memo- rial service to the Pentagon victims a month after the 9/11 attacks, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld underscored not only the heroic nature of the victims, but by extension the virtuous nature of the American character and spirit more broadly: ‘We remember them as heroes. And we are right to do so. […] “He was a hero long before the eleventh of September,” said a friend of one of those we have lost—“a hero every single day, a hero to his family, to his friends and to his professional peers.” […] About him and those who served with him, his wife said: “It’s not just when a plane hits their building. They are heroes every day.” Heroes every day…we are here to affirm that’ (Rumsfeld, 11 October, 2001b). 4 In a similar vein, Secretary of State Colin Powell referred to terrorism as a ‘scourge’ (Powell, 2001), while Secretary Rumsfeld characterized terrorism as ‘a cancer on the human condition’ (Rumsfeld, 2001a). In emphasizing this ‘oth- erness’, Attorney General John Ashcroft characterized terrorists and their sup- porters as ‘alien’ ‘…Today I’m announcing several steps that we’re taking to enhance our ability to protect the United States from the threat of terrorist aliens…The Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force…will ensure that federal 244 Notes

agencies coordinate their efforts to bar from the United States all aliens who meet any of the following criteria: aliens who are representatives, members or supporters of terrorist organizations; aliens who are suspected of engaging in terrorist activity; or aliens who provide material support to terrorist activity (Ashcroft, 2001a). 5 In a wide-ranging interview with Tim Russert of NBC News, Vice President Dick Cheney unequivocally situated the 9/11 attacks relative to this struggle between civilization and barbarism: ‘I think the world increasingly will under- stand what we have here are a group of barbarians, that they threaten all of us, that the US is the target at the moment, but one of the things to remember is if you look at the roster of countries who lost people in the bombing in New York, over 40 countries have had someone killed or have significant num- bers missing…so it’s an attack not just upon the United States but upon, you know, civilized society’ (Cheney, 2001). 6 The fact that Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty (a.k.a., the NATO Charter) was invoked in support of the first out-of-area offensive deployment in NATO’s history in Afghanistan further underscores both the wide appeal of self-defense as a legitimate grounds for war as well as the degree to which 9/11 and the GWOT were understood in that light. 7 A representative sampling of this rationale was provided by Undersecretary of State Marc Grossman, ‘I believe that Security Council resolution 1368 that was passed on the 12th of September, offers all of the legal basis and requirement that we need, in addition to Article 51 of the United Nations Charter, which is the right of self-defense. And we believe the United States was attacked on the 11th of September and that we have a right of self-defense in this regard’ (Grossman, 2001). 8 See Chapter 4, note 26 for an accounting of data collection procedures employed in identifying and obtaining relevant ‘speech-acts’ by the President of the United States employed in this analysis. 9 A combination of computer-based and human coding was used in arriving at the determination of the presence/absence and relative weight of these indi- cators in the data collected for each case. In the latter instance, inter-coder reliability estimates (reached through simple correlation tests) met or exceeded a threshold parameter of 0.8 in all cases (Lombard et al., 2002). 10 An even more robust 91 per cent (79/87) of Presidential speech-acts featured at least one just war signification, though in the interests of conservatism in analysis I view the presence of two or more significations a better estimate of minimal significance for the frame. 11 Furthermore, if one rules out the 14 days in which no Presidential speech- acts concerning Afghanistan occurred, then the average number of just war significations in days in which Presidential speech-acts concerning Afghanistan were rendered was just over 6 (6.04). 12 The mean value of just war signifiers per speech-act was 3.3, with a standard deviation of 2.0. 13 This differential is robust, even if one controls for the fact that the just cause criterion had more potential observations than the competent authority and right intention criteria. 14 The mean value for all 15 indicators of the just war frame was 19.3, with a stan- dard deviation of 15.2. There was one prominent outlier in the data that Notes 245

accounts for the magnitude of the standard deviation estimate; namely, the just cause signifier ‘Significant power discrepancy between trigger and target’. This long-standing translation of just cause within just war theory intended to reflect the classic ‘bullying scenario’ in which a resort to war would be jus- tifiable to defend a weaker party from a stronger belligerent was never invoked. Its total lack of appearance within the application of the just war frame to the affirmative war-decision in Afghanistan is seemingly a by-product of two factors, one logical and the other political. On the former score, the clear asymmetry in power in favor of the US in the crisis makes painting a scenario in which the ‘victim’ was weaker implausible. On the latter score, the Bush Administration’s perception of the gains to be had in portraying the Taliban regime as illegit- imate and lacking a base of support within Afghan society (and al-Qaeda as uninvited and unwelcome intruders in Afghanistan) mitigated against such a portrayal. 15 ‘Target state authority’ was completely absent from the data in the early stages of the crisis; as the military campaign progressed (and cooperation between US special forces and Northern Alliance forces increased), the Northern Alliance received occasional acknowledgements in Presidential speech-acts as the right- ful and legitimate political authority within Afghanistan. 16 These 87 cases of Presidential speech-acts were coded for ‘primary target audi- ence’ in accordance with considerations including (but not limited to): the venue in which the speech-act was delivered, formal or intentional references or allusions to one or more audiences within the speech-act, and the delivery mechanism of the speech-act itself (e.g., press conference, speech, televised appearance, etc.). Inter-coder reliability estimates (reached through simple cor- relation tests) relative to the determinations of primary target audience met or exceeded a threshold parameter of 0.8 in all cases (Lombard et al., 2002). The audience category ‘opinion-leaders’ includes business and religious leaders, the legal community, and members of the military; the category ‘foreign’ refers to instances where the speech-act is primarily directed at a non-American audi- ence; the category ‘multiple’ includes those speech-acts in which multiple audiences were targeted to a degree in which it was impossible to determine a primary and secondary audience(s). 17 However, it should be noted that appeals to ‘competent authority’ were somewhat more frequent in speech-acts directed primarily at a foreign audience, appearing in 21 per cent (11/53) of all such speech-acts—though at the same time remaining the least cited of the three jus ad bellum criteria even in speech-acts intended for consumption by non-US audiences. 18 The employment of the ‘property/persons seized’ signification can be explained largely by allusions to the loss of life and property associated with the 9/11 attacks, as well as to a high profile episode involving the detainment of two young American relief workers by the Taliban during the crisis. Apart from the ‘power discrepancy’ translation of ‘just cause’ which (as men- tioned above) was never employed, the ‘territory seized’ translation was also very sparingly used, on only three occasions—all early in the crisis, in conjunction with Presidential speech-acts portraying the 9/11 attacks as attacks on the territorial integrity of the United States. Clearly this signi- fication was rendered irrelevant as the military engagement in Afghanistan proceeded. 246 Notes

19 It is important to note that these figures also include speech-acts directed at foreign (non-US) and multiple audiences; whereas the various just cause signi- fications directed at foreign audiences were in rough proportion with the aver- age across all audiences, sizable divergences from the average (towards ‘response to/punishment of evil’, and away from ‘direct violent crisis trigger’) emerged in speech-acts directed at multiple audiences—with the important caveat that this was by far the audience category with the lowest number of observations. 20 In relation to speech-acts directed at the public, some of the ‘slack’ from the diminished use of the ‘formality of outcome’ signification, as well as the complete absence of the two significations related to the perception of the effects of the affirmative war-decision by other actors (namely, ‘post-hoc sat- isfaction’ and ‘post-hoc tension reduction’), was taken up by the fundamen- tal competent authority claim of ‘last resort’, which was employed almost twice as often (15 per cent, v. 8.6 per cent) in speech-acts directed at the mass public as was true on average across all audiences. 21 With respect to the conditions defining a ‘chronological cluster’, it should again be noted that the average daily number of just war significations con- tained in Presidential speech-acts concerning Afghanistan was 4.7; hence, the notion of the ‘cluster’ rests on the idea of a sustained level of just war significations above the daily average for the crisis. 22 In light of the focus on the temporal dimension of the crisis and its poss- ible effects on the just war frame, the unit of analysis was days. This required a slight manipulation of the data, such that days featuring more than one Presidential speech-act were aggregated, as were the data pertaining to the 15 translations of the just war frame coded here. 23 The second ‘cluster’, consisting of 21 total just war significations advanced during the period 19–21 October, also could be readily explained by empirical events—in this case, the use of the just war frame came largely (though not exclusively) in speech-acts directed at a foreign (non-US) audience, in con- junction with efforts to attract diplomatic support from foreign leaders at APEC’s ‘Shanghai summit’.

Conclusion

1 Of course, this ‘subversion’ can prove dangerous if it leads to the fetishization of the frame itself. As Chong and Druckman (2007) point out, strong and cul- turally embedded frames may draw their effectiveness from the heuristic func- tion they provide rather than direct information about a problem, event, or decision. In such cases, the rationale for a policy comes to be associated with and advanced through a particular frame only because that frame is known to resonate with one or more audiences of concern, not because the frame conveys useful or relevant knowledge. Bibliography

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ad bellum conventions see jus ad al-Qaeda, 180, 182, 208 bellum conventions American exceptionalism, 67 adversarial/boundary frames, 50–1 see also US foreign policy affirmative war decisions, 85–7, 211, Amos, 20 236n17 analysis of the just war frame, see also the war-decision 211–22, 225–7 Afghanistan affirmative war-decisions in, 86–7, as al-Qaeda sanctuary, 180 211, 236n17 crisis profile of, 181t, 243n1 cascade models in, 54, 135, 173, Karzai’s government in, 182 219–20, 232n3 NATO’s deployment in, 244n6 case selection criteria in, 90–4, as new war, 218–19 236–7nn19–25 Northern Alliance of, 181, 245n15 credibility in, 55–6, 212–15, 232n4 public opinion on, 7 data analysis in, 94–8, summary of, 180–2 237–8nn26–9 Taliban government of, 180–2, dynamism in, 57–8, 212, 213t, 187–8, 206, 208, 245n18 217–19 Afghanistan’s just war frame ex-post facto conditions in, 90 analysis of, 203–7 foreign policy crisis settings in, chronological clusters in, 197, 199, 89–90, 236n16 205, 246n21, 246n23 geographic considerations in, 92 consistency in use of, 203, 206–8, gravity of crisis in, 93, 236n23 214–15 jus ad bellum conventions in, 73–9, democracy promotion in, 209 80t, 234–5nn2–10 focus on ‘evil’ in, 209–10, multicase design of, 94–5 243–4nn3–5 operational signifiers of, 16, 79–85 just war frame signifiers in, 188–91, parameters of, 85–90 244–5nn10–15 political party contexts in, 92–3 multiple sub-framing of, 208–11 practical considerations (praxis) in, Presidential rhetoric in, 182–8 71–2, 87 selection for study of, 92t, 94 Presidential speech acts in, 96–8, speech acts in, 188–9, 199 237nn26–8 target audiences in, 191–7, 204–6, salience in, 56–7, 212, 213t, 215–17 208–9, 220, 245–6nn16–20 single-frame focus of, 87 temporal dynamics of, 197–203, triggering entity in, 93–4 205, 246nn21–2 US contexts of, 87–9, 236n19 agency, 63 ancient criteria for just war, 19–22 agenda-setting, 50 anticipatory self-defense, 76, 234n7 Albania, 157, 168 Aquinas see see also Kosovo Arab League, 100, 121 Albright, Madeleine Aristotle Holocaust parallels for Kosovo of, on justice and just war, 21, 71–2 174, 241n3 on social practice (praxis) of war, liberal internationalism of, 143, 178 71–2, 87

271 272 Index

Ashcroft, John, 243n4 Boxer Rebellion, 35 Asmus, Ronald, 178 Brahimi, Lakhdar, 182 al-Assad, Hafiz, 124 Brailsford, H.N., 35 asymmetry in power see power Brecher, Michael, 89, 93, 236n16 discrepancy Britain, 34, 231nn15–16 atomic weapons, 231n16 Bulgaria, 35 attributional frames, 50–1 Bull, Hedley, 69 audience Bush, George H.W., administration for Afghanistan speech acts, 191–7, credibility problems of, 214 204–6, 208–9, 220, electoral defeat of 1992 of, 139–40 245–6nn16–20 foreign policy crises of, 92t for Gulf War speech acts, 115–23, Gulf War rhetoric of, 102–10, 134, 135, 239–40nn15–19 134–8, 238nn2–7 for Kosovo speech acts, 159–65, New World Order paradigm of, 107, 173–4, 242nn13–17 134, 136–7, 139, 214, 238n7, , 19 241n25 just war criteria of, 22–3, 26, 73–4 political considerations of, 222 on right intent, 78–9 pragmatic policies of, 102 ‘Two Cities’ notion of, 23 speech acts of, 110–12, 214 authoritarian regimes, 80t, 82–3, see also Gulf War 215–16 Bush, George W., administration in Afghanistan speech acts, 190, democracy promotion of, 209 194, 207, 209, 219 focus on ‘evil’ by, 209–10 in Gulf War speech acts, 119–20, foreign policy crises of, 92t 134 Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) in Kosovo speech acts, 162, 219 of, 180, 182–6, 203–4, 208–9, in Libya speech acts, 224 243–4nn2–6 authority see competent authority Iraq regime crisis of, 8, 44, 76, 92t, signifiers 94, 236n24 Azar, Edward, 218 political considerations of, 222 Aziz, Tariq, 101 Presidential rhetoric of, 13, 182–8 September 11, 2001, attacks, 180, Baker, James, 101, 238n2 182, 207, 243n3 Bartholomew, Amy, 64 speech acts of, 188–9, 199, 214–15, Battle of Kosovo, 141, 241n2 219, 220 Benford, Robert D. world view of, 208–20 on agency in framing, 63 see also Afghanistan on frame functions, 52, 232n2 on master frames, 58 canon law, 28 Bennett, W. Lance, 96 cascade model of frames, 54, 135, Bentham, Jeremy, 35, 228n6 173, 219–20, 232n3 Beveridge, Albert, 35, 231n13 the case for war see the just war frame Blair, Tony, 143, 178 case studies, 16–17, 90–6 Blum, Leon, 231n15 the categorical imperative Boer War, 35 in early Christian tradition, 22 Bosnia-Herzegovina in Kantian thought, 10, 228n5 Dayton Accords on, 142 centrality of frames, 57 ethnic cleansing in, 153–5 The Challenge of Peace: God’s Promise Boulding, Kenneth, 47 and Our Response (NCCB), 43 Index 273

Cheney, Richard, 100, 244n5 Walzer’s theory of aggression in, Chirac, Jacques, 148–9 42–3, 232n21 Chong, Dennis, 55, 246n1 see also post-Cold War era Christian tradition competent authority signifiers, 74, Aquinas’s exploration of intent and 76–8, 80t, 83, 235nn8–10, consequences in, 23–5, 26 235n12 Augustine’s criteria for war in, in Afghanistan speech acts, 190–1, 22–3, 26 193, 195, 201–2, 204, 245n17, Crusades in, 26, 29, 229–30nn6–7 246n20 neo-scholastic pragmatism in, 25–7, in Gulf War speech acts, 113, 229n5, 230n8 116–18, 120–2, 130–3, 138 in secularized law of nations, 27–30 in Kosovo speech acts, 157–8, 161, chronological clusters 163–4, 170–2, 173, 175, 178 in Afghanistan speech acts, 197, consequences, 24 199, 205, 246n21, 246n23 contemporary era see post-Cold in Gulf War speech acts, 123, War era 240n20 contested nature of frames, 53–4 in Kosovo speech acts, 166–8, Council of Europe 242n18 on Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, 100 Cicero, 229n2 Kosovo policies of, 158, 163 Clausewitz, Carl von credibility on public opinion, 9, 12–13 in frame evaluation, 55–6, 232n4 on warfare, 3–4, 32–3, 218 of the just war frame, 212–15 Clinton, Bill, administration, 237n25 crisis abatement, 80t, 84–5 foreign policy crises of, 92t in Gulf War speech acts, 221–2 impeachment of, 177, 243n22 in Kosovo speech acts, 165 Kosovo rhetoric of, 144–56, 175, Crusades, 26, 29, 229–30nn6–7 241n4 liberal internationalism under, 143, Dayton Accords, 142 178 decision-making see frames/framing political considerations of, 222 Declaration of St. Petersburg, 230n9 Rwandan policies of, 178, 225 defensive war, 25–7 speech acts of, 156–9, 214–15, 219, see also self-defense 221 De Indis et De Jure Belli (Vitoria), 25–6 US embassy bombings crisis, 92t, De Jure Belli (Gentili), 29 177, 236n23 destruction of property see see also Kosovo persons/property seized Coalition for a Realist Foreign Policy, Deuteronomy, 20 209–10 diagnostic frames, 50–1 Cobden, Richard, 35 Diesing, Paul, 236n16 Cohen, Marshall, 43 direct violent trigger, 80t, 81 Cohen, William, 143 in Afghanistan speech acts, 190, Cold War era, 40–4 195, 246n20 collective security in, 77–8, 235n9 in Gulf War speech acts, 118–19 proliferation of armed conflict in Kosovo speech acts, 161–2 following, 2 in Libya speech acts, 224 restraint orientation of just war discordant frames, 59 tradition in, 40–1, 44–5 discrepancies in power see power UN Charter in, 41, 232nn18–20 discrepancy 274 Index

Downs, Anthony, 55 for Gulf War speech acts, 115t, Doyle, Michael, 11, 43 239n16, 240n18 Druckman, James N., 55, 232n4, for Kosovo speech acts, 159t, 164t, 246n1 173, 242n13, 242n17 dynamism foreign policy crisis settings, 89–90, in frame evaluation, 57–8 236n16 of the just war frame, 212, 213t, foreign policy decisions, 60–3 217–19 high stakes and low salience in, 60–1 Eisenhower, Dwight D., 67 political opportunity structure in, Elshtain, Jean Bethke, 43, 207 62 empirical credibility, 56, 213 public rationale of, 61 see also credibility see also US foreign policy Entman, Robert M., 49 formal outcomes, 80t, 84–5 cascade model of frames of, 54, in Afghanistan speech acts, 190, 135, 173, 219–20, 232n3 196–7, 246n20 on cultural resonance of frames, 57 in Gulf War speech acts, 113, 120, on foreign policy framing, 64 135–6 evil action, 80t, 82–3, 215–17, 235n11 frames/framing, 16 in Afghanistan speech acts, 190, analytical uses of, 48–9 194, 207–8, 219, 246n20 broad social context of, 50 in Gulf War speech acts, 113, 118, cascade model of, 54, 135, 173, 119–20, 134 219–20, 232n3 in Kosovo speech acts, 161–3, consistency in, 56 173–5, 177–8, 219, contestation and signification in, 242nn16–17 53–4 subjectivity of ‘evil’ in, 215–16 core functions of, 51–2 exclusivity of frames, 58 credibility in, 55–6, 212–15, experiential commensurability of 232n4 frames, 57 criteria for evaluation of, 54–60 extensity of just war significations cross-disciplinary use of, 46–9, in Afghanistan speech acts, 193–4, 232n1 197 cultural factors in, 62–3 in Gulf War speech acts, 115–20, dynamism of, 57–8, 212, 213t, 138 217–19 in Kosovo speech acts, 161–4 failures of, 59–60 in foreign policy decisions, 60–3 fascism of the 1930s, 37–8 impact of ideology on, 62–3 fearmongering, 208, 219 individual agency in, 63 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia see master frame status of, 58–9, 233n5 Yugoslav wars potential subversiveness of, 215, ‘A Few Words on Non-Intervention’ 246n1 (Mill), 4 process of, 52–4 Fiss, Peer C., 63 production of meaning in, 51 Fitzwater, Marlin, 103 purposive vs. effective use of, 138, flexibility of frames, 58 221–2 foreign audiences salience in, 56–7, 212, 213t, 215–17 for Afghanistan speech acts, 191–7, terminology used in, 50 245nn16–17, 246n19 valence issues in, 53 Index 275

vs. agenda-setting, 50 inconsistency and incoherence of, vs. priming, 49–50 138–40, 176, 214 vs. schema, 49 just war frame signifiers in, 112–14 see also the just war frame Presidential rhetoric in, 102–10, France, 230n11, 231nn15–16 134–8, 238nn2–7 Franco-Prussian War, 230n11 selection for study of, 92t, 94 function(s) of frames, 50 speech acts in, 110–12, 221, 239nn8–14 Gaddafi, Moammar, 2, 222–7 target audiences in, 115–23, 134, Gamson, William A., 50, 62 239–40nn15–19 Geneva Convention, 30 temporal dynamics of, 123–31, Gentili, Alberico, 27–30 134–5, 240nn20–4 George, David Lloyd, 35 Gilbert, Martin, 238n3 Hague Convention, 30 Gladstone, William, 34–5 Haiti invasion, 92t global authority, 80t, 83 Hammurabi’s Code, 228n5 in Afghanistan speech acts, 190–1, Hart, Gary, 224–5 195, 219 Hebraic traditions of just war, 19–22 in Gulf War speech acts, 113, hegemonic power frame, 34–6, 120–1, 134–5 233n5, 233n8 in Kosovo speech acts, 221 Henkin, Louis, 40 ‘Global Views’ survey, 7–8 Herman, Charles F., 236n16 Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), Hezbollah, 76 180, 182–6, 203–4, 208–9, Hirsch, Paul M., 63 243–4nn2–6 history of just war theory, 15–16 Goffman, Erving, 47, 53 in the Cold War era in, 41–5, gravity of crises, 93, 236n23 232nn18–21 Greek traditions of just war, 19–22, in early Christian tradition, 22–5 73–8, 229n3, 233n1 in Hebrew and Greek traditions, Green, T.H., 35 19–22, 73–8, 229n3, 233n1 Gregory VII, Pope, 28 law of nations and nature in, Grossman, Marc, 244n7 27–31 Grotius, Hugo, 27–30 the liberal contradiction in, 34–6, Gulf Cooperation Council, 102, 230–1nn11–14 121–2 in medieval neo-, Gulf War, 237n25 25–7, 229n5, 230n8 as anachronistic, 217–18 in the modern era, 33–9, 231n13 crisis profile of, 99t positivist legal framework of, 30–3, Iraqi transgressions in Kuwait 37, 230n9 during, 134 in the post-Cold War era, 43–5, 68, multinational coalition in, 101, 71–2 238n1 raison d’état doctrine in, 31–3, 37, Saddam’s post-war reprisals in, 114, 41, 227, 230nn8–10 136, 240n23 in Roman tradition, 21, 229n2 summary of, 99–102 as social narrative, 18, 228–9n1 Gulf War’s just war frame in US foreign policy, 13–14, 66–71, analysis of, 131–8 221–2, 233n7 chronological clusters in, 123, in the world war era, 36–9, 44, 240n20 231nn15–16 276 Index

Hobbes, Thomas, 33 Isaiah, 20 Hobson, J.A., 35 Israel, 76 Holbrooke, Richard, 143–4 Holy , 26–7 Jackson, Richard, 184, 243n2 Hosea, 20 Jasper, James M., 62 Howard, Michael, 38, 64 Jentleson, Bruce W., 228n4 Huberman, A. Michael, 235n13 Johnson, James Turner, 229n6 Hume, David, 229n4 on just cause for war, 76, 234n2 Hurd, Ian, 6 on just war tradition, 15–16 Hussein, Saddam, 100–1, 102, 114, jus ad bellum conventions, 19, 39, 65, 136, 216, 240n23 73–5 see also Gulf War basic criteria of, 234n2 competent authority in, 74, 76–8, the ideological conflict frame, 68, 69 80t, 83, 235nn8–10, 235n12 ideology, 62–3 historical articulation of, 73–4, implementation of war, 9 233n1 in bello concerns see jus in bello hope for success in, 74–5 conventions just cause in, 74, 75–6, 80t, 81–3, inclusivity of frames, 58 234nn4–7 inducing frames, 59 in just war frames see the just war the injustice frame, 233n5 frame injustice frames, 50 liberal thought on, 38–44 intensity of just war significations, neo-scholastics on, 25 221–2 in positivist raison d’état thought, in Afghanistan speech acts, 194–7, 32–3 205 proportionality of ends desired in, in Gulf War speech acts, 116–23, 74–5 138 prudential criteria in, 234n3 in Kosovo speech acts, 161–5 right intention in, 74, 78–9, 80t intent see right intention signifiers jus in bello conventions, 19, 20, internal harmony of claims, 56, 213 39–41, 65, 230n9, 233n1 International Crisis Behavior (ICB) Just and Unjust Wars (Walzer), 41–3 dataset, 91 just cause signifiers, 74, 75–6, 80t, on Afghanistan crisis, 243n1 81–3, 215–17, 234nn4–7 on gravity of crises, 93 in Afghanistan speech acts, 190–7, on US uses of military force, 201, 202, 204–6, 219, 245n18, 236n19 246n20 international public law, 27–31 in Gulf War speech acts, 113, 114, intra-state wars, 218–19 116–18, 130–4, 138, 218–19, Iran-Iraq war, 100, 107 239n16 Iraq in Kosovo speech acts, 157–8, Kuwait invasion by, 99–102 161–5, 170–5, 219, 242n14 no-fly zone crisis in (1992), 236n21 the just war frame, x, 11–15, 63–70, regime crisis in (2002), 8, 44, 76, 211–22, 225–7 92t, 94, 236n24 in Afghanistan see Afghanistan’s Saddam’s post-Gulf-War reprisals just war frame in, 114, 136, 240n23 analysis of see analysis of the just war with Iran of, 100, 107 war frame see also Gulf War case studies using, 16–17, 90–4 Index 277

contradictions in see the liberal Kahneman, Daniel, 47–8 contradiction Kaldor, Mary, 218 defining parameters of, 72–9 Kant, Immanuel fearmongering in, 208, 219 on asocial sociability, 228n3 function of, 71–2 the categorical imperative of, 10, in the Gulf War see Gulf War’s 228n5 just war frame on war and peace, 3–4, 34, hegemonic power alternative 234n2 in, 68–9, 233n8 Karzai, Hamid, 182 ideological conflict alternative Kellogg-Briand pact, 37 in, 68, 69 Kennedy, John F., 67 importance of, 71 kidnapping see persons/property intent and consequences in, 24, seized 221–2 Kinder, Donald R., 50 in Kosovo see Kosovo’s just war Klandermans, Bert, 49 frame Kosovo, 237n25 legitimacy considerations in see crisis profile of, 145t legitimacy ethnic cleansing in, 144, 147–8, moral language in, 13–14 177–9 non-signification in, 221–2 ethnic makeup of, 141 operational signifiers of, 16, Military Technical Agreement on, 79–85 155, 164 in politics of signification, 18 as new/intrastate war, 174–5, role of tradition in, 15–16, 18 218–19 in selling of war, x–xi, 85–6 parallels with Holocaust of, as a social construct, 14–18, 64–6, 174–5 68, 72, 228–9n1, 233n6 Rambouillet talks on, 144, 148–9 structural realist alternative in, 68 summary of, 141–4 underlying assumptions in, 12–13 Kosovo’s just war frame use of frames/framing in see analysis of, 172–5 frames/framing chronological clusters in, 166–8, US use of, 13–14, 66–71, 79, 242n18 211–22 just war frame signifiers in, just war theory 157–9 ad bellum criteria in, 19, 65 limited, prudent, and effective in bello criteria in, 19, 65 use of, 176–9, 214–15, historical overview of see history of 243n21 just war theory muted and limited application importance in the US of, x, 13–16, of, 173–6 71 Presidential rhetoric in, 144–56, jus ad bellum criteria in, 73–9 241n4 language and rhetoric of, 13–14 selection for study of, 92t, 94 post bellum criteria in, 44, 65 speech acts in, 156–7, 173–4, 221, in US foreign policy, 13–14, 66–71, 241nn7–11, 243n21 221–2, 233n7 target audiences in, 159–65, 173–4, war-decision law in, 5–6, 15–16, 242nn13–17 133, 211 temporal dynamics of, 165–72, 175, just war tradition see history of just 242–3nn18–20 war theory; the just war frame Kuwait see Gulf War 278 Index language of just war theory, 13–14 in, 10, 228n6 last resort, 80t, 83–4 in Western nation-states see in Afghanistan speech acts, 246n20 nation-states in Gulf War speech acts, 122–3, Libya’s just war frame, 2, 222–7 240n19 Locke, John, 229n4 in Kosovo speech acts, 149–50 Luard, Evan, 68–9 in Libya speech acts, 224 Lupia, Arthur, 56 law of nations, 27–30 lying/deception, 12, 208 positivist framework of, 30–3, 37 rise of nation-states in, 30–1, Macedonia, 145, 157, 168 230nn9–10 Machiavelli, Niccolò, 29 ‘The and Peace’ (Grotius), mass public audiences 29 of Afghanistan speech acts, 191–7, laws of war, 40–1, 230n9 206, 220, 246n20 League of Nations, 36–7, 40 of Gulf War speech, 115–23, 135, Lebow, Richard Ned, 236n16 240n19 Le Droit des Gens (Vattel), 30–1 of Kosovo speech acts, 159–65, 173, legitimacy, 5–6, 211 242n14 impact on military outcomes of, 9 master frames, 58–9, 63, 233n5 in just war tradition, 15–16, 34–6, Mayer, Margit, 64 215, 230–1nn11–12 McKinley, William, 35 of organized violence of nation- Mearsheimer, John J., 67, 208 states, 32–3, 230n10 media see press audiences role of public opinion in, 6–9, Meyer, David S., 62 212–13 Miles, Matthew B., 235n13 as social construct, 9–11, 227, military regimes, 80t, 82–3 228nn5–6 Mill, John Stuart, 4, 35, 228n6, 234n4 see also the just war frame Milosevic, Slobodan, 216 Lehrer, Jim, 224–5 celebration of the Battle of Kosovo Leurdijk, J. Henk, 69 by, 141–2, 241n2 Lewinsky, Monida, 177, 178 indictment for war crimes of, 155, the liberal contradiction, x–xi, 3–4, 241n5 34–6, 228n4 see also Kosovo in France’s Third Republic, 230n11 Modelski, George, 68, 233n8 frequency of war under, 231n14 modern era just war frames in, 11–15 collective security systems of, 36–7, popular support due in, 6–9, 40, 77–8, 235n9 212–13 liberal contradictions in, 34–6, in radical liberal internationalism, 230n11 35–6, 44, 231nn12–13 liberal internationalism in, 35–6, in US war decisions, 5–6, 10, 88–9, 44, 231nn12–13 231n13 liberal interventionism under, the liberal tradition 36–7, 38 justification of war in, 11–15 self-determination and anarchy of, Kant’s categorical imperative in, 10, 33–7 228n5 world wars of, 36–69, 231nn15–16 peace as normative in, 3–4, 6, see also Cold War era 228n3 Modigliani, Andre, 50 US reliance on, 66 Monroe Doctrine, 67 Index 279

Montesquieu, 64 primacy of justice in, 229n4 Morgenthau, Hans J., 4, 15, 69 of UN Charter’s non-intervention motivational frames, 52 doctrine, 41, 232n18 Mubarak, Hosni, 124 Nazism, 38–9 Mueller, John E., 6 neo-scholastic parameters of just war, multiple audiences 25–7, 229n5, 230n8 of Afghanistan speech acts, 191–7, New Whiggery, 35–6 245n16 New World Order, 107, 134, 136–7, of Gulf War speech acts, 115t, 139, 214, 238n7, 241n25 239n16 The Nicomachean Ethics (Aristotle), 72 of Kosovo speech acts, 159t, 164t, Niebuhr, Reinhold, 4 173, 242n13 non-intervention doctrine, 3, 40–1, Münkler, Herfried, 218 232n18 narrative fidelity of frames, 57 Obama, Barack, administration National Conference of Catholic Libya operation of, 2, 222–7 Bishops, 43 obsolescence of war notions, 1–2, national interest see social practice of 228n1 war offensive wars, 25–7 national liberation wars, 231n12 Omar, Mullah Muhammad, 180, 216 nation-states operationalizing of the just war affirmation of sovereign power in, frame, 16, 79–85 31, 33, 37, 77 Operation Allied Force/Noble Anvil, 141, inter-state wars among, 36–9, 151–5, 174, 241n1 218 see also Kosovo laws of war among, 40–1, 230n9 Operation Desert Fox, 92t, 236n23 legitimate organized violence of, Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, 32–3, 230n10 100–1 the liberal contradiction of just see also Gulf War war in, 34–6, 230–1nn11–14 Operation Desert Strike, 92t natural law of, 27–31 Operation Determined Falcon, 143–4 raison d’état doctrine of, 31–3, 37, Operation Enduring Freedom/Infinite 41, 227, 230nn8–10 Justice, 180 self-determination and anarchy of, see also Afghanistan 33–4, 37 Operation Infinite Reach, 177 the social contract in, 34–5, 77 Operation Iraqi Freedom, 235n15 Treaty of Westphalia of, 31–2, Operation Just Cause, 235n15 34 Operation Noble Anvil, 165 NATO Operation Restore Freedom, 235n15 collective security focus of, 163–4, Operation Restore Hope, 235n15 244n6 Operation Unified Protector, 2, 222–7 Operation Allied Force/Noble Anvil opinion-leader audiences of, 143–4, 151–5, 158, 163, for Afghanistan speech acts, 191–7, 174, 176 206, 245n16 Operation Unified Protector of, 2, for Gulf War speech, 115–23, 222–7 240nn18–19 natural law for Kosovo speech acts, 159–65, nation-states under, 27–31, 230n9 161, 173–4, 175, 242n13, Paine’s evocation of, 233n7 242n16 280 Index opposition to war decisions see public post-hoc satisfaction, 80t, 83–5 opinion in Afghanistan speech acts, 197, outcomes see formal outcomes 246n20 in Gulf War speech acts, 113–14, pace of crisis abatement, 80t, 84–5 126 in Afghanistan speech acts, 190, in Kosovo speech acts, 174 196–7 Powell, Colin, 100, 138, 243n4 in Kosovo speech acts, 158 power discrepancy, 80t, 81 Paine, Thomas, 66–7, 233n7 in Afghanistan speech acts, 193, Panama invasion, 92t 244n14, 245n18 peace in Gulf War speech acts, 114, as normative in the liberal 118–19, 135 tradition, 3–4, 6, 228n3 praxis, 21, 71–2, 87 in notions on the obsolescence of pre-emptive wars war, 1–2, 228n1 as anticipatory self-defense, 76 Peace of Westphalia, 31–2, 34 Crusades as, 26, 29, 229–30nn6–7 Persian Gulf War see Gulf War’s just presidential power, 6 war frame Presidential speech acts, 96–8, persons/property seized, 80t, 81–2 237nn26–8 in Afghanistan speech acts, 207, of Barack Obama, 222–4 245n18 of Bill Clinton, 156–9, 214–15, 219, in Gulf War speech acts, 76, 119, 221 218–19 of George H.W. Bush, 110–12, in Kosovo speech acts, 158 214 Petersen, J.H., 68–9 of George W. Bush, 188–9, 199, Plato, 21–2, 71–2, 229n3 214–15, 219, 220 political opportunity structure, 62 press audiences, 135 political parties, 92–3, 237n25 for Afghanistan speech acts, 191–7, political science scholarship see 204–6 frames/framing for Gulf War speech acts directed Polk, James K., 67 towards, 115–23, 135, 240n17, positivism, 30–3 240n19 affirmation of sovereign power for Kosovo speech acts, 159–65, under, 31, 33, 37, 77 173–4, 175 raison d’état doctrine under, 31–3, priming, 49–50 37, 41, 227, 230nn8–10 process models, 49–50, 52–4 post bellum criteria, 44, 65 prognostic frames, 52 post-Cold War era property seizure see persons/property armed conflict of, 2 seized the just war conversation in, 43–5, prospect theory, 47–8 68, 71–2, 212–22 Psalms, 20 the liberal contradiction in, 5–10, psychology scholarship, 47–8 88–9, 212–13, 231n13 public opinion liberal internationalism in, 143, opposition to war-making in, 6–9 178 role in military success of, 9–11, new war dynamics of, 174–5, 12–13, 212–13 218–19 role of frames in, 61 US use of force in, 87–9 selling of war in see selling of war see also the just war frame see also legitimacy Index 281

Pufendorf, Samuel, 31 salience punishment for evil see evil action in foreign policy decisions, 60–1 in frame evaluation, 56–7 raison d’état doctrine, 31–3, 37, 41, of the just war frame, 212, 213t, 227, 230nn8–10 215–17 Rawls, John, 228n5 Salih, Ali Abdullah, 102 Reagan, Ronald, 67 Sanders, Lynn M., 50 Reagan Doctrine, 69 schema, 49 reduction of tension see tension Scheufele, Dietram A., 50, 52 reduction Schröeder, Gerhard, 199 refugees from post-Cold War wars, Schwartzkopf, Norman, 138 2 Scott, Andrew M., 68 regional authority, 80t, 83 Scowcroft, Brent, 241n25 in Afghanistan speech acts, 190–1, The Second World War (Gilbert), 219 238n3 in Gulf War speech acts, 121–2 Security Council of the UN see United in Kosovo speech acts, 163–4, 173, Nations Security Council 175, 219 Security Scholars for a Sensible in Libya speech acts, 224 Foreign Policy group, 209–10 Reichberg, Gregory, 234n2 seizure of territory, 80t, 81–2 The Republic (Plato), 22 in Afghanistan speech acts, 245n18 research methodology see analysis in Gulf War speech acts, 76, 113, of the just war frame 118, 218–19 response to evil see evil action in Kosovo speech acts, 158 rhetoric of just war theory, 13–14 self-defense, 25–7 right intention signifiers, 74, 78–9, in Afghanistan speech acts, 195, 80t, 83–5 207 in Afghanistan speech acts, anticipatory forms of, 76, 208, 190–1, 193, 196–7, 202–3, 234n7 204, 206 Cicero’s views on, 229n2 Aquinas’s introduction of, 24 in Gulf War speech acts, 118, 135, in Gulf War speech acts, 113–14, 218, 221, 240n17 116–18, 120, 122–3, 130–1, in the just war frame, 75–6, 80t, 132t, 135–6, 138, 221–2, 81, 234nn4–5 240n24 in Kosovo speech acts, 158 in Kosovo speech acts, 158–9, 163, Paine’s evocation of, 233n7 165, 171, 174 standard for aggression in, 75, the rights frame, 233n5 234n6 rigidity of frames, 58 UN Charter on, 40–1, 186, 232n18, Robertson, George, 199 244n7 Robespierre, 219 in Walzer’s theory of aggression, Roman church, 19 42–3, 232n21 Roosevelt, Franklin D., 67 self-determination, 34–7, 231n12 Roosevelt, Theodore, 67 self-help principle, 234n4 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques, 64 selling of war, x–xi, 9–16, 85–6, Rubin, Jamie, 178 211 Rugova, Ibrahim, 141–2, 144 lying and deception in, 12, 208 Rumsfeld, Donald, 243n3 moral and utilitarian frameworks Rwandan genocide, 178, 225 for, 10, 228nn5–6 282 Index selling of war – continued in the Gulf War’s just war frame, political cost considerations in, 110–15, 239nn8–14 12–13 in Kosovo’s just war frame, 156–9, Presidential speech acts in, 6, 96–8, 241–2nn7–12 237nn26–8 spheres of influence, 233n8 as social practice/appeals to Stake, Robert E., 95 national interest in, 9–11, the structural realist frame, 68 226–7 Suarez, Francisco, 25–7 see also frames/framing Summa Theologica (Aquinas), 23–5 September 11, 2001, attacks, 180, Swart, William James, 58, 217 182, 207, 243n3 Serbia Taft, Julia, 143, 241n3 Dayton Accords, 142 Talbott, Strobe, 178 independence from Ottomans Taliban, 180–2, 187–8, 206, 208, of, 35 216, 245n18 NATO bombing of Belgrade, 157 see also Afghanistan war in Kosovo of, 141–4, 242n15 the Talmud, 19–22 Seward, William, 67 target-state authority, 80t, 83, Shattuck, John, 241n3 235n12 Shaw, Martin, 218 in Afghanistan speech acts, 190–1, Shevardnadze, Eduard, 238n2 245n15 significant power discrepancy see in Kosovo speech acts, 158, power discrepancy 242n14 Six Day War, 76 in Libya speech acts, 224 Smith, Jean Edward, 238n3 temporal dynamics Snow, David A., 52, 58, 63 of Afghanistan speech acts, Snyder, Glenn H., 236n16 197–203, 205, 246nn21–2 the social contract, 34–5 of Gulf War speech acts, 123–31, social practice of war, 226–7 134–5, 240nn20–4 the just war frame in, 14–18, 64–6, of Kosovo speech acts, 165–72, 175, 68, 72, 228–9n1, 233n6 242–3nn18–20 legitimacy considerations in, 9–11, tension reduction, 80t, 84–5 27, 228nn5–6 in Afghanistan speech acts, 197, sociology scholarship, 47 246n20 Solana, Javier, 144 in Gulf War speech acts, 113–14 Solomon, Norman, 21 territory seizure see seizure of sovereign power, 28–31, 74 territory as competent authority in Tewksbury, David, 50 war-decisions, 76–8, 80t, Thatcher, Margaret, 102, 107 235nn8–10, 235n12 theory of aggression, 42–3, 232n21 positivist affirmation of, 30–1, 33, Thiers, Adolphe, 230n11 37 Thomas, Helen, 102 of the UN Security Council, 40–1, Thomas Aquinas 77–8, 232n20, 235n10 on authorization for war, 76 Spanish-American War, 35 on consequences, 24–6 speech acts, 96–8, 237nn26–8 criteria for just war of, 22–5, 73–4, in Afghanistan’s just war frame, 75, 78 188–9, 199 Tillema, Herbert K., 68 coding of, 239n9, 239n15, 244n9 Tito, Josip Broz, 141 Index 283

Tjalve, Vibeke Schou, 4 role of political parties in, 92–3 tradition see history of just war uses of military force in, 2–3, 46, theory 91–2, 235n15, 236nn18–19 Treaty of Westphalia, 31–2, 34 wars of choice in, 12 triggering entities, 93–4 see also Afghanistan; Gulf War; Truman Doctrine, 69 the just war frame; Kosovo Tversky, Amos, 47–8 utilitarian reasons for military force, 10, 228n6, 229n4 UNIKOM (UN Iraq–Kuwait Observation Mission), 101–2 Van Wingen, John R., 68 United Nations Vattel, Emerich de, 27–8, 30–1 collective security under, 40, 77–8, Veblen, Thorstein, 39 235n9 Vietnam syndrome, 135, 136–8, Contact Group on Kosovo of, 142, 139, 214, 238n7, 241n25 144 Vietnam War, 41–2, 43, 44 United Nations Charter Vitoria, Francisco de, 25–7, 229n5, just war tradition influence in, 230n8 235n9 on non-intervention, 40–1 ‘wag the dog’ syndrome, 177 on self-defense, 40, 186, 232n18, Walters, LeRoy, 229n6 244n7 Walzer, Michael, 33, 41–3 United Nations Security Council on anticipatory self-defense, resolutions on Iraq’s invasion of 208 Kuwait of, 100, 101–2, 120, on self-defense, 234n7, 234nn4–5 121, 136, 238n1 theory of aggression of, 42–3, resolutions on Kosovo of, 142, 232n21 146–7, 164–5 the war-decision sovereign authority of, 40–1, 77–8, affirmative war decisions, 85–7, 232n20, 235n10 211, 236n17 UNSCOM II Operation Desert Fox crisis of legitimacy in, 4–5 (1998), 92t, 236n23 presidential power in, 6 US embassy bombings (1998), 92t, public opposition in, 6–9, 177, 236n23 212–13 US foreign policy, 87–9 as social practice, 9–11, 226–7 American exceptionalism in, 67 The War on Terrorism (Jackson), attribution of ‘evil’ in, 215–17 243n2 case studies of, 16–17, 90–6 war-related deaths, 2 crisis of legitimacy of the war- warrior’s code, 19 decision in, 5–6 wars of choice, 12 expansionist focus of, 67 Weber, Max, 32, 230n10, 235n8 fundamental liberal contradiction Wilkensfield, Jonathan, 89, 93, in, 3–4, 228n4 236n16 the just war frame in, 13–14, Wilson, Woodrow, 4, 36–7, 67 66–71, 79, 211–22, 233n7 Wittkopf, Eugene R. et al., 228n4 the liberal contradiction in, Wolff, Christian, 31 212–13 world wars of the twentieth liberal internationalism in, 35–6, century, 36–9, 231nn15–16 44, 143, 178, 231n13 , 36, 38, 39 in Libya, 2, 222–7 World War II, 38–9, 44, 231n16 284 Index

Yeltsin, Boris, 145–6 in Kosovo, 141–4, 145t, 242n15 Yin, Robert K., 95 see also Kosovo Yugoslav wars in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 142, Zald, Mayer, 47 236n21 zones of peace, 3