Engineering Success:Pratt & Whitney Aircraft, 1925-1940 Bayla Singer* lndq•endentScholar Putall your eggs in onebasket - andthen watch that basket] -AndrewCarnegie [quoted in Morison,1966, p. 195] The Pratt& WhitneyAircraft Company was incorporated in 1925.As a casestudy, the spectacularsuccess of the first fifteenyears of the Company illustratesthe interdependenceof technicalexcellence, market conditions, and managerialdecision-making. Guided by the visionof FrederickB. Rentscrier andthe engineeringskill of GeorgeJ. Mead,the companyfocused on design andproduction of air-cooledradial engines, the typepreferred by the Navy. Sincethe Navywas the majormarket, it is no surprisethat air-cooledradials underwentrapid development and came to dominatethe aviationindustry in the periodbetween the World Wars.Rentscrier's network of businessand governmentcontacts, and his particularapproach to productdevelopment, wereinsr_n.wnental in engineering the early success of hiscompany. Backgroundand Genealogy:1910o1925 Priorto WorldWar I, civilianaviation in Americahad been primarily a matterof barnstormingand stunt flying. There was litfie motivation to improve engines,nor an extensivemarket to spurcompetitive engineering. Although poweredflight had beenpioneered in the UnitedStates (with the Wright brothersmanufacturing their own engine),by 1916 the complaintcould legitimatelybe madethat "Thereis not a good Americanmotor made" (Roland,1985, p. 35). With war brewingin Europe,and American involvement increasingly likely, the armed forcesbecame a potentiallarge market for improved aeronauticalengines. Two separatelines of developmentensued, each having stronginfluences on theeventual formation of Pratt& WhitneyAircraft. One line beganwith a meetingbetween the enginemanufacturers and representativesof the militaryair armson June8, 1916."J.G. Vincent, of the PackardMotor Car Company,and E.J. Hall, of the Hall-ScottMotor Car Company,took over a hotelroom in Washingtonfor nearlya weekand * I shouldlike to thankRobert Harvey, Roger Launius, and JoAnne Yates for their helpfulsuggestions. An expandedversion of thiswork will appearin RogerLaunius, ed., Innovationin the Air:. Ess•s on the Det•lopment ofF•ght. BUSINESSAND ECONOMIC HISTORY, VolumeTwenty-seven, no.1, Fall 1998. Copyright¸1998 by theBusiness History Conference. ISSN 0894-6825. 162 ENGINEERING SUCCESS:PRATT & WHITNEY AIRCRAFT / 163 designedthe 8- and 12-cylinderLiberty power plants with prevalent engineeringand mass-production procedures in mind"[Bilstein, 1984, p. 37].• The secondline of devdopmentbegan with a licenseto produce Hispano-Suiza("Hisso") engines. The WrightCompany (later Wright-Martin, WrightAeronautical, and Curriss-Wright) acquired the licensein 1916 [Smith, 1981,p. 68]. Duringthe War, the WrightCompany worked closely with the militaryAircraft Production Board. One NaW officerdetailed from the Board to Wright-Martinwas FrederickB. Rentschief,a thirty-yearold Princeton graduatewith a strongbackground in automotiveengines [Pratt & Whitney Story pp. 16-18]. His main activitiesat Wright-Martinwere administrative, thoughhe becameintimately familiar with the qualityof workdone by such hands-onengineers as GeorgeJ. Mead, an MIT graduatewho later joined Rentschiefin foundingthe Pratt & WhitneyAircraft Company. The intimate association between the aeronautical manufacturers and their militaryclients continued through and afterthe War, and becameone importantingredient in the strengthof the industry.The Naw's continuing directcommunication with industryexecutives was a strongfactor in the subsequentestablishment of Pratt & WhitneyAircraft. Aviation'scontribution to the war effort was significantenough to convincethe Americanmilitary that strongair forceswould be crucialto the successfulprosecution of futurewars. Strong air forces,in turn,would depend on a thrivingdomestic aviation industry [Rentschief, 1950, pp. 5-8;Schlaifer, 1950,pp. 7-14;Trimble, 1990, ch. 4; TxSmble,1994, p. 116]. Afterthe armistice, however, the military weakened the aviation industry by abruptlycanceling contracts and by dumpingsurplus aircraft on the civilian market.The aircraftconstruction industry shrank to a baretenth its wartime size(Roland, 1985, p. 51).Rentschief later commented "...when the Armistice cameall the companieswho carriedon our chiefaviation activities blithely wentback to automobilemanufacture, so the aviation industry did not evenget anyreal or lastingresults..." [Rentschief, 1950, p. 6]. The Wright-Martinassets had been sold to the MackTruck Company, with approximatelythree million dolhrs set aside "for the possibleformation of a smallpostwar aviation company." Rentschief was appointedCEO, and askedto assemblepersonnel for the new Wright AeronauticalCompany (Rentschief,1950, p. 7). The principalclient continued to be themilitary, and Rentschief'scontacts with the Na W werean additional asset over and above his demonstratedmanagerial skills. The demandsof the militarymarket proved a strongmotivation for aviationmanufacturers' research and development.The engineeringsearch began:which of the manypossible engine types was capable of the sortof improvementswhich would be attractiveto the military?Some engine types provedto haveintractable negative chaxacterisfics when attempts were made to scalethem up. • For a moredetailed account of theLiberty engine's development, see Schlaifer [19501; and Smith [1981]. 164 / BAYLA SINGER For example,the rotary engine had been almost satisfactory at the low speedstypical of WW I aircraft,although the castor-oilfumes billowing from theengines into the open cockpits were reputed to havecaused more than one pilotto makean emergency landing in orderto answerthe call of nature.(If the delicatemoment occurred over enemyterritory, the haplesspilot mightfind himselfa POW [Smith,1981, p. 63].) When the rotarywas scaledup, the gyroscopiceffect of therotating engine became unmanageable and the aircraft couldnot be easilysteered. 2 In othercases, superiority of oneengine type over another could not be soeasily established. This was the situationwith thecompetition between air- cooledand liquid-cooled engines, and between those in whichthe pistons were arrangedlike spokes of a wheel(called radial) and those where the pistons were in straight-lineor V configurations.Incremental technical advances could swing the balancebetween one typeand another.For militarypurposes, the short noselength and light weight of an air-cooledradial were potentially attractive features. The newlyreorganized Wright Aeronautical Company began operations by providingimproved liquid-cooled V-8 Hisso-typeengines to the Army. GeorgeMead had made a comprehensivestudy of enginesduring his stint at theArmy's McCook Field, and felt that this was the most promising avenue. Meanwhile,a workableair-cooled radial engine had been developed by one CharlesLawrance. His companywas very small,and ran into financial trouble.The directorsapproached Wright Aeronautical about a merger,which Rentschiefat firstopposed. As Rentschieflater recalled, ...Admiral [WilliamF.] Moffett, thenthe headof the Bureauof Aeronautics,asked me to come down and talk with him about the Lawrancesituation. He said definitely the Navy was interestedin the typeand was proposing to concentrateon air- cooledradials for thatsize [Rentschief, 1950, pp. 9-10]. Rentschiefreversed his recommendation,and Wright Aeronautical acquiredthe Lawrance Aero-Engine Corporation. Rentschief continued to keep a tightrein on the company,and a weathereye on the requirementsof the Navy. When it becameapparent that the Navy wouldinsist on continued developmentof the air-cooledradial, and the directorsat WrightAeronautical balkedat the levelof attendantexpense and effort that Rentschiefthought appropriate,Rentschief resigned as president.(Byttebier, 1972, p. 75; Rentschief,1950, p. 10).3 2 It shouldbe notedthat the rotaryengine of the 1910-1920period differed signif- icantlyfrom themodem automotive engine bearing the samedesignation, especially in the factthat the early engine rotated in itsentirety around the crankshaft [Smith, 1981, p. 58]. 5 Lawrancewas a vicepresident of WrightAeronautical, and becamepresident after Rentschief'sdeparture. It wouldnot be surprisingif therewere somecoolness between Lawranceand Rentschief,reflected in the subsequentrivalry between their firms.In an addressbefore the RoyalAeronaufcal Society in England,Lawrance menfons the Simoon "whichhas just completed a full 50-hourtest" and two otherAmerican radial engines under ENGINEEKING SUCCESS: PRATT & WHITNEY AIRCRAFT / 165 Formation of Pratt & Whitney Aircraft About a yearlater, in the springof 1925,Rentschief was readyto re- enterthe aeronauticalengine business. The yearwas one of transitionfor the aviationindustry as a whole,moving from the useof war surplusplanes for barnstorming,stunt flying,and offeringthrill rides,to developingserious commercialbusinesses based on the capabilitiesof moremodem equipment (Osborn,1925). The CurtissExhibition Companyadvertised that they had now "disposedof theirsurplus JN airplanesunder their offer of a freeplane with each flying course"and went on to suggestthat patronsconsider the "CompleteCourse, including Flying and Mechanical Training...$300" (this was accomplishedin ten hours)or "Flyinginstruction by the hour...$35 (no depositrequired to coverbreakage)" (Aviation, Jan 5, 1925,4; Schlaifer,1950, p. 160). RobertsonAircraft Corporation advertised that eightto ten hoursof instruction"should complete the moststubborn case, and from then on, the