Copyright is owned by the Author of the thesis. Permission is given for a copy to be downloaded by an individual for the purpose of research and private study only. The thesis may not be reproduced elsewhere without the permission of the Author. lHE N[W ZEALAND SOLDIER IN WORLD WAR 11: ~YTH Mm nr fl[ 1 TY A thes i s presented in partial fulfilme~t of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in History at Massey University John Reginald Mcleod 1 980 ·~t . .t_ R ll ABSTRACT Th e New Zua l and soldier has ga i ned a r eputation for be i ng an outstanding sol dier . Th e p roli fi c New Zea l a nd invol vement i n the nume r ous Wdrs of this century have allowed him to deve l op and consolidate this reputdtion . Wo rld Wdr I I was to add further lustre t o this reputulio11 , The que •,ti.011 th.it this pone c; i!; whethe r Lhe r ep u tcJtio11 is justified - how much is ~yth and how much is reality? In the early st~~es of World w~r II Lho New Zealander fai l ed to live up to his ~yLhica l reputation . The ba l es o f Greece and Crete , in pa r ticular , showed the totol l y unprofessiona l nature o f the New Zealand Army . Much of the weaknes s es shown in these battles were caused by i nadequate preparation . The Army had been on e o f t he principa l victims of the retrenchment policies of success i ve governme nts betwe en the w~ r s . I n 9J9 the rJew lealar:d Arm y \•Jas i~1 no state to f ight a wa r, The Reqular ror ce numbered no more than 500 and of the 10 , 000 Territor ia l s only twenty perce nt cou l d have been cons i de r ed act i ve. The Army was deficient not only in t r ained m<lnpowe r but a l so in mode r n e quipment . I t was t he refo r e a r ac e against time to p r epare the New Zea l and Division f or combat . Though the earl y years o f t he wa r de mo nstra t ed jus t how ina dequate t he p r eparations had been , the quality of t he Ne w Ze a land soldier a nd t he New Zea l and Division i nc reased . This wa s d ue to experience, improved l ogistics , and more c ompe ten t leadership. Leaders hip was perhaps the major problem f o r t he New Zeala nd Div i sion in i ts early years . Th e fail ur e of l eade r ship i s clearly illustrated by the los s of Ma leme ae r od rome arid consequentl y Crete . The s ki lls requir ed for peacetime p romotion as usual di f fere d f rom thos e n eede d for leaders hi p in war. As the wa r pr ogre ssed promoti on became ba sed on ability a nd officers lacking in leadership skill s were gradually replaced. The Ne w Zealand Di vision had achieved a high standard by the end of the North African campaign but its standard was not at variance with iii othe r Divis ions with s imil ar experiences . Ba t t l e s suc h as Min qar Qairn, El Alamein , Tebaga Ga p and Ta krouna were examples o f the Di v isi on profiting from its expe rienc es , Howeve r, t here were still problems . At Tak r ouna the Ne w Zealande r s were ab l e to bring a ll the i r e xperie nc e to bear, but the need f or new tac t i cs i n this un usual attack found the New Zea l ande r s a l ittle l acking, and an o t her l ess on was l ear nt . The New Zealand soldier is not physical l y or menta l l y superior ta any other soldier , The Division did ha ve a dvantages such as Freyberg ' s Charter arid the r~.J tionul nature of the Division and this helped t h e solcJiurs <.rnd the Divisior, iri their ba ttles . It/hat cour1ts though , for f i g h t i rHJ il t· i l i ty i " tr n i '' i 11 q , e-< r r r i c n cc , 1 1' ,] de r r. h i p ;rn d 1 a CJ i c; t i r: 'J • 1 n all armies ard all Divisions these fluct~ate and correspondingl y so does lhs f ighting ability of thAt Division . The myth ~f the New Zealand sol dier has deve l oped as New Zealanders search for~ national i dentity. The myt h h ~s grow~ with New Ze2land na t ionalism t o a stage where Ne w Zealanders are unab le to d isti~guis h myth f rom rB;:ility . TABLE OF CONTENTS ABS TRAC T ii AB8R[VIATI0~5 Vll PREFA CE ix CHAP TER 1 INTRODUCTION The Myth of the Ne w Zea l and Sol dier 3 The Liter ature 12 Mi l itary Histor y 16 CHAP TC R 2 PRELUDE TO BATTLE [ nlistrnent 24 Composition of 2NZE F 28 Training 3 13 rH11rrrn J lflf r·rn ·,r 'l'' f lrnJ : r Lf\Tf\MrnJ f\NO rIN!O'"· GO!lr;[ I 1 CHAPTER 4 LEADERSH IP : MALEME 68 The Malerne Se ctor 74 The Attack 77 CHAPTER 5 THC tif1'•D,'J[T : GALATAS 91 CHAPTER 6 TH E QUICK ATTACK : PT . 175 104 CHAPTER 7 THE KILLING INS TI NC T: MI NQAR QA IM 124 CHAP TE R 8 TA KROUNA 14 2 CHAPT ER 9 CONCLUS IO N 160 APPE NDI CES 170 BIBL IOGR APHY 177 LI ST Or FIGLJ R[S AND TABLES Figures 1. Syllabus of Training for 20 Battalion 42 2 , Greece 3, 21 Battalion ' s Pos itions Platarnon 11-1 6 Apri l 1941 4. Pinios Gorge - Dispositions 17-1 6 April 1941 61 5 . Crete 69 6 . 5 Brigade Dispositions 19 May 1941 69 7. German La ndings at Maleme 20 Ma y 1941 75 8 . Male~e : 0130 hours 21 May 75 9 , Malem e Counterattack 2 1-22 May 67 1 0. Galatas - Noon 25 May 1941 9 3 11. [ounteratlack at Galnta s 25 M1y 93 a 1 2 . The Ba yonet Technique 100 1 ~ ',.J # 1 OE! 14 . D Coy 25 Bn Attuck on Pt.175 ?] ~cverber 1941 1 1 3 1 5 . B Coy 25 f"3n Attack :i:1 PL . 17':. 1 1 1 1 s. A Coy 25 /1;; : Opercition~·; 11 U0 - 1 j'J[) hmir·> 1 1 J 17. C & D C~v~ ?5 En Overrun by T,rk~ : Afrrrnoo~ 23 Nove~ber 194 1 117 1 8 . 24 & 25 E r•s : Late Afternoor1 23 ~·lo·,·e:n~er 194 1 1 17 1 9 . 2 1 Pa.-izer Div , ' :3 Encirc l ement of NZ Di·J . at Min qar Qaim 27 June 1942 1 27 2 [] . Withdrawal of rU Div . from Minqar Qoim on the 127 Night 27/28 June 2 1. The Withdrawa l of 4 N, Z. Infantry Brigade at Minqar Qaim, J un e 27/28 , 1942 1 32 22 . Plan Vulcan Issued 12 April 1943 144 23. Takrouna 147 24 . NZ Div, Attac k on Takrouna 1 5 3 Tables I. Regular Officers, NCOs, and Other Ranks in the First Three Echelons 29 I I. Rank Distribution of Staff Corps Officers in 2NZEF 30 I I I. Occupationa l Status Ranking for Officers of First Three Echelons of 2NZEF 32. Tables (C ontd ,) IV . Occupational Status Ranking for Officers of First Th ree Echelons of 2NZEF ( totals) 33 V. Rank Structure of Selected Occupations of Personnel from the First Three Echelons 34 VI. Occupational Groupings for Co mmissions 2 Division 1941 - 5 37 vii ABBREVIA TID NS A. Te xt Abb reviations Th e abbreviations used in this thesis are primarily those used by the War Hi story Branch . l have used as a guide t he g lossary in W.G . McC lymont . To Greece , pp . 515-17 though the use of the abbreviations varied throug hout the Official Histories . Th e specifically military abbreviations have only be':!n used in ca~,e !:.; tudicci , excepting , of course , tho ~; e in common usage . Unit titles such a s plutoon , compJny , bdttalion , and brigade , have been abbreviated in the case studies except when referred to in general terms . Tht! ':i huvc be~r1 .JbbrL~vi .Jled if it is obviuu'.3 lhcy refr; r to a speci fi c unit or uni.t~- even though it ir; nol prefixed by c1 lE:l.t.er or number . One modifi_c,·it i.or1 has bee, adopted . When referring to a specific company of battalion in a battle in ~hi ch more than one battalion is involved, I have referred to it as company/b1ttalion to av0id any confusion , e . g . D/24 refers to D Company of 24 Bat+.alior . AA Anti- aircraft AA &. QMG Assistant 1\dj:Jtant and Quartermaster- Gene ral AG RA Army Group Royal Artillery Ar::J c,_· Army Service Corps AV.JOL Absent Without Leave bde brigade bn batta l ion bty batter y CGS Chief of General Staff cm centimetre CMS Company Sergeant- Major co Commanding Officer comd comman de r coy company CRA Commander Ro ya l Artillery CRE Commander Ro yal Engineers cwt hundredv1e ight Div Division GDC General Officer Commanding G50 General Staff Officer FOO Forward Observation Officer HQ Headquarters viii 2 i/c second-in- comman d rn I ntel l igence Officer I tank I n fa ntr y tank LOB Left Out o f Battle L/Sgt Lance Sergea r.t L ~.