Faculty of Gradu Faculty of Graduate Studies the Ibrahim Abu-Lughod

Faculty of Gradu Faculty of Graduate Studies the Ibrahim Abu-Lughod

Faculty of Graduate Studies The Ibrahim Abu-Lughod Institute of International Studies [IALIIS] Israel's 1967 First Strike against Egypt: Preemptive or Preventive ﺍﻝﻀﺭﺒﺔ ﺍﻹﺴﺭﺍﺌﻴﻠﻴﺔ ﺍﻷﻭﻝﻰ ﻀﺩ ﻤﺼﺭ ﻓﻲ ﻋﺎﻡ 1967 : ﺍﺴﺘﺒﺎﻗﻴﺔ ﺃﻡ ﻭﻗﺎﺌﻴﺔ Prepared by Gamal M. A. Mohammed Supervisor Dr. Roger Heacock 2012 Faculty of Graduate Studies The Ibrahim Abu-Lughod Institute of International Studies [IALIIS] Israel's 1967 First Strike against Egypt: Preemptive or Preventive ﺍﻝﻀﺭﺒﺔ ﺍﻹﺴﺭﺍﺌﻴﻠﻴﺔ ﺍﻷﻭﻝﻰ ﻀﺩ ﻤﺼﺭ ﻓﻲ ﻋﺎﻡ 1967 : ﺍﺴﺘﺒﺎﻗﻴﺔ ﺃﻡ ﻭﻗﺎﺌﻴﺔ Prepared by Gamal M. A. Mohammed University Number 1085443 Supervisor Dr. Roger Heacock Readers Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi Dr. Basem Ezbidi This thesis was submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Masters Degree in International Studies from the Faculty of Graduate Studies at Birzeit University -Palestine. Israel’s 1967 First Strike against Egypt: Preemptive or Preventive ﺍﻝﻀﺭﺒﺔ ﺍﻹﺴﺭﺍﺌﻴﻠﻴﺔ ﺍﻷﻭﻝﻰ ﻀﺩ ﻤﺼﺭ ﻓﻲ ﻋﺎﻡ 1967 : ﺍﺴﺘﺒﺎﻗﻴﺔ ﺃﻡ ﻭﻗﺎﺌﻴﺔ Prepared by Gamal M. A. Mohammed University Number 1085443 Supervisor Dr. Roger Heacock ……………………… Readers Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi Dr. Basem Ezbidi ………………………. …………………... May 16, 2012 iv iv AKNOWLEDGEMENT I would like to thank Dr. Roger Heacock for his unwavering support while researching my thesis. He did not spare either time or effort to help me accomplish my research objectives. Gratitude is also extended to Bashar Skaik for preparing the thesis’ charts and to Maysa Gayyusi for preparing the tables and the maps. Special thanks to Julia Pitner for proofreading the manuscript. I am grateful also to Muatasem Afanih and the staff members of the library of the Centre for Development Studies [CDS]. Last but not least, I would like to thank Dr. Mahdi Abdul Hadi and Dr. Basem Ezbidi for their valuable remarks on the research draft. v v To Palestine : History , People , and Land vi vi TABLE OF CONTENTS PREFACE ...................................................................................................................................... 1 CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................... 5 FIRST STRIKE : CONCEPTS ................................................................................................................ 5 First Strike ................................................................................................................... 6 Inadvertent War ........................................................................................................... 7 Interceptive Strike ........................................................................................................ 8 Preemptive War and Its Criteria ................................................................................. 9 Preventive War .......................................................................................................... 12 LITERATURE REVIEW ..................................................................................................................... 13 First Category: Historical and Narrative Literature ................................................ 14 Second Category: Theoretical Literature .................................................................. 21 PROBLEM STATEMENT .................................................................................................................. 24 HYPOTHESIS .................................................................................................................................. 24 METHODOLOGY ............................................................................................................................ 24 CHAPTER TWO: PROLOGUE TO THE 1967 WAR ........................................................... 28 THE SYRIAN FRONT ........................................................................................................................ 29 INVALIDATING MISCONCEPTIONS .................................................................................................. 40 Egyptian Escalation versus De-escalation ................................................................ 40 The Status of the Gulf of Aqaba ................................................................................. 45 The Arab Military Alliances ...................................................................................... 54 The Status of the Sinai: Was the Sinai Demilitarized? .............................................. 59 The Withdrawal of the Egyptian Forces from Yemen ............................................... 62 CHAPTER THREE: HISTORY OF THE ARAB MILITARY PLANNING 1964-1967: DID THE ARAB COUNTRIES EVER HAVE AN OFFENSIVE PLAN AGAINST ISRAEL?. 68 THE UNIFIED ARAB COMMAND ..................................................................................................... 69 The Joint Defense Council Meetings ......................................................................... 72 Did Israel Know about the Real Status of the UAC? ................................................ 77 EGYPTIAN MILITARY PLANNING .................................................................................................... 79 The Original Qahir .................................................................................................... 80 The Modified Qahir ................................................................................................... 83 The Number of the Deployed Egyptian Forces ........................................................ 86 The Fourth Armored Division .................................................................................. 91 The Shazly Division .................................................................................................. 93 REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE CAUSES OF THE DEFEAT OF JUNE 1967: COMMITTEE OF THE TEN ................................................................................. 95 vii THE EGYPTIAN AIR FORCE .................................................................................................... 96 CHAPTER FOUR: EGYPT AND THE FIRST STRIKE OPTION: DID EGYPT PLAN TO STRIKE FIRST IN 1967? ........................................................................................................ 104 EGYPTIAN VERSUS ISRAELI NARRATIVE : WHO STARTED HOSTILITIES ? .............................................. 105 NASSER ’S DISCOURSE VERSUS POLICIES ...................................................................................................... 111 Nasser’s Discourse during the Crisis ...................................................................... 113 ISRAELI HISTORIANS ’ ALLEGATIONS : GINOR AND REMEZ VERSUS OREN ........................................... 117 Israeli Troop Concentrations on the Syrian Borders .............................................. 117 Moscow and Egypt’s First Strike ............................................................................ 121 Nasser-Amer Relationship and its Impact on the Army .......................................... 126 Fajr [Dawn] Plan .................................................................................................... 129 The American and Soviet Influence ......................................................................... 134 Oren’s Construction of Events ................................................................................ 139 Israel and Fajr: Superb Intelligence Material or Mere Coincidence ..................... 142 Reconstructing the Actual Events ............................................................................ 145 CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION ......................................................................................... 151 GENERAL CONCLUSIONS .............................................................................................................. 152 THE ISRAELI STRIKE : PREEMPTIVE OR PREVENTIVE .................................................................................. 155 The Pre-crisis Period .............................................................................................. 153 The Crisis Period ..................................................................................................... 157 Conceptualizing the Israeli Strike ........................................................................... 158 THE FINAL CONCLUSION .............................................................................................................. 164 ANNEX I: ARABIC DOCUMENTS ...................................................................................... 166 ANNEX II: AMERICAN DOCUMENTS .............................................................................. 169 ANNEX III: EASTERN BLOC’S DOCUMENTS ................................................................ 173 ANNEX IV: FRENCH DOCUMENT..................................................................................... 174 BIBLIOGRAPHY..................................................................................................................... 175 viii LIST OF CHARTS CHART NO. 1: NUMBER OF ISRAELI CASUALTIES BETWEEN 1950 AND 1989…………………….. 35 CHART NO. 2: NUMBER OF THE ISRAELI CASUALTIES IN THE SIXTIES …………………………. 36 CHART NO. 3: NUMBER OF ISRAELI CASUALTIES IN 1967 ……………………………………… 37 LIST OF TABLES TABLE NO. 1: NUMBER OF EGYPTIAN TROOPS IN YEMEN AS MENTIONED IN EGYPTIAN AND FOREIGN SOURCES ON THE WAR ………………………………………………………………... 64 TABLE NO. 2: NUMBER OF EGYPTIAN TROOPS DEPLOYED TO THE SINAI AS MENTIONED

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