PUSHING EPISTEMOLOGICAL BOUNDARIES: THE EXPANSION OF THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL TRADITION WITHIN THE WORK OF WILLIAM ALSTON by NATHAN DOUGLAS SEGARS (Under the direction of Dr. Randolph Clarke) ABSTRACT William Alston has set himself squarely among the most prominent figures in philosophy and contemporary epistemology. In the work that follows I shall be investigating whether his most recent work in epistemology might not place him closer to those thinkers, specifically Ludwig Wittgenstein, from whom Alston has always made an effort to distinguish himself. I begin by tracing Alston’s steps through his earlier work in epistemology and justification theory in particular. In those early steps we notice many features of Alston’s thought that figure largely in our study. Those features are drawn out more clearly by setting them against the opposing viewpoints of other philosophers. As the investigation continues, we shall arrive at the crucial problem for Alston: How can we present a defense of our beliefs that doesn’t involve circular support? We shall be looking at three attempts Alston might make at solving this problem. The first is a weak one that he discards himself. The second attempt begins to take Alston into the domain of those thinkers like Wittgenstein mentioned before. The third attempt is my own construction from scattered hints and pieces left by Alston, which I believe can be formulated into a proposed solution to the problem. Even this last attempt takes Alston closer to the camp of philosophers he has tried to avoid. By way of hammering this point home, I demonstrate ways in which Alston and Wittgenstein are found to be more similar than Alston might want us to think. The final conclusion is that Alston’s commitments from his earlier work in epistemology have led him to the connections between himself and philosophers like Wittgenstein when dealing with the problem of finding non-circular support for one’s beliefs. INDEX WORDS: Philosophy, Epistemology, Justification theory, William Alston, Ludwig Wittgenstein PUSHING EPISTEMOLOGICAL BOUNDARIES: THE EXPANSION OF THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL TRADITION WITHIN THE WORK OF WILLIAM ALSTON By NATHAN DOUGLAS SEGARS B.A., Freed-Hardeman University, 1995 M.A., University of Mississippi, 1997 A Dissertation Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of The University of Georgia in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY ATHENS, GEORGIA 2002 2002 Nathan Douglas Segars All Rights Reserved PUSHING EPISTEMOLOGICAL BOUNDARIES: THE EXPANSION OF THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL TRADITION WITHIN THE WORK OF WILLIAM ALSTON by NATHAN DOUGLAS SEGARS Approved: Major Professor: Randolph Clarke Committee: Robert Burton Frank Harrison William Power Elizabeth Preston Electronic Version Approved: Gordhan L. Patel Dean of the Graduate School The University of Georgia May 2002 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page INTRODUCTION ...............................................................................................................1 CHAPTER ONE ...........................................................................................................................4 TWO ........................................................................................................................37 THREE.....................................................................................................................79 FOUR.....................................................................................................................109 FIVE.......................................................................................................................154 SIX.........................................................................................................................184 NOTES.............................................................................................................................217 iv INTRODUCTION Epistemology and especially justification theory have been hot topics within philosophical journals and around philosophy department water coolers for the last forty years or so. Among those pushing these discussions along into ever more interesting territory has been William Alston. Although it was not his initial interest in philosophy, epistemology and epistemic justification have become the areas most readily associated with his name. His contributions to the heated debates within justification theory have presented veterans of epistemology with more challenging opposition while they have inspired newcomers to enter a field that might otherwise have faded into the background of philosophical endeavors. In what follows, I shall lay out a good portion of Alston’s labors in the area of epistemic justification theory. In doing so, it will become clear that his efforts have had an enormous effect on epistemological thought contemporary to those efforts as well as on the discussions subsequent to his writings. While lasting value might not be gained simply by an overview of Alston’s contribution to epistemology, I shall be suggesting that pushing his ideas to their ultimate conclusions leads his work into areas he might not have wished. In particular, our study will show that Alston’s dedication to the defense of a certain stance on epistemic justification ends up pushing him toward a position more and more similar to the likes of Ludwig Wittgenstein. This similarity comes even though Alston claims a strong separation from such positions all throughout his writings. In the end, I believe this unintended turn by Alston actually leads to the possibility of more fascinating work in the field of epistemology. Our course leading to these observations will begin, as was stated, with a look into Alston’s actual view on issues concerning epistemic justification. In chapter one, we shall be distinguishing his position from those who would place strict and heavy requirements on those who would have justified belief. In addition, even though Alston 1 2 may succeed in defending justification on a lower level than those who would make such requirements, the end of chapter one leaves Alston with the challenge of dogmatism that motivates our later chapters. Those distinguishing marks between Alston and other theorists become more important in chapter two. Alston’s externalism on justification comes to the fore as it is set at odds with pure internalism. Chapter three leads us to the major difficulty facing Alston as a result of trying to clear up the challenge of dogmatism. It will be discovered there that any attempt to show the support for our beliefs ends up in what he terms as the problem of “epistemic circularity.” The need to display our justification as a result of the challenge of dogmatism lands Alston face to face with the question of how to avoid circular support in making that display. How Alston grapples with epistemic circularity constitutes the remainder of the dissertation. The end of chapter three gives an initial, but weak, advance toward dealing with the problem. However, the fourth chapter centers on Alston’s most concerted effort to combat epistemic circularity with his doxastic practice approach to epistemology. After examining that approach through the eyes of several critics, we shall find that even the attempt is not successful. In this chapter we begin to see Alston’s tendency to favor ideas similar to Wittgenstein in their attention to the practical rather than the purely epistemic. Chapter five brings to a head the difficulty before Alston in the form of a dilemma: Either Alston falls to epistemic circularity, or he gives way to a pragmatic form of epistemic evaluation that adheres to a less than realist notion of truth.1 Since his own advertised solution to epistemic circularity fails, I take it upon myself to construct another answer form his early position on justification, his work with doxastic practices, and his ideas on a new theory of epistemic evaluation. As this progresses, it becomes more and more clear that Alston is leaning toward the practical side. This suspicion is finally solidified in chapter six where I demonstrate the deficiencies of the distinctions between Alston and the person identified with the practical position on epistemic evaluation, Wittgenstein. 3 Though Alston denies the kind of affiliation I propose between himself and Wittgenstein, his own words take him down that path. In the end, we shall find that Alston definitely leans toward the second horn of the dilemma stated above. His association with Wittgensteinian ideas leads him there. By way of conclusion, I shall show that what brings Alston to this point is a position he takes at the very beginning of our study. It is his commitment to externalism that appears to seal his fate from the start. While this may not be the direction he had intended, I believe that his direction works to define the landscape before any current epistemologist. In addition, it opens new avenues of thought and discussion that may be taken up for years to come. Following Alston’s work is always enlightening. His insights into current debates are both helpful and motivating. His work as a pioneer in epistemology is inestimably valuable. In this present case, even where his trail blazing is unintentional, nevertheless, it ignites important fires that ensure the productive future of epistemology and justification theory. CHAPTER ONE Of the competing views on the subject of epistemic justification made popular in the last thirty years, perhaps the most frequently and dramatically attacked and defended