G NER Y SE E CU O R T I A T Y N NATO ENERGY SECURITY C E CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE E C N T N R E E LL OF EXCE ENERGY HIGHLIGHTS ENERGY HIGHLIGHTS 1 Hybrid warfare against Critical Energy Infrastructure: The Case of Ukraine* by Vytautas Butrimas by Jaroslav Hajek, PhD by Sukhodolia Oleksandr, Doctor of Science, Professor, by Bobro Dmytro, PhD, by Sergii Karasov ANNOTATION This study seeks to answer the question. It aims to determine whether it is necessary to review his study identifies and analyses the the existing approach to ensuring the protection success of different hybrid warfare tools and resilience of critical energy infrastructure used by Russia in the Ukrainian energy throughout the Alliance. The case of Ukraine is sector between 2014 and 2017, namely unique – it is a country at war whose political, le- Tdifferent types of malicious acts against critical gal and economic conditions are, or until recently energy infrastructure, the implication of these have been, very different from those of NATO events for Ukraine and the lessons to be learned Nations. Any lessons learned will thus take this for NATO security. difference into account.2 INTRODUCTION The conflict in Ukraine is often referred to as an Ensuring the uninterrupted functioning of energy example of hybrid warfare, where conventional systems is among the most important issues fac- methods of fighting do not play a primary role. ing every country. This mission is not a new one Instead, an expanded use of the tools of political and measures have been developed to secure and economic pressure comes to the fore, includ- critical energy infrastructure – facilities, services, ing information warfare and psychological opera- information and industrial control systems so vi- tions built on disinformation and propaganda. tal that their denial or destruction would have a significant impact on national security, economy, In Russia, these methods are called ‘New Genera- government and well-being of society. However, tion Warfare’. Their objective is to achieve supe- Russia’s aggression against Ukraine and the chal- riority over the enemy’s armed forces and civil- lenges it has brought1 have raised the question ian population through moral and psychological of whether there is a need to rethink the ‘energy means. Such an approach seeks to minimise the dimension’ of modern warfare. need for deploying hard military power and in- * This is a product of the NATO Energy Security Centre of Excellence (NATO ENSEC COE). It is produced for NATO, NATO member countries, NATO part- ners, related private and public institutions and related individuals. It does not represent the opinions or policies of NATO or NATO ENSEC COE. The views presented in the articles are those of the authors alone. © All rights reserved by the NATO ENSEC COE. Report may not be copied, reproduced, distributed or publicly displayed without reference to the NATO ENSEC COE and the respective publication. I They include preparation for and destruction of critical infrastructure; weakness of security systems and the armed forces of Ukraine; inefficient coordina- tion between agencies; inability of the international community to secure the guarantees given by the Budapest Memorandum of 1994 to Ukraine; usage of unconventional tools of warfare; informational attacks against Ukraine to spur an economic crisis; rise in criminal activity. 2 Please note that the NATO Energy Security Centre of Excellence will publish the main lessons learned in a separate document. 2 ENERGY HIGHLIGHTS stead attacks its opponents “hearts and minds“ port diversification, NATO Nations are now less (Berzins 2016:2). The intention is to create an vulnerable to Russia’s energy pressure. atmosphere of mistrust, doubts and insecurity within a society. It also aims to disrupt the unity In trying to keep Ukraine in its sphere of influ- and cohesion of alliances and to cover up the ag- ence, Russia employed a range of tools: monopo- gressor’s real objectives (Nissen 2016:3). lising the gas market by blocking the entry of new suppliers; denying access to pipelines com- This paper is organised as follows. Firstly, it as- ing into Ukraine from the west via Slovakia, Po- sesses Russia’s use of energy as a political weap- land and Hungary [1, 2]; obstructing reforms of on during the pre-conflict period. Secondly, it Ukraine’s gas market by insisting on long-term examines attacks on energy infrastructure during prices in contracts, ‘take-or-pay’ and re-export the 2014-2017 period of conflict in Donbas, dis- prohibition clauses; offering gas price discounts tinguishing between energy assets that are criti- in exchange for political concessions; taking cal and those that are not. Thirdly, it surveys en- measures designed to corrupt government offi- ergy-related events in the rest of Ukraine. Finally, cials and corporate managers. The involvement it offers lessons learnt and proposes measures to of intermediaries in the gas trade between Russia enhance the resilience of the energy sector. and Ukraine created a wide range of supporters of non-transparent gas market readily lobbing for 1. USE OF ENERGY AS A TOOL OF RUSSIAN Russian interests.4, 5 FOREIGN POLICY DURING THE PRE-CON- FLICT PERIOD The most striking examples of this policy are: corruption of officials in 1998-2005 that led to The use of energy for political purposes has a long the signing of unfavorable contracts for natural history in Russia’s foreign policy. It was openly gas supplies in 2009; gas price discounts in ex- proclaimed in 2003 in the Energy Strategy of the change for the extension of a long-term lease of Russian Federation for the period up to 2020, the naval base in the Ukrainian Black Sea port of which states that the fuel and energy complex of Sevastopol in 2010; rejection of the Association Russia “is the basis of economic development, a Agreement between Ukraine and the EU while tool of domestic and foreign policy making”.3 securing the promise of additional loans from Russia for the purchase of gas in 2013. Energy, especially supplies of natural gas, has served Russia as a tool to advance its objectives Another example of the political use of energy is with respect to both Ukraine and NATO Nations the case of supplies of nuclear fuel to Ukrainian in the period preceding the crisis in Ukraine and, nuclear power plants (NPPs). Russian experts and in some cases, subsequently. The methods em- politicians claim, falsely, that the “use of fuel as- ployed include imposing unfavorable commercial semblies produced in America will inevitably raise terms and conditions onto countries, attempts the risk of Ukrainian nuclear reactor failures and to create or expose corruption and political pres- increase the probability of man-caused disasters sure to achieve desired foreign policy objectives. that would be comparable to the Chernobyl ac- However, Russia’s ability to use energy for politi- cident” [3, 4, 6, 7]. cal purposes has declined. Thanks to market lib- eralisation, improved interconnectivity and im- Another example involves spent nuclear fuel6. An 3 Energy Strategy of the Russian Federation for the period up to 2020 (in Russian). Access: http://www.cpnt.ru/userfiles/_files_normativ_energosafe_energostrategy.pdf 4 Balmaseda M. (2008). Energy Dependency, Politics and Corruption in the Former Soviet Union: Russia’s Power, Oligarchs’ Profits and Ukraine’s Missing Energy Policy, 1995-2006. Routledge. 5 Sukhodolia O. Chapter 3.4 and 7.4 in book: The Global Hybrid War: Ukrainian Front. / monograph under the General Editorship of V.Horbulin (in Ukrain- ian). К.: NISS, 2017. – 496 p. 6 Energy Strategy of Ukraine as the Instrument of Energy Security Politics. Conference information package under the general editorship of O. Sukhodolia. Кiev: NISS, 2014. – 168 p. (in Ukrainian). D. Bobro “Aspects of development of nuclear-power engineering in the context of providing energy independence and sovereignty of Ukraine”. p.60-70. Access: http://www.niss.gov.ua/content/articles/files/Druk_Cyxodolya_Bezpeka_31_08-e5ff5.pdf ENERGY HIGHLIGHTS 3 attempt by Ukraine to construct its own spent Russia’s direct use of the energy sector as a weap- fuel storage facility created a strong reaction in on in the pre-crisis period (up to 2014) contrib- Russia [7, 8]. Because of the allocation of land uted to the inclusion of the energy dimension in for the facility, Russia’s information machine ac- the present concept of hybrid warfare. During the cused Ukraine of trying to build a nuclear bomb period between 2014 and 2017, a series of en- and use it against Russian cities7. These claims ergy related events led to internal disruptions in were repeated by some European experts and Ukraine. Ukrainian individuals [9, 10, 11, 12]. While spent nuclear fuel can be made into a ‘dirty bomb’ if the It should be noted that Russia mentioned the material is placed within a conventional bomb, importance of subversive activities as early as Ukraine signed up to and respects IAEA standards 2014. The seizing of energy infrastructure and on spent nuclear fuel storage. resources in Ukraine represented a first step in the energy dimension of the conflict, with Rus- Such statements on the part of Russia, also re- sia targeting energy facilities in Crimea and later peated by some members of the Ukrainian politi- in some districts of the Donetsk and Luhansk re- cal elite, are aimed at the destabilisation of so- gions. Actions of this type are described in detail ciety through a demoralisation from inside and in section 3.1 below. reinvigorating the deep rooted fears of another accident of the extent of Chernobyl [13,14,15,16]. Kinetic methods of adversely impacting impor- Fake news about committing acts of sabotage at tant infrastructure were used often and included Ukrainian NPPs or subversive activities with ra- demolitions and shelling, which caused damage dioactive materials by Ukraine are possible sce- to coal mines and heat and power generation narios for future attempts at destabilisation of facilities, as well as water, gas and power supply the situation in Ukraine.