www.presciencepoint.com Disclaimer This research presentation report expresses our research opinions, which we have based upon certain facts, all of which are based upon publicly available information, and all of which are set out in this research presentation report. Any investment involves substantial risks, including complete loss of capital. Any forecasts or estimates are for illustrative purpose only and should not be taken as limitations of the maximum possible loss or gain. Any information contained in this report may include forward looking statements, expectations, and projections. You should assume these types of statements, expectations, and projections may turn out to be incorrect for reasons beyond Prescience Point LLC’s control. This is not investment advice nor should it be construed as such. Use of Prescience Point LLC’s research is at your own risk. You should do your own research and due diligence before making any investment decision with respect to securities covered herein. You should assume that as of the publication date of any presentation, report or letter, Prescience Point LLC (possibly along with or through our members, partners, affiliates, employees, and/or consultants) along with our clients and/or investors has a short position in all stocks (and/or are long puts/short call options of the stock) covered herein, including without limitation LKQ Corporation, Inc. (“LKQ”), and therefore stands to realize significant gains in the event that the price of its stock declines. Following publication of any presentation, report or letter, we intend to continue transacting in the securities covered therein, and we may be long, short, or neutral at any time hereafter regardless of our initial recommendation. This is not an offer to sell or a solicitation of an offer to buy any security, nor shall any security be offered or sold to any person, in any jurisdiction in which such offer would be unlawful under the securities laws of such jurisdiction. Prescience Point LLC is not registered as an investment advisor. To the best of our ability and belief, as of the date hereof, all information contained herein is accurate and reliable and does not omit to state material facts necessary to make the statements herein not misleading, and all information has been obtained from public sources we believe to be accurate and reliable, and who are not insiders or connected persons of the stock covered herein or who may otherwise owe any fiduciary duty or duty of confidentiality to the issuer, or to any other person or entity that was breached by the transmission of information to Prescience Point LLC. However, Prescience Point LLC recognizes that there may be non-public information in the possession of LKQ Corporation, Inc. or other insiders of LKQ Corporation, Inc. that has not been publicly disclosed by LKQ Corporation, Inc. Therefore, such information contained herein is presented “as is,” without warranty of any kind – whether express or implied. Prescience Point LLC makes no other representations, express or implied, as to the accuracy, timeliness, or completeness of any such information or with regard to the results to be obtained from its use. 2 Report Highlights From Penny Stock Promoter to $10bn+ Wall Street Darling: The Story of LKQ ReversesCouse Back to US $40.00 Targets, Acquires Keystone 100.0 Auto. Industries for $450m 90.0 $35.00 Acquires Sator, issues $600m HY bonds, JP Morgan resigns as lead banker 80.0 $30.00 Code of Ethics 70.0 policy updated $25.00 60.0 Controller and Chief Co-CEO role created, Accountant Resigns $20.00 mgmt comp increases, 50.0 Director of IR resigns 40.0 $15.00 Acquires Keystone Auto for $811m 30.0 Penny stock $10.00 promoter RedChip Acquires Euro Car initiates coverage Parts for $347m 20.0 CFO Mark $5.00 Spears Resigns 10.0 $0.00 0.0 10/6/2003 10/6/2005 10/6/2007 10/6/2009 10/6/2011 10/6/2013 4 Prescience Point Believes, LKQ Is An Ineffective Roll-up The Company Has Generated No Cumulative Free Cash 1 Flow Adjusted for Acquisitions and Becoming Increasingly Dependent on External Capital to Perpetuate the Illusion of GAAP Profits. LKQ Will Need Larger and Larger Targets to Keep the Growth Game Alive Caught in a Massive Margin Squeeze Gross Margins Are In Persistent Decline, and 2 Inventory Accounting Methods Are Likely Blunting the True Problems. North American Organic Growth Very Likely To Be Overstated and Not Reconcilable to Our Research Problems With the New Growth Story To Divert Attention from its North American 3 Problems, LKQ Bolted to Europe in Hopes of Spinning a New Growth Story; Our Research Suggests LKQ is Already Facing Problems and Quickly Scrambling to Cover Dramatic Overvaluation to Aftermarket Auto, Recycling and Industrial Distributors, and 4 Supported by Sell-Side Analysts’ Failing to Question Assumptions, and Not Considering the Fundamental Problems Facing the Company 5 Previous Accounting Fraud and Failures at Waste Mgmt/Discovery Zone Associated With Numerous Members of the Management Team Have Cost Shareholders Billions of Lost $’s in Aggressive Roll-up Strategies Price Target: $10 - $15 per share >>> 50% – 70% Downside 5 Report Highlights (cont’d) High-Level Indications of Fabricated GAAP Profits, Unsustainable Business Model: LKQ is a classic roll-up, fueling growth through acquisitions. Roll-up business models provide management with a significant amount of discretion in presenting financial results. Roll-ups tend to exhibit strong earnings, CFO, and earnings quality metrics due to the inherent financial statement mechanics of paying for growth through acquisition outflows, which do not affect earnings or CFO. Because of this, free cash flow after acquisitions is an important metric for analyzing roll-ups; it presents a better picture of the business’s economics. LKQ’s free cash flow after acquisitions has been negative in 8 of the last 9 years. Furthermore, our analysis indicates LKQ is an ineffective rollup – wealth creation from years of acquisitions has been nil. Since 2007, LKQ has reported cumulative Earnings and EBIT of $1.22B and $2.15B, respectively. Meanwhile, it has burned cumulative free cash flow after acquisitions of -$1.62B, and raised cumulative net capital of $1.63B, suggesting it has never earned a cash-on-cash return on invested capital. Put another way, the immense wealth generation represented by LKQ’s historical GAAP profits is not observable in the company’s cash flows – it appears to be ‘paper’ wealth generated by accounting gimmickry. In light of this and a broad array of other red flags discussed in this report, we are forced to look through management’s representations. We believe the credibility of LKQ’s financial statements is questionable and that LKQ bears a heightened risk of a crippling inventory and/or goodwill write-down or financial restatement. Reported Organic Growth for LKQ’s North America Business Appears Overstated: LKQ’s aggressive roll-up strategy also gives it a high level of flexibility to inflate revenue growth. LKQ reported organic revenue growth averaging ~6.5% from 2008 – 2012 and ~6% for its North America (NA) Parts & Services (P&S) business (~75% of P&S revenue), with far less variability vs comps, and not a single quarter of negative growth. LKQ does not provide clarity around the calculation or the impact on earnings, making it difficult for investors to confirm its validity. However, based on our research, LKQ’s reported organic growth rate does not appear reconcilable with trends in the primary fundamental factors that drive it. We believe it is overstated. We believe LKQ’s NA growth rate, normalized for a 2013 spike in collision frequency, more likely measures in the range of 0-2%. From 2008 to 2012, annual insurance claims paid for repairable accident claims have been flat according to industry consultant The Romans Group, LLC. Additionally, from 2010 to 2012, growth in Alternative Parts Usage (“APU”) (i.e., market share of alternative auto parts, which LKQ sells, relative to OEM parts), which had risen steadily for 3 decades and was a primary driver of LKQ’s historical organic growth, has flat-lined; going forward, CCC Information Services – provider of the industry’s dominant estimate writing platform and LKQ’s source for APU data – expects it to taper or reverse. Based on industry data sources and our conversations with industry sources, this is resulting from a recent expansion in OEM price-matching programs; they have become more aggressive in pursuit of retaking lost market share by undercutting alternative parts prices, thereby negating LKQ’s value proposition. Internal dealer documents we have obtained indicate the OEMs are increasingly subsidizing dealers to sell parts at levels 33% below aftermarket list prices (i.e., LKQ’s price), making them whole on the loss, and paying them an additional 14% profit on the cost for the part. (Refer to dealer source document on page 12.) As a result, for the first time – according to Mitchell International – parts prices in general deflated in 2012. LKQ management tells investors APU rose 100bp in 2012; however, their own data source and LKQ’s SEC filings refute their claim. 6 Report Highlights (cont’d) Short-Term Thinking Pervades Decision-Making, Signals Desperation to Keep Financials Inflated & Meet Targets: With NA growth waning, LKQ looked to Europe for acquisition candidates. In Q4’2011, it made its 2nd largest acquisition ever, acquiring UK-based Euro Car Parts (ECP), a distributor of mechanical aftermarket parts operating out of 89 branch/store locations. As LKQ pitched investors on the open-ended growth opportunity provided by buying ECP, to our knowledge, it never publicly disclosed that the UK aftermarket parts industry was in significant contraction (2011E -5.8%, according to Datamonitor), or that it is projected to continue contracting; but, LKQ touted ECP’s 30%+ ‘organic’ revenue growth rate from 2009-2011.