PLUTARCH ON SELF AND OTHERS* 1. INTRODUCTION: THE RELATION OF SELF AND OTHER IN ANTIQUITY AND IN PLUTARCH Plutarch strongly opposed the Epicurean ideal of a sequestered life: man should not withdraw from society, but should as a social being, h¬çon koinwnikón, enter public life, where he meets the other1. Now it is clear that there are many possible attitudes which one can adopt towards the other. They vary from violence against, and manipulation of, the other to sincere concern for the good of the other, from paternalism to responsi- bility for the other, from exclusion to love, from neglect and indifference to an encounter between an I and a Thou, based on mutual respect. What then is Plutarch's position with regard to this question? How does he conceive the relation Self-Other? First of all, one should note that Plutarch’s specific way of putting the question is highly relevant. He always sets the problem from the perspective of the self, hardly ever from the perspective of the other. He wants to exam- ine which attitude one should adopt towards the other in order to act oneself in a virtuous way; he never asks which attitude should be adopted in order to take into account the wishes of the other, to bear in mind as far as possi- ble the other’s identity as being different from that of one’s own. For that very reason, it becomes particularly interesting to examine to what extent Plutarch’s ethics can precisely do justice to the perspective of the other. Now the first question that should be asked is whether it is a remotely realistic thing at all to expect a certain respect for the other as other in Antiquity. To what extent the ancients really cared about the problem of the identity of the other as being different from that of oneself? In fact, the problem had already received some attention in traditional thinking2, * I would like to thank Prof. P.A. Stadter for many valuable remarks on an earlier draft of this article. Where I still disagree with him, it has been with hesitation, and any faults that remain are, of course, entirely my own. I’m also much indebted to Prof. L. Van der Stockt, to Prof. G. Schepens and to Dr. S. Verdegem. 1 See especially the little essay De latenter vivendo (1128A-1130E); for Plutarch’s contro- versy against Epicureanism on this point, see also the final section of Adv. Colot. (1124D-1127E). 2 The seeds of the later problem were already present in ancient Greek thinking, which contains many pairs of opposites, often divided into a positive and a negative pole; see 246 G. ROSKAM and had become quite important in Plutarch’s time. As to the relation between Greeks and Romans, for instance, the basic difference between both peoples was discussed earlier already3 and was underlined more and more in the first centuries A.D.4, even though later authors tried to deny this difference5. In the same way, the differences between man and woman were emphasized long before Plutarch6, although in this case too, one sometimes tried, if not to deny, than certainly to nuance them7. It is clear, then, that in more than one domain, questions related to the prob- lem of the difference between self and other had received already much discussion when Plutarch and his contemporaries had to seek their own, personal answers. The question remains, however, whether such discussions in concrete contexts did also influence ethical thinking about the place of the other. Are there any traces of a moral position that could somehow do justice to the peculiar nature of the other as being different from that of the self? Usually, a respect for the other as other is absent from ancient thinking, even though there can be found some important, though limited, begin- nings. According to Aristotle’s theory of friendship, for instance, one wishes a friend good for his own sake8. However, in such ideal friend- ship, a friend is also another self9, so that respect for the friend is based on a kind of shared identity10. In different Hellenistic philosophical G.E.R. LLOYD, Polarity and Analogy. Two Types of Argumentation in Early Greek Thought, Cambridge 1966, p. 15-171. On the classical period, see P. CARTLEDGE, The Greeks. A Portrait of Self and Others, Oxford 2002. 3 See, e.g., Cicero, Tusc. disp. I 1-3 and Horace, Epist. II 1.156-163. 4 See, e.g., Lucian, De merc. cond. 40; Juvenal, Sat. III 58-125; Tacitus, Ann. II 88, III 60, IV 35, VI 18 etc.; more passages in H. HUNGER, Graeculus perfidus — ‰Italov îtamóv. Il senso dell’alterità nei rapporti Greco-Romani ed Italo-Bizantini, Roma 1987, p. 22-31. 5 See, e.g., Julian, Orat. IV 152d-153a and Libanius, Orat. XV 25; much more material in J. PALM, Rom, Römertum und Imperium in der griechischen Literatur der Kaiserzeit, Lund 1959. 6 See, e.g., Plato, Leges VI 781ab; Republ. V 453b and e, 455c-e; Aristotle, Hist. an. IX 1, 608a-b. 7 See, e.g., Plato, Leges VII 804de and 805cd; Republ. V 451c-456a (A.W. PRICE, Love and Friendship in Plato and Aristotle, Oxford 1989, p. 167-171); Musonius Rufus, fragm. 3 and 4 Hense. 8 EN VIII 2, 1155b31; 4, 1156b9-11; 5, 1157a18-19; IX 1166a2-4; EE VII 6, 1240a24- 25; Rhet. II 4, 1380b36-1381a1; cf. also Cicero, De fin. I XX-69 on the position of some Epicureans. 9 EN IX 4, 1166a31-32; 9, 1170b6-7; EE VII 12, 1245a29-30 and 34-35; cf. also EN VIII 10, 1159b2-4. 10 Cf. A.W. PRICE, op. cit. (n. 7), p. 130: «To love another actively for his sake is above all to identify with him in action by making his acts also one’s own as realizations of choices that one shares with him»; cf. EN IX 9, 1170a2-4. PLUTARCH ON SELF AND OTHERS 247 schools, due attention is given to real differences in talents between indi- viduals11, although each individual should in the end realize the same ideal. In this case too, the perspective of the other as other is hardly taken into account. Extremely important in this context is Panaetius. In his famous per- sonae theory, he distinguishes four considerations that should be taken into account in order to determine the nature of propriety (tò prépon / decorum): the universal, rational nature of human beings (Cicero, De off. I XXX 107), one’s own individual nature (XXX 107-109), external cir- cumstances (XXXII 115) and one’s personal deliberate choice (ibid.). Accordingly, an individual should not only refrain from opposing his uni- versal human nature, but he should also follow his own particular nature instead of trying in vain to imitate the personal characteristics of others (XXXI 110-114). This implies that an action can be appropriate for one man, but inappropriate for another (XXXI 112). For instance, whereas sui- cide is the right alternative for a Cato, it would be wrong for others who have a less austere character (ibid.). And the behaviour that fits in very well with Ulysses would be completely at odds with Ajax (XXXI 113). In this way, Panaetius succeeded to develop an ethical theory that made it possible to give a certain place to the other without merely consider- ing him from the perspective of the self. With this position, Panaetius was a rara avis in Antiquity. Did Plutarch join him? To what extent Plutarch introduced a certain respect for the other as other in his ethical thinking? The question is important for two reasons. First of all, the problem of the relation between self and other returns in several domains of Plutarch’s thinking. Much work has been done here. Nonetheless, the great number of detailed studies have not made all aspects of Plutarch’s position equally clear. Did Plutarch, for instance, ever try to go beyond the different character of Greeks and Romans, in order to reach a unified Greco-Roman culture12? Or should he rather be regarded as a non-integrationist13? And whereas more than 11 See, e.g., Seneca, Epist. 52.3-6 (= Epicurus, fr. 192 Us.); Epist. 95.36-37; De benef. V 25.5; Musonius Rufus, fr. I 2.23-5.2 H.; Philo of Alexandria, Post. XX-71; Deus XIII 61- 64. 12 Cf. J. BOULOGNE, Le sens des ‘Questions Romaines’ de Plutarque, REG 100 (1987), p. 474-475; ID., Plutarque. Un aristocrate grec sous l’occupation romaine, Lille 1994, p. 35-54 and passim. 13 Cf. S.C.R. SWAIN, Hellenism and Empire. Language, Classicism, and Power in the Greek World AD 50-250, Oxford 1996, p. 137-186; cf. also T. DUFF, Plutarch’s Lives. Exploring Virtue and Vice, Oxford 1999, p. 291-308. 248 G. ROSKAM once Plutarch’s very positive treatment of women has been emphasized14, others also nuanced to a certain extent Plutarch’s philogyny15. Secondly, Plutarch’s great emphasis on mildness (praótjv) and humanity (filanqrwpía) seems to point to a certain respect for the other as other: To the Platonist or Aristotelian, eudaimonia (‘felicity’) is self-evidently the goal. It may involve preferring honour to pleasure, death to dis- grace, restraint to indulgence. But it can never lead one to think of the eudaimonia of some other person as to be preferred to one's own. What is notable in Plutarch is not his adhesion to these attitudes, but his tacit modifications of them. These come from the emphasis laid in all his moral judgments on mildness and humanity, praotes and philanthropia; these are qualities which, even if practised in a self-regarding sense, involve at least some degree of concern and understanding for the feel- ings and aims of others16.