GLOBAL JUSTICE AND DUTY TO HUMANITY —A PHENOMENOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE Xunwu Chen Abstract: This essay is devoted to exploring global justice as duty to humanity. The essay first explores humanity as the universal substance of all humankind, indicating that if a person loses a quality, s/he is not alienated or less than himself/herself; but if a person loses his/her humanity, s/he is alienated and absurd. Second, the essay demonstrates that the idea of humanity as the universal substance of all humankind is necessary to make senses those operating norms and principles of global justice in our time, including human rights, crimes against humanity and toleration. Third, essay indicates that global justice is the way of human living because it is consistent with humanity as the universal substance of all humankind. Therefore, the essay concludes that global justice is giving due to humanity as a substance. We can hardly talk about global justice today without mentioning the concepts of the law of humanity, human rights, crimes against humanity, and global cultural toleration. What are conspicuous also follow. First, we search for global justice of, for, and by all humankind in the globe, not justice for all beings—humans and non-humans included. We aim at global principles of justice that normalize all humankind on the earth, not principles of justice that regulate all beings, humans and non-humans alike. Second, if there should be global justice of, for, and by all humankind on the earth, all humankind must share some commonalities. Third, the global human community formally declares the norms of human rights, crimes against humanity, and cultural toleration as the norms of global justice recognized in the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 and the Rome Statute of International Criminal Courts in 2002. Therefore, the following normative question arises: What necessary condition(s) must be met if the norm of human rights, the laws of crimes against humanity, and the norm of global cultural toleration are applicable to all human persons, institutions, and practices Dr. XUNWU CHEN, Professor of Philosophy, Department of Philosophy & Classics, University of Texas at San Antonio, San Antonio, TX 78249. E-mail: [email protected]. Journal of East-West Thought 22 XUNWU CHEN in the world? Therefore, in this essay, it is argued that in order for us to make better sense of the concept of global justice, we must have a concept of humanity that can account for: (1) humankind in whole is an entity that can be an object of criminal injury; (2) humankind in whole is a sovereign entity that has legitimate legal authority to which those who commit crimes against humanity or offence to the law of humanity and human rights must be answerable for their activities and responsibilities; and (3) humankind in whole is a sovereign entity of legitimate legal authority in whose name juridical laws (such the Roman Statute of International Criminal Court are established and issued, just as America is a political community of legal sovereign in whose names such constructs such as “the American Constitution” and “American Laws”) come into existence. In short, we must have a concept of humanity as an entity with legitimate authority, power, and rights to make claims. What kind of entity can, and should, humanity be in this context? A quality, virtue, or a substance? Without further introduction, I present my case below. I. Let us start with the concept of humanity as the universal substance or the Aristotelian secondary substance of all humankind. The concept implies three ideas: (1) all human beings belong to the same species or family of beings called “humankind” named by humanity; 2) humanity is not merely a quality, but an entity-subject that underlies all human activities and is embodied in all human persons; and (3) the most justified way of living for humankind, consistent with humanity as a substance, is universal and necessary to all humankind. The term “humanity” can name a species or family of beings, not merely a quality. In English, the term “humanity” is often synonymous to such terms as “the human race” or “mankind” (Mazlish 2009, 1). A substance is a subject or entity that possesses qualities or that is predicated by qualities. A quality is a property possessed by an entity. To claim that a being is a substance is not the same as claiming a being is a material entity or a being has a physical body. In reality, we can indulge ourselves in the view that there can be non-material or non-bodily substance, e.g., mental substance. Thus, for example, one can reasonably claim that God is a substance without meaning that God has a physical body or is a physical being. It is not unreasonable for us, and it does make sense for us, to claim that God is a spiritual substance, or to claim that the mind is a Journal of East-West Though GLOBAL JUSTICE AND DUTY TO HUMANITY 23 mental substance. Similarly, to claim that humanity is the universal substance of all human beings is not to claim that humanity is a physical or bodily entity, which occupies a physical space in human beings. Similarly, to claim that a tomato is a substance is not to claim that tomato is a physical entity that occupies a physical space or has a physical body. As Aristotle points out, a substance underlies, and is the subject of, properties, conditions, and activities. That is to say, a substance is not merely a property, but a substantive subject of which properties, conditions, and activities are predicates. As Aristotle sees it, substances divide between primary and secondary ones. A primary substance is an individual entity that “is neither predicable of a subject nor present in a subject.”(Aristotle 1941, 9) A primary substance is not a predicate to another subject, but can only be a subject, which is predicated by qualities, quantities, conditions, and activities. In comparison, a secondary substance refers to species and genus to which primary substances belong and which signifies an entity qualitatively differentiated (Ibid, 12). For the purpose of this study, we should focus on the concept of the secondary substance here. While a secondary substance is asserted of or embodied in a family of primary substances, it does not “merely indicate quality, like the term ‘white’.”(Ibid.) Instead, a secondary substance is also an entity that underlies and is the subject of properties, conditions and activities. Thus, apple is not merely a quality or property of particular Fuji apples, and differs from sweetness as a quality or property of them. Instead, apple indicates a substance qualitatively differentiated from tomato or potato. The humanity of Barbara Stanwyck and Cary Grant differs from goodness, beauty (handsomeness), specific height, and weight that are qualities of these two persons. Their humanity is an entity of which reason, equality, human dignity and free will are properties. Their humanity is a substance designating a family of beings wherein human status and human rights exist. For conceptual clarity, three points warrant repetition. First, an Aristotelian secondary substance is substantially constitutive of a primary substance. That is to say, it is part of the substance of a primary substance in whole. An Aristotelian secondary substance necessarily presents in the substances of primary substances themselves, not their properties or virtues. Proper primary substances necessarily embody the secondary substance as part of its substance or otherwise it is an alienated substance. No wonder, when a person loses his/her humanity substance, s/he is an alienated person and thus becomes absurd. In comparison, if a person loses a quality, s/he is not alienated or less than they are self, but simply lacks the Journal of East-West Thought 24 XUNWU CHEN lost quality. Second, an Aristotelian secondary substance is a substantive subject or entity that has predicates, though it is embodied in a family of primary substances. In particular, humanity is a substantive subject or entity of which human rights, human status, human dignity, and reason are predicates. It is a subject or entity, which can be both a possible object of legal criminal injury and a sovereign being with the legitimate legal authority to define what a legal offence is. Third, the way of an Aristotelian secondary substance’s existence is universal and necessary to all members of the family named by this secondary substance. Moreover, we can understand that humanity is the universal substance of all humankind further as follows. First, humanity has as its functions a set of human feelings such as love, hate, compassion, shame, and repugnance. Meanwhile, humanity itself is not the functions of love, hate, compassion, shame, or repugnance. This differs from that when love functions as love, it is itself; when hate functions as hate, it is itself; when shame functions as shame, it is itself; or when repugnance functions as repugnance, it is itself. Second, it singles out a set of universal values such as dignity, autonomy, liberty, and personal integrity as its properties and predicates. That is to say, these properties or attributes become valuables for humanity, by humanity, and of humanity. Third, it singles out a set of properties or qualities as virtues, e.g., courage, wisdom, propriety, consistence, and the like. Again, these virtues can be predicates of humanity, but humanity is not identical to any of them. Though Kant never uses the concept of humanity as a substance, we can read Kant as asserting the following: (1) all humankind share a common mind which is rational by nature; this universal mind is of definite faculty; and (2) all human beings share a common humanity that has an intrinsic valued called “dignity”, and that is not, and must not be, merely means to other beings, but also an end in itself.