National Missile Defense What Does It All Mean? A CDI ISSUE BRIEF CENTER FOR DEFENSE INFORMATION National Missile Defense What Does It All Mean? A CDI ISSUE BRIEF CENTER FOR DEFENSE INFORMATION © September 2000 Center for Defense Information 1779 Massachusetts Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20036 (202) 332-0600 • Fax: (202) 462-4559 www.cdi.org DESIGN BY CUTTING EDGE GRAPHICS Contents v Foreword 1 Why Should We Care? 2 A Brief History of “Missiles” and Ballistic Missile Defense 5 The Ballistic Missile Threat 10 Technological Challenges in National Missile Defense 17 The Costs of Ballistic Missile Defense 20 Impact of NMD on Russia, Nuclear Security 24 U.S. National Missile Defense: Views from Asia 33 Europe’s Role in National Missile Defense 39 Chronology of U.S. National Missile Defense Programs 47 Acronyms 49 Glossary Foreword THE FUTURE OF U.S. NATIONAL MISSILE DEFENSE remains in limbo at the time of this writing. We find ourselves in the midst of a presidential campaign in which defense programs often gain momentum from boosterism. At the same time, a string of missile interceptor failures has raised doubts about the feasibility of national missile defense to new heights. On September 1, 2000, President Clinton deferred NMD deployment, delaying—but not killing—the program. Extensive press coverage of this politically charged program during an election year makes for a noisy dispute that the Center for Defense Information seeks to quell with a dispassionate survey of the potential costs and consequences of national missile defense. This Issue Brief covers the four major desidarata that should, in a rational world, determine the decision on whether or not to build the NMD system. These key factors are cost, technical feasibility, the magnitude and timing of missile threats to America, and the political and strategic impact—especially on U.S. relations with its allies, Russia, and China. The reader of this primer will be able to draw his or her own informed conclusions about the worth of NMD in these terms. BRUCE G. BLAIR President Washington, DC September 2000 Center for Defense Information v Why Should We Care? ONE By Rear Admiral Eugene J. Carroll, Jr., USN (Ret.), Vice President, Center for Defense Information To an extent seldom seen since Cold War days, Treaty of 1972 (SALT I) was negotiated in the growing debate over the need for a national tandem with the ABM Treaty as complementary missile defense (NMD) system has polarized measures, neither one possible without the public opinion. Pros and cons are put forward other. Subsequently SALT II and the Strategic in increasingly strident confrontations, which Arms Reduction Treaties (START I and II) were lead not to understanding or accommodation erected on the SALT I/ABM foundation. but to divisive, emotional rejection of opposing The existence of this stabilizing arms control views. What is there about NMD that produces structure was recognized by other nations (most heat—not light—when the issue arises? importantly by China) and thereby inhibited It is because the decision to deploy an NMD the expansion of other nuclear arsenals while system rests on the most fundamental issues of contributing to global nuclear non-proliferation America’s role in the world and our relation- efforts. To pull out a keystone of arms control ship not only with our adversaries but with our by abrogation of the ABM Treaty could weaken closest allies as well. It is not surprising that nuclear stability worldwide, particularly in the Russia and China are loud critics of NMD but sensitive areas of Chinese, Indian and Pakistani Germany, France, Great Britain and other nuclear programs. western nations are also questioning the Of equal concern is that NMD will certainly wisdom of proceeding with a program that be a bar to progress on future arms control threatens to ignite a new nuclear arms race. It agreements, which are essential to achieve may be possible to shrug off the anticipated genuine reductions in still bloated nuclear criticisms of countries often treated as enemies, arsenals. but the United States must give thoughtful President Jacques Chirac of France identified consideration and great weight to the same this problem when he declared: “Nuclear criticism from its friends. disarmament will be more difficult when President Clinton has said that a final powerful countries are developing new decision to deploy NMD must await technologies [NMD] to enhance their nuclear satisfactory answers to four criteria: 1) there capabilities.” The great danger is that other must be a real threat; 2) we must have the nations, most notably China and Russia, technological means to address that threat will seek to enhance their own nuclear effectively; 3) our response must be affordable; capabilities in response to the deployment and 4) NMD deployment must not do unac- of an American NMD system. In the political ceptable damage to the stability of current and effort to justify deployment of defenses against future international security arrangements. All a highly unlikely threat, the United States four of these criteria are evaluated in this issue can undo significant arms control measures brief, but the fourth is clearly the most critical. and end up facing much greater real nuclear What good does a defense system do if it dangers. weakens the current strategic nuclear stability This is why all Americans should care deeply which rests on a hard-won arms control struc- about the decision to deploy a national missile ture built over the last 30 years? Repeated U.S. defense system. By such an action we will threats to abrogate the Anti-Ballistic Missile signal to the world that we are willing to (ABM) Treaty of 1972 ignore the truth that there pursue illusory defenses against non-existent is a comprehensive arms control structure threats even though we subject all nations to within which the individual treaties are inter- continued nuclear competition and increased dependent. The first Strategic Arms Limitation risks of a future nuclear war. Center for Defense Information 1 A Brief History of “Missiles” and Ballistic Missile Defense TWO By Colonel Daniel Smith, USA (Ret.), Chief of Research, Center for Defense Information The “Missile” Threat Evolves Nonetheless, aware that the Soviets were For most Americans, the Iraqi “Scuds” pressing ahead with their missile develop- launched against Israel and the coalition forces ments, the Pentagon continued research on in Saudi Arabia during the 1991 Persian Gulf missile defenses. Then, on October 4, 1957, the War brought home for the first time a real sense Soviets launched into orbit the Sputnik satellite of the damage that a distant enemy could inflict atop a multi-stage missile. A few weeks later the The 1991 by employing ballistic missiles. first U.S. attempt ended in disaster when the Persian Gulf The first “ballistic” weapons probably were Vanguard rocket blew up on the launch pad. rocks that cavemen hurled at each other. These Not until January 1958, when a Pentagon ban War brought “missiles” were followed by sticks fitted with on Army missile launches was lifted, did a U.S. home a real pointed stone heads to make spears and later by Jupiter-C loft its Explorer I satellite into orbit. wood and “string” devices that propelled Both offensive and defensive long range missile sense of smaller wooden shafts through the air. development became priorities in a matter of a the damage But it wasn’t until catapults evolved that few weeks. “missiles”—which could be anything from large ballistic flaming arrows (used by the Chinese in the 11th Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Defenses: missiles could century) to large stones to a body (infected if Part I (1958–1968) possible)—became really useful in warfare. In inflict. the west, the Greeks set the early design stan- Nike-Zeus was one of the first U.S. efforts dards for mechanical catapults, designs on whose objective was to develop long range which the Romans relied for their siege warfare defenses against ballistic missiles. The logic machines. driving the program called for an exo- The Chinese, who invented gunpowder, were atmospheric (60 miles or higher above the also the first to employ explosives to power earth’s surface) or very high altitude, long missiles and the first, in the 1300s, to fire a multi- range interceptor carrying a 400 kiloton nuclear stage missile. By the 17th century western warhead that, when detonated, would destroy military forces were experimenting with “war” incoming missiles. rockets. Yet not until World War II were long While rocket science had put the concept range (up to 180 miles) rockets—the Nazi V-1— within reach, the tracking radars were still too and ballistic missiles—the A-4, renamed the primitive to cope with a large number of mis- V-2—developed. Although it was possible to siles. The radars could be spoofed by counter- counter the noisy, relatively slow V-1, there was measures such as chaff and decoys, and were virtually no defense against the ballistic V-2. physically vulnerable. The tight defense budgets As the wartime Allied coalition split, the new of the 1950s also acted as a restraint since a antagonists concentrated on developing long widely deployed system would be costly. range intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) Overlapping the Nike-Zeus program was that could carry nuclear warheads. Strategic Project Defender, what today might be classed defenses were oriented more toward aircraft as an Advanced Technology Demonstrator (with an estimated $200 billion spent between program that explored possible new technolo- 1945–1961) rather than missiles for the simple gies that could be incorporated into future reason that the technology for the latter was not missile defense programs. One concept that available.