Afghanistan: An Analytical Framing Past, Present and into the Future James Micheal Page DGSi Working Paper No. 2, 2016 Afghanistan: An Analytical Framing – Past, Present and into the Future James Michael Page1 University of Durham Institute of Advanced Study & School of Government and International Affairs, Durham, UK 30th April 2016 Concerns for the present raised urgent questions about the future 2 Abstract This paper comes out of a paper presented by the author at a NATO Intelligence Fusion Centre conference in early December 2015, at which the question of analytically framing Afghanistan was addressed. In order to do so, consideration was given to the intervention in Afghanistan since 2001 and the present situation as a basis from which analytical framing can be explored, developed, refined and further tailored. Analytical frames assessed as pertinent into the future are elucidated upon with reference to a range of classical texts, newly published research and analysis, as well as recent first-hand experience. Serving as a key conceptual starting point is Clausewitz’s ‘trinity’ and its clarification in the context of the Global War on Terror and the ongoing intervention in Afghanistan. This thread is subsequently traced through matters of policy, strategy and operations, and their corollaries. Appropriate reflection is also entered into in relation to a range of relevant selected paradigms, assumptions, historical developments and thematic issues. This finds that although Afghanistan presents an extraordinary complexity -- that is likely to continue for the foreseeable future -- ways do exist in which analytical framing can be usefully undertaken. This necessarily utilizes: insights arising from frank analyses of events, paradigms and constructs; assessing and where apt adapting pre-existing analytical frames; carefully examining assumptions; locating congruence between analytical frames and making use of what this may offer; tailoring to and enabling appreciation of context as part of analytical exploration; developing constructive awareness of limiting factors; and being creative about challenges such as data availability and volatility. 1 Corresponding author’s (e-mail) address: [email protected] . James Michael Page is a Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of Advanced Study (IAS) & the School of Government of International Affairs (SGIA). Prior to this, he was a Political Affairs Officer at the United Nations Assistance Mission Afghanistan (UNAMA) for extensive periods 2009- 2015. The views of the author are his own and should not be understood as the views of DGSI, SGIA or Durham University 2 Professor David Stafford quoted in Keene, Thomas (2012) p.55. 2 Main Findings and Recommendations: The Situation in Afghanistan: Past, Present and Prospective Afghanistan is a country, a situation and of circumstances which will continue to be salient to and amongst global political affairs for the foreseeable future. Afghanistan is very likely to experience a further period of difficult challenges, particularly amid uncertainties about: security, economic development, and regional dynamics. The importance of Afghanistan for regional and global security, stability and prosperity should not be underestimated. This draws on historical and other recent developments.3 4 What commenced as a war of purpose in Afghanistan in 2001 currently appears to be characterizable more as a war of risk. However, risk and consequence management could well prove insufficient approaches in addressing: a range of actors with renewed purpose; an environment of growing instability and uncertainty; and, signs of strengthening determination of proxy actors, supporters and related dynamics. U.S. and International Community Goals in Afghanistan Crucially, al Qaeda and other terror groups active in Afghanistan have some significant symbolic and relatively long-standing roots in war in Afghanistan.5 Their ties with the Taliban and its various elements remain rather opaque, but not unbroken. Combat continues to occur involving U.S. and NATO-coalition forces, despite efforts to withdraw and delimit their engagement with insurgent forces and terror entities. President Obama’s announcement of the ending of the combat mission in Afghanistan in December 2014 is symbolic of changes to the meaning contained in the “GWOT” (Global War on Terror) formulation. In praxis, his announcement of “the end of the Combat Mission” then is not the end per se of war on terror. Nevertheless, this represents a key point along a longer trajectory of changing the tone, tenor -- and to a degree -- the character of the U.S.’s engagement with the threat of terror attacks. Critically, threats currently cited by President Obama comprise many of those stated by President G.W. Bush during his presidency. Indeed, directly invoked in President Obama’s recent major speech on Afghanistan of 15 October 2015, are the threats of: various al Qaeda affiliates; extremists; state- sponsored networks; local militias or extremists interested in seizing territory; regional networks 3 The referents of: security, stability and prosperity, will be used through this paper and in congruence with the will of the international community in UN Security Council mandates (more on this in Annex 1 and in the main body of the paper) as useful norm, but also allowing for a range of political interpretations and uses. 4 For an especially thoughtful recent article including strong argument as to why Afghanistan is important and will be in the future (and why) see: Rashid, Ahmed (2015) ‘While we weren't looking, the Taleban surged back in Afghanistan: Fifteen years of western intervention achieved no more than the pretense of a stable state’, The Spectator Magazine, (London), 12 December 2015, available: http://www.spectator.co.uk/2015/12/while-we-werent-looking-the-taleban-surged-back-in- afghanistan/ Accessed December 2015. 5 For more on this there are numerous sources. Coll (2004) is one of the more exciting and detailed with focus on Afghanistan and Pakistan, which is especially useful here. For a more philosophical and thought-provoking perspective, see: Gray, John (2003) Al Qaeda and What it Means to be Modern. London: Verso. 3 launching periodic attacks against western diplomats, companies, and other soft targets, or resort to kidnapping and other criminal enterprises to fund their operations. The “global reach” of groups with networks utilizing terror to target the U.S. and its allies (e.g., al Qaeda, and a range of offshoots and militant groups) is a continuing problematic, including for international global engagement, linkages and elements of integration. Challenges arising out of this, such as the impact of these on U.S. influence and power projection (and perceptions thereof) to resolve crises. These should be neither overlooked nor ignored. In Afghanistan, the consequences of the 2001 intervention and efforts are still filtering through. Meanwhile, the tools, breadth of relationships and confidence of close allies have been broadly reducing in Afghanistan. Terror and its use --what is widely called terrorism – is largely a symptom of challenges. It is neither the root cause nor solution to terror.6 The “disrupt, dismantle and defeat” (‘triple-d’) formulation, applied to Afghanistan quite systematically since 2009 is a key construct in U.S.-led international efforts there. Although an attractive sounding alliteration, it has served to filter statements and conceptualities of: the threat / enemy; goal(s); and, concurrently: strategy and tactics. It deserves focused attention due to its enduring presence and capacity for catalyzing, but also obscuring meaning of goals and associated factors. Thus, it’s of great importance for analytically framing Afghanistan, past, present and into the future. As Schroden (2014) claims, it seems as though President Obama and the White House were of the mind that they had (albeit perhaps hopefully) defeated the core of al Qaeda in c. 2014 vis-à-vis Afghanistan.7 However, the situation has been altering, as acknowledged by President Obama – e.g. in his statement of 15 October 2015. In the latter statement, President Obama made reference to the Taliban making “gains” in Afghanistan; this is an unusual level of detail among other admittances of significant recent security issues in Afghanistan and of “fragility”. The unresolved questions about the goal in Afghanistan, and issues around interpretation through the ‘triple-d’ matrix, may be due to uncertainty on the part of the White House. However, this state of affairs can also be ‘read’ as the out-workings of political calculation encompassing less favourable intentions on the U.S.’s part. Some important potential regional support may suffer if this is not better addressed. This is despite how strange assertions may seem that the U.S. wishes leave a degree of instability in Afghanistan in order to weaken some regional powers / global powers. What remains unclear is: what is it to defeat al Qaeda? Here, earlier difficulties with aligning ways and means with ends from the Bush era, and the many complications that occurred since then, are continuing to fog efforts. Towards Analytical Framing 6 It may be a trigger, or a contributory cause, but seldom a root cause in the sense used, for example, in conflict analysis as taught by the UN System Staff College. This is also in keeping with various other conflict analysis definitions, methodologies and ontologies. 7Schroden, Jonathan (2014) ‘Obama’s Confusing