Engineering Success:Pratt & Whitney Aircraft, 1925-1940

Bayla Singer* lndq•endentScholar Putall your eggs in onebasket - andthen watch that basket] -AndrewCarnegie [quoted in Morison,1966, p. 195] The Pratt& WhitneyAircraft Company was incorporated in 1925.As a casestudy, the spectacularsuccess of the firstfifteen years of the Company illustratesthe interdependenceof technicalexcellence, market conditions, and managerialdecision-making. Guided by the visionof FrederickB. Rentscrier andthe engineeringskill of GeorgeJ. Mead,the companyfocused on design andproduction of air-cooledradial engines, the typepreferred by the Navy. Sincethe Navywas the majormarket, it is no surprisethat air-cooledradials underwentrapid development and came to dominatethe aviationindustry in the periodbetween the World Wars.Rentscrier's network of businessand governmentcontacts, and his particularapproach to productdevelopment, wereinsr_n.wnental in engineering the early success of hiscompany.

Backgroundand Genealogy:1910o1925 Priorto WorldWar I, civilianaviation in Americahad been primarily a matterof barnstormingand stunt flying. There was litfie motivation to improve engines,nor an extensivemarket to spurcompetitive engineering. Although poweredflight had beenpioneered in the UnitedStates (with the Wright brothersmanufacturing their own engine),by 1916 the complaintcould legitimatelybe madethat "Thereis not a good Americanmotor made" (Roland,1985, p. 35). With war brewingin Europe,and American involvement increasingly likely, the armed forcesbecame a potentiallarge market for improved aeronauticalengines. Two separatelines of developmentensued, each having stronginfluences on theeventual formation of Pratt& WhitneyAircraft. One line beganwith a meetingbetween the enginemanufacturers and representativesof the militaryair armson June8, 1916."J.G. Vincent, of the PackardMotor Car Company,and E.J. Hall, of the Hall-ScottMotor Car Company,took over a hotelroom in Washingtonfor nearlya weekand

* I shouldlike to thankRobert Harvey, Roger Launius, and JoAnne Yates for their helpfulsuggestions. An expandedversion of thiswork will appearin RogerLaunius, ed., Innovationin the Air:. Ess•s on the Det•lopment ofF•ght. BUSINESSAND ECONOMIC HISTORY, VolumeTwenty-seven, no.1, Fall 1998. Copyright¸1998 by theBusiness History Conference. ISSN 0894-6825.

162 ENGINEERING SUCCESS:PRATT & WHITNEY AIRCRAFT / 163 designedthe 8- and 12-cylinderLiberty power plants with prevalent engineeringand mass-production procedures in mind"[Bilstein, 1984, p. 37].• The secondline of devdopmentbegan with a licenseto produce Hispano-Suiza("Hisso") engines. The WrightCompany (later Wright-Martin, WrightAeronautical, and Curriss-Wright) acquired the licensein 1916 [Smith, 1981,p. 68]. Duringthe War, the WrightCompany worked closely with the militaryAircraft Production Board. One NaW officerdetailed from the Board to Wright-Martinwas FrederickB. Rentschief,a thirty-yearold Princeton graduatewith a strongbackground in automotiveengines [Pratt & Whitney Story pp. 16-18]. His main activitiesat Wright-Martinwere administrative, thoughhe becameintimately familiar with the qualityof workdone by such hands-onengineers as GeorgeJ. Mead, an MIT graduatewho later joined Rentschiefin foundingthe Pratt & WhitneyAircraft Company. The intimate association between the aeronautical manufacturers and their militaryclients continued through and afterthe War, and becameone importantingredient in the strengthof the industry.The Naw's continuing directcommunication with industryexecutives was a strongfactor in the subsequentestablishment of Pratt & WhitneyAircraft. Aviation'scontribution to the war effort was significantenough to convincethe Americanmilitary that strongair forceswould be crucialto the successfulprosecution of futurewars. Strong air forces,in turn,would depend on a thrivingdomestic aviation industry [Rentschief, 1950, pp. 5-8;Schlaifer, 1950,pp. 7-14;Trimble, 1990, ch. 4; TxSmble,1994, p. 116]. Afterthe armistice, however, the military weakened the aviation industry by abruptlycanceling contracts and by dumpingsurplus aircraft on thecivilian market.The aircraftconstruction industry shrank to a baretenth its wartime size(Roland, 1985, p. 51).Rentschief later commented "...when the Armistice cameall the companieswho carriedon our chiefaviation activities blithely wentback to automobilemanufacture, so the aviation industry did not evenget anyreal or lastingresults..." [Rentschief, 1950, p. 6]. The Wright-Martinassets had been sold to the MackTruck Company, with approximatelythree million dolhrs set aside "for the possibleformation of a smallpostwar aviation company." Rentschief was appointedCEO, and askedto assemblepersonnel for the new Wright AeronauticalCompany (Rentschief,1950, p. 7). The principalclient continued to be themilitary, and Rentschief'scontacts with the Na W werean additional asset over and above his demonstratedmanagerial skills. The demandsof the militarymarket proved a strongmotivation for aviationmanufacturers' research and development.The engineeringsearch began:which of the manypossible engine types was capable of the sortof improvementswhich would be attractiveto the military?Some engine types provedto haveintractable negative chaxacterisfics when attempts were made to scalethem up.

• For a moredetailed account of theLiberty engine's development, see Schlaifer [19501; and Smith [1981]. 164 / BAYLA SINGER

For example,the rotary engine had been almost satisfactory at the low speedstypical of WW I aircraft,although the castor-oilfumes billowing from theengines into the open cockpits were reputed to havecaused more than one pilotto makean emergency landing in orderto answerthe call of nature.(If the delicatemoment occurred over enemyterritory, the haplesspilot mightfind himselfa POW [Smith,1981, p. 63].) When the rotarywas scaledup, the gyroscopiceffect of therotating engine became unmanageable and the aircraft couldnot be easilysteered. 2 In othercases, superiority of oneengine type over another could not be soeasily established. This was the situationwith thecompetition between air- cooledand liquid-cooled engines, and between those in whichthe pistons were arrangedlike spokes of a wheel(called radial) and those where the pistons were in straight-lineor V configurations.Incremental technical advances could swing the balancebetween one typeand another. For militarypurposes, the short noselength and light weight of an air-cooledradial were potentially attractive features. The newlyreorganized Company began operations by providingimproved liquid-cooled V-8 Hisso-typeengines to the Army. GeorgeMead had made a comprehensivestudy of enginesduring his stint at theArmy's McCook Field, and felt that this was the most promising avenue. Meanwhile,a workableair-cooled had been developed by one CharlesLawrance. His companywas very small,and ran into financial trouble.The directorsapproached Wright Aeronautical about a merger,which Rentschiefat firstopposed. As Rentschieflater recalled, ...Admiral [WilliamF.] Moffett, thenthe headof the Bureauof Aeronautics,asked me to come down and talk with him about the Lawrancesituation. He said definitely the Navy was interestedin the typeand was proposing to concentrateon air- cooledradials for thatsize [Rentschief, 1950, pp. 9-10]. Rentschiefreversed his recommendation,and Wright Aeronautical acquiredthe Lawrance Aero-Engine Corporation. Rentschief continued to keep a tightrein on the company,and a weathereye on the requirementsof the Navy. When it becameapparent that the Navy wouldinsist on continued developmentof the air-cooledradial, and the directorsat WrightAeronautical balkedat the levelof attendantexpense and effort that Rentschiefthought appropriate,Rentschief resigned as president.(Byttebier, 1972, p. 75; Rentschief,1950, p. 10).3

2 It shouldbe notedthat the rotaryengine of the 1910-1920period differed signif- icantlyfrom themodem automotive engine bearing the samedesignation, especially in the factthat the early engine rotated in itsentirety around the crankshaft [Smith, 1981, p. 58]. 5 Lawrancewas a vicepresident of WrightAeronautical, and becamepresident after Rentschief'sdeparture. It wouldnot be surprisingif therewere somecoolness between Lawranceand Rentschief,reflected in the subsequentrivalry between their firms.In an addressbefore the RoyalAeronaufcal Society in England,Lawrance menfons the Simoon "whichhas just completed a full 50-hourtest" and two otherAmerican radial engines under ENGINEEKING SUCCESS: PRATT & WHITNEY AIRCRAFT / 165

Formation of Pratt & Whitney Aircraft

About a yearlater, in the springof 1925,Rentschief was readyto re- enterthe aeronauticalengine business. The yearwas one of transitionfor the aviationindustry as a whole,moving from the useof war surplusplanes for barnstorming,stunt flying,and offeringthrill rides,to developingserious commercialbusinesses based on the capabilitiesof moremodem equipment (Osborn,1925). The CurtissExhibition Companyadvertised that they had now "disposedof theirsurplus JN airplanesunder their offer of a freeplane with each flying course"and went on to suggestthat patronsconsider the "CompleteCourse, including Flying and Mechanical Training...$300" (this was accomplishedin ten hours)or "Flyinginstruction by the hour...$35 (no depositrequired to coverbreakage)" (Aviation, Jan 5, 1925,4; Schlaifer,1950, p. 160). RobertsonAircraft Corporation advertised that eightto ten hoursof instruction"should complete the moststubborn case, and from then on, the refinements...canbegained only from experience." Robertsoh's ad went on to say"Commercial aviation is a rapidlygrowing industry. Don't delay!Enroll now!"(Aviation, June 15, 1925,p. 659)The aircraftoffered for salein theseads werelight one- andtwo-seaters, powered by 150 hp enginessuch as the early Hisso and OX-5. "Commercialaviation" was clearlyenvisioned as an enterprisefor independentbusinessmen flying short hauls. Crop-dusting operations are one suchopportunity mentioned in an advertisementfor the Wright Whirlwind 200hp J-4 engine.The advertisementexplicitly cites military adoption of the Whirlwindas a positiveselling point, evidenceof the engine's"unusual dependability,high performance,ease of inspection,adjustment and minor repairsand the low cost per flying hour" (Aviation, June 15, 1925, p. 660). Foresightis alwaysrisky: there are always predictions, plausible enough at the time theyare made, which mm out to be spectacularlyoff the mark;a 1925 editorialin the tradejournal, Aviation, saw a poor marketoutlook for planesto be flown by highlypaid professionals,and opined"the largest potentialfield for planesis theamateur user...until a planeis builtwhich is safe for the amateurthere will only be a limitedmarket for specializedplanes" (Aviation,Mar 30, 1925,p. 341). The largestsector of the limited marketwas still the military,and Rentschiefwas positionedto make the most of it. He had retainedhis connectionwith the Navy, and had been reassured by Admiral Moffett that the Navyremained eager to purchaseair-cooled radial engines in the 400 hp class from a civilianindustry; the altemativewould be to developthe Navy'sown designand productioncapacities far beyondthat requiredfor peacetime.

developmentin the 400 hp class,but omitsany notice at all of the Pratt& WhitneyWasp. CharlesL. Lawrance,"Modern American Development" Aviation, March 22, 1926p. 411-415. 166 / BAYLA SINGER

RentschieFsphns offered an opportunity to strengthenthe civilian industry, to promoteequitable pricing policies, and to stimulatefurther innovation.4 Rentschief was also well-connected to the business establishment: his elderbrother Gordon was executive vice-president of the NationalCity Bank of New York, and FrederickRentschief himself was acquaintedwith many influentialpeople both throughhis family'sbusiness and throughfriendships and acquaintancesmade at Princetonand in the Navy. There was risk, as always,in startinga newcompany, but FrederickRentschief was the typeof manthat would please the heart of anycapkalist. As oneof thelong-time Pratt & Whitneyengineers, Leonard S. Hobbs,later recalled, "He workedvery hard, andhe fixedit sohe knew everybody. This was back in theearly days more, but he knew everybodyin the Air Force and the government,the Navy particularly...Forfestalwas his brother's roommate in Princeton;he was an old friendof Lovett's,the second Secretat2/of Defense..." (Hobbs, 1970). Gordon Rentschiefsuggested that Fredericksee their family friend JamesK. Cullen,who in turngave him a letterof introductionto ChytonBust, generalmanager of the Pratt& Whitneydivision of the Niles-Bemont-Pond Company.Pratt & Whitneywas an establishedname in the toolbusiness, and hadboth idle capital and an idlephnt in Hartford.Within days, the dealwas done;Rentschief should assemble his team,and the Pratt & WhitneyTool Companywould provide capital and workspace. Rentschief recruited a half-dozen men in the next few weeks. His first hirewas George Mead, who wouldbe vice-presidentand head the engineering department.Knowing that WrightAeronautical would enter its new Simoon air-cooledradial for theNavy's consideration by early1926, the engineersfek the pressuseof time. If Pratt & WhitneyAircraft couldn'tsubmit its own contenderbefore the Navy standardized on theWright entry, all would be lost. GeorgeMead and Andrew Wilgoos worked through June and July in Wilgoos'garage to designthe company'snew engine,well beforePratt & WhitneyAircraft's official incorporation on August1. EarleRyder, another of the"first official employees," assisted Wilgoos in July.Ryder recalled "[w]e set up a coupleof drawingboards on packingcases..." and laid out the "essentials for theengine." In the1920s, design was more art than science: You apportionedyour partsso they lookedright and a good mechaniccould pretty well tell whatthey needed. That wasone of AndyWillgoos's strong points. He wasa naturalmechanic andhad a feel for machineryof all kinds.He didn'tneed any pencilwork to tell him how a thingought to be made(Ryder, pp. 12-13,41).

4 Moffett'sbiographer describes Moffett's dilemma in the early1920s: "it [w]asthe govemment'sresponsibility, in the absence of a viablecommercial outlet for theproducts of the aviationbusiness, to do all it couldto encouragethe industry,knowing that'if war shouldbreak out therewould be a tremendousurge to get what we needin the shortest possiblespace of time."[Trimble, 1994, p. 116;see also Trimble, 1990, p. 66.] ENGINEERING SUCCESS: PRATT & WHITNEY AIRCRAFT / 167

Pratt& Whitney'snew engine, the Wasp, was ready for testingwithin six months.It performedextremely well, and the Navy choseit for their standardin the400 hp class.The less powerful Wright Whirlwinds (150-200 hp class)continued to be usedfor Armyand Navy trainers. TheWright Simoon engine was announced in theFebruary 1, 1926issue of Aviation;the Pratt & WhitneyWasp made its debut in the issueof February15. Each was tested by the Navy in thestandard bench procedure and flight-testedin actualaircraft, in thiscase the WrightApache. The Waspfar outperformedthe Simoon,and went on to becomethe parent of an extremely successfulfamily of engines. Althoughthe Wasp was designed to suitthe Navy's requirements, Pratt & Whitneymarketed it to generalaviation as well. The February15th issue of Aviationcarried an elegantlyspare advertisement: a frontal view of the engine, resemblinga sunburst, with the simplecaption "Introducing The %Vasp'."An articlein the sameissue stressed such qualities as reliability,durability, high safetyfactor, and easeof maintenance.The articlealso notes "The efficient coolingenables the engine to developfull power on domesticaviation gasoline, whichis an importantconsideration." Additionaldetails of the benchand flight test results appeared in May. "For thefirst time, a radialtype engine in the400 hp classcompares more than favorablywith the efficientwater-cooled types of engineson a dryweight per horsepowerbasis." The Office of the Secretaryof the Navy is quoted:"A numberof new airplanesfor shipboarduse are beingbuilt aroundthis engine...There is everyassurance that, as a resultof thisdevelopment, the fleet will soonhave aircraft whose performance is farin excessof anythingavailable elsewhere." Tucked inconspicuouslynear the end of the article is Frederick Rentschief'sannouncement that Pratt & WhitneyAircraft has added two men to itsBoard of Directors:Charles F. Ketteringof GeneralMotors, and William B. Mayo of Ford. The choicewas well calculated;both men were trained engineers,and not likelyto be short-sightedabout the need for continued researchand product development. Further, Mayo had "directed the...aviation operationsof thatcompany" (Aviation, May 31, 1926,pp. 827-828);the Wasp enginewas soon installed in a Ford airplane(Aviation, April 25, 1927,p. 620). Pratt& Whitneyshipping records show, however, only one Wasp engine sold to Fordin 1926(United Technologies Archives). ByAugust, the advertising for theWasp showed a detailedside view of the engine,ticking off the engineeringachievements: "Exclusive Reasons for Leadership:Valve Mechatfism - completelyenclosed; Nose - cleanand free fromaccessories providing for excellentcowl lines; Solid Master Rod and Split Crankshaft- providesfor highspeed; Main Crankcase - Divided - maximum strengthwith minimumweight; Accessories - all locatedbehind mounting - accessibleand weather proof; Mounting Flange - approximatelyon centerof gravity;Supercharger - built in G.E. type;Cylinders - Unusualprovision for cooling;Lifting Hooks - on centerof gravity"(Aviation, August 2, 1926, p. 199). 168 / BAYLA SINGER

At WrightAeronautical, Rentschief had been unhappy with what he saw as their lack of commitmentto continuedimprovements in their engines;he did not let hisPratt and Whitney team make that mistake.Almost immediately afterinauguration of theWasp engine, Pratt & Whitneyintroduced a larger and morepowerful sibling, the Hornet.At 1900r.p.m., the Hornet developed 525 horsepowercompared to the Wasp's425. As Aviationnoted, "From a service...standpoint, it is of unusualinterest to knowthat approximately 80 per cent of the total partsof the Hornet and Waspare identical...The entire accessoryends of the enginesare exactlyalike, including even the mounting flange,so that Waspand Hornet enginescan evenbe interchangedreadily in the sametype of airplane"(Aviation, May 2, 1927,p. 897). One can easily understandthe importanceof sucha featureto both the logistics-and spare- parts-mindedNavy market and to theindustry as a whole.

DevelopingMarkets

In the period 1925-1930,civilian aviation was still the glamorous provinceof individuals,but the earlyphases of the moremundane workaday industry were beginning to appear. Aircraft manufacturingincreased dramatically;the numberof establishmentsproducing aircraft gxew from 44 in 1925to 132 in 1929,and the value added gxew from $9,654,752 to $43,784,821 in the sameperiod. The numberof personsemployed in aircraftmanufacture increasedas well, from 2,701 in 1925 to 14,710in 1929 (FifteenthCensus, pp. 1189-1192;Sixteenth Census, pp. 540-542).Pratt & WhitneyAircraft shipped 260 Waspsin 1927;by 1929,the number shipped rose to 1656(Records 1933-35). The exploitsof aeronauticalrecord-setters drew attentionto aviation; suchcommercial enterprises as cargo transport, air mail,and passenger service rodetheir public-relations coattails while military clients provided the economic foundationfor continueddevelopment of the industry.Airmail contracts direcfiysubsidized and encouragedpassenger traffic, and flying beganto acquirea new imagein the publicconsciousness. Speed-minded businessmen bravedthe perilsof open-cockpitplanes, or laterenjoyed the relativecomfort of small,unpressurized closed cabins. The nascentcommercial market and the establishedmilitary role are evidentin a 1927advertisement for theWasp: "In a FordAir LineTransport the•9(/asp' has demonstrated itsability to carry33-% gxeater pay load than the previouslyused water cooled powerplant of approximatelythe samepower. It is becomingapparent that the %Vasp'will findthe sameuseful application in the commercialfield as it hasin Navalaeronautics" (Aviation, April 25, 1927, p. 620). However,the major market for Pratt & Whitney's400 hp engine remainedthe Navy;Congxess in 1926 fundedfive-year aircraft procurement progxamsfor themilitary, which provided the security and stability needed by themanufacturers (Trimble, 1990, p. 75).Pratt & Whitneygave the Navytheir highestpriority; shipping records for 1926show that all butone of the first213 Waspswere sold to theNavy (the odd one was sold to Ford,and was probably ENGINEERING SUCCESS: PRATT & WHITNEY AIRCRAFT / 169 the enginereferred to in the advertisementmentioned above). Not until 1927 were 25 Waspssold to Boeing,to replacethe Libertyengines in Boeing's Model 40A. Over 725 out of the first thousandWasps went to the Navy. Substantial sales to commercial aviation had to wait until the field matured enoughto needand demand the higher-powered engine) Personalassociations were as economicallyimportant among the varioussegments of theaeronautical industry as they were between the industry and their clients.Frederick Rentschief had askedadvice of ChanceVought beforeorganizing Pratt & WhitneyAircraft; he had beenacquainted with WilliamBoeing since 1918. It is not surprisingthat in 1928William Boeing beganto insfitufionalizesome of the informalarrangements, by purchasing companiesand consolidatingthem under the umbrellaof a holdingcompany, eventuallynamed United Aircraft & Transport.He first expandedhis own operations,adding subsidiaries to carry airmail. Early in 1929,he acquixedPratt & WhitneyAircraft and Chance Vought Aircraft Corporation. Later that year five othermanufacturers and designersof aviationequipment were added: SikorskyAircraft Corporation,Northrop Aircraft Corporation,Stearman Aircraft Corporation,Hamilton Aircraft Corporation,and StandardSteel Propeller.Three other airlines were also acquixed: Stout Air Services,National Air Transport,and Varney Airlines. Rentschief became president of theholding company,Mead and Vought vice presidents, and Boeing held the chair (Kepos, 1994,p. 416; Pratt & Whitney,1950, pp. 31, 73; UnitedAircraft First Annual Baport,1929). United Aircraft & Transportwas well positioned to respondto all aspectsof bothmilitary and civilian aviation. This vertical integration provided sufficientstrength to weatherthe financialstorms of the 1929 stockmarket crashand ensuing Depression.

TechnicalDevelopment

The military,unlike the commercialmarket, required a constantstream of improvementsin engineand airframe. As thesewere incorporated into prod- uctionmodels, the smallercommercial market reaped the benefits- lowercost andhigher quality - of thequantity production runs supported by themilitary. Someof Pratt& Whitney'sinnovations were easily visible, such as the two-rowradial design of theTwin Wasp, whose first model was rated at 1350 horsepower.Other developmentsto the entirePratt & Whitneyline, while improvingperformance sufficiently to warrantnew modelnumbers, were less obvious:thinner cooling fins, improved superchargers and carburetors,new compositionsfor bearings.

s United TechnologiesArchives. Serial numbers 216 through240 sold to Boeing, shippingdates 17 Feb 1927through 18 May 1927.The recordbears the comment"first commercialairline engine."Serial numbers 683-727 "first commercialseries" shipped 1/9/28-5/14/28;"second commercial series" numbers 729-740, shipped 4/15/28-5/21/28, to variousmanufacturers. Of the first thousandserial numbers, 738 are recordedas sold to theNa W. 170 / BAYLA SINGER

The BalancingAct, 1930-35

The growth and improvementof infrastructureelements such as airports,radio, and navigationalinstruments helped support concurrent evolutionof civilianaviation. As civilianaviation began to answera wider varietyof socialfunctions, the World War I surplusengines and airframes were slowlydisplaced by the newermodels (see, e.g., Aviation, March 1934, pp. 72- 76;May 1935, pp. 178-180,201). Aeronautical manufacturers trod a precarious path,dependent on governmentsubsidy and struggling to establisha stable civilianbusiness environment. Mih'tary procurement remained the economic backboneof the industry. Encouragedby the Navy,Pratt & Whitneybegan development of the Twin Waspand a smallerversion, the Twin WaspJr, in 1929.The primary advantagesof the two-rowconfiguration were smootheroperation, higher operatingspeeds (hence higher power), and smaller frontal diameter. Flight tests"in a longseries of Navyairplanes" were conducted in 1931through 1933. Production "was commenced in 1934 and from that time on... further improvementsto these engines, including automatic mixture and power control carburetors,fully automaticvalve gear lubrication, [and] improved cylinder cooling[resulted in] increasedpower and evengreater dependability." The Twin Wasp and Twin WaspJr were eventuallypurchased in significant quantitiesby boththe Army and the Navy (Olligainen, 1938; Dependable Engines, 1990). Celebrityendorsement, and record-setting achievements, continued to be importantthroughout the 1930s.After the Granville Gee Bee taxed Jimmy Doolittle'spiloting skill to the utmostin Augustand September1932, he neverthelesssent Pratt & Whitneya letteron ShellPetroleum letterhead, I wantedto tell you that the WaspSenior functioned perfectly duringthe ShellSpeed Dashes and theThompson Trophy Race. I have never flown a sweeterrunning engine and want to congratulateyou and the Pratt & WhitneyCompany... (Prouty, 1977,pp. 77-81; Doolittle, 1932) AmeliaEarhart owned and flew a Wasp-poweredLockheed Vega; the planein whichshe made her last flight in 1937was a Lockheed10 E Electra, withtwo Wasp engines (Blay, 1988, p. 22). Passengertraffic continued to growwith the increasingcomfort and convenienceof the airlines'planes and schedules.Advertising in Aviation acknowledgedthe new markets; e.g., one illustration shows over a dozenmen and fashionablyattired women waiting to board a trimotor, another advertisementtouts new materialswhich "bring valuablerefinements in passengerplanes," and yet another, showing a chic young woman at easein her airlineseat, simply offers "Latest Upholstery Fabrics for ModernTransporta- tion"(Aviation, February 9, 1929,p. 394;April 6, 1929,p. 1136;June 15, 1929, p. 2186). ENGINEERING SUCCESS: PRATT & WHITNEY AIRCRAFT / 171

Passengertraffic still did not generateenough revenue to supportthe service,however. Government support, in the form of subsidizedairmail contracts,was sought and obtained by Unitedand other airline operators. This proveda sourceof notorietyin 1934,when Senator Hugo L. Blackdirected an investigationinto what seemed inordinate, not to sayobscene, profits made by the aviationindustry at a timewhen other sectors of the Americaneconomy weresuffering (Hearings, 1934).

Interdependence,1920-1940

Both the aviationindustry and the federalgovernment were caught in mutual dependencethroughout this period. Companiessuch as Pratt & WhitneyAircraft prospered by employingdemonstrated technical excellence togetherwith personalconnections in timelyfashion. Civiliandesigners and manufacturersneeded large markets to provide economicsupport for innovation,while the militarysaw the importanceof a well-developedcivilian manufacturing capability long beforecivil aviation emergedfrom the barnstormingstage. The industrychafed at the restrictions attendantupon receiptof publicmoney, yet reliedon govemmentcontracts andsubsidies during this period of pioneeringgrowth. Verticalintegration, an effectivetool in adaptingto theuncertain civilian market,rendered United and others vulnerable to deeplyheld public anti-trust sentiments.The governmentcould not affordto ignorethis, and indeed used thesesentiments as a politicalbrake on the degreeto whichit accommodated the aeronauticalindustry. The emergenceof a self-sufficientcivilian airline industo] awaited the developmentof aircraftwhich were safeand comfortable enough to attracta large number of passengers,but such developmentrequired a sizeable investmentin researchand innovation. Since the civilianmarket could not yet supportthis investment, federal recognition of the nationalinterest prompted long-termeconomic support. With this stablesupport, Pratt & Whitneycould concentrateon solvingthe technicalproblems encountered with increasing demandsfor higherengine performance.

Refezences

Bilstein,Roger E., F•ht inAmerica, 1900-1985: From the Wffghts to the Astronauts (Baltimore & London,1984). Blay,Roy, "'s Last Flight," Lo&heedHoti•om, issue 26, May 1988. Byttebier,Hugo T., "The CurtissD-12 Aero Engine,"Sraithsonian Annals of F•ht • 7. (WashingtonDC, 1972),p. 75. D•endableEngines...Since 1925, Pratt & Whitneybooklet J32952 July 1990. Doolittle,James H. to DonaldL. Brown.Sept 16, 1932.United Technologies Archives, Cabinet922A, folder"Doolitfle, James H." FifteenthCensus ofthe United States. 1950. Manufactures 1929. VoL I, R•orts!Y lndus#ies.Group 14,pp. 1189-1192;Sixteenth Census of the United States. 1940. Manufactures. 1959. Volume II, part2, Reportsby IndustriesGroups 11 to 20, 540-542. 172 / BAYLA SINGER

HeatingsBe•re a SpecialCommittee onInvestigation ofAir Mail andOcean Mail Contracts.1933-1934. UnitedStates Senate. 73rd Congress,2nd Session.Transcripts of the investigation:see especiallyparts 4, 5. SUDOC:Y4.Ai7/2:H35. Heron,S.D., Development ofAviation Fueh (Andover, MA., 1950). Hobbs,Leonard S., oral interview19 March1970. Interviewed by JohnH. Martin.United TechnologiesArchives, East Hartford, CT. Kepos,Paula, Editor, International Directory ofCompany Histories, Volume 9, (Detroit,London, Washington,DC., 1994). Morison,Elting E., Men,Machines, and Modern Times (Cambridge, MA and London,England, 1966). Olligainen,J., "pratt& Whitney2-Row 14-Cylinder Engines" Typescript, datelined The Hague,October 1, 1938.United Technologies archives, drawer 910 B, folder"Twin Wasp(R-1830)-7, Engine Modal History - General." Osborn,Earl D., "ModernPlanes vs War Surplus Equipment" Aviation, 0an 12,1925), 47. Prouty,Col. Fletcher,USAF (Ret)"Jimmy Doolitfle and the Gee Bee"Air ForceMagazine (February1977), 77-81." United Technologies Archives, Cabinet 922A, folder"Prouty, 'JimmyDoolitfle and the Gee Bee"' Air ForceMagazine, (February 1977), 77-81. Recordsof the SpecialCommittee of the Senateto InvestigateAir-Mail and Ocean-Mail Contracts.1933-35. National Archives and RecordsAdministration (NARA) Record Group# 46, Box153, folder "United Aircraft - Pratt& Whitney." Roland,Alex, Model Research: The National Advisory Committee .•r Aeronautics 19I$-1958, NASA HistorySeries, 1985. NASA SP-4103.vol. 1. Ryder,Earle A., interviewedby HarveyLippincott. United TechnologyArchives, East Hartford, CT. Schlaifer,Robert, Development ofAircraft Engines (Andover, MA, 1950). Smith, Herschel,Aircraft Piston Engines: From the Man• Bal,•erto the ContinentalTiara (Manhattan,KS, 1981). Rentschief,Frederick, An AccountofPratt eY IVhitnf7 (Privately printed, 1950). Trimble,William F., AdmiralIVil•am A. Mofl?tt,Architect of NavalAviation (Washington & London,1994). Trimble,William F., IVingsj•r theNavy: A Historyof theNaval Aircraft Factory, 1917-1956 (Annapolis,MD, 1990). The Pratt eY IVhitnf7Aircraft Story privately published by the Pratt & WhitneyAircraft Divisionof UnitedAircraft Corporation. August 1950. p. 31,73. UnitedAircraft & TransportCorporation, First Annual Report to StockholdersDecember 1929.