COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN Issue 3 Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, D.C. Fall 1993 FROM THE RUSSIAN ARCHIVES ARCHIVAL RESEARCH IN MOSCOW: NEW FINDINGS ON THE KOREAN WAR Progress and Pitfalls Translation and Commentary by Kathryn Weathersby by Mark Kramer While the opening of Soviet ar- War, 1950-53, and the Armistice Ne- The British writer and literary critic Lytton chives brought high expectations for gotiations,” is one such find. It is a Strachey once remarked that “ignorance is the first quick answers to long-standing ques- survey of Soviet and Chinese involve- requisite of the historian — ignorance, which simpli- tions about the Cold War, those of us ment in the Korean War that was fies and clarifies, which selects and omits.”1 By this working in the Soviet archives have compiled in 1966 by so far unidenti- criterion, historians studying the Soviet Union were found that they are like other historical fied members of the staff of the Soviet remarkably lucky until very recently. Unlike scholars collections; individual documents con- Foreign Ministry archive. The appar- of American politics and foreign policy, who had the tain only fragments of the information ent purpose of this internal history daunting task each year of poring through thousands we seek. It is only after laboriously was to provide background informa- of newly declassified documents, specialists on the sifting through a great and varied mass tion for the small group of Soviet Soviet Union normally were forced to go about their of records that we can begin to piece officials who were at that time en- work without reading a single item from the Soviet together even one part of the intricate gaged in discussions with the People’s archives. Soviet authorities exercised tight control story of the Cold War. Republic of China and North Viet- over all official documents and archival repositories, Occasionally, however, we come nam over possible Soviet assistance and no procedures were in place to release any of these upon a single document that directly to the Viet Cong in their war with the materials to the public. For nearly 75 years, the answers a major question. The docu- United States.1 This document thus information available about Soviet policy-making ment excerpted below, “On the Korean tells us something about Soviet atti- was so sparse that Western scholars often had to rely continued on page 14 exclusively on published sources, supplemented by a few interviews. Soviet Foreign Policy During the Cold War: Now that the Soviet Union has ceased to exist, several of the key Soviet archives have finally been A DOCUMENTARY SAMPLER opened — if only on a limited and sporadic basis — for scholarly research. This development has brought On 12-15 January 1993, in the presidium of the Russian Academy of Sciences both benefits and drawbacks. The focus here will be building in Moscow, the Cold War International History Project sponsored the first scholarly conference on Cold War history to be based on newly available archival mainly on the drawbacks, but that does not mean the sources in the former Soviet Union. CWIHP organized the conference in collabo- benefits have been negligible. As recently as three to ration with the Institute of General History of the Russian Academy of Sciences and four years ago, the notion that Western and Russian the Storage Center for Contemporary Documentation (SCCD, or TsKhSD, its scholars would be permitted to examine sensitive Russian acronym), which houses the post-1952 records of the CPSU Central postwar documents in the archives of the Soviet Committee. Over four days Russian and American scholars presented roughly three Foreign Ministry or the Central Committee of the dozen papers, on topics ranging from the Cold War’s origins to the Sino-Soviet split continued on page 18 to the Soviet invasions of Hungary and Czechoslovakia to the superpower crises over Suez, Berlin, the Taiwan Straits, and Cuba. (Several of these papers have since been published by CWIHP in revised form as Working Papers—by Hope Harrison and INSIDE: Vladislav Zubok on the Berlin Crisis, 1958-62, and by Kathryn Weathersby on Soviet policy and the origins of the Korean War, 1945-50—and more are slated to appear Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia (Part 2) 2 as working papers and in a forthcoming edited volume.) Russian Foreign Ministry Archives 26, 27 An essential precondition to the holding of the conference was a written Soviet Tactical Nuclear Weapons and agreement by SCCD that all participants, whether Russian or foreign, would receive the Cuban Missile Crisis: An Exchange 40, 41 equal access to released materials, that all materials released for the conference Warsaw Pact Planning: A Response 51 would be made available to the world scholarly community, and that “no restric- Update 70 continued on page 55 2 COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN THE PRAGUE SPRING AND THE emerged up to now suggests that, for the been a substitute for materials contained in SOVIET INVASION OF most part, the best analyses produced by archives, but, taken cumulatively, they gave CZECHOSLOVAKIA: Western scholars in the pre-glasnost era will Western scholars a body of evidence incom- New Interpretations stand up very well. There are, of course, parably richer than the meager details known innumerable details that have to be revised, about most other Soviet foreign policy deci- by Mark Kramer and, as indicated below, details can often be sions. It is not wholly surprising, then, that (Second of two parts) important. But except for a few more sweep- pre-glasnost analyses of the Czechoslovak ing changes that may be necessary (as will be crisis have fared remarkably well amidst the The first part of this two-part article discussed in the final section of this article), flood of post-Communist revelations. provided a brief review of the vast amount prevailing conceptions of the crisis and of the Still, if it is true that documents released of material that has been released over the Soviet-led invasion have not been greatly since 1989 have not undermined our basic past few years regarding the Prague Spring altered thus far by the declassified docu- understanding of the Soviet invasion of and the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia ments, new memoirs, and other evidence that Czechoslovakia, it is also true that earlier in August 1968.1 The aim of this part is to has recently come to light. treatments of certain key aspects of the crisis offer a preliminary look at some of the new The fact that drastic changes have not need to be revised to take account of new interpretations that can be derived from the been required in the broad historical record is evidence. The revised interpretations of wealth of fresh evidence, including newly in part attributable to the insight and meticu- these matters can help provide a clearer available materials from East European and lous research that Western scholars earlier picture of the crisis as a whole. Obviously, former Soviet archives. brought to bear on the topic. The events of the discussion that follows is not intended to The first question to be asked is whether 1968 attracted some of the best analysts in be an exhaustive compilation of changes the documents and memoirs that have re- the field, and it shows in the quality of their necessitated by evidence that has emerged cently become available or soon will be work. Another reason that pre-glasnost schol- over the past few years, but it should give a available are likely to force drastic changes arship has stood up well, however, is that reasonable idea of the importance that seem- in the historical record. Does the new evi- Western observers had access to far more ingly narrow aspects of the crisis can have dence compel Western scholars to rethink primary material about the Czechoslovak when seen in a new light. Many other topics their whole understanding of the Czecho- crisis than they normally had about key events not discussed here—including the influence slovak crisis? Will older analyses of the in Soviet foreign policy. Scholars were able of hard-line East European leaders; the role subject have to be discarded? Occasionally, to make good use, for example, of documents of prominent officials such as Janos Kadar, historical disclosures do bring about funda- that were brought out of Czechoslovakia Aleksei Kosygin, and Yurii Andropov; East- mental changes in traditional interpretations shortly after the invasion.3 They also were West military and diplomatic relations be- of events. Such was the case, for example, able to draw on the first-hand observations fore and during the invasion; Soviet/East with the revelations in the mid-1970s about contained in published interviews with and European military preparations; Brezhnev’s the crucial role of code-breaking and signals commentaries by leading figures in the cri- contacts with Dubcek; and the post-invasion intelligence (SIGINT) in the U.S. and Brit- sis, such as Josef Smrkovsky, Jiri Hajek, Jiri talks between the Soviet Union and Czecho- ish efforts in World War II.2 Military histo- Pelikan, and Zdenek Hejzlar.4 Moreover, by slovakia—will be covered in other analyses ries that had failed to take due account of the mid- to late 1970s a growing number of by the present author scheduled for publica- this factor — which is to say, all histories up memoirs by former Czechoslovak officials tion in the near future.7 to that point — were suddenly rendered were available in the West. Books by Hajek, obsolete, or at least were in need of major Zdenek Mlynar, and Pelikan, among others, 1. The “Letters of Invitation” to Brezhnev revision.